| 1 |
<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Adamson |
| 2 |
Request for Comments: 7861 NetApp |
| 3 |
Updates: <a href="./rfc5403">5403</a> N. Williams |
| 4 |
Category: Standards Track Cryptonector |
| 5 |
ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2016 |
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
|
| 8 |
<span class="h1">Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Security Version 3</span> |
| 9 |
|
| 10 |
Abstract |
| 11 |
|
| 12 |
This document specifies version 3 of the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) |
| 13 |
security protocol (RPCSEC_GSS). This protocol provides support for |
| 14 |
multi-principal authentication of client hosts and user principals to |
| 15 |
a server (constructed by generic composition), security label |
| 16 |
assertions for multi-level security and type enforcement, structured |
| 17 |
privilege assertions, and channel bindings. This document updates |
| 18 |
<a href="./rfc5403">RFC 5403</a>. |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
Status of This Memo |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
| 25 |
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
| 26 |
received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
| 27 |
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
| 28 |
Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
| 29 |
|
| 30 |
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
| 31 |
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
| 32 |
<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7861">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7861</a>. |
| 33 |
|
| 34 |
Copyright Notice |
| 35 |
|
| 36 |
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
| 37 |
document authors. All rights reserved. |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
| 40 |
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
| 41 |
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
| 42 |
publication of this document. Please review these documents |
| 43 |
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
| 44 |
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
| 45 |
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
| 46 |
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
| 47 |
described in the Simplified BSD License. |
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
| 53 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
| 54 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
Table of Contents |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction and Motivation .....................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
| 60 |
<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language ......................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 61 |
<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Added Functionality ........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
| 62 |
<a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. XDR Code Extraction ........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 63 |
<a href="#section-2">2</a>. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 Protocol .......................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 64 |
<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Compatibility with RPCSEC_GSSv2 ............................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 65 |
<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Version Negotiation ........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 66 |
<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. New Reply Verifier .........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 67 |
<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. XDR Code Preliminaries .....................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 68 |
<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL Operation .........................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
| 69 |
<a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. New auth_stat Values ......................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
| 70 |
<a href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. New Control Procedures ....................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
| 71 |
<a href="#section-2.7.1">2.7.1</a>. New Control Procedure - RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE ..........<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
| 72 |
<a href="#section-2.7.2">2.7.2</a>. New Control Procedure - RPCSEC_GSS_LIST ............<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
| 73 |
<a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. Extensibility .............................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
| 74 |
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Operational Recommendation for Deployment ......................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
| 75 |
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
| 76 |
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations ............................................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
| 77 |
<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. New RPC Authentication Status Numbers .....................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
| 78 |
<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Structured Privilege Name Definitions .....................<a href="#page-23">23</a> |
| 79 |
<a href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a>. Initial Registry ...................................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
| 80 |
<a href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a>. Updating Registrations .............................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
| 81 |
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-25">25</a> |
| 82 |
<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-25">25</a> |
| 83 |
<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-26">26</a> |
| 84 |
Acknowledgments ...................................................<a href="#page-26">26</a> |
| 85 |
Authors' Addresses ................................................<a href="#page-26">26</a> |
| 86 |
|
| 87 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction and Motivation</span> |
| 88 |
|
| 89 |
The original Remote Procedure Call (RPC) security protocol |
| 90 |
(RPCSEC_GSS) [<a href="./rfc2203" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification"">RFC2203</a>] provided for authentication of RPC clients and |
| 91 |
servers to each other using the Generic Security Service Application |
| 92 |
Programming Interface (GSS-API) [<a href="./rfc2743" title=""Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1"">RFC2743</a>]. The second version of |
| 93 |
RPCSEC_GSS [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>] added support for channel bindings [<a href="./rfc5056" title=""On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels"">RFC5056</a>]. |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
Existing GSS-API mechanisms are insufficient for communicating |
| 96 |
certain authorization and authentication information to a server. |
| 97 |
The GSS-API and its mechanisms certainly could be extended to address |
| 98 |
this shortcoming. However, it is addressed here at the application |
| 99 |
layer, i.e., in RPCSEC_GSS. |
| 100 |
|
| 101 |
A major motivation for version 3 of RPCSEC_GSS (RPCSEC_GSSv3) is to |
| 102 |
add support for multi-level (labeled) security and server-side copy |
| 103 |
for NFSv4. |
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
| 109 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
| 110 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
Multi-Level Security (MLS) is a traditional model where subjects |
| 114 |
(processes) are given a security level (Unclassified, Secret, |
| 115 |
Top Secret, etc.) and objects (files) are given security labels that |
| 116 |
mandate the access of the subject to the object (see <a href="./rfc7862#section-9.1">Section 9.1 of |
| 117 |
[RFC7862]</a>). |
| 118 |
|
| 119 |
Labeled NFS (see <a href="./rfc7862#section-9">Section 9 of [RFC7862]</a>) uses an MLS policy with |
| 120 |
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems as defined in [<a href="./rfc4949" title=""Internet Security Glossary, Version 2"">RFC4949</a>]. |
| 121 |
Labeled NFS stores MAC file object labels on the NFS server and |
| 122 |
enables client Guest Mode MAC as described in <a href="./rfc7862#section-9.5.3">Section 9.5.3 of |
| 123 |
[RFC7862]</a>. RPCSEC_GSSv3 label assertions assert client MAC process |
| 124 |
subject labels to enable Full Mode MAC when combined with Labeled NFS |
| 125 |
as described in <a href="./rfc7862#section-9.5.1">Section 9.5.1 of [RFC7862]</a>. |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
