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<pre>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) S. Gueron |
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Request for Comments: 8452 University of Haifa and Amazon |
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Category: Informational A. Langley |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Google LLC |
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Y. Lindell |
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Bar-Ilan University and Unbound Tech |
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April 2019 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are |
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nonce misuse resistant -- that is, they do not fail catastrophically |
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if a nonce is repeated. |
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This document is the product of the Crypto Forum Research Group. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force |
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(IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research |
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and development activities. These results might not be suitable for |
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deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum |
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Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents |
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approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for any level |
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of Internet Standard; see <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8452">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8452</a>. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. POLYVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. AEADs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Field Operation Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Worked Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. The Relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Additional Comparisons with AES-GCM . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.1">C.1</a>. AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.2">C.2</a>. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.3">C.3</a>. Counter Wrap Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-41">41</a> |
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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The concept of Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) |
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[<a href="./rfc5116" title=""An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"">RFC5116</a>] couples confidentiality and integrity in a single |
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operation, avoiding the risks of the previously common practice of |
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using ad hoc constructions of block-cipher and hash primitives. The |
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most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [<a href="#ref-GCM" title=""Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC"">GCM</a>], is seeing widespread use due to its |
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attractive performance. |
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|
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However, some AEADs (including AES-GCM) suffer catastrophic failures |
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of confidentiality and/or integrity when two distinct messages are |
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encrypted with the same key and nonce. While the requirements for |
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AEADs specify that the pair of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used |
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once, and thus prohibit this, this is a worry in practice. |
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Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For |
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this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only |
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discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the |
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minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak |
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in this situation. |
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This memo specifies two nonce misuse-resistant AEADs: |
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AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV. These AEADs are |
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designed to be able to take advantage of existing hardware support |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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for AES-GCM and can decrypt within 5% of the speed of AES-GCM (for |
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multikilobyte messages). Encryption is, perforce, slower than |
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AES-GCM, because two passes are required in order to achieve that |
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nonce misuse-resistance property. However, measurements suggest that |
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it can still run at two-thirds of the speed of AES-GCM. |
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We suggest that these AEADs be considered in any situation where |
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nonce uniqueness cannot be guaranteed. This includes situations |
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where there is no stateful counter or where such state cannot be |
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guaranteed, as when multiple encryptors use the same key. As |
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discussed in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>, it is RECOMMENDED to use this scheme with |
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randomly chosen nonces. |
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This document represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum Research |
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Group (CFRG). |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title=""Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all |
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capitals, as shown here. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. POLYVAL</span> |
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The GCM-SIV construction is similar to GCM: the block cipher is used |
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in counter mode to encrypt the plaintext, and a polynomial |
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authenticator is used to provide integrity. The authenticator in |
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GCM-SIV is called POLYVAL. |
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POLYVAL, like GHASH (the authenticator in AES-GCM; see [<a href="#ref-GCM" title=""Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC"">GCM</a>], |
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Section 6.4), operates in a binary field of size 2^128. The field is |
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defined by the irreducible polynomial x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + |
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1. The sum of any two elements in the field is the result of XORing |
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them. The product of any two elements is calculated using standard |
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(binary) polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo the |
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irreducible polynomial. |
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We define another binary operation on elements of the field: |
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dot(a, b), where dot(a, b) = a * b * x^-128. The value of the field |
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element x^-128 is equal to x^127 + x^124 + x^121 + x^114 + 1. The |
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result of this multiplication, dot(a, b), is another field element. |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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Polynomials in this field are converted to and from 128-bit strings |
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by taking the least significant bit of the first byte to be the |
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coefficient of x^0, the most significant bit of the first byte to be |
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the coefficient of x^7, and so on, until the most significant bit of |
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the last byte is the coefficient of x^127. |
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POLYVAL takes a field element, H, and a series of field elements |
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X_1, ..., X_s. Its result is S_s, where S is defined by the |
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iteration S_0 = 0; S_j = dot(S_{j-1} + X_j, H), for j = 1..s. |
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We note that POLYVAL(H, X_1, X_2, ...) is equal to |
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ByteReverse(GHASH(ByteReverse(H) * x, ByteReverse(X_1), |
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ByteReverse(X_2), ...)), where ByteReverse is a function that |
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reverses the order of 16 bytes. See <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> for a more detailed |
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explanation. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Encryption</span> |
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AES-GCM-SIV encryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a |
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96-bit nonce, and plaintext and additional data byte strings of |
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variable length. It outputs an authenticated ciphertext that will be |
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16 bytes longer than the plaintext. Both encryption and decryption |
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are only defined on inputs that are a whole number of bytes. |
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If the key-generating key is 16 bytes long, then AES-128 is used |
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throughout. Otherwise, AES-256 is used throughout. |
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The first step of encryption is to generate per-nonce, message- |
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authentication and message-encryption keys. The message- |
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authentication key is 128 bit, and the message-encryption key is |
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either 128 (for AES-128) or 256 bit (for AES-256). |
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These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks |
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that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce, |
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and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext. In |
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the AES-128 case, 128 + 128 = 256 bits of key material need to be |
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generated, and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after |
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discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted. The counter |
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values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2, and 3. For AES-256, six blocks |
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are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive). |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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|
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In pseudocode form, where "++" indicates concatenation and "x[:8]" |
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indicates taking only the first eight bytes from x: |
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|
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func derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce) { |
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message_authentication_key = |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(0) ++ nonce)[:8] ++ |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(1) ++ nonce)[:8] |
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message_encryption_key = |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(2) ++ nonce)[:8] ++ |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(3) ++ nonce)[:8] |
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|
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if bytelen(key_generating_key) == 32 { |
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message_encryption_key ++= |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(4) ++ nonce)[:8] ++ |
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AES(key = key_generating_key, |
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block = little_endian_uint32(5) ++ nonce)[:8] |
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} |
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return message_authentication_key, message_encryption_key |
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} |
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Define the "length block" as a 16-byte value that is the |
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concatenation of the 64-bit, little-endian encodings of |
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bytelen(additional_data) * 8 and bytelen(plaintext) * 8. Pad the |
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plaintext and additional data with zeros until they are each a |
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multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Then X_1, X_2, ... (the |
