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1 <pre>Network Working Group P. Eronen
2 Request for Comments: 4739 Nokia
3 Category: Experimental J. Korhonen
4 TeliaSonera
5 November 2006
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Multiple Authentication Exchanges</span>
9 <span class="h1">in the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol</span>
10
11 Status of This Memo
12
13 This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
14 community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
15 Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
16 Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
17
18 Copyright Notice
19
20 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).
21
22 Abstract
23
24 The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol supports several
25 mechanisms for authenticating the parties, including signatures with
26 public-key certificates, shared secrets, and Extensible
27 Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods. Currently, each endpoint uses
28 only one of these mechanisms to authenticate itself. This document
29 specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the use of multiple
30 authentication exchanges, using either different mechanisms or the
31 same mechanism. This extension allows, for instance, performing
32 certificate-based authentication of the client host followed by an
33 EAP authentication of the user. When backend authentication servers
34 are used, they can belong to different administrative domains, such
35 as the network access provider and the service provider.
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52 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Usage Scenarios ............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
61 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
62 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Solution ........................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Solution Overview ..........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
64 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Example 1: Multiple EAP Authentications ....................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
65 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Example 2: Mixed EAP and Certificate Authentications .......<a href="#page-7">7</a>
66 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Example 3: Multiple Initiator Certificates .................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
67 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Example 4: Multiple Responder Certificates .................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
68 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Payload Formats .................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
69 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED Notify Payload .....................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
70 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS Notify Payload ........................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
71 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations .............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
72 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
73 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments ................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
74 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
75 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
76 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
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108 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 IKEv2 [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>] supports several mechanisms for parties involved in the
116 IKE_SA (IKE security association). These include signatures with
117 public-key certificates, shared secrets, and Extensible
118 Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods.
119
120 Currently, each endpoint uses only one of these mechanisms to
121 authenticate itself. However, there are scenarios where making the
122 authorization decision in IKEv2 (whether to allow access or not)
123 requires using several of these methods.
124
125 For instance, it may be necessary to authenticate both the host
126 (machine) requesting access, and the user currently using the host.
127 These two authentications would use two separate sets of credentials
128 (such as certificates and associated private keys) and might even use
129 different authentication mechanisms.
130
131 To take another example, when an operator is hosting a Virtual
132 Private Network (VPN) gateway service for a third party, it may be
133 necessary to authenticate the client to both the operator (for
134 billing purposes) and the third party's Authentication,
135 Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server (for authorizing access to
136 the third party's internal network).
137
138 This document specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the use of
139 multiple authentication exchanges, using either different mechanisms
140 or the same mechanism. This extension allows, for instance,
141 performing certificate-based authentication of the client host
142 followed by an EAP authentication of the user.
143
144 Each authentication exchange requiring communication with backend AAA
145 servers may be directed to different backend AAA servers, located
146 even in different administrative domains. However, details of the
147 communication between the IKEv2 gateway and the backend
148 authentication servers are beyond the scope of this document. In
149 particular, this document does not specify any changes to existing
150 AAA protocols, and it does not require the use of any particular AAA
151 protocol.
152
153 In case of several EAP authentications, it is important to notice
154 that they are not a "sequence" (as described in Section 2.1 of
155 [<a href="#ref-EAP" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">EAP</a>]), but separate independent EAP conversations, which are usually
156 also terminated in different EAP servers. Multiple authentication
157 methods within a single EAP conversation are still prohibited as
158 described in Section 2.1 of [<a href="#ref-EAP" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">EAP</a>]. Using multiple independent EAP
159 conversations is similar to the separate Network Access Provider
160 (NAP) and Internet Service Provider (ISP) authentication exchanges
161
162
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164 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
167
168
169 planned for [<a href="#ref-PANA" title="&quot;Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Requirements&quot;">PANA</a>]. The discovery of the appropriate EAP server for
170 each EAP authentication conversation is based on AAA routing.
171
172 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Usage Scenarios</span>
173
174 Figure 1 shows an example architecture of an operator-hosted VPN
175 scenario that could benefit from a two-phase authentication within
176 the IKEv2 exchange. First, the client authenticates towards the
177 Network Access Provider (NAP) and gets access to the NAP-hosted VPN
178 gateway. The first-phase authentication involves the backend AAA
179 server of the NAP. After the first authentication, the client
180 initiates the second authentication round that also involves the
181 Third Party's backend AAA server. If both authentications succeed,
182 the required IPsec tunnels are set up and the client can access
183 protected networks behind the Third Party.