A traditional inter-server file copy entails the user gaining access |
| 128 |
to a file on the source, reading it, and writing it to a file on the |
| 129 |
destination. In secure NFSv4 inter-server server-side copy (see |
| 130 |
<a href="./rfc7862#section-4">Section 4 of [RFC7862]</a>), the user first secures access to both source |
| 131 |
and destination files and then uses NFSv4.2-defined RPCSEC_GSSv3 |
| 132 |
structured privileges to authorize the destination to copy the file |
| 133 |
from the source on behalf of the user. |
| 134 |
|
| 135 |
Multi-principal authentication can be used to address shared cache |
| 136 |
poisoning attacks (see Section 9 of [<a href="#ref-AFS-RXGK">AFS-RXGK</a>]) on the client cache |
| 137 |
by a user. As described in Section 7 of [<a href="#ref-AFS-RXGK">AFS-RXGK</a>], multi-user |
| 138 |
machines with a single cache manager can fetch and cache data on a |
| 139 |
user's behalf and re-display it for another user from the cache |
| 140 |
without refetching the data from the server. The initial data |
| 141 |
acquisition is authenticated by the first user's credentials, and if |
| 142 |
only that user's credentials are used, it may be possible for a |
| 143 |
malicious user or users to "poison" the cache for other users by |
| 144 |
introducing bogus data into the cache. |
| 145 |
|
| 146 |
Another use of the multi-principal assertion is the secure conveyance |
| 147 |
of privilege information for processes running with more (or even |
| 148 |
with less) privilege than the user normally would be accorded. |
| 149 |
|
| 150 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
| 151 |
|
| 152 |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
| 153 |
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
| 154 |
document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
| 155 |
|
| 156 |
|
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
|
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
| 165 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
| 166 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Added Functionality</span> |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 (RPCSEC_GSSv3) is the same as RPCSEC_GSSv2 |
| 172 |
[<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>], except that the following assertions of authority have |
| 173 |
been added: |
| 174 |
|
| 175 |
o Security labels for Full Mode security type enforcement, and other |
| 176 |
labeled security models (see <a href="./rfc7862#section-9.5.1">Section 9.5.1 of [RFC7862]</a>). |
| 177 |
|
| 178 |
o Application-specific structured privileges. These allow an RPC |
| 179 |
application client to pass structured information to the |
| 180 |
corresponding application code in a server to control the use of |
| 181 |
the privilege and/or the conditions in which the privilege may be |
| 182 |
exercised. For an example, see server-side copy as described in |
| 183 |
[<a href="./rfc7862" title=""Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 2 Protocol"">RFC7862</a>]. |
| 184 |
|
| 185 |
o Multi-principal authentication of the client host and user to the |
| 186 |
server, done by binding two RPCSEC_GSS handles. |
| 187 |
|
| 188 |
o Simplified channel binding. |
| 189 |
|
| 190 |
Assertions of labels and privileges are evaluated by the server, |
| 191 |
which may then map the asserted values to other values, all according |
| 192 |
to server-side policy. See [<a href="./rfc7862" title=""Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 2 Protocol"">RFC7862</a>]. |
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
An option for enumerating server-supported Label Format Specifiers |
| 195 |
(LFSs) is provided. See <a href="./rfc7862#section-9.1">Section 9.1 of [RFC7862]</a>. |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
Note that there is no RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE payload that is REQUIRED to |
| 198 |
implement. RPCSEC_GSSv3 implementations are feature driven. Besides |
| 199 |
implementing the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE operation and payloads for the |
| 200 |
desired features, all RPCSEC_GSSv3 implementations MUST implement: |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
o The new RPCSEC_GSS version number (<a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>). |
| 203 |
|
| 204 |
o The new reply verifier (<a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>). |
| 205 |
|
| 206 |
o The new auth_stat values (<a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a>). |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
|
| 209 |
|
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
|
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
|
| 215 |
|
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
| 221 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
| 222 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 targets implementing a desired feature MUST also |
| 226 |
implement the RPCSEC_GSS_LIST operation, and the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE |
| 227 |
operation replies for unsupported features as follows: |
| 228 |
|
| 229 |
o For label assertions, the target indicates no support by returning |
| 230 |
the new RPCSEC_GSS_LABEL_PROBLEM auth_stat value (see |
| 231 |
<a href="#section-2.7.1.3">Section 2.7.1.3</a>). |
| 232 |
|
| 233 |
o For structured privilege assertions, the target indicates no |
| 234 |
support by returning the new RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE auth_stat |
| 235 |
value (see <a href="#section-2.7.1.4">Section 2.7.1.4</a>). |
| 236 |
|
| 237 |
o For multi-principal authentication (<a href="#section-2.7.1.1">Section 2.7.1.1</a>), the target |
| 238 |
indicates no support by not including an rgss3_gss_mp_auth value |
| 239 |
in the rgss3_create_res. |
| 240 |
|
| 241 |
o For channel bindings (<a href="#section-2.7.1.2">Section 2.7.1.2</a>), the target indicates no |
| 242 |
support by not including an rgss3_chan_binding value in the |
| 243 |
rgss3_create_res. |
| 244 |
|
| 245 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. XDR Code Extraction</span> |
| 246 |
|
| 247 |
This document contains the External Data Representation (XDR) |
| 248 |
[<a href="./rfc4506" title=""XDR: External Data Representation Standard"">RFC4506</a>] definitions for the RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol. The XDR |
| 249 |
description is provided in this document in a way that makes it |
| 250 |
simple for the reader to extract it into a form that is ready to |
| 251 |
compile. The reader can feed this document in the following shell |
| 252 |
script to produce the machine-readable XDR description of |
| 253 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3: |
| 254 |
|
| 255 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
#!/bin/sh |
| 258 |
grep "^ *///" | sed 's?^ */// ??' | sed 's?^ *///$??' |
| 259 |
|
| 260 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 261 |
|
| 262 |
That is, if the above script is stored in a file called "extract.sh" |
| 263 |
and this document is in a file called "spec.txt", then the reader |
| 264 |
can do: |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 267 |
|
| 268 |
sh extract.sh < spec.txt > rpcsec_gss_v3.x |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 271 |
|
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
| 277 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
| 278 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
The effect of the script is to remove leading white space from each |
| 282 |
line, plus a sentinel sequence of "///". |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 Protocol</span> |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 (RPCSEC_GSSv3) is very similar to RPCSEC_GSS |
| 287 |
version 2 (RPCSEC_GSSv2) [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>]. The difference is that the new |
| 288 |
support for assertions and channel bindings is implemented via a |
| 289 |
different mechanism. |
| 290 |
|
| 291 |
The entire RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol is not presented here. Only the |
| 292 |
differences between RPCSEC_GSSv3 and RPCSEC_GSSv2 are shown. |
| 293 |
|
| 294 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 is implemented as follows: |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
o A client uses an existing RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle established |
| 297 |
in the usual manner (see <a href="./rfc2203#section-5.2">Section 5.2 of [RFC2203]</a>) to protect |
| 298 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 exchanges; this will be termed the "parent" handle. |
| 299 |
|
| 300 |
o The server issues a "child" RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle in the |
| 301 |
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE response, which uses the underlying GSS-API |
| 302 |
security context of the parent handle in all subsequent exchanges |
| 303 |