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series of field elements that are inputs to POLYVAL) are the |
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concatenation of the padded additional data, the padded plaintext, |
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and the length block. |
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Calculate S_s = POLYVAL(message-authentication-key, X_1, X_2, ...). |
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XOR the first twelve bytes of S_s with the nonce and clear the most |
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significant bit of the last byte. Encrypt the result with AES using |
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the message-encryption key to produce the tag. |
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(It's worth highlighting a contrast with AES-GCM here: AES-GCM |
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authenticates the encoded additional data and ciphertext, while |
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AES-GCM-SIV authenticates the encoded additional data and plaintext.) |
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The encrypted plaintext is produced by using AES, with the message- |
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encryption key, in counter mode (see [<a href="#ref-SP800-38A">SP800-38A</a>], Section 6.5) on the |
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unpadded plaintext. The initial counter block is the tag with the |
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most significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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|
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advances by incrementing the first 32 bits interpreted as an |
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unsigned, little-endian integer, wrapping at 2^32. The result of the |
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encryption is the encrypted plaintext (truncated to the length of the |
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plaintext), followed by the tag. |
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In pseudocode form, the encryption process can be expressed as: |
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func right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(input) { |
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while (bytelen(input) % 16 != 0) { |
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input = input ++ "\x00" |
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} |
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return input |
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} |
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func AES_CTR(key, initial_counter_block, in) { |
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block = initial_counter_block |
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output = "" |
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while bytelen(in) > 0 { |
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keystream_block = AES(key = key, block = block) |
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block[0:4] = little_endian_uint32( |
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read_little_endian_uint32(block[0:4]) + 1) |
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todo = min(bytelen(in), bytelen(keystream_block) |
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for j = 0; j < todo; j++ { |
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output = output ++ (keystream_block[j] ^ in[j]) |
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} |
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in = in[todo:] |
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} |
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return output |
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} |
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func encrypt(key_generating_key, |
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nonce, |
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plaintext, |
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additional_data) { |
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if bytelen(plaintext) > 2^36 { |
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fail() |
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} |
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if bytelen(additional_data) > 2^36 { |
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fail() |
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} |
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message_encryption_key, message_authentication_key = |
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derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce) |
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<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
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|
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length_block = |
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little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++ |
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little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8) |
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padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext) |
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padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data) |
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S_s = POLYVAL(key = message_authentication_key, |
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input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++ |
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length_block) |
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for i = 0; i < 12; i++ { |
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S_s[i] ^= nonce[i] |
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} |
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S_s[15] &= 0x7f |
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tag = AES(key = message_encryption_key, block = S_s) |
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counter_block = tag |
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counter_block[15] |= 0x80 |
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return AES_CTR(key = message_encryption_key, |
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initial_counter_block = counter_block, |
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in = plaintext) ++ |
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tag |
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} |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Decryption</span> |
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Decryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, |
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and ciphertext and additional data byte strings of variable length. |
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It either fails or outputs a plaintext that is 16 bytes shorter than |
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the ciphertext. |
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|
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To decrypt an AES-GCM-SIV ciphertext, first derive the message- |
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encryption and message-authentication keys in the same manner as when |
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encrypting. |
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If the ciphertext is less than 16 bytes or more than 2^36 + 16 bytes, |
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then fail. Otherwise, split the input into the encrypted plaintext |
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and a 16-byte tag. Decrypt the encrypted plaintext with the message- |
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encryption key in counter mode, where the initial counter block is |
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the tag with the most significant bit of the last byte set to one. |
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Advance the counter for each block in the same way as when |
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encrypting. At this point, the plaintext is unauthenticated and MUST |
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NOT be output until the following tag confirmation is complete: |
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|
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Pad the additional data and plaintext with zeros until they are each |
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a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Calculate the length |
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block and X_1, X_2, ... as above and compute |
| 382 |
S_s = POLYVAL(message-authentication-key, X_1, X_2, ...) |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the |
| 394 |
most significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the |
| 395 |
message-encryption key. Compare the provided and expected tag values |
| 396 |
in constant time. Fail the decryption if they do not match (and do |
| 397 |
not release the plaintext); otherwise, return the plaintext. |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
In pseudocode form, the decryption process can be expressed as: |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
func decrypt(key_generating_key, |
| 450 |
nonce, |
| 451 |
ciphertext, |
| 452 |
additional_data) { |
| 453 |
if bytelen(ciphertext) < 16 || bytelen(ciphertext) > 2^36 + 16 { |
| 454 |
fail() |
| 455 |
} |
| 456 |
if bytelen(additional_data) > 2^36 { |
| 457 |
fail() |
| 458 |
} |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
message_encryption_key, message_authentication_key = |
| 461 |
derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce) |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
tag = ciphertext[bytelen(ciphertext)-16:] |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
counter_block = tag |
| 466 |
counter_block[15] |= 0x80 |
| 467 |
plaintext = AES_CTR(key = message_encryption_key, |
| 468 |
initial_counter_block = counter_block, |
| 469 |
in = ciphertext[:bytelen(ciphertext)-16]) |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
length_block = |
| 472 |
little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++ |
| 473 |
little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8) |
| 474 |
padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext) |
| 475 |
padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data) |
| 476 |
S_s = POLYVAL(key = message_authentication_key, |
| 477 |
input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++ |
| 478 |
length_block) |
| 479 |
for i = 0; i < 12; i++ { |
| 480 |
S_s[i] ^= nonce[i] |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
S_s[15] &= 0x7f |
| 483 |
expected_tag = AES(key = message_encryption_key, block = S_s) |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
xor_sum = 0 |
| 486 |
for i := 0; i < bytelen(expected_tag); i++ { |
| 487 |
xor_sum |= expected_tag[i] ^ tag[i] |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
if xor_sum != 0 { |
| 491 |
fail() |
| 492 |
} |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
return plaintext |
| 495 |
} |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. AEADs</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
We define two AEADs, in the format of <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, that use AES-GCM-SIV: |
| 508 |
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV. They differ only in |
| 509 |
the size of the AES key used. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
The key input to these AEADs becomes the key-generating key. Thus, |
| 512 |
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV takes a 16-byte key and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV |
| 513 |
takes a 32-byte key. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
The parameters for AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV are then as follows: |
| 516 |
K_LEN is 16, P_MAX is 2^36, A_MAX is 2^36, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12, |
| 517 |
and C_MAX is 2^36 + 16. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
The parameters for AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV differ only in the key size: |
| 520 |
K_LEN is 32, P_MAX is 2^36, A_MAX is 2^36, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12, |
| 521 |
and C_MAX is 2^36 + 16. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Field Operation Examples</span> |
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
Polynomials in this document will be written as 16-byte values. For |
| 526 |
example, the sixteen bytes 01000000000000000000000000000492 would |
| 527 |
represent the polynomial x^127 + x^124 + x^121 + x^114 + 1, which is |
| 528 |
also the value of x^-128 in this field. |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
If a = 66e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e and |
| 531 |
b = ff000000000000000000000000000000, |
| 532 |
then a + b = 99e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e, |
| 533 |
a * b = 37856175e9dc9df26ebc6d6171aa0ae9, and |
| 534 |
dot(a, b) = ebe563401e7e91ea3ad6426b8140c394. |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Worked Example</span> |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
Consider the encryption of the plaintext "Hello world" with the |
| 539 |
additional data "example" under key ee8e1ed9ff2540ae8f2ba9f50bc2f27c |
| 540 |
using AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV. The random nonce that we'll use for this |
| 541 |
example is 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
In order to generate the message-authentication and message- |
| 544 |
encryption keys, a counter is combined with the nonce to form four |
| 545 |
blocks. These blocks are encrypted with the key given above: |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
Counter | Nonce Ciphertext |
| 548 |
00000000752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 -> 310728d9911f1f38c40e952ca83d093e |
| 549 |
01000000752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 -> 37b24316c3fab9a046ae90952daa0450 |
| 550 |
02000000752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 -> a4c5ae624996327947920b2d2412474b |
| 551 |
03000000752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 -> c100be4d7e2c6edd1efef004305ab1e7 |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