184
185
186 Client *Network Access Provider*
187 +---------+ +---------+ +-----+
188 | | | NAP's | | NAP |
189 |Protected| IPsec SAs | Tunnel | AAA Protocol | AAA |
190 |Endpoint |&lt;------------------&gt;|Endpoint |&lt;------------&gt;|Serv/|
191 | | | | |Proxy|
192 +---------+ +---------+ +-----+
193 ^ ^
194 IPsec or / AAA |
195 Leased Line / Protocol |
196 / |
197 v |
198 +---------+ *Third Party* v
199 |3rd Party| +-----+
200 Protected | Tunnel | | 3rd |
201 Subnet &lt;----|Endpoint | |Party|
202 | | | AAA |
203 +---------+ +-----+
204
205 Figure 1: Two-phase authentication used to gain access to
206 the Third Party network via Network Access Provider. AAA
207 traffic goes through NAP's AAA server.
208
209 The NAP's AAA server can be used to proxy the AAA traffic to the
210 Third Party's backend AAA server. Alternatively, the AAA traffic
211 from the NAP's tunnel endpoint could go directly to the Third Party's
212 backend AAA servers. However, this is more or less an AAA routing
213 issue.
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220 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology</span>
226
227 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
228 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
229 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="#ref-KEYWORDS" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">KEYWORDS</a>].
230
231 The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication
232 server", "EAP server", and "peer" in this document are to be
233 interpreted as described in [<a href="#ref-EAP" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">EAP</a>].
234
235 When messages containing IKEv2 payloads are described, optional
236 payloads are shown in brackets (for instance, "[FOO]"), and a plus
237 sign indicates that a payload can be repeated one or more times (for
238 instance, "FOO+").
239
240 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Solution</span>
241
242 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Solution Overview</span>
243
244 The peers announce support for this IKEv2 extension by including a
245 MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response
246 (responder) and the first IKE_AUTH request (initiator).
247
248 If both peers support this extension, either of them can announce
249 that it wishes to have a second authentication by including an
250 ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS notification in any IKE_AUTH message that
251 contains an AUTH payload. This indicates that the peer sending the
252 ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS wishes to authenticate another set of
253 credentials to the other peer. The next IKE_AUTH message sent by
254 this peer will contain a second identity payload (IDi or IDr) and
255 starts another authentication exchange. The IKE_AUTH phase is
256 considered successful only if all the individual authentication
257 exchanges complete successfully.
258
259 It is assumed that both peers know what credentials they want to
260 present; there is no negotiation about, for instance, what type of
261 authentication is to be done. As in IKEv2, EAP-based authentication
262 is always requested by the initiator (by omitting the AUTH payload).
263
264 The AUTH payloads are calculated as specified in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>] Sections
265 2.15 and 2.16, where IDi' refers to the latest IDi payload sent by
266 the initiator, and IDr' refers to the latest IDr payload sent by the
267 responder. If EAP methods that do not generate shared keys are used,
268 it is possible that several AUTH payloads with identical contents are
269 sent. When such EAP methods are used, the purpose of the AUTH
270 payload is simply to delimit the authentication exchanges, and ensure
271 that the IKE_SA_INIT request/response messages were not modified.
272
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276 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
279
280
281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Example 1: Multiple EAP Authentications</span>
282
283 This example shows certificate-based authentication of the responder
284 followed by an EAP authentication exchange (messages 1-10). When the
285 first EAP exchange is ending (the initiator is sending its AUTH
286 payload), the initiator announces that it wishes to have a second
287 authentication exchange by including an ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS
288 notification (message 9).
289
290 After this, a second authentication exchange begins. The initiator
291 sends a new IDi payload but no AUTH payload (message 11), indicating
292 that EAP will be used. After that, another EAP authentication
293 exchange follows (messages 12-18).
294
295 Initiator Responder
296 ----------- -----------
297 1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni --&gt;
298 &lt;-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
299 N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
300 3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERTREQ+], [IDr],
301 SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED) } --&gt;
302 &lt;-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
303 EAP(Request) }
304 5. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
305 &lt;-- 6. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
306 7. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
307 &lt;-- 8. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
308 9. HDR, SK { AUTH,
309 N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } --&gt;
310 &lt;-- 10. HDR, SK { AUTH }
311 11. HDR, SK { IDi } --&gt;
312 &lt;-- 12. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
313 13. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
314 &lt;-- 14. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
315 15. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
316 &lt;-- 16. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
317 17. HDR, SK { AUTH } --&gt;
318 &lt;-- 18. HDR, SK { AUTH, SA, TSi, TSr }
319
320 Example 1: Certificate-based authentication of the
321 responder, followed by two EAP authentication exchanges.
322
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332 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Example 2: Mixed EAP and Certificate Authentications</span>
338
339 Another example is shown below: here both the initiator and the
340 responder are first authenticated using certificates (or shared
341 secrets); this is followed by an EAP authentication exchange.
342
343 Initiator Responder
344 ----------- -----------
345 1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni --&gt;
346 &lt;-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
347 N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
348 3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
349 SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED),
350 N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } --&gt;
351 &lt;-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH }
352 5. HDR, SK { IDi } --&gt;
353 &lt;-- 6. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
354 7. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
355 &lt;-- 8. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
356 9. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
357 &lt;-- 10. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
358 11. HDR, SK { AUTH } --&gt;
359 &lt;-- 12. HDR, SK { AUTH, SA, TSi, TSr }
360
361 Example 2: Certificate-based (or shared-secret-based)
362 authentication of the initiator and the responder,
363 followed by an EAP authentication exchange.