that use the child handle. |
| 304 |
|
| 305 |
o An RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handle MUST NOT be used as the parent handle |
| 306 |
in an RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE control message. |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Compatibility with RPCSEC_GSSv2</span> |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
The functionality of RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>] is fully supported by |
| 311 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3, with the exception of the RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL |
| 312 |
operation, which is not supported when RPCSEC_GSSv3 is in use (see |
| 313 |
<a href="#section-2.5">Section 2.5</a>). |
| 314 |
|
| 315 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Version Negotiation</span> |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
An initiator that supports version 3 of RPCSEC_GSS simply issues an |
| 318 |
RPCSEC_GSS request with the rgc_version field set to |
| 319 |
RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3. If the target does not recognize |
| 320 |
RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3, the target will return an RPC error per |
| 321 |
<a href="./rfc2203#section-5.1">Section 5.1 of [RFC2203]</a>. |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
The initiator MUST NOT attempt to use an RPCSEC_GSS handle returned |
| 324 |
by version 3 of a target with version 1 or version 2 of the same |
| 325 |
target. The initiator MUST NOT attempt to use an RPCSEC_GSS handle |
| 326 |
returned by version 1 or version 2 of a target with version 3 of the |
| 327 |
same target. |
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. New Reply Verifier</span> |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
A new reply verifier is needed for RPCSEC_GSSv3 because of a |
| 340 |
situation that arises from the use of the same GSS context by child |
| 341 |
and parent handles. Because the RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handle uses the |
| 342 |
same GSS context as the parent handle, a child and parent |
| 343 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle could have the same RPCSEC_GSS sequence numbers. |
| 344 |
Since the reply verifier of previous versions of RPCSEC_GSS computes |
| 345 |
a Message Integrity Code (MIC) on just the sequence number, this |
| 346 |
provides opportunities for man-in-the-middle attacks. |
| 347 |
|
| 348 |
This issue is addressed in RPCSEC_GSS version 3 by computing the |
| 349 |
verifier using exactly the same input as the information used to |
| 350 |
compute the request verifier, except that the mtype is changed from |
| 351 |
CALL to REPLY. The new reply verifier computes a MIC over the |
| 352 |
following RPC reply header data: |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
unsigned int xid; |
| 355 |
msg_type mtype; /* set to REPLY */ |
| 356 |
unsigned int rpcvers; |
| 357 |
unsigned int prog; |
| 358 |
unsigned int vers; |
| 359 |
unsigned int proc; |
| 360 |
opaque_auth cred; /* binds the RPCSEC_GSS handle */ |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
|
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
|
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. XDR Code Preliminaries</span> |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
The following code fragment replaces the corresponding preliminary |
| 396 |
code shown in Figure 1 of [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>]. The values in the code fragment |
| 397 |
in <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a> are additions to the auth_stat enumeration. |
| 398 |
Subsequent code fragments are additions to the code for version 2 |
| 399 |
that support the new procedures defined in version 3. |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
/// /* |
| 404 |
/// * Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons |
| 405 |
/// * identified as the authors. All rights reserved. |
| 406 |
/// * |
| 407 |
/// * The authors of the code are identified in <a href="./rfc2203">RFC 2203</a>, |
| 408 |
/// * <a href="./rfc5403">RFC 5403</a>, and <a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a>. |
| 409 |
/// * |
| 410 |
/// * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, |
| 411 |
/// * with or without modification, are permitted |
| 412 |
/// * provided that the following conditions are met: |
| 413 |
/// * |
| 414 |
/// * o Redistributions of source code must retain the above |
| 415 |
/// * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the |
| 416 |
/// * following disclaimer. |
| 417 |
/// * |
| 418 |
/// * o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the |
| 419 |
/// * above copyright notice, this list of |
| 420 |
/// * conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 421 |
/// * the documentation and/or other materials |
| 422 |
/// * provided with the distribution. |
| 423 |
/// * |
| 424 |
/// * o Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF |
| 425 |
/// * Trust, nor the names of specific contributors, may be |
| 426 |
/// * used to endorse or promote products derived from this |
| 427 |
/// * software without specific prior written permission. |
| 428 |
/// * |
| 429 |
/// * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS |
| 430 |
/// * AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED |
| 431 |
/// * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 432 |
/// * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS |
| 433 |
/// * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO |
| 434 |
/// * EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE |
| 435 |
/// * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, |
| 436 |
/// * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 437 |
/// * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR |
| 438 |
/// * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS |
| 439 |
/// * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF |
| 440 |
/// * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
/// * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING |
| 450 |
/// * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF |
| 451 |
/// * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 452 |
/// */ |
| 453 |
/// |
| 454 |
/// /* |
| 455 |
/// * This code was derived from <a href="./rfc2203">RFC 2203</a>, <a href="./rfc5403">RFC 5403</a>, |
| 456 |
/// * and <a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a>. Please reproduce this note if possible. |
| 457 |
/// */ |
| 458 |
/// |
| 459 |
/// enum rpc_gss_service_t { |
| 460 |
/// /* Note: The enumerated value for 0 is reserved. */ |
| 461 |
/// rpc_gss_svc_none = 1, |
| 462 |
/// rpc_gss_svc_integrity = 2, |
| 463 |
/// rpc_gss_svc_privacy = 3, |
| 464 |
/// rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot = 4 |
| 465 |
/// }; |
| 466 |
/// |
| 467 |
/// enum rpc_gss_proc_t { |
| 468 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_DATA = 0, |
| 469 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_INIT = 1, |
| 470 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT = 2, |
| 471 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY = 3, |
| 472 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL = 4, /* Not used */ |
| 473 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE = 5, /* New */ |
| 474 |
/// RPCSEC_GSS_LIST = 6 /* New */ |
| 475 |
/// }; |
| 476 |
/// |
| 477 |
/// struct rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t { |
| 478 |
/// rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc; /* Control procedure */ |
| 479 |
/// unsigned int seq_num; /* Sequence number */ |
| 480 |
/// rpc_gss_service_t service; /* Service used */ |
| 481 |
/// opaque handle<>; /* Context handle */ |
| 482 |
/// }; |
| 483 |
/// |
| 484 |
/// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 = 1; |
| 485 |
/// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_2 = 2; |
| 486 |
/// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3 = 3; /* New */ |
| 487 |
/// |
| 488 |
/// union rpc_gss_cred_t switch (unsigned int rgc_version) { |
| 489 |
/// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1: |
| 490 |
/// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_2: |
| 491 |
/// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3: /* New */ |
| 492 |
/// rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t rgc_cred_v1; |
| 493 |
/// }; |
| 494 |
/// |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
As seen above, the RPCSEC_GSSv3 credential has the same format as the |
| 506 |
RPCSEC_GSSv1 [<a href="./rfc2203" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification"">RFC2203</a>] and RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>] credential. |
| 507 |
Setting the rgc_version field to 3 indicates that the initiator and |
| 508 |