The latter halves of the ciphertext blocks are discarded and the |
| 562 |
remaining bytes are concatenated to form the per-message keys. Thus, |
| 563 |
the message-authentication key is 310728d9911f1f3837b24316c3fab9a0, |
| 564 |
and the message-encryption key is a4c5ae6249963279c100be4d7e2c6edd. |
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
The length block contains the encoding of the bit lengths of the |
| 567 |
additional data and plaintext, respectively. The string "example" is |
| 568 |
seven characters, thus 56 bits (or 0x38 in hex). The string "Hello |
| 569 |
world" is 11 characters, or 88 = 0x58 bits. Thus, the length block |
| 570 |
is 38000000000000005800000000000000. |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
The input to POLYVAL is the padded additional data, padded plaintext, |
| 573 |
and then the length block. This is 6578616d706c650000000000000000004 |
| 574 |
8656c6c6f20776f726c64000000000038000000000000005800000000000000, |
| 575 |
based on the ASCII encoding of "example" (6578616d706c65) and "Hello |
| 576 |
world" (48656c6c6f20776f726c64). |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
Calling POLYVAL with the message-authentication key and the input |
| 579 |
above results in S_s = ad7fcf0b5169851662672f3c5f95138f. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
Before encrypting, the nonce is XORed in and the most significant bit |
| 582 |
of the last byte is cleared. This gives |
| 583 |
d85575d8b1c630e256bb6c2c5f95130f, because that bit happened to be one |
| 584 |
previously. Encrypting with the message-encryption key (using |
| 585 |
AES-128) gives the tag, which is 4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1. |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
In order to form the initial counter block, the most significant bit |
| 588 |
of the last byte of the tag is set to one. That doesn't result in a |
| 589 |
change in this example. Encrypting this with the message key (using |
| 590 |
AES-128) gives the first block of the keystream: |
| 591 |
1551f2c1787e81deac9a99f139540ab5. |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
The final ciphertext is the result of XORing the plaintext with the |
| 594 |
keystream and appending the tag. That gives |
| 595 |
5d349ead175ef6b1def6fd4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1. |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
AES-GCM-SIV decryption involves first producing an unauthenticated |
| 600 |
plaintext. This plaintext is vulnerable to manipulation by an |
| 601 |
attacker; thus, if an implementation released some or all of the |
| 602 |
plaintext before authenticating it, other parts of a system may |
| 603 |
process malicious data as if it were authentic. AES-GCM might be |
| 604 |
less likely to lead implementations to do this because there the |
| 605 |
ciphertext is generally authenticated before, or concurrently with, |
| 606 |
the plaintext calculation. Therefore, this text requires that |
| 607 |
implementations MUST NOT release unauthenticated plaintext. Thus, |
| 608 |
system designers should consider memory limitations when picking the |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
size of AES-GCM-SIV plaintexts: large plaintexts may not fit in the |
| 618 |
available memory of some machines, tempting implementations to |
| 619 |
release unverified plaintext. |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
A detailed cryptographic analysis of AES-GCM-SIV appears in |
| 622 |
[<a href="#ref-AES-GCM-SIV">AES-GCM-SIV</a>], and the remainder of this section is a summary of that |
| 623 |
paper. |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
The AEADs defined in this document calculate fresh AES keys for each |
| 626 |
nonce. This allows a larger number of plaintexts to be encrypted |
| 627 |
under a given key. Without this step, AES-GCM-SIV encryption would |
| 628 |
be limited by the birthday bound like other standard modes (e.g., |
| 629 |
AES-GCM, AES-CCM [<a href="./rfc3610" title=""Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)"">RFC3610</a>], and AES-SIV [<a href="./rfc5297" title=""Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"">RFC5297</a>]). This means that |
| 630 |
when 2^64 blocks have been encrypted overall, a distinguishing |
| 631 |
adversary who is trying to break the confidentiality of the scheme |
| 632 |
has an advantage of 1/2. Thus, in order to limit the adversary's |
| 633 |
advantage to 2^-32, at most 2^48 blocks can be encrypted overall. In |
| 634 |
contrast, by deriving fresh keys from each nonce, it is possible to |
| 635 |
encrypt a far larger number of messages and blocks with AES-GCM-SIV. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
We stress that nonce misuse-resistant schemes guarantee that if a |
| 638 |
nonce repeats, then the only security loss is that identical |
| 639 |
plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts. Since this can also |
| 640 |
be a concern (as the fact that the same plaintext has been encrypted |
| 641 |
twice is revealed), we do not recommend using a fixed nonce as a |
| 642 |
policy. In addition, as we show below, better-than-birthday bounds |
| 643 |
are achieved by AES-GCM-SIV when the nonce repetition rate is low. |
| 644 |
Finally, as shown in [<a href="#ref-BHT18" title=""Revisiting AES-GCM- SIV: Multi-user Security, Faster Key Derivation, and Better Bounds"">BHT18</a>], there is a great security benefit in |
| 645 |
the multiuser/multikey setting when each particular nonce is reused |
| 646 |
by a small number of users only. We stress that the nonce misuse- |
| 647 |
resistance property is not intended to be coupled with intentional |
| 648 |
nonce reuse; rather, such schemes provide the best possible security |
| 649 |
in the event of nonce reuse. Due to all of the above, it is |
| 650 |
RECOMMENDED that AES-GCM-SIV nonces be randomly generated. |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
Some example usage bounds for AES-GCM-SIV are given below. The |
| 653 |
adversary's advantage is the "AdvEnc" from [<a href="#ref-key-derive">key-derive</a>] and is |
| 654 |
colloquially the ability of an attacker to distinguish ciphertexts |
| 655 |
from random bit strings. The bounds below limit this advantage to |
| 656 |
2^-32. For up to 256 uses of the same nonce and key (i.e., where one |
| 657 |
can assume that nonce misuse is no more than this bound), the |
| 658 |
following message limits should be respected (this assumes a short |
| 659 |
additional authenticated data (AAD), i.e., less than 64 bytes): |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
2^29 messages, where each plaintext is at most 1 GiB |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
2^35 messages, where each plaintext is at most 128 MiB |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
2^49 messages, where each plaintext is at most 1 MiB |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
2^61 messages, where each plaintext is at most 16 KiB |
| 676 |
|
| 677 |
Suzuki et al. [<a href="#ref-multi-birthday">multi-birthday</a>] show that even if nonces are selected |
| 678 |
uniformly at random, the probability that one or more values would be |
| 679 |
repeated 256 or more times is negligible until the number of nonces |
| 680 |
reaches 2^102. (Specifically, the probability is 1/((2^96)^(255)) * |
| 681 |
Binomial(q, 256), where q is the number of nonces.) Since 2^102 is |
| 682 |
vastly greater than the limit on the number of plaintexts per key |
| 683 |
given above, we don't feel that this limit on the number of repeated |
| 684 |
nonces will be a problem. This also means that selecting nonces at |
| 685 |
random is a safe practice with AES-GCM-SIV. The bounds obtained for |
| 686 |
random nonces are as follows (as above, for these bounds, the |
| 687 |
adversary's advantage is at most 2^-32): |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
2^32 messages, where each plaintext is at most 8 GiB |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
2^48 messages, where each plaintext is at most 32 MiB |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
2^64 messages, where each plaintext is at most 128 KiB |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
For situations where, for some reason, an even higher number of nonce |
| 696 |
repeats is possible (e.g., in devices with very poor randomness), the |
| 697 |
message limits need to be reconsidered. Theorem 7 in [<a href="#ref-AES-GCM-SIV">AES-GCM-SIV</a>] |
| 698 |
contains more details, but for up to 1,024 repeats of each nonce, the |
| 699 |
limits would be (again assuming a short AAD, i.e., less than 64 |
| 700 |
bytes): |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
2^25 messages, where each plaintext is at most 1 GiB |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
2^31 messages, where each plaintext is at most 128 MiB |
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
2^45 messages, where each plaintext is at most 1 MiB |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
2^57 messages, where each plaintext is at most 16 KiB |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
In addition to calculating fresh AES keys for each nonce, these AEADs |
| 711 |
also calculate fresh POLYVAL keys. Previous versions of GCM-SIV did |
| 712 |
not do this and instead used part of the AEAD's key as the POLYVAL |
| 713 |
key. Bleichenbacher pointed out [<a href="#ref-Bleichenbacher16">Bleichenbacher16</a>] that this allowed |
| 714 |
an attacker who controlled the AEAD key to force the POLYVAL key to |
| 715 |
be zero. If a user of this AEAD authenticated messages with a secret |
| 716 |
additional-data value, then this would be insecure as the attacker |
| 717 |
could calculate a valid authenticator without knowing the input. |
| 718 |
This does not violate the standard properties of an AEAD as the |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
additional data is not assumed to be confidential. However, we want |
| 730 |
these AEADs to be robust against plausible misuse and also to be |
| 731 |
drop-in replacements for AES-GCM and so derive nonce-specific POLYVAL |
| 732 |
keys to avoid this issue. |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
We also wish to note that the probability of successful forgery |
| 735 |
increases with the number of attempts that an attacker is permitted. |
| 736 |
The advantage defined in [<a href="#ref-key-derive">key-derive</a>] and used above is specified in |
| 737 |
terms of the ability of an attacker to distinguish ciphertexts from |
| 738 |
random bit strings. It thus covers both confidentiality and |
| 739 |
integrity, and Theorem 6.2 in [<a href="#ref-key-derive">key-derive</a>] shows that the advantage |
| 740 |
increases with the number of decryption attempts, although much more |
| 741 |
slowly than with the number of encryptions; the dependence on the |
| 742 |
number of decryption queries for forgery is actually only linear, not |
| 743 |
quadratic. The latter is an artifact of the bound in the paper not |
| 744 |
being tight. If an attacker is permitted extremely large numbers of |
| 745 |
attempts, then the tiny probability that any given attempt succeeds |
| 746 |
may sum to a non-trivial chance. |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
A security analysis of a similar scheme without nonce-based key |
| 749 |
derivation appears in [<a href="#ref-GCM-SIV" title=""GCM-SIV: Full Nonce Misuse- Resistant Authenticated Encryption at Under One Cycle Per Byte"">GCM-SIV</a>], and a full analysis of the bounds |
| 750 |
when applying nonce-based key derivation appears in [<a href="#ref-key-derive">key-derive</a>]. A |
| 751 |
larger table of bounds and other information appears at |
| 752 |
[<a href="#ref-aes-gcm-siv-homepage">aes-gcm-siv-homepage</a>]. |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
The multiuser/multikey security of AES-GCM-SIV was studied by |
| 755 |
[<a href="#ref-BHT18" title=""Revisiting AES-GCM- SIV: Multi-user Security, Faster Key Derivation, and Better Bounds"">BHT18</a>], which showed that security is almost the same as in the |
| 756 |
single-user setting, as long as nonces do not repeat many times |
| 757 |
across many users. This is the case when nonces are chosen randomly. |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
IANA has added two entries to the "AEAD Algorithms" registry: |
| 762 |
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV (Numeric ID 30) and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV |
| 763 |
(Numeric ID 31), both referencing this document as their |
| 764 |
specification. |
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. References</span> |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 771 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 772 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 773 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a> |
| 786 |
<a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, |
| 787 |
May 2017, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>>. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
[<a id="ref-SP800-38A">SP800-38A</a>] |
| 790 |
Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of |
| 791 |
Operation: Methods and Techniques", NIST SP 800-38A, |
| 792 |
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A, December 2001, |
| 793 |
<<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/</a> |
| 794 |
<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final">final</a>>. |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
[<a id="ref-AES-GCM-SIV">AES-GCM-SIV</a>] |
| 799 |
Gueron, S., Langley, A., and Y. Lindell, "AES-GCM-SIV: |
| 800 |
Specification and Analysis", July 2017, |
| 801 |
<<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/168">https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/168</a>>. |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
[<a id="ref-aes-gcm-siv-homepage">aes-gcm-siv-homepage</a>] |
| 804 |
Gueron, S., Langley, A., and Y. Lindell, "Webpage for the |
| 805 |
AES-GCM-SIV Mode of Operation", |
| 806 |
<<a href="https://cyber.biu.ac.il/aes-gcm-siv/">https://cyber.biu.ac.il/aes-gcm-siv/</a>>. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
[<a id="ref-BHT18">BHT18</a>] Bose, P., Hoang, V., and S. Tessaro, "Revisiting AES-GCM- |
| 809 |
SIV: Multi-user Security, Faster Key Derivation, and |
| 810 |
Better Bounds", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2018, |
| 811 |
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-78381-9_18, May 2018, |
| 812 |
<<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/136.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/136.pdf</a>>. |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