364
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388 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Example 3: Multiple Initiator Certificates</span>
394
395 This example shows yet another possibility: the initiator has two
396 different certificates (and associated private keys), and
397 authenticates both of them to the responder.
398
399 Initiator Responder
400 ----------- -----------
401 1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni --&gt;
402 &lt;-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
403 N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
404 3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
405 SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED),
406 N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } --&gt;
407 &lt;-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH }
408 5. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], AUTH } --&gt;
409 &lt;-- 6. HDR, SK { SA, TSi, TSr }
410
411 Example 3: Two certificate-based authentications of the
412 initiator, and one certificate-based authentication
413 of the responder.
414
415 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Example 4: Multiple Responder Certificates</span>
416
417 This example shows yet another possibility: the responder has two
418 different certificates (and associated private keys), and
419 authenticates both of them to the initiator.
420
421 Initiator Responder
422 ----------- -----------
423 1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni --&gt;
424 &lt;-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
425 N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
426 3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
427 SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED) } --&gt;
428 &lt;-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
429 N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) }
430 5. HDR, SK { } --&gt;
431 &lt;-- 6. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
432 SA, TSi, TSr }
433
434 Example 4: Two certificate-based authentications of the
435 responder, and one certificate-based authentication
436 of the initiator.
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444 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Payload Formats</span>
450
451 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED Notify Payload</span>
452
453 The MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED notification is included in the
454 IKE_SA_INIT response or the first IKE_AUTH request to indicate that
455 the peer supports this specification. The Notify Message Type is
456 MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED (16404). The Protocol ID and SPI Size fields
457 MUST be set to zero, and there is no data associated with this Notify
458 type.
459
460 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS Notify Payload</span>
461
462 The ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS notification payload is included in an
463 IKE_AUTH message containing an AUTH payload to indicate that the peer
464 wants to continue with another authentication exchange. The Notify
465 Message Type is ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS (16405). The Protocol ID and
466 SPI Size fields MUST be set to zero, and there is no data associated
467 with this Notify type.
468
469 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
470
471 This document defines two new IKEv2 notifications,
472 MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED and ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS, whose values are
473 allocated from the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" namespace defined in
474 [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>].
475
476 This document does not define any new namespaces to be managed by
477 IANA.
478
479 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
480
481 Security considerations for IKEv2 are discussed in [<a href="#ref-IKEv2" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">IKEv2</a>]. The
482 reader is encouraged to pay special attention to considerations
483 relating to the use of EAP methods that do not generate shared keys.
484 However, the use of multiple authentication exchanges results in at
485 least one new security consideration.
486
487 In normal IKEv2, the responder authenticates the initiator before
488 revealing its identity (except when EAP is used). When multiple
489 authentication exchanges are used to authenticate the initiator, the
490 responder has to reveal its identity before all of the initiator
491 authentication exchanges have been completed.
492
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500 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
503
504
505 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
506
507 The authors would like to thank Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, Spencer
508 Dawkins, Lakshminath Dondeti, Henry Haverinen, Russ Housley, Mika
509 Joutsenvirta, Charlie Kaufman, Tero Kivinen, Yoav Nir, Magnus
510 Nystrom, Mohan Parthasarathy, and Juha Savolainen for their valuable
511 comments.
512
513 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
514
515 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
516
517 [<a id="ref-IKEv2">IKEv2</a>] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
518 <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005.
519
520 [<a id="ref-KEYWORDS">KEYWORDS</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
521 Requirement Levels", <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
522
523 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
524
525 [<a id="ref-EAP">EAP</a>] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
526 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
527 <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, June 2004.
528
529 [<a id="ref-PANA">PANA</a>] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C.
530 Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
531 Access (PANA) Requirements", <a href="./rfc4058">RFC 4058</a>, May 2005.
532
533 Authors' Addresses
534
535 Pasi Eronen
536 Nokia Research Center
537 P.O. Box 407
538 FIN-00045 Nokia Group
539 Finland
540
541 EMail: [email protected]
542
543
544 Jouni Korhonen
545 TeliaSonera
546 P.O. Box 970
547 FIN-00051 Sonera
548 Finland
549
550 EMail: [email protected]
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4739">RFC 4739</a> Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006</span>
559
560
561 Full Copyright Statement
562
563 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).
564
565 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
566 contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
567 retain all their rights.
568
569 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
570 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
571 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST,
572 AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
573 EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
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601
602 Acknowledgement
603
604 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
605 Internet Society.
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 Eronen &amp; Korhonen Experimental [Page 11]
613 </pre>