target support the new RPCSEC_GSSv3 control procedures. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL Operation</span> |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 provides a channel-binding assertion that replaces the |
| 513 |
RPCSEC_GSSv2 RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL operation. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
The RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL operation is not supported on RPCSEC_GSS |
| 516 |
version 3 handles. If a server receives an RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL |
| 517 |
operation on an RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle, it MUST return a reply status of |
| 518 |
MSG_ACCEPTED with an accept_stat of PROC_UNAVAIL [<a href="./rfc5531" title=""RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Specification Version 2"">RFC5531</a>]. |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. New auth_stat Values</span> |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 requires the addition of several values to the auth_stat |
| 523 |
enumerated type definition. The use of these new auth_stat values is |
| 524 |
explained throughout this document. |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
enum auth_stat { |
| 527 |
... |
| 528 |
/* |
| 529 |
* RPCSEC_GSSv3 errors |
| 530 |
*/ |
| 531 |
RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM = 15, |
| 532 |
RPCSEC_GSS_LABEL_PROBLEM = 16, |
| 533 |
RPCSEC_GSS_PRIVILEGE_PROBLEM = 17, |
| 534 |
RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE = 18 |
| 535 |
}; |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. New Control Procedures</span> |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
There are two new RPCSEC_GSSv3 control procedures: RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE |
| 540 |
and RPCSEC_GSS_LIST. |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
The RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE procedure binds any combination of assertions |
| 543 |
-- multi-principal authentication, labels, structured privileges, or |
| 544 |
channel bindings -- to a new RPCSEC_GSSv3 context returned in the |
| 545 |
rgss3_create_res rcr_handle field. |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
The RPCSEC_GSS_LIST procedure queries the target for supported |
| 548 |
assertions. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 control messages are similar to the RPCSEC_GSS |
| 562 |
version 1 and version 2 RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY control message (see |
| 563 |
<a href="./rfc2203#section-5.4">Section 5.4 of [RFC2203]</a>) in that the sequence number in the request |
| 564 |
must be valid and the header checksum in the verifier must be valid. |
| 565 |
As in RPCSEC_GSS version 1 and version 2, the RPCSEC_GSS version 3 |
| 566 |
control messages may contain call data following the verifier in the |
| 567 |
body of the NULLPROC procedure. In other words, they look a lot like |
| 568 |
an RPCSEC_GSS data message with the header procedure set to NULLPROC. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
The client MUST use one of the following security services to protect |
| 571 |
the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE or RPCSEC_GSS_LIST control message: |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
o rpc_gss_svc_integrity |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
o rpc_gss_svc_privacy |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
Specifically, the client MUST NOT use rpc_gss_svc_none. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
RPCSEC_GSS_LIST can also use rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot (see |
| 580 |
RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>]) if the request is sent using an RPCSEC_GSSv3 |
| 581 |
child handle with channel bindings enabled as described in |
| 582 |
<a href="#section-2.7.1.2">Section 2.7.1.2</a>. |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.1" href="#section-2.7.1">2.7.1</a>. New Control Procedure - RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
/// struct rgss3_create_args { |
| 622 |
/// rgss3_gss_mp_auth *rca_mp_auth; |
| 623 |
/// rgss3_chan_binding *rca_chan_bind_mic; |
| 624 |
/// rgss3_assertion_u rca_assertions<>; |
| 625 |
/// }; |
| 626 |
/// |
| 627 |
/// struct rgss3_create_res { |
| 628 |
/// opaque rcr_handle<>; |
| 629 |
/// rgss3_gss_mp_auth *rcr_mp_auth; |
| 630 |
/// rgss3_chan_binding *rcr_chan_bind_mic; |
| 631 |
/// rgss3_assertion_u rcr_assertions<>; |
| 632 |
/// }; |
| 633 |
/// |
| 634 |
/// enum rgss3_assertion_type { |
| 635 |
/// LABEL = 0, |
| 636 |
/// PRIVS = 1 |
| 637 |
/// }; |
| 638 |
/// |
| 639 |
/// union rgss3_assertion_u |
| 640 |
/// switch (rgss3_assertion_type atype) { |
| 641 |
/// case LABEL: |
| 642 |
/// rgss3_label rau_label; |
| 643 |
/// case PRIVS: |
| 644 |
/// rgss3_privs rau_privs; |
| 645 |
/// default: |
| 646 |
/// opaque rau_ext<>; |
| 647 |
/// }; |
| 648 |
/// |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
The call data for an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE request consists of an |
| 653 |
rgss3_create_args, which binds one or more items of several kinds to |
| 654 |
the returned rcr_handle RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle (the child |
| 655 |
handle): |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
o Multi-principal authentication: another RPCSEC_GSS context handle |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
o A channel binding |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
o Authorization assertions: labels and/or privileges |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
The reply to this message consists of either an error or an |
| 674 |
rgss3_create_res structure. As noted in Sections <a href="#section-2.7.1.3">2.7.1.3</a> and |
| 675 |
2.7.1.4, successful rgss3_assertions are enumerated in rcr_assertions |
| 676 |
and are REQUIRED to be enumerated in the same order as they appeared |
| 677 |
in the rca_assertions argument. |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
Upon a successful RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE, both the client and the server |
| 680 |
need to associate the resultant child rcr_handle context handle with |
| 681 |
the parent context handle in their GSS context caches so as to be |
| 682 |
able to reference the parent context given the child context handle. |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handles MUST be destroyed upon the destruction of |
| 685 |
the associated parent handle. |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
Server implementation and policy MAY result in labels, privileges, |
| 688 |
and identities being mapped to concepts and values that are local to |
| 689 |
the server. Server policies should take into account the identity of |
| 690 |
the client and/or user as authenticated via the GSS-API. |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.1.1" href="#section-2.7.1.1">2.7.1.1</a>. Multi-Principal Authentication</span> |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
/// |
| 697 |
/// struct rgss3_gss_mp_auth { |
| 698 |
/// opaque rgmp_handle<>; /* Inner handle */ |
| 699 |
/// opaque rgmp_rpcheader_mic<>; |
| 700 |
/// }; |
| 701 |
/// |
| 702 |
|
| 703 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a multi-principal authentication of |
| 706 |
the RPC client host principal and a user principal. This feature is |
| 707 |
needed, for example, when an RPC client host wishes to use authority |
| 708 |
assertions that the server may only grant if a user and an RPC client |
| 709 |
host are authenticated together to the server. Thus, a server may |
| 710 |
refuse to grant requested authority to a user acting alone (e.g., via |
| 711 |
an unprivileged user-space program) or to an RPC client host acting |
| 712 |
alone (e.g., when an RPC client host is acting on behalf of a user) |
| 713 |
but may grant requested authority to an RPC client host acting on |
| 714 |
behalf of a user if the server identifies the user and trusts the RPC |
| 715 |
client host. |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
It is assumed that an unprivileged user-space program would not have |
| 730 |
access to RPC client host credentials needed to establish a GSS-API |
| 731 |
security context authenticating the RPC client host to the server; |
| 732 |
therefore, an unprivileged user-space program could not create an |
| 733 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE message that successfully binds an RPC |
| 734 |
client host and a user security context. |
| 735 |
|
| 736 |
In addition to the parent handle (<a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>), the multi-principal |
| 737 |
authentication call data has an RPCSEC_GSS version 3 handle |
| 738 |
referenced via the rgmp_handle field termed the "inner" handle. |
| 739 |
Clients using RPCSEC_GSSv3 multi-principal authentication MUST use an |
| 740 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle that corresponds to a GSS-API security |