[<a id="ref-Bleichenbacher16">Bleichenbacher16</a>] |
| 815 |
Bleichenbacher, D., "Subject: AES-GCM-SIV security of the |
| 816 |
additional data", message to the cfrg mailing list, 24 |
| 817 |
June 2016, <<a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qgh-Yxmj7CC7cq2YZLpmfGA3x-o">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/</a> |
| 818 |
<a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qgh-Yxmj7CC7cq2YZLpmfGA3x-o">qgh-Yxmj7CC7cq2YZLpmfGA3x-o</a>>. |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
[<a id="ref-GCM">GCM</a>] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of |
| 821 |
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST |
| 822 |
SP 800-38D, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D, November 2007, |
| 823 |
<<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/</a> |
| 824 |
<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final">final</a>>. |
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
[<a id="ref-GCM-SIV">GCM-SIV</a>] Gueron, S. and Y. Lindell, "GCM-SIV: Full Nonce Misuse- |
| 827 |
Resistant Authenticated Encryption at Under One Cycle Per |
| 828 |
Byte", Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on |
| 829 |
Computer and Communications Security, |
| 830 |
DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813613, October 2015, |
| 831 |
<<a href="http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2810103.2813613">http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2810103.2813613</a>>. |
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
[<a id="ref-key-derive">key-derive</a>] |
| 842 |
Gueron, S. and Y. Lindell, "Better Bounds for Block Cipher |
| 843 |
Modes of Operation via Nonce-Based Key Derivation", |
| 844 |
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer |
| 845 |
and Communications Security, DOI 10.1145/3133956.3133992, |
| 846 |
2017, <<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133992">https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133992</a>>. |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
[<a id="ref-multi-birthday">multi-birthday</a>] |
| 849 |
Suzuki, K., Tonien, D., Kurosawa, K., and K. Toyota, |
| 850 |
"Birthday Paradox for Multi-collisions", Information |
| 851 |
Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2006, Lecture Notes in |
| 852 |
Computer Science, Volume 4296, DOI 10.1007/11927587_5, |
| 853 |
2006, <<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11927587_5">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11927587_5</a>>. |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3610">RFC3610</a>] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with |
| 856 |
CBC-MAC (CCM)", <a href="./rfc3610">RFC 3610</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3610, September |
| 857 |
2003, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610</a>>. |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated |
| 860 |
Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, |
| 861 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116</a>>. |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5297">RFC5297</a>] Harkins, D., "Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) |
| 864 |
Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption |
| 865 |
Standard (AES)", <a href="./rfc5297">RFC 5297</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5297, October |
| 866 |
2008, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297</a>>. |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. The Relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH</span> |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
GHASH and POLYVAL both operate in GF(2^128), although with different |
| 900 |
irreducible polynomials: POLYVAL works modulo x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + |
| 901 |
x^121 + 1 and GHASH works modulo x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1. Note |
| 902 |
that these irreducible polynomials are the "reverse" of each other. |
| 903 |
|
| 904 |
GHASH also has a different mapping between 128-bit strings and field |
| 905 |
elements. Whereas POLYVAL takes the least significant to most |
| 906 |
significant bits of the first byte to be the coefficients of x^0 to |
| 907 |
x^7, GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^7 to x^0. This |
| 908 |
continues until, for the last byte, POLYVAL takes the least |
| 909 |
significant to most significant bits to be the coefficients of x^120 |
| 910 |
to x^127, while GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^127 to |
| 911 |
x^120. |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
The combination of these facts means that it's possible to "convert" |
| 914 |
values between the two by reversing the order of the bytes in a |
| 915 |
16-byte string. The differing interpretations of bit order takes |
| 916 |
care of reversing the bits within each byte, and then reversing the |
| 917 |
bytes does the rest. This may have a practical benefit for |
| 918 |
implementations that wish to implement both GHASH and POLYVAL. |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
In order to be clear which field a given operation is performed in, |
| 921 |
let mulX_GHASH be a function that takes a 16-byte string, converts it |
| 922 |
to an element of GHASH's field using GHASH's convention, multiplies |
| 923 |
it by x, and converts it back to a string. Likewise, let |
| 924 |
mulX_POLYVAL be a function that converts a 16-byte string to an |
| 925 |
element of POLYVAL's field using POLYVAL's convention, multiplies it |
| 926 |
by x, and converts it back. |
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
Given the 16-byte string 01000000000000000000000000000000, mulX_GHASH |
| 929 |
of that string is 00800000000000000000000000000000 and mulX_POLYVAL |
| 930 |
of that string is 02000000000000000000000000000000. As a more |
| 931 |
general example, given 9c98c04df9387ded828175a92ba652d8, mulX_GHASH |
| 932 |
of that string is 4e4c6026fc9c3ef6c140bad495d3296c and mulX_POLYVAL |
| 933 |
of it is 3931819bf271fada0503eb52574ca5f2. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
Lastly, let ByteReverse be the function that takes a 16-byte string |
| 936 |
and returns a copy where the order of the bytes has been reversed. |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
Now GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of one another: |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
POLYVAL(H, X_1, ..., X_n) = |
| 956 |
ByteReverse(GHASH(mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), ..., |
| 957 |
ByteReverse(X_n))) |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
GHASH(H, X_1, ..., X_n) = |
| 960 |
ByteReverse(POLYVAL(mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), |
| 961 |
..., ByteReverse(X_n))) |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
As a worked example: |
| 964 |
let H = 25629347589242761d31f826ba4b757b, |
| 965 |
X_1 = 4f4f95668c83dfb6401762bb2d01a262, and |
| 966 |
X_2 = d1a24ddd2721d006bbe45f20d3c9f362. |
| 967 |
POLYVAL(H, X_1, X_2) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e. |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of GHASH, |
| 970 |
then the key for GHASH would be |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)) = dcbaa5dd137c188ebb21492c23c9b112. |
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
Then ByteReverse(GHASH(dcba..., ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) |
| 975 |
= f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e, as required. |
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
In the other direction, GHASH(H, X_1, X_2) = |
| 978 |
bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a. If we wished to calculate this |
| 979 |
given only an implementation of POLYVAL, then we would first |
| 980 |
calculate the key for POLYVAL: |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)) = f6ea96744df0633aec8424b18e26c54a. |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
Then ByteReverse(POLYVAL(f6ea..., ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) |
| 985 |
= bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a. |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Additional Comparisons with AES-GCM</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
Some functional properties that differ between AES-GCM and AES-GCM- |
| 1012 |
SIV that are also worth noting: |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
AES-GCM allows plaintexts to be encrypted in a streaming fashion -- |
| 1015 |
i.e., the beginning of the plaintext can be encrypted and transmitted |
| 1016 |
before the entire message has been processed. AES-GCM-SIV requires |
| 1017 |
two passes for encryption and so cannot do this. |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
AES-GCM allows a constant additional-data input to be precomputed in |
| 1020 |
order to save per-message computation. AES-GCM-SIV varies the |
| 1021 |
authenticator key based on the nonce and so does not permit this. |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
The performance for AES-GCM versus AES-GCM-SIV on small machines can |
| 1024 |
be roughly characterized by the number of AES operations and the |
| 1025 |
number of GF(2^128) multiplications needed to process a message. |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
Let a = (bytelen(additional-data) + 15) / 16 and |
| 1028 |
p = (bytelen(plaintext) + 15) / 16. |
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 |
Then AES-GCM requires p + 1 AES operations and p + a + 1 field |
| 1031 |
multiplications. |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
Defined similarly, AES-GCM-SIV with AES-128 requires p + 5 AES |
| 1034 |
operations and p + a + 1 field multiplications. With AES-256, that |
| 1035 |
becomes p + 7 AES operations. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
With large machines, the available parallelism becomes far more |
| 1038 |
important, and such simple performance analysis is no longer |
| 1039 |
representative. For such machines, we find that decryption of AES- |
| 1040 |
GCM-SIV is only about 5% slower than AES-GCM, as long as the message |
| 1041 |
is at least a couple of kilobytes. Encryption tends to run about |
| 1042 |
two-thirds the speed because of the additional pass required. |
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Test Vectors</span> |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.1" href="#appendix-C.1">C.1</a>. AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV</span> |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
Plaintext (0 bytes) = |
| 1070 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1071 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1072 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1073 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1074 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1075 |
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1076 |
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1077 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1078 |
... and masked = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1079 |
Tag = dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25 |
| 1080 |
Initial counter = dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56dea5 |
| 1081 |
Result (16 bytes) = dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25 |
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0100000000000000 |
| 1085 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1086 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1087 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1088 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1089 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1090 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1091 |
00000000000000004000000000000000 |
| 1092 |
POLYVAL result = eb93b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74 |
| 1093 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = e893b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74 |
| 1094 |
... and masked = e893b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74 |
| 1095 |
Tag = 578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c |
| 1096 |
Initial counter = 578782fff6013b815b287c22493a36cc |
| 1097 |
Result (24 bytes) = b5d839330ac7b786578782fff6013b81 |
| 1098 |
5b287c22493a364c |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 010000000000000000000000 |
| 1102 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1103 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1104 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1105 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1106 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1107 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1108 |
00000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 1109 |
POLYVAL result = 48eb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b |
| 1110 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4beb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b |
| 1111 |
... and masked = 4beb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b |
| 1112 |
Tag = a4978db357391a0bc4fdec8b0d106639 |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
Initial counter = a4978db357391a0bc4fdec8b0d1066b9 |
| 1122 |
Result (28 bytes) = 7323ea61d05932260047d942a4978db3 |
| 1123 |
57391a0bc4fdec8b0d106639 |
| 1124 |
|
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1127 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1128 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1129 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1130 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1131 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1132 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1133 |
00000000000000008000000000000000 |
| 1134 |
POLYVAL result = 20806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6 |
| 1135 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 23806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6 |
| 1136 |
... and masked = 23806c26e3c1de019e11125570803156 |
| 1137 |
Tag = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4 |
| 1138 |
Initial counter = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4 |
| 1139 |
Result (32 bytes) = 743f7c8077ab25f8624e2e948579cf77 |
| 1140 |
303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4 |
| 1141 |
|
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1144 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1145 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1146 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1147 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1148 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1149 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1150 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1151 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1152 |
