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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. McGrew
2 Request for Comments: 7321 Cisco Systems
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc4835">4835</a> P. Hoffman
4 Category: Standards Track VPN Consortium
5 ISSN: 2070-1721 August 2014
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance</span>
9 for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
10
11 Abstract
12
13 This document updates the Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
14 Requirements for the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
15 Authentication Header (AH). It also adds usage guidance to help in
16 the selection of these algorithms.
17
18 ESP and AH protocols make use of various cryptographic algorithms to
19 provide confidentiality and/or data origin authentication to
20 protected data communications in the IP Security (IPsec)
21 architecture. To ensure interoperability between disparate
22 implementations, the IPsec standard specifies a set of mandatory-to-
23 implement algorithms. This document specifies the current set of
24 mandatory-to-implement algorithms for ESP and AH, specifies
25 algorithms that should be implemented because they may be promoted to
26 mandatory at some future time, and also recommends against the
27 implementation of some obsolete algorithms. Usage guidance is also
28 provided to help the user of ESP and AH best achieve their security
29 goals through appropriate choices of cryptographic algorithms.
30
31 This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>.
32
33 Status of This Memo
34
35 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
36
37 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
38 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
39 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
40 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
41 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
42
43 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
44 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
45 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321</a>.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
73 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
74 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
75 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
76 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
77 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
78 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
79 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
80 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
81 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
82 than English.
83
84 Table of Contents
85
86 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
87 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
88 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Implementation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
89 2.1. ESP Authenticated Encryption (Combined Mode Algorithms) . 4
90 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. ESP Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
91 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. ESP Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
92 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. AH Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
93 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Summary of Changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
94 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Usage Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
95 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
96 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Authenticated Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
97 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Encryption Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
98 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Authentication Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
99 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Algorithm Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
100 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
101 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
102 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
103 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
104 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>] and the
116 Authentication Header (AH) [<a href="./rfc4302" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">RFC4302</a>] are the mechanisms for applying
117 cryptographic protection to data being sent over an IPsec Security
118 Association (SA) [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>].
119
120 To ensure interoperability between disparate implementations, it is
121 necessary to specify a set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms.
122 This ensures that there is at least one algorithm that all
123 implementations will have in common. This document specifies the
124 current set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms for ESP and AH,
125 specifies algorithms that should be implemented because they may be
126 promoted to mandatory at some future time, and also recommends
127 against the implementation of some obsolete algorithms. Usage
128 guidance is also provided to help the user of ESP and AH best achieve
129 their security goals through appropriate choices of mechanisms.
130
131 The nature of cryptography is that new algorithms surface
132 continuously and existing algorithms are continuously attacked. An
133 algorithm believed to be strong today may be demonstrated to be weak
134 tomorrow. Given this, the choice of mandatory-to-implement algorithm
135 should be conservative so as to minimize the likelihood of it being
136 compromised quickly. Thought should also be given to performance
137 considerations, as many uses of IPsec will be in environments where
138 performance is a concern.
139
140 The ESP and AH mandatory-to-implement algorithm(s) may need to change
141 over time to adapt to new developments in cryptography. For this
142 reason, the specification of the mandatory-to-implement algorithms is
143 not included in the main IPsec, ESP, or AH specifications, but is
144 instead placed in this document. Ideally, the mandatory-to-implement
145 algorithm of tomorrow should already be available in most
146 implementations of IPsec by the time it is made mandatory. To
147 facilitate this, this document identifies such algorithms, as they
148 are known today. There is no guarantee that the algorithms that we
149 predict will be mandatory in the future will actually be so. All
150 algorithms known today are subject to cryptographic attack and may be
151 broken in the future.
152
153 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
154
155 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
156 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
157 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
158 [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
167
168
169 We define some additional keywords here:
170
171 MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, we expect that at
172 some point in the future this algorithm will no longer be a MUST.
173
174 SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely
175 that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at some
176 future time to be a MUST.