| 741 |
context that authenticates the RPC client host for the parent handle. |
| 742 |
The inner context handle of the multi-principal authentication |
| 743 |
assertion MUST use an RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle that corresponds to |
| 744 |
a GSS-API security context that authenticates the user. The reverse |
| 745 |
(parent handle authenticates user, inner context handle authenticates |
| 746 |
an RPC client host) MUST NOT be used. Other multi-principal parent |
| 747 |
and inner context handle uses might eventually make sense, but they |
| 748 |
would need to be introduced in a new revision of the RPCSEC_GSS |
| 749 |
protocol. |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
The child context handle returned by a successful multi-principal |
| 752 |
assertion binds the inner RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle to the parent |
| 753 |
RPCSEC_GSS context handle and MUST be treated by servers as |
| 754 |
authenticating the GSS-API initiator principal authenticated by the |
| 755 |
inner context handle's GSS-API security context. This principal may |
| 756 |
be mapped to a server-side notion of user or principal. |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
Multi-principal binding is done by including an assertion of type |
| 759 |
rgss3_gss_mp_auth in the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_args call |
| 760 |
data. The inner context handle is placed in the rgmp_handle field. |
| 761 |
A MIC of the RPC header, up to and including the credential, is |
| 762 |
computed using the GSS-API security context associated with the inner |
| 763 |
context handle and is placed in the rgmp_rpcheader_mic field. Note |
| 764 |
that the rgmp_rpcheader_mic only identifies the client host GSS |
| 765 |
context by its context handle (the parent context handle) in the RPC |
| 766 |
header. |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
An RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE control procedure with a multi-principal |
| 769 |
authentication payload MUST use the rpc_gss_svc_privacy security |
| 770 |
service for protection. This prevents an attacker from intercepting |
| 771 |
the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE control procedure, reassigning the (parent) |
| 772 |
context handle, and stealing the user's identity. |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
The target verifies the multi-principal authentication by first |
| 786 |
confirming that the parent context used is an RPC client host |
| 787 |
context; the target then verifies the rgmp_rpcheader_mic using the |
| 788 |
GSS-API security context associated with the rgmp_handle field. |
| 789 |
|
| 790 |
On successful verification, the rgss3_gss_mp_auth field in the |
| 791 |
rgss3_create_res reply MUST be filled in with the inner RPCSEC_GSSv3 |
| 792 |
context handle as the rgmp_handle and a MIC computed over the RPC |
| 793 |
reply header (see <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>) using the GSS-API security context |
| 794 |
associated with the inner handle. |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
On failure, the rgss3_gss_mp_auth field is not sent |
| 797 |
(rgss3_gss_mp_auth is an optional field). A MSG_DENIED reply to the |
| 798 |
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE call is formulated as usual. |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
As described in <a href="./rfc2203#section-5.3.3.3">Section 5.3.3.3 of [RFC2203]</a>, the server maintains a |
| 801 |
list of contexts for the clients that are currently in session with |
| 802 |
it. When a client request comes in, there may not be a context |
| 803 |
corresponding to its handle. When this occurs on an |
| 804 |
RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE request processing of the parent handle, the |
| 805 |
server rejects the request with a reply status of MSG_DENIED with the |
| 806 |
reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR and with an auth_stat value of |
| 807 |
RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM. |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
A new value, RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM, has been added to the |
| 810 |
auth_stat type. With a multi-principal authorization request, the |
| 811 |
server must also have a context corresponding to the inner context |
| 812 |
handle. When the server does not have a context handle corresponding |
| 813 |
to the inner context handle of a multi-principal authorization |
| 814 |
request, the server sends a reply status of MSG_DENIED with the |
| 815 |
reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR and with an auth_stat value of |
| 816 |
RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM. |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
When processing the multi-principal authentication request, if the |
| 819 |
GSS_VerifyMIC() call on the rgmp_rpcheader_mic fails to return |
| 820 |
GSS_S_COMPLETE, the server sends a reply status of MSG_DENIED with |
| 821 |
the reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR and with an auth_stat value of |
| 822 |
RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.1.2" href="#section-2.7.1.2">2.7.1.2</a>. Channel Binding</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
/// |
| 846 |
/// typedef opaque rgss3_chan_binding<>; |
| 847 |
/// |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 provides a different way to do channel binding than |
| 852 |
RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>]. Specifically: |
| 853 |
|
| 854 |
a. RPCSEC_GSSv3 builds on RPCSEC_GSSv1 by reusing existing, |
| 855 |
established context handles rather than providing a different RPC |
| 856 |
security flavor for establishing context handles. |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
b. Channel-bindings data is not hashed because there is now general |
| 859 |
agreement that it is the secure channel's responsibility to |
| 860 |
produce channel-bindings data of manageable size. |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
(a) is useful in keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple in general, not just for |
| 863 |
channel binding. (b) is useful in keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple |
| 864 |
specifically for channel binding. |
| 865 |
|
| 866 |
Channel binding is accomplished as follows. The client prefixes the |
| 867 |
channel-bindings data octet string with the channel type as described |
| 868 |
in [<a href="./rfc5056" title=""On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels"">RFC5056</a>]; then, the client calls GSS_GetMIC() to get a MIC of the |
| 869 |
resulting octet string, using the parent RPCSEC_GSSv3 context |
| 870 |
handle's GSS-API security context. The MIC is then placed in the |
| 871 |
rca_chan_bind_mic field of RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE arguments |
| 872 |
(rgss3_create_args). |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
If the rca_chan_bind_mic field of the arguments of an |
| 875 |
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE control message is set, then the server MUST verify |
| 876 |
the client's channel-binding MIC if the server supports this feature. |
| 877 |
If channel-binding verification succeeds, then the server MUST |
| 878 |
generate a new MIC of the same channel bindings and place it in the |
| 879 |
rcr_chan_bind_mic field of the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_res |
| 880 |
results. If channel-binding verification fails or the server doesn't |
| 881 |
support channel binding, then the server MUST indicate this in its |
| 882 |
reply by not including an rgss3_chan_binding value in |
| 883 |
rgss3_create_res (rgss3_chan_binding is an optional field). |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
The client MUST verify the result's rcr_chan_bind_mic value by |
| 886 |
calling GSS_VerifyMIC() with the given MIC and the channel-bindings |
| 887 |
data (including the channel-type prefix). If client-side channel- |
| 888 |
binding verification fails, then the client MUST call |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY. If the client requested channel binding but the |
| 898 |
server did not include an rcr_chan_binding_mic field in the results, |
| 899 |
then the client MAY continue to use the resulting context handle as |
| 900 |
though channel binding had never been requested. If the client |
| 901 |
considers channel binding critical, it MUST call RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY. |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
As per RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>]: |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
Once a successful [channel-binding] procedure has been performed |
| 906 |
on an [RPCSEC_GSSv3] context handle, the initiator's |
| 907 |
implementation may map application requests for rpc_gss_svc_none |