00000000000000000001000000000000 |
| 1153 |
POLYVAL result = ce6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b |
| 1154 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b |
| 1155 |
... and masked = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b |
| 1156 |
Tag = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff |
| 1157 |
Initial counter = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff |
| 1158 |
Result (48 bytes) = 84e07e62ba83a6585417245d7ec413a9 |
| 1159 |
fe427d6315c09b57ce45f2e3936a9445 |
| 1160 |
1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff |
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1164 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1165 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1166 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1167 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1168 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1178 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1179 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1180 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1181 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1182 |
00000000000000008001000000000000 |
| 1183 |
POLYVAL result = 81388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222 |
| 1184 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222 |
| 1185 |
... and masked = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222 |
| 1186 |
Tag = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8 |
| 1187 |
Initial counter = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8 |
| 1188 |
Result (64 bytes) = 3fd24ce1f5a67b75bf2351f181a475c7 |
| 1189 |
b800a5b4d3dcf70106b1eea82fa1d64d |
| 1190 |
f42bf7226122fa92e17a40eeaac1201b |
| 1191 |
5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8 |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
Plaintext (64 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1195 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1196 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1197 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1198 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1199 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1200 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1201 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1202 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1203 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1204 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1205 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1206 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1207 |
00000000000000000002000000000000 |
| 1208 |
POLYVAL result = 1e39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78 |
| 1209 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78 |
| 1210 |
... and masked = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78 |
| 1211 |
Tag = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8 |
| 1212 |
Initial counter = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8 |
| 1213 |
Result (80 bytes) = 2433668f1058190f6d43e360f4f35cd8 |
| 1214 |
e475127cfca7028ea8ab5c20f7ab2af0 |
| 1215 |
2516a2bdcbc08d521be37ff28c152bba |
| 1216 |
36697f25b4cd169c6590d1dd39566d3f |
| 1217 |
8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8 |
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
|
| 1220 |
Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000 |
| 1221 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1222 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1223 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1224 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1234 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1235 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1236 |
08000000000000004000000000000000 |
| 1237 |
POLYVAL result = b26781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a |
| 1238 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a |
| 1239 |
... and masked = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a |
| 1240 |
Tag = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508 |
| 1241 |
Initial counter = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1588 |
| 1242 |
Result (24 bytes) = 1e6daba35669f4273b0a1a2560969cdf |
| 1243 |
790d99759abd1508 |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
|
| 1246 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 020000000000000000000000 |
| 1247 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1248 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1249 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1250 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1251 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1252 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1253 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1254 |
08000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 1255 |
POLYVAL result = 111f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145 |
| 1256 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145 |
| 1257 |
... and masked = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145 |
| 1258 |
Tag = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a |
| 1259 |
Initial counter = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e07da |
| 1260 |
Result (28 bytes) = 296c7889fd99f41917f4462008299c51 |
| 1261 |
02745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a |
| 1262 |
|
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1265 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1266 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1267 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1268 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1269 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1270 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1271 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1272 |
08000000000000008000000000000000 |
| 1273 |
POLYVAL result = 79745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688 |
| 1274 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688 |
| 1275 |
... and masked = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4608 |
| 1276 |
Tag = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f |
| 1277 |
Initial counter = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457449f |
| 1278 |
Result (32 bytes) = e2b0c5da79a901c1745f700525cb335b |
| 1279 |
8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1290 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1291 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1292 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1293 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1294 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1295 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1296 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1297 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1298 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1299 |
08000000000000000001000000000000 |
| 1300 |
POLYVAL result = 2ce7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b |
| 1301 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b |
| 1302 |
... and masked = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b |
| 1303 |
Tag = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1 |
| 1304 |
Initial counter = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1 |
| 1305 |
Result (48 bytes) = 620048ef3c1e73e57e02bb8562c416a3 |
| 1306 |
19e73e4caac8e96a1ecb2933145a1d71 |
| 1307 |
e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1 |
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1311 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1312 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1313 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1314 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1315 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1316 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1317 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1318 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1319 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1320 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1321 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1322 |
08000000000000008001000000000000 |
| 1323 |
POLYVAL result = 9ca987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc |
| 1324 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc |
| 1325 |
... and masked = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f8307c |
| 1326 |
Tag = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2 |
| 1327 |
Initial counter = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2 |
| 1328 |
Result (64 bytes) = 50c8303ea93925d64090d07bd109dfd9 |
| 1329 |
515a5a33431019c17d93465999a8b005 |
| 1330 |
3201d723120a8562b838cdff25bf9d1e |
| 1331 |
6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2 |
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
Plaintext (64 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1335 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1336 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
05000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1346 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1347 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1348 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1349 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1350 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1351 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1352 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1353 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1354 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1355 |
05000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1356 |
08000000000000000002000000000000 |
| 1357 |
POLYVAL result = ffcd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a |
| 1358 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a |
| 1359 |
... and masked = fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a |
| 1360 |
Tag = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744 |
| 1361 |
Initial counter = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae217c4 |
| 1362 |
Result (80 bytes) = 2f5c64059db55ee0fb847ed513003746 |
| 1363 |
aca4e61c711b5de2e7a77ffd02da42fe |
| 1364 |
ec601910d3467bb8b36ebbaebce5fba3 |
| 1365 |
0d36c95f48a3e7980f0e7ac299332a80 |
| 1366 |
cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744 |
| 1367 |
|
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
Plaintext (4 bytes) = 02000000 |
| 1370 |
AAD (12 bytes) = 010000000000000000000000 |
| 1371 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1372 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1373 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1374 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1375 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1376 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1377 |
60000000000000002000000000000000 |
| 1378 |
POLYVAL result = f6ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918 |
| 1379 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918 |
| 1380 |
... and masked = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918 |
| 1381 |
Tag = 07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14 |
| 1382 |
Initial counter = 07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a94 |
| 1383 |
Result (20 bytes) = a8fe3e8707eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99 |
| 1384 |
e2f48a14 |
| 1385 |
|
| 1386 |
|
| 1387 |
Plaintext (20 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1388 |
04000000 |
| 1389 |
AAD (18 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1390 |
0200 |
| 1391 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1392 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1402 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1403 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1404 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1405 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1406 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1407 |
9000000000000000a000000000000000 |
| 1408 |
POLYVAL result = 4781d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe |
| 1409 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe |
| 1410 |
... and masked = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f610087e |
| 1411 |
Tag = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514 |
| 1412 |
Initial counter = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106594 |
| 1413 |
Result (36 bytes) = 6bb0fecf5ded9b77f902c7d5da236a43 |
| 1414 |
91dd029724afc9805e976f451e6d87f6 |
| 1415 |
fe106514 |
| 1416 |
|
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1419 |
0400 |
| 1420 |
AAD (20 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1421 |
02000000 |
| 1422 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1423 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1424 |
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377 |
| 1425 |
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c |
| 1426 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1427 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1428 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1429 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1430 |
a0000000000000009000000000000000 |
| 1431 |
POLYVAL result = 75cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd |
| 1432 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd |
| 1433 |
... and masked = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc797d |
| 1434 |
Tag = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd |
| 1435 |
Initial counter = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd |
| 1436 |
Result (34 bytes) = 44d0aaf6fb2f1f34add5e8064e83e12a |
| 1437 |
2adabff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13 |
| 1438 |
b9fd |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
Plaintext (0 bytes) = |
| 1441 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1442 |
Key = e66021d5eb8e4f4066d4adb9c33560e4 |
| 1443 |
Nonce = f46e44bb3da0015c94f70887 |
| 1444 |
Record authentication key = 036ee1fe2d7926af68898095e54e7b3c |
| 1445 |
Record encryption key = 5e46482396008223b5c1d25173d87539 |
| 1446 |
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1447 |
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1448 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000 |
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