| 908 |
and rpc_gss_svc_integrity to rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot credentials. |
| 909 |
And if the secure channel has privacy enabled, requests for |
| 910 |
rpc_gss_svc_privacy can also be mapped to |
| 911 |
rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot. |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
Any RPCSEC_GSSv3 child context handle that has been bound to a secure |
| 914 |
channel in this way SHOULD be used only with the |
| 915 |
rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot and SHOULD NOT be used with rpc_gss_svc_none |
| 916 |
or rpc_gss_svc_integrity -- if the secure channel does not provide |
| 917 |
privacy protection, then the client MAY use rpc_gss_svc_privacy where |
| 918 |
privacy protection is needed or desired. |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.1.3" href="#section-2.7.1.3">2.7.1.3</a>. Label Assertions</span> |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
/// struct rgss3_label { |
| 925 |
/// rgss3_lfs rl_lfs; |
| 926 |
/// opaque rl_label<>; |
| 927 |
/// }; |
| 928 |
/// |
| 929 |
/// struct rgss3_lfs { |
| 930 |
/// unsigned int rlf_lfs_id; |
| 931 |
/// unsigned int rlf_pi_id; |
| 932 |
/// }; |
| 933 |
/// |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
The client discovers, via the RPCSEC_GSS_LIST control message, which |
| 938 |
LFSs the server supports. Full Mode MAC is enabled when an |
| 939 |
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 process subject label assertion is combined with |
| 940 |
a file object label provided by the NFSv4.2 sec_label attribute. |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
Label encoding is specified to mirror the NFSv4.2 sec_label attribute |
| 943 |
described in <a href="./rfc7862#section-12.2.4">Section 12.2.4 of [RFC7862]</a>. The LFS is an identifier |
| 944 |
used by the client to establish the syntactic format of the security |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
label and the semantic meaning of its components. The Policy |
| 954 |
Identifier (PI) is an optional part of the definition of an LFS that |
| 955 |
allows clients and the server to identify specific security policies. |
| 956 |
The opaque label field (rgss3_label) is dependent on the MAC model to |
| 957 |
interpret and enforce. |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
If a label itself requires privacy protection (i.e., requires that |
| 960 |
the user can assert that the label is a secret), then the client MUST |
| 961 |
use the rpc_gss_svc_privacy protection service for the |
| 962 |
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE request. |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a set of subject security labels in |
| 965 |
some LFS by binding a label assertion to the RPCSEC_GSSv3 child |
| 966 |
context handle. This is done by including an assertion of type |
| 967 |
rgss3_label in the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_args rca_assertions |
| 968 |
call data. The label assertion payload is the set of subject labels |
| 969 |
asserted by the calling NFS client process. The resultant child |
| 970 |
context is used for NFS requests asserting the client process subject |
| 971 |
labels. The NFS server process that handles such requests then |
| 972 |
asserts the (client) process subject label(s) as it attempts to |
| 973 |
access a file that has associated Labeled NFS object labels. |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
Servers that support labeling in the requested LFS MAY map the |
| 976 |
requested subject label to a different subject label as a result of |
| 977 |
server-side policy evaluation. |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
The labels that are accepted by the target and bound to the |
| 980 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 context MUST be enumerated in the rcr_assertions field |
| 981 |
of the rgss3_create_res RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE reply. |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
Servers that do not support labeling or that do not support the |
| 984 |
requested LFS reject the label assertion with a reply status of |
| 985 |
MSG_DENIED, a reject_status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of |
| 986 |
RPCSEC_GSS_LABEL_PROBLEM. |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.1.4" href="#section-2.7.1.4">2.7.1.4</a>. Structured Privilege Assertions</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
/// |
| 1014 |
/// typedef opaque utf8string<>; /* UTF-8 encoding */ |
| 1015 |
/// typedef utf8string utf8str_cs; /* Case-sensitive UTF-8 */ |
| 1016 |
/// |
| 1017 |
/// struct rgss3_privs { |
| 1018 |
/// utf8str_cs rp_name<>; |
| 1019 |
/// opaque rp_privilege<>; |
| 1020 |
/// }; |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
A structured privilege is a capability defined by a specific RPC |
| 1025 |
application. To support the assertion of this privilege, by a client |
| 1026 |
using the application, in a server that also supports the |
| 1027 |
application, the application may define a private data structure that |
| 1028 |
is understood by clients and servers implementing the RPC |
| 1029 |
application. |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a structured privilege by binding the |
| 1032 |
privilege to the RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle. This is done by |
| 1033 |
including an assertion of type rgss3_privs in the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE |
| 1034 |
rgss3_create_args rca_assertions call data. |
| 1035 |
|
| 1036 |
The privilege is identified by the description string that is used by |
| 1037 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 to identify the privilege and communicate the private |
| 1038 |
data between the relevant RPC application-specific code without |
| 1039 |
needing to be aware of the details of the structure used. Thus, as |
| 1040 |
far as RPCSEC_GSSv3 is concerned, the defined structure is passed |
| 1041 |
between client and server as opaque data encoded in the |
| 1042 |
rpc_gss3_privs rp_privilege field. |
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 |
Encoding, server verification, and any server policies for structured |
| 1045 |
privileges are described by the RPC application definition. The |
| 1046 |
rp_name field of rpc_gss3_privs carries the description string used |
| 1047 |
to identify and list the privilege. The utf8str_cs definition is |
| 1048 |
from [<a href="./rfc7530" title=""Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Protocol"">RFC7530</a>]. |
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
A successful structured privilege assertion MUST be enumerated in the |
| 1051 |
rcr_assertions field of the rgss3_create_res RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE reply. |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
If a server receives a structured privilege assertion that it does |
| 1054 |
not recognize, the assertion is rejected with a reply status of |
| 1055 |
MSG_DENIED, a reject_status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of |
| 1056 |
RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE. |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
It is assumed that a client asserting more than one structured |
| 1066 |
privilege to be bound to a context handle would not require all the |
| 1067 |
privilege assertions to succeed. |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
The server MUST NOT reject RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE requests containing |
| 1070 |
supported structured privilege assertions, even if some of those |
| 1071 |
assertions are rejected (e.g., for local policy reasons). |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
If a server receives an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE request containing one or |
| 1074 |
more unsupported structured privilege assertions, the request MUST be |
| 1075 |
rejected with a reply status of MSG_DENIED, a reject_status of |
| 1076 |
AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of RPCSEC_GSS_PRIVILEGE_PROBLEM. |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
<a href="./rfc7862#section-4.9.1.1">Section 4.9.1.1 of [RFC7862]</a> ("Inter-Server Copy via ONC RPC with |
| 1079 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3") shows an example of structured privilege definition |
| 1080 |
and use. |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7.2" href="#section-2.7.2">2.7.2</a>. New Control Procedure - RPCSEC_GSS_LIST</span> |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
/// enum rgss3_list_item { |
| 1087 |
/// LABEL = 0, |
| 1088 |
/// PRIVS = 1 |
| 1089 |
/// }; |
| 1090 |
/// |
| 1091 |
/// struct rgss3_list_args { |
| 1092 |
/// rgss3_list_item rla_list_what<>; |
| 1093 |
/// }; |
| 1094 |
/// |
| 1095 |
/// union rgss3_list_item_u |
| 1096 |
/// switch (rgss3_list_item itype) { |
| 1097 |