... and masked = f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000 |
| 1458 |
Tag = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578 |
| 1459 |
Initial counter = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e39495f8 |
| 1460 |
Result (16 bytes) = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578 |
| 1461 |
|
| 1462 |
|
| 1463 |
Plaintext (3 bytes) = 7a806c |
| 1464 |
AAD (5 bytes) = 46bb91c3c5 |
| 1465 |
Key = 36864200e0eaf5284d884a0e77d31646 |
| 1466 |
Nonce = bae8e37fc83441b16034566b |
| 1467 |
Record authentication key = 3e28de1120b2981a0155795ca2812af6 |
| 1468 |
Record encryption key = 6d4b78b31a4c9c03d8db0f42f7507fae |
| 1469 |
POLYVAL input = 46bb91c3c50000000000000000000000 |
| 1470 |
7a806c00000000000000000000000000 |
| 1471 |
28000000000000001800000000000000 |
| 1472 |
POLYVAL result = 43d9a745511dcfa21b96dd606f1d5720 |
| 1473 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720 |
| 1474 |
... and masked = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720 |
| 1475 |
Tag = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8 |
| 1476 |
Initial counter = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8 |
| 1477 |
Result (19 bytes) = af60eb711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074ee |
| 1478 |
a428a8 |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
Plaintext (6 bytes) = bdc66f146545 |
| 1482 |
AAD (10 bytes) = fc880c94a95198874296 |
| 1483 |
Key = aedb64a6c590bc84d1a5e269e4b47801 |
| 1484 |
Nonce = afc0577e34699b9e671fdd4f |
| 1485 |
Record authentication key = 43b8de9cea62330d15cccfc84a33e8c8 |
| 1486 |
Record encryption key = 8e54631607e431e095b54852868e3a27 |
| 1487 |
POLYVAL input = fc880c94a95198874296000000000000 |
| 1488 |
bdc66f14654500000000000000000000 |
| 1489 |
50000000000000003000000000000000 |
| 1490 |
POLYVAL result = 26498e0d2b1ef004e808c458e8f2f515 |
| 1491 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515 |
| 1492 |
... and masked = 8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515 |
| 1493 |
Tag = d6a9c45545cfc11f03ad743dba20f966 |
| 1494 |
Initial counter = d6a9c45545cfc11f03ad743dba20f9e6 |
| 1495 |
Result (22 bytes) = bb93a3e34d3cd6a9c45545cfc11f03ad |
| 1496 |
743dba20f966 |
| 1497 |
|
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
Plaintext (9 bytes) = 1177441f195495860f |
| 1500 |
AAD (15 bytes) = 046787f3ea22c127aaf195d1894728 |
| 1501 |
Key = d5cc1fd161320b6920ce07787f86743b |
| 1502 |
Nonce = 275d1ab32f6d1f0434d8848c |
| 1503 |
Record authentication key = 8a51df64d93eaf667c2c09bd454ce5c5 |
| 1504 |
Record encryption key = 43ab276c2b4a473918ca73f2dd85109c |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
POLYVAL input = 046787f3ea22c127aaf195d189472800 |
| 1514 |
1177441f195495860f00000000000000 |
| 1515 |
78000000000000004800000000000000 |
| 1516 |
POLYVAL result = 63a3451c0b23345ad02bba59956517cf |
| 1517 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed5956517cf |
| 1518 |
... and masked = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed59565174f |
| 1519 |
Tag = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fd2b |
| 1520 |
Initial counter = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fdab |
| 1521 |
Result (25 bytes) = 4f37281f7ad12949d01d02fd0cd174c8 |
| 1522 |
4fc5dae2f60f52fd2b |
| 1523 |
|
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7 |
| 1526 |
AAD (20 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec489c8fde2be2cf |
| 1527 |
97e74e93 |
| 1528 |
Key = b3fed1473c528b8426a582995929a149 |
| 1529 |
Nonce = 9e9ad8780c8d63d0ab4149c0 |
| 1530 |
Record authentication key = 22f50707a95dd416df069d670cb775e8 |
| 1531 |
Record encryption key = f674a5584ee21fe97b4cebc468ab61e4 |
| 1532 |
POLYVAL input = c9882e5386fd9f92ec489c8fde2be2cf |
| 1533 |
97e74e93000000000000000000000000 |
| 1534 |
9f572c614b4745914474e7c700000000 |
| 1535 |
a0000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 1536 |
POLYVAL result = 0cca0423fba9d77fe7e2e6963b08cdd0 |
| 1537 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9250dc5bf724b4af4ca3af563b08cdd0 |
| 1538 |
... and masked = 9250dc5bf724b4af4ca3af563b08cd50 |
| 1539 |
Tag = c1dc2f871fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0 |
| 1540 |
Initial counter = c1dc2f871fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0 |
| 1541 |
Result (28 bytes) = f54673c5ddf710c745641c8bc1dc2f87 |
| 1542 |
1fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0 |
| 1543 |
|
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 |
Plaintext (15 bytes) = 0d8c8451178082355c9e940fea2f58 |
| 1546 |
AAD (25 bytes) = 2950a70d5a1db2316fd568378da107b5 |
| 1547 |
2b0da55210cc1c1b0a |
| 1548 |
Key = 2d4ed87da44102952ef94b02b805249b |
| 1549 |
Nonce = ac80e6f61455bfac8308a2d4 |
| 1550 |
Record authentication key = 0b00a29a83e7e95b92e3a0783b29f140 |
| 1551 |
Record encryption key = a430c27f285aed913005975c42eed5f3 |
| 1552 |
POLYVAL input = 2950a70d5a1db2316fd568378da107b5 |
| 1553 |
2b0da55210cc1c1b0a00000000000000 |
| 1554 |
0d8c8451178082355c9e940fea2f5800 |
| 1555 |
c8000000000000007800000000000000 |
| 1556 |
POLYVAL result = 1086ef25247aa41009bbc40871d9b350 |
| 1557 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = bc0609d3302f1bbc8ab366dc71d9b350 |
| 1558 |
... and masked = bc0609d3302f1bbc8ab366dc71d9b350 |
| 1559 |
Tag = 83b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b0b |
| 1560 |
Initial counter = 83b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b8b |
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
Result (31 bytes) = c9ff545e07b88a015f05b274540aa183 |
| 1570 |
b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b0b |
| 1571 |
|
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
Plaintext (18 bytes) = 6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb |
| 1574 |
6de7 |
| 1575 |
AAD (30 bytes) = 1860f762ebfbd08284e421702de0de18 |
| 1576 |
baa9c9596291b08466f37de21c7f |
| 1577 |
Key = bde3b2f204d1e9f8b06bc47f9745b3d1 |
| 1578 |
Nonce = ae06556fb6aa7890bebc18fe |
| 1579 |
Record authentication key = 21c874a8bad3603d1c3e8784df5b3f9f |
| 1580 |
Record encryption key = d1c16d72651c3df504eae27129d818e8 |
| 1581 |
POLYVAL input = 1860f762ebfbd08284e421702de0de18 |
| 1582 |
baa9c9596291b08466f37de21c7f0000 |
| 1583 |
6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb |
| 1584 |
6de70000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1585 |
f0000000000000009000000000000000 |
| 1586 |
POLYVAL result = 55462a5afa0da8d646481e049ef9c764 |
| 1587 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764 |
| 1588 |
... and masked = fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764 |
| 1589 |
Tag = 3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84 |
| 1590 |
Initial counter = 3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84 |
| 1591 |
Result (34 bytes) = 6298b296e24e8cc35dce0bed484b7f30 |
| 1592 |
d5803e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4 |
| 1593 |
db84 |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
|
| 1596 |
Plaintext (21 bytes) = e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd |
| 1597 |
dfc240871d |
| 1598 |
AAD (35 bytes) = 7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2 |
| 1599 |
02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa |
| 1600 |
859c21 |
| 1601 |
Key = f901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a98cad48179 |
| 1602 |
Nonce = 6245709fb18853f68d833640 |
| 1603 |
Record authentication key = 3724f55f1d22ac0ab830da0b6a995d74 |
| 1604 |
Record encryption key = 75ac87b70c05db287de779006105a344 |
| 1605 |
POLYVAL input = 7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2 |
| 1606 |
02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa |
| 1607 |
859c2100000000000000000000000000 |
| 1608 |
e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd |
| 1609 |
dfc240871d0000000000000000000000 |
| 1610 |
1801000000000000a800000000000000 |
| 1611 |
POLYVAL result = 4cbba090f03f7d1188ea55749fa6c7bd |
| 1612 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c7bd |
| 1613 |
... and masked = 2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c73d |
| 1614 |
Tag = 2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6e70 |
| 1615 |
Initial counter = 2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6ef0 |
| 1616 |
Result (37 bytes) = 391cc328d484a4f46406181bcd62efd9 |
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
b3ee197d052d15506c84a9edd65e13e9 |
| 1626 |
d24a2a6e70 |
| 1627 |
|
| 1628 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.2" href="#appendix-C.2">C.2</a>. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV</span> |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
Plaintext (0 bytes) = |
| 1631 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1632 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1633 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1634 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1635 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1636 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1637 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1638 |
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1639 |
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1640 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1641 |
... and masked = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1642 |
Tag = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f |
| 1643 |
Initial counter = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd408f |
| 1644 |
Result (16 bytes) = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f |
| 1645 |
|
| 1646 |
|
| 1647 |
Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0100000000000000 |
| 1648 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1649 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1650 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1651 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1652 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1653 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1654 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1655 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1656 |
00000000000000004000000000000000 |
| 1657 |
POLYVAL result = 05230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41 |
| 1658 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41 |
| 1659 |
... and masked = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41 |
| 1660 |
Tag = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28 |
| 1661 |
Initial counter = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3dfa8 |
| 1662 |
Result (24 bytes) = c2ef328e5c71c83b843122130f7364b7 |
| 1663 |
61e0b97427e3df28 |
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 010000000000000000000000 |
| 1667 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1668 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1669 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1670 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1671 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1672 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1682 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1683 |
00000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 1684 |
POLYVAL result = 6d81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13 |
| 1685 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13 |
| 1686 |
... and masked = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13 |
| 1687 |
Tag = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e |
| 1688 |
Initial counter = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca1fe |
| 1689 |
Result (28 bytes) = 9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b18ca50da9 |
| 1690 |
ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e |
| 1691 |
|
| 1692 |
|
| 1693 |
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1694 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1695 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1696 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1697 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1698 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1699 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1700 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1701 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1702 |
00000000000000008000000000000000 |
| 1703 |
POLYVAL result = 74eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d |
| 1704 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d |
| 1705 |
... and masked = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d |
| 1706 |
Tag = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366 |
| 1707 |
Initial counter = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c3e6 |
| 1708 |
Result (32 bytes) = 85a01b63025ba19b7fd3ddfc033b3e76 |
| 1709 |
c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366 |
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 |
|
| 1712 |
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1713 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1714 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1715 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1716 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1717 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1718 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1719 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1720 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1721 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1722 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1723 |
00000000000000000001000000000000 |
| 1724 |
POLYVAL result = 899b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba188f5 |
| 1725 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba188f5 |
| 1726 |
... and masked = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba18875 |
| 1727 |
Tag = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d |
| 1728 |
Initial counter = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632ebdd |
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
Result (48 bytes) = 4a6a9db4c8c6549201b9edb53006cba8 |
| 1738 |
21ec9cf850948a7c86c68ac7539d027f |
| 1739 |
e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d |
| 1740 |
|
| 1741 |
|
| 1742 |
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1743 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1744 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1745 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1746 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1747 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1748 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1749 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1750 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1751 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1752 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1753 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1754 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1755 |