/// case LABEL: |
| 1098 |
/// rgss3_label rli_labels<>; |
| 1099 |
/// case PRIVS: |
| 1100 |
/// rgss3_privs rli_privs<>; |
| 1101 |
/// default: |
| 1102 |
/// opaque rli_ext<>; |
| 1103 |
/// }; |
| 1104 |
/// |
| 1105 |
/// typedef rgss3_list_item_u rgss3_list_res<>; |
| 1106 |
/// |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
The call data for an RPCSEC_GSS_LIST request consists of a list of |
| 1111 |
integers (rla_list_what) indicating what assertions are to be listed, |
| 1112 |
and the reply consists of an error or the requested list. |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
The result of requesting a list of rgss3_list_item LABEL objects is a |
| 1122 |
list of LFSs supported by the server. The client can then use the |
| 1123 |
LFS list to assert labels via the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE label assertions. |
| 1124 |
See <a href="#section-2.7.1.3">Section 2.7.1.3</a>. |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. Extensibility</span> |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
Assertion types may be added in the future by adding arms to the |
| 1129 |
"rgss3_assertion_u" union (<a href="#section-2.7.1">Section 2.7.1</a>) and the "rgss3_list_item_u" |
| 1130 |
union (<a href="#section-2.7.2">Section 2.7.2</a>). Examples of other potential assertion types |
| 1131 |
include: |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
o Client-side assertions of identity: |
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 |
* Primary client/user identity. |
| 1136 |
|
| 1137 |
* Supplementary group memberships of the client/user, including |
| 1138 |
support for specifying deltas to the membership list as seen on |
| 1139 |
the server. |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Operational Recommendation for Deployment</span> |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 is a superset of RPCSEC_GSSv2 [<a href="./rfc5403" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Version 2"">RFC5403</a>], which in turn |
| 1144 |
is a superset of RPCSEC_GSSv1 [<a href="./rfc2203" title=""RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification"">RFC2203</a>], and so can be used in all |
| 1145 |
situations where RPCSEC_GSSv2 is used, or where RPCSEC_GSSv1 is used |
| 1146 |
and channel-bindings functionality is not needed. RPCSEC_GSSv3 |
| 1147 |
should be used when the new functionality is needed. |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
This entire document deals with security issues. |
| 1152 |
|
| 1153 |
The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol allows for client-side assertions of data |
| 1154 |
that is relevant to server-side authorization decisions. These |
| 1155 |
assertions must be evaluated by the server in the context of whether |
| 1156 |
the client and/or user are authenticated, whether multi-principal |
| 1157 |
authentication was used, whether the client is trusted, what ranges |
| 1158 |
of assertions are allowed for the client and the user (separately or |
| 1159 |
together), and any relevant server-side policy. |
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 |
The security semantics of assertions carried by RPCSEC_GSSv3 are |
| 1162 |
application protocol-specific. |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
Note that RPCSEC_GSSv3 is not a complete solution for labeling: it |
| 1165 |
conveys the labels of actors but not the labels of objects. RPC |
| 1166 |
application protocols may require extending in order to carry object |
| 1167 |
label information. |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
There may be interactions with NFSv4's callback security scheme and |
| 1178 |
NFSv4.1's [<a href="./rfc5661" title=""Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1 Protocol"">RFC5661</a>] GSS SSV (Secret State Verifier) mechanisms. |
| 1179 |
Specifically, the NFSv4 callback scheme requires that the server |
| 1180 |
initiate GSS-API security contexts, which does not work well in |
| 1181 |
practice; in the context of client-side processes running as the same |
| 1182 |
user but with different privileges and security labels, the NFSv4 |
| 1183 |
callback security scheme seems particularly unlikely to work well. |
| 1184 |
NFSv4.1 has the server use an existing, client-initiated RPCSEC_GSS |
| 1185 |
context handle to protect server-initiated callback RPCs. The |
| 1186 |
NFSv4.1 callback security scheme lacks all the problems of the NFSv4 |
| 1187 |
scheme; however, it is important that the server pick an appropriate |
| 1188 |
RPCSEC_GSS context handle to protect any callbacks. Specifically, it |
| 1189 |
is important that the server use RPCSEC_GSS context handles that |
| 1190 |
authenticate the client to protect any callbacks related to server |
| 1191 |
state initiated by RPCs protected by RPCSEC_GSSv3 contexts. |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
As described in <a href="./rfc5661#section-2.10.10">Section 2.10.10 of [RFC5661]</a>, the client is permitted |
| 1194 |
to associate multiple RPCSEC_GSS handles with a single SSV GSS |
| 1195 |
context. RPCSEC_GSSv3 handles will work well with SSV in that the |
| 1196 |
man-in-the-middle attacks described in <a href="./rfc5661#section-2.10.10">Section 2.10.10 of [RFC5661]</a> |
| 1197 |
are solved by the new reply verifier (<a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>). Using an |
| 1198 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle backed by a GSS-SSV mechanism context as a parent |
| 1199 |
handle in an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE call, while permitted, is complicated |
| 1200 |
by the lifetime rules of SSV contexts and their associated RPCSEC_GSS |
| 1201 |
handles. |
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
This section uses terms that are defined in [<a href="./rfc5226" title="">RFC5226</a>]. |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. New RPC Authentication Status Numbers</span> |
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
The following new RPC Authentication Status Numbers have been added |
| 1210 |
to the IANA registry: |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
o RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM (15) "No credentials for |
| 1213 |
multi-principal assertion inner context user". See |
| 1214 |
<a href="#section-2.7.1.1">Section 2.7.1.1</a>. |
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 |
o RPCSEC_GSS_LABEL_PROBLEM (16) "Problem with label assertion". |
| 1217 |
See <a href="#section-2.7.1.3">Section 2.7.1.3</a>. |
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
o RPCSEC_GSS_PRIVILEGE_PROBLEM (17) "Problem with structured |
| 1220 |
privilege assertion". See <a href="#section-2.7.1.4">Section 2.7.1.4</a>. |
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
o RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE (18) "Unknown structured privilege |
| 1223 |
assertion". See <a href="#section-2.7.1.4">Section 2.7.1.4</a>. |
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Structured Privilege Name Definitions</span> |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
IANA has created a registry called the "RPCSEC_GSS Structured |
| 1236 |
Privilege Names Registry". |
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
Structured privilege assertions (<a href="#section-2.7.1.4">Section 2.7.1.4</a>) are defined by a |
| 1239 |
specific RPC application. The namespace identifiers for these |
| 1240 |
assertions (the rp_name) are defined as string names. The |
| 1241 |
RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol does not define the specific assignment of the |
| 1242 |
namespace for these structured privilege assertion names. The IANA |
| 1243 |
registry promotes interoperability where common interests exist. |
| 1244 |
While RPC application developers are allowed to define and use |
| 1245 |
structured privileges as needed, they are encouraged to register |
| 1246 |
structured privilege assertion names with IANA. |
| 1247 |
|
| 1248 |
The registry is to be maintained using the Standards Action policy as |
| 1249 |
defined in <a href="./rfc5226#section-4.1">Section 4.1 of [RFC5226]</a>. |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
Under the RPCSEC_GSS version 3 specification, the name of a |
| 1252 |
structured privilege can in theory be up to 2^32 - 1 bytes in length, |
| 1253 |
but in practice RPC application clients and servers will be unable to |
| 1254 |
handle a string that long. IANA should reject any assignment request |
| 1255 |
with a structured privilege name that exceeds 128 UTF-8 characters. |
| 1256 |
To give the IESG the flexibility to set up bases of assignment of |
| 1257 |
Experimental Use, the prefix "EXPE" is Reserved. The structured |
| 1258 |
privilege with a zero-length name is Reserved. |
| 1259 |
|
| 1260 |
The prefix "PRIV" is allocated for Private Use. A site that wants to |
| 1261 |
make use of unregistered named attributes without risk of conflicting |
| 1262 |
with an assignment in IANA's registry should use the prefix "PRIV" in |
| 1263 |
all of its structured privilege assertion names. |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
Because some RPC application clients and servers have case- |
| 1266 |
insensitive semantics, the fifteen additional lower-case and mixed- |
| 1267 |
case permutations of each of "EXPE" and "PRIV" are Reserved (e.g., |
| 1268 |
"expe", "expE", and "exPe" are Reserved). Similarly, IANA must not |
| 1269 |
allow two assignments that would conflict if both structured |
| 1270 |
privilege names were converted to a common case. |
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
|
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
The registry of structured privilege names is a list of assignments, |
| 1290 |
each containing three fields for each assignment. |
| 1291 |
|
| 1292 |
1. A US-ASCII string name that is the actual name of the structured |
| 1293 |
privilege. This name must be unique. This string name can be 1 |
| 1294 |
to 128 UTF-8 characters long. |
| 1295 |
|
| 1296 |
2. A reference to the specification of the RPC-application-defined |
| 1297 |
structured privilege. The reference can consume up to 256 bytes |
| 1298 |
(or more if IANA permits). |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
3. The point of contact of the registrant. The point of contact can |
| 1301 |
consume up to 256 bytes (or more if IANA permits). |
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.1" href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a>. Initial Registry</span> |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
The initial registry consists of the three structured privileges |
| 1306 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc7862" title=""Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 2 Protocol"">RFC7862</a>]. |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
1. NAME: copy_to_auth, REFERENCE: <a href="./rfc7862">RFC 7862</a>, CONTACT: William |
| 1309 |
A.(Andy) Adamson, [email protected] |
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
2. NAME: copy_from_auth, REFERENCE: <a href="./rfc7862">RFC 7862</a>, CONTACT: William |
| 1312 |
A.(Andy) Adamson, [email protected] |
| 1313 |
|
| 1314 |
3. NAME: copy_confirm_auth, REFERENCE: <a href="./rfc7862">RFC 7862</a>, CONTACT: William |
| 1315 |
A.(Andy) Adamson, [email protected] |
| 1316 |
|
| 1317 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.2" href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a>. Updating Registrations</span> |
| 1318 |
|
| 1319 |
The registrant is always permitted to update the point of contact |
| 1320 |
field. To make any other change will require Expert Review or IESG |
| 1321 |
Approval. |
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
|
| 1324 |
|
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span> |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1350 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 1351 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 1352 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 1353 |
|
| 1354 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2203">RFC2203</a>] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol |
| 1355 |
Specification", <a href="./rfc2203">RFC 2203</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2203, |
| 1356 |
September 1997, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2203">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2203</a>>. |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2743">RFC2743</a>] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program |
| 1359 |
Interface Version 2, Update 1", <a href="./rfc2743">RFC 2743</a>, |
| 1360 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000, |
| 1361 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743</a>>. |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4506">RFC4506</a>] Eisler, M., Ed., "XDR: External Data Representation |
| 1364 |
Standard", STD 67, <a href="./rfc4506">RFC 4506</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4506, |
| 1365 |
May 2006, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4506">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4506</a>>. |
| 1366 |
|
| 1367 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5056">RFC5056</a>] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure |
| 1368 |
Channels", <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, |
| 1369 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056</a>>. |
| 1370 |
|
| 1371 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5403">RFC5403</a>] Eisler, M., "RPCSEC_GSS Version 2", <a href="./rfc5403">RFC 5403</a>, |
| 1372 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5403, February 2009, |
| 1373 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5403">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5403</a>>. |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5661">RFC5661</a>] Shepler, S., Ed., Eisler, M., Ed., and D. Noveck, Ed., |
| 1376 |
"Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1 |
| 1377 |
Protocol", <a href="./rfc5661">RFC 5661</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5661, January 2010, |
| 1378 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5661">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5661</a>>. |
| 1379 |
|
| 1380 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7530">RFC7530</a>] Haynes, T., Ed., and D. Noveck, Ed., "Network File System |
| 1381 |
(NFS) Version 4 Protocol", <a href="./rfc7530">RFC 7530</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7530, |
| 1382 |
March 2015, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7530">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7530</a>>. |
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7862">RFC7862</a>] Haynes, T., "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor |
| 1385 |
Version 2 Protocol", <a href="./rfc7862">RFC 7862</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7862, |
| 1386 |
November 2016, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7862">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7862</a>>. |
| 1387 |
|
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 |
|
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7861">RFC 7861</a> NFSv4 RPC Security November 2016</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1402 |
|
| 1403 |
[<a id="ref-AFS-RXGK">AFS-RXGK</a>] |
| 1404 |
Wilkinson, S. and B. Kaduk, <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22Integrating+rxgk+with+AFS%22'>"Integrating rxgk with AFS"</a>, |
| 1405 |
Work in Progress, <a href="./draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-08">draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-08</a>, |
| 1406 |
May 2015. |
| 1407 |
|
| 1408 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4949">RFC4949</a>] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", |
| 1409 |
FYI 36, <a href="./rfc4949">RFC 4949</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, |
| 1410 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949</a>>. |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5226">RFC5226</a>] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an |
| 1413 |
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>, <a href="./rfc5226">RFC 5226</a>, |
| 1414 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, |
| 1415 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226</a>>. |
| 1416 |
|
| 1417 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5531">RFC5531</a>] Thurlow, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol |
| 1418 |
Specification Version 2", <a href="./rfc5531">RFC 5531</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5531, |
| 1419 |
May 2009, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5531">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5531</a>>. |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
Acknowledgments |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
Andy Adamson would like to thank NetApp, Inc. for its funding of his |
| 1424 |
time on this project. |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
We thank Lars Eggert, Mike Eisler, Ben Kaduk, Bruce Fields, Tom |
| 1427 |
Haynes, and Dave Noveck for their most helpful reviews. |
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 |
William A. (Andy) Adamson |
| 1432 |
NetApp |
| 1433 |
3629 Wagner Ridge Ct. |
| 1434 |
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 |
| 1435 |
United States of America |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
Phone: +1 734 665 1204 |
| 1438 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
|
| 1441 |
Nico Williams |
| 1442 |
cryptonector.com |
| 1443 |
13115 Tamayo Dr. |
| 1444 |
Austin, TX 78729 |
| 1445 |
United States of America |
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
Adamson & Williams Standards Track [Page 26] |
| 1453 |
</pre> |