00000000000000008001000000000000 |
| 1756 |
POLYVAL result = c1f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51 |
| 1757 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51 |
| 1758 |
... and masked = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51 |
| 1759 |
Tag = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4 |
| 1760 |
Initial counter = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4 |
| 1761 |
Result (64 bytes) = c00d121893a9fa603f48ccc1ca3c57ce |
| 1762 |
7499245ea0046db16c53c7c66fe717e3 |
| 1763 |
9cf6c748837b61f6ee3adcee17534ed5 |
| 1764 |
790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4 |
| 1765 |
|
| 1766 |
|
| 1767 |
Plaintext (64 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1768 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1769 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1770 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1771 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 1772 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1773 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1774 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1775 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1776 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1777 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1778 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1779 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1780 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1781 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1782 |
00000000000000000002000000000000 |
| 1783 |
POLYVAL result = 6ef38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4 |
| 1784 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4 |
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
... and masked = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec444 |
| 1794 |
Tag = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08 |
| 1795 |
Initial counter = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa88 |
| 1796 |
Result (80 bytes) = c2d5160a1f8683834910acdafc41fbb1 |
| 1797 |
632d4a353e8b905ec9a5499ac34f96c7 |
| 1798 |
e1049eb080883891a4db8caaa1f99dd0 |
| 1799 |
04d80487540735234e3744512c6f90ce |
| 1800 |
112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08 |
| 1801 |
|
| 1802 |
|
| 1803 |
Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000 |
| 1804 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1805 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1806 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1807 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1808 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1809 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1810 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1811 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1812 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1813 |
08000000000000004000000000000000 |
| 1814 |
POLYVAL result = 34e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354 |
| 1815 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354 |
| 1816 |
... and masked = 37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354 |
| 1817 |
Tag = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854 |
| 1818 |
Initial counter = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec8d4 |
| 1819 |
Result (24 bytes) = 1de22967237a813291213f267e3b452f |
| 1820 |
02d01ae33e4ec854 |
| 1821 |
|
| 1822 |
|
| 1823 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 020000000000000000000000 |
| 1824 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1825 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1826 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1827 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1828 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1829 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1830 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1831 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1832 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1833 |
08000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 1834 |
POLYVAL result = 5c47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206 |
| 1835 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206 |
| 1836 |
... and masked = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206 |
| 1837 |
Tag = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f |
| 1838 |
Initial counter = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff |
| 1839 |
Result (28 bytes) = 163d6f9cc1b346cd453a2e4cc1a4a19a |
| 1840 |
e800941ccdc57cc8413c277f |
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1850 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1851 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1852 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1853 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1854 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1855 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1856 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1857 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1858 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1859 |
08000000000000008000000000000000 |
| 1860 |
POLYVAL result = 452896726c616746f01d11d82911d478 |
| 1861 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478 |
| 1862 |
... and masked = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478 |
| 1863 |
Tag = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7 |
| 1864 |
Initial counter = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7 |
| 1865 |
Result (32 bytes) = c91545823cc24f17dbb0e9e807d5ec17 |
| 1866 |
b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7 |
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 |
|
| 1869 |
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1870 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1871 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1872 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1873 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1874 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1875 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1876 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1877 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1878 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1879 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1880 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1881 |
08000000000000000001000000000000 |
| 1882 |
POLYVAL result = 4e58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c |
| 1883 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c |
| 1884 |
... and masked = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c |
| 1885 |
Tag = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc |
| 1886 |
Initial counter = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc |
| 1887 |
Result (48 bytes) = 07dad364bfc2b9da89116d7bef6daaaf |
| 1888 |
6f255510aa654f920ac81b94e8bad365 |
| 1889 |
aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc |
| 1890 |
|
| 1891 |
|
| 1892 |
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1893 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1894 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1895 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1896 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1906 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1907 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1908 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1909 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1910 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1911 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1912 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1913 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1914 |
08000000000000008001000000000000 |
| 1915 |
POLYVAL result = 2566a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a |
| 1916 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a |
| 1917 |
... and masked = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a |
| 1918 |
Tag = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb |
| 1919 |
Initial counter = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb |
| 1920 |
Result (64 bytes) = c67a1f0f567a5198aa1fcc8e3f213143 |
| 1921 |
36f7f51ca8b1af61feac35a86416fa47 |
| 1922 |
fbca3b5f749cdf564527f2314f42fe25 |
| 1923 |
03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb |
| 1924 |
|
| 1925 |
|
| 1926 |
Plaintext (64 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1927 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1928 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1929 |
05000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1930 |
AAD (1 bytes) = 01 |
| 1931 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1932 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1933 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1934 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1935 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1936 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1937 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1938 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1939 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1940 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1941 |
05000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1942 |
08000000000000000002000000000000 |
| 1943 |
POLYVAL result = da58d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733 |
| 1944 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733 |
| 1945 |
... and masked = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733 |
| 1946 |
Tag = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0 |
| 1947 |
Initial counter = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0 |
| 1948 |
Result (80 bytes) = 67fd45e126bfb9a79930c43aad2d3696 |
| 1949 |
7d3f0e4d217c1e551f59727870beefc9 |
| 1950 |
8cb933a8fce9de887b1e40799988db1f |
| 1951 |
c3f91880ed405b2dd298318858467c89 |
| 1952 |
5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0 |
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
Plaintext (4 bytes) = 02000000 |
| 1962 |
AAD (12 bytes) = 010000000000000000000000 |
| 1963 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1964 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1965 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1966 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1967 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1968 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1969 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1970 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1971 |
60000000000000002000000000000000 |
| 1972 |
POLYVAL result = 6dc76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf |
| 1973 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf |
| 1974 |
... and masked = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde054f |
| 1975 |
Tag = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf |
| 1976 |
Initial counter = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf |
| 1977 |
Result (20 bytes) = 22b3f4cd1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4 |
| 1978 |
661b74cf |
| 1979 |
|
| 1980 |
|
| 1981 |
Plaintext (20 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1982 |
04000000 |
| 1983 |
AAD (18 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1984 |
0200 |
| 1985 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1986 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1987 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 1988 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 1989 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 1990 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 1991 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1992 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1993 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1994 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 1995 |
9000000000000000a000000000000000 |
| 1996 |
POLYVAL result = 973ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca |
| 1997 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca |
| 1998 |
... and masked = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f86554a |
| 1999 |
Tag = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307 |
| 2000 |
Initial counter = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe387 |
| 2001 |
Result (36 bytes) = 43dd0163cdb48f9fe3212bf61b201976 |
| 2002 |
067f342bb879ad976d8242acc188ab59 |
| 2003 |
cabfe307 |
| 2004 |
|
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 |
Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2007 |
0400 |
| 2008 |
AAD (20 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
|
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
02000000 |
| 2018 |
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2019 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2020 |
Nonce = 030000000000000000000000 |
| 2021 |
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f |
| 2022 |
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 |
| 2023 |
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222 |
| 2024 |
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2025 |
02000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2026 |
03000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2027 |
04000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2028 |
a0000000000000009000000000000000 |
| 2029 |
POLYVAL result = 2cbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c |
| 2030 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c |
| 2031 |
... and masked = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c |
| 2032 |
Tag = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc2056543 |
| 2033 |
Initial counter = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc20565c3 |
| 2034 |
Result (34 bytes) = 462401724b5ce6588d5a54aae5375513 |
| 2035 |
a075cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc205 |
| 2036 |
6543 |
| 2037 |
|
| 2038 |
Plaintext (0 bytes) = |
| 2039 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 2040 |
Key = e66021d5eb8e4f4066d4adb9c33560e4 |
| 2041 |
f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088736864200 |
| 2042 |
Nonce = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d31646 |
| 2043 |
Record authentication key = e40d26f82774aa27f47b047b608b9585 |
| 2044 |
Record encryption key = 7c7c3d9a542cef53dde0e6de9b580040 |
| 2045 |
0f82e73ec5f7ee41b7ba8dcb9ba078c3 |
| 2046 |
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2047 |
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2048 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d3164600000000 |
| 2049 |
... and masked = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d3164600000000 |
| 2050 |
Tag = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228a62 |
| 2051 |
Initial counter = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228ae2 |
| 2052 |
Result (16 bytes) = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228a62 |
| 2053 |
|
| 2054 |
|
| 2055 |
Plaintext (3 bytes) = 671fdd |
| 2056 |
AAD (5 bytes) = 4fbdc66f14 |
| 2057 |
Key = bae8e37fc83441b16034566b7a806c46 |
| 2058 |
bb91c3c5aedb64a6c590bc84d1a5e269 |
| 2059 |
Nonce = e4b47801afc0577e34699b9e |
| 2060 |
Record authentication key = b546f5a850d0a90adfe39e95c2510fc6 |
| 2061 |
Record encryption key = b9d1e239d62cbb5c49273ddac8838bdc |
| 2062 |
c53bca478a770f07087caa4e0a924a55 |
| 2063 |
POLYVAL input = 4fbdc66f140000000000000000000000 |
| 2064 |
671fdd00000000000000000000000000 |
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 37]</span></pre> |
| 2069 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span> |
| 2070 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
28000000000000001800000000000000 |
| 2074 |
POLYVAL result = b91f91f96b159a7c611c05035b839e92 |
| 2075 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 5dabe9f8c4d5cd0255759e9d5b839e92 |
| 2076 |
... and masked = 5dabe9f8c4d5cd0255759e9d5b839e12 |
| 2077 |
Tag = 93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d319719d |
| 2078 |
Initial counter = 93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d319719d |
| 2079 |
Result (19 bytes) = 0eaccb93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d3 |
| 2080 |
19719d |
| 2081 |
|
| 2082 |
|
| 2083 |
Plaintext (6 bytes) = 195495860f04 |
| 2084 |
AAD (10 bytes) = 6787f3ea22c127aaf195 |
| 2085 |
Key = 6545fc880c94a95198874296d5cc1fd1 |
| 2086 |
61320b6920ce07787f86743b275d1ab3 |
| 2087 |
Nonce = 2f6d1f0434d8848c1177441f |
| 2088 |
Record authentication key = e156e1f9b0b07b780cbe30f259e3c8da |
| 2089 |
Record encryption key = 6fc1c494519f944aae52fcd8b14e5b17 |
| 2090 |
1b5a9429d3b76e430d49940c0021d612 |
| 2091 |
POLYVAL input = 6787f3ea22c127aaf195000000000000 |
| 2092 |
195495860f0400000000000000000000 |
| 2093 |
50000000000000003000000000000000 |
| 2094 |
POLYVAL result = 2c480ed9d236b1df24c6eec109bd40c1 |
| 2095 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 032511dde6ee355335b1aade09bd40c1 |
| 2096 |
... and masked = 032511dde6ee355335b1aade09bd4041 |
| 2097 |
Tag = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8c2c |
| 2098 |
Initial counter = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8cac |
| 2099 |
Result (22 bytes) = a254dad4f3f96b62b84dc40c84636a5e |
| 2100 |
c12020ec8c2c |
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 |
|
| 2103 |
Plaintext (9 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec |
| 2104 |
AAD (15 bytes) = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d |
| 2105 |
Key = d1894728b3fed1473c528b8426a58299 |
| 2106 |
5929a1499e9ad8780c8d63d0ab4149c0 |
| 2107 |
Nonce = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7 |
| 2108 |
Record authentication key = 0533fd71f4119257361a3ff1469dd4e5 |
| 2109 |
Record encryption key = 4feba89799be8ac3684fa2bb30ade0ea |
| 2110 |
51390e6d87dcf3627d2ee44493853abe |
| 2111 |
POLYVAL input = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d00 |
| 2112 |
c9882e5386fd9f92ec00000000000000 |
| 2113 |
78000000000000004800000000000000 |
| 2114 |
POLYVAL result = bf160bc9ded8c63057d2c38aae552fb4 |
| 2115 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552fb4 |
| 2116 |
... and masked = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552f34 |
| 2117 |
Tag = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2 |
| 2118 |
Initial counter = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2 |
| 2119 |
Result (25 bytes) = 0df9e308678244c44bc0fd3dc6628dfe |
| 2120 |
55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2 |
| 2121 |
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 38]</span></pre> |
| 2125 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span> |
| 2126 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2127 |
|
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 |
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 1db2316fd568378da107b52b |
| 2130 |
AAD (20 bytes) = 0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8 |
| 2131 |
b06bc47f |
| 2132 |
Key = a44102952ef94b02b805249bac80e6f6 |
| 2133 |
1455bfac8308a2d40d8c845117808235 |
| 2134 |
Nonce = 5c9e940fea2f582950a70d5a |
| 2135 |
Record authentication key = 64779ab10ee8a280272f14cc8851b727 |
| 2136 |
Record encryption key = 25f40fc63f49d3b9016a8eeeb75846e0 |
| 2137 |
d72ca36ddbd312b6f5ef38ad14bd2651 |
| 2138 |
POLYVAL input = 0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8 |
| 2139 |
b06bc47f000000000000000000000000 |
| 2140 |
1db2316fd568378da107b52b00000000 |
| 2141 |
a0000000000000006000000000000000 |
| 2142 |
POLYVAL result = cc86ee22c861e1fd474c84676b42739c |
| 2143 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42739c |
| 2144 |
... and masked = 90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42731c |
| 2145 |
Tag = 404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5 |
| 2146 |
Initial counter = 404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5 |
| 2147 |
Result (28 bytes) = 8dbeb9f7255bf5769dd56692404099c2 |
| 2148 |
587f64979f21826706d497d5 |
| 2149 |
|
| 2150 |
|
| 2151 |
Plaintext (15 bytes) = 21702de0de18baa9c9596291b08466 |
| 2152 |
AAD (25 bytes) = f37de21c7ff901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a |
| 2153 |
98cad481796245709f |
| 2154 |
Key = 9745b3d1ae06556fb6aa7890bebc18fe |
| 2155 |
6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb |
| 2156 |
Nonce = 6de71860f762ebfbd08284e4 |
| 2157 |
Record authentication key = 27c2959ed4daea3b1f52e849478de376 |
| 2158 |
Record encryption key = 307a38a5a6cf231c0a9af3b527f23a62 |
| 2159 |
e9a6ff09aff8ae669f760153e864fc93 |
| 2160 |
POLYVAL input = f37de21c7ff901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a |
| 2161 |
98cad481796245709f00000000000000 |
| 2162 |
21702de0de18baa9c9596291b0846600 |
| 2163 |
c8000000000000007800000000000000 |
| 2164 |
POLYVAL result = c4fa5e5b713853703bcf8e6424505fa5 |
| 2165 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505fa5 |
| 2166 |
... and masked = a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505f25 |
| 2167 |
Tag = b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd |
| 2168 |
Initial counter = b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd |
| 2169 |
Result (31 bytes) = 793576dfa5c0f88729a7ed3c2f1bffb3 |
| 2170 |
080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd |
| 2171 |
|
| 2172 |
|
| 2173 |
Plaintext (18 bytes) = b202b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296 |
| 2174 |
fa85 |
| 2175 |
AAD (30 bytes) = 9c2159058b1f0fe91433a5bdc20e214e |
| 2176 |
ab7fecef4454a10ef0657df21ac7 |
| 2177 |
|
| 2178 |
|
| 2179 |
|
| 2180 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 39]</span></pre> |
| 2181 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span> |
| 2182 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2183 |
|
| 2184 |
|
| 2185 |
Key = b18853f68d833640e42a3c02c25b6486 |
| 2186 |
9e146d7b233987bddfc240871d7576f7 |
| 2187 |
Nonce = 028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4 |
| 2188 |
Record authentication key = 670b98154076ddb59b7a9137d0dcc0f0 |
| 2189 |
Record encryption key = 78116d78507fbe69d4a820c350f55c7c |
| 2190 |
b36c3c9287df0e9614b142b76a587c3f |
| 2191 |
POLYVAL input = 9c2159058b1f0fe91433a5bdc20e214e |
| 2192 |
ab7fecef4454a10ef0657df21ac70000 |
| 2193 |
b202b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296 |
| 2194 |
fa850000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2195 |
f0000000000000009000000000000000 |
| 2196 |
POLYVAL result = 4e4108f09f41d797dc9256f8da8d58c7 |
| 2197 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d58c7 |
| 2198 |
... and masked = 4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d5847 |
| 2199 |
Tag = 454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0a49 |
| 2200 |
Initial counter = 454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0ac9 |
| 2201 |
Result (34 bytes) = 857e16a64915a787637687db4a951963 |
| 2202 |
5cdd454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d |
| 2203 |
0a49 |
| 2204 |
|
| 2205 |
|
| 2206 |
Plaintext (21 bytes) = ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296 |
| 2207 |
8b13cd4eec |
| 2208 |
AAD (35 bytes) = 734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3 |
| 2209 |
e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f |
| 2210 |
167541 |
| 2211 |
Key = 3c535de192eaed3822a2fbbe2ca9dfc8 |
| 2212 |
8255e14a661b8aa82cc54236093bbc23 |
| 2213 |
Nonce = 688089e55540db1872504e1c |
| 2214 |
Record authentication key = cb8c3aa3f8dbaeb4b28a3e86ff6625f8 |
| 2215 |
Record encryption key = 02426ce1aa3ab31313b0848469a1b5fc |
| 2216 |
6c9af9602600b195b04ad407026bc06d |
| 2217 |
POLYVAL input = 734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3 |
| 2218 |
e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f |
| 2219 |
16754100000000000000000000000000 |
| 2220 |
ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296 |
| 2221 |
8b13cd4eec0000000000000000000000 |
| 2222 |
1801000000000000a800000000000000 |
| 2223 |
POLYVAL result = ffd503c7dd712eb3791b7114b17bb0cf |
| 2224 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb0cf |
| 2225 |
... and masked = 97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb04f |
| 2226 |
Tag = 9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594 |
| 2227 |
Initial counter = 9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594 |
| 2228 |
Result (37 bytes) = 626660c26ea6612fb17ad91e8e767639 |
| 2229 |
edd6c9faee9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1d |
| 2230 |
ed1a286594 |
| 2231 |
|
| 2232 |
|
| 2233 |
|
| 2234 |
|
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 40]</span></pre> |
| 2237 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span> |
| 2238 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2239 |
|
| 2240 |
|
| 2241 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.3" href="#appendix-C.3">C.3</a>. Counter Wrap Tests</span> |
| 2242 |
|
| 2243 |
The tests in this section use AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV and are crafted to |
| 2244 |
test correct wrapping of the block counter. |
| 2245 |
|
| 2246 |
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2247 |
4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108 |
| 2248 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 2249 |
Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2250 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2251 |
Nonce = 000000000000000000000000 |
| 2252 |
Record authentication key = dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868 |
| 2253 |
Record encryption key = 779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3 |
| 2254 |
75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f |
| 2255 |
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2256 |
4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108 |
| 2257 |
00000000000000000001000000000000 |
| 2258 |
POLYVAL result = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2259 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2260 |
... and masked = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2261 |
Tag = ffffffff000000000000000000000000 |
| 2262 |
Initial counter = ffffffff000000000000000000000080 |
| 2263 |
Result (48 bytes) = f3f80f2cf0cb2dd9c5984fcda908456c |
| 2264 |
c537703b5ba70324a6793a7bf218d3ea |
| 2265 |
ffffffff000000000000000000000000 |
| 2266 |
|
| 2267 |
|
| 2268 |
Plaintext (24 bytes) = eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c |
| 2269 |
0000000000000000 |
| 2270 |
AAD (0 bytes) = |
| 2271 |
Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2272 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2273 |
Nonce = 000000000000000000000000 |
| 2274 |
Record authentication key = dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868 |
| 2275 |
Record encryption key = 779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3 |
| 2276 |
75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f |
| 2277 |
POLYVAL input = eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c |
| 2278 |
00000000000000000000000000000000 |
| 2279 |
0000000000000000c000000000000000 |
| 2280 |
POLYVAL result = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2281 |
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2282 |
... and masked = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56 |
| 2283 |
Tag = ffffffff000000000000000000000000 |
| 2284 |
Initial counter = ffffffff000000000000000000000080 |
| 2285 |
Result (40 bytes) = 18ce4f0b8cb4d0cac65fea8f79257b20 |
| 2286 |
888e53e72299e56dffffffff00000000 |
| 2287 |
0000000000000000 |
| 2288 |
|
| 2289 |
|
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
|
| 2292 |
<span class="grey">Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 41]</span></pre> |
| 2293 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span> |
| 2294 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8452">RFC 8452</a> AES-GCM-SIV April 2019</span> |
| 2295 |
|
| 2296 |
|
| 2297 |
Acknowledgements |
| 2298 |
|
| 2299 |
The authors would like to thank Daniel Bleichenbacher, Uri |
| 2300 |
Blumenthal, Deb Cooley's team at NSA Information Assurance, Scott |
| 2301 |
Fluhrer, Tetsu Iwata, Tibor Jager, John Mattsson, Ondrej Mosnacek, |
| 2302 |
Kenny Paterson, Bart Preneel, Yannick Seurin, and Bjoern Tackmann for |
| 2303 |
their helpful suggestions and review. |
| 2304 |
|
| 2305 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 2306 |
|
| 2307 |
Shay Gueron |
| 2308 |
University of Haifa and Amazon |
| 2309 |
Abba Khoushy Ave 199 |
| 2310 |
Haifa 3498838 |
| 2311 |
Israel |
| 2312 |
|
| 2313 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 2314 |
|
| 2315 |
|
| 2316 |
Adam Langley |
| 2317 |
Google LLC |
| 2318 |
345 Spear St |
| 2319 |
San Francisco, CA 94105 |
| 2320 |
United States of America |
| 2321 |
|
| 2322 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 2323 |
|
| 2324 |
|
| 2325 |
Yehuda Lindell |
| 2326 |
Bar-Ilan University and Unbound Tech |
| 2327 |
Ramat Gan |
| 2328 |
5290002 |
| 2329 |
Israel |
| 2330 |
|
| 2331 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 |
|
| 2334 |
|
| 2335 |
|
| 2336 |
|
| 2337 |
|
| 2338 |
|
| 2339 |
|
| 2340 |
|
| 2341 |
|
| 2342 |
|
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 |
|
| 2346 |
|
| 2347 |
|
| 2348 |
Gueron, et al. Informational [Page 42] |
| 2349 |
</pre> |