177
178 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Implementation Requirements</span>
179
180 This section specifies the cryptographic algorithms that MUST be
181 implemented, and provides guidance about ones that SHOULD or SHOULD
182 NOT be implemented.
183
184 In the following sections, all AES modes are for 128-bit AES. 192-bit
185 and 256-bit AES MAY be supported for those modes, but the
186 requirements here are for 128-bit AES.
187
188 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. ESP Authenticated Encryption (Combined Mode Algorithms)</span>
189
190 ESP combined mode algorithms provide both confidentiality and
191 authentication services; in cryptographic terms, these are
192 authenticated encryption algorithms [<a href="./rfc5116" title="&quot;An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption&quot;">RFC5116</a>]. Authenticated
193 encryption transforms are listed in the ESP encryption transforms
194 IANA registry.
195
196 Requirement Authenticated Encryption Algorithm
197 ----------- ----------------------------------
198 SHOULD+ AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV [<a href="./rfc4106" title="&quot;The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4106</a>]
199 MAY AES-CCM [<a href="./rfc4309" title="&quot;Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4309</a>]
200
201 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. ESP Encryption Algorithms</span>
202
203 Requirement Encryption Algorithm
204 ----------- --------------------------
205 MUST NULL [<a href="./rfc2410" title="&quot;The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec&quot;">RFC2410</a>]
206 MUST AES-CBC [<a href="./rfc3602" title="&quot;The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec&quot;">RFC3602</a>]
207 MAY AES-CTR [<a href="./rfc3686" title="&quot;Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC3686</a>]
208 MAY TripleDES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2451" title="&quot;The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms&quot;">RFC2451</a>]
209 MUST NOT DES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2405" title="&quot;The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV&quot;">RFC2405</a>]
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. ESP Authentication Algorithms</span>
226
227 Requirement Authentication Algorithm (notes)
228 ----------- -----------------------------
229 MUST HMAC-SHA1-96 [<a href="./rfc2404" title="&quot;The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH&quot;">RFC2404</a>]
230 SHOULD+ AES-GMAC with AES-128 [<a href="./rfc4543" title="&quot;The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH&quot;">RFC4543</a>]
231 SHOULD AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [<a href="./rfc3566" title="&quot;The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec&quot;">RFC3566</a>]
232 MAY NULL [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>]
233
234 Note that the requirement level for NULL authentication depends on
235 the type of encryption used. When using authenticated encryption
236 from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>, the requirement for NULL encryption is the same as
237 the requirement for the authenticated encryption itself. When using
238 the encryption from <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>, the requirement for NULL encryption
239 is truly "MAY"; see <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> for more detail.
240
241 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. AH Authentication Algorithms</span>
242
243 The requirements for AH are the same as for ESP Authentication
244 Algorithms, except that NULL authentication is inapplicable.
245
246 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Summary of Changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a></span>
247
248 The following is a summary of the changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>.
249
250 Old New
251 Requirement Requirement Algorithm (notes)
252 ---- ----------- -----------------
253 MAY SHOULD+ AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV [<a href="./rfc4106" title="&quot;The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4106</a>]
254 MAY SHOULD+ AES-GMAC with AES-128 [<a href="./rfc4543" title="&quot;The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH&quot;">RFC4543</a>]
255 MUST- MAY TripleDES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2451" title="&quot;The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms&quot;">RFC2451</a>]
256 SHOULD NOT MUST NOT DES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2405" title="&quot;The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV&quot;">RFC2405</a>]
257 SHOULD+ SHOULD AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [<a href="./rfc3566" title="&quot;The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec&quot;">RFC3566</a>]
258 SHOULD MAY AES-CTR [<a href="./rfc3686" title="&quot;Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC3686</a>]
259
260 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Usage Guidance</span>
261
262 Since ESP and AH can be used in several different ways, this document
263 provides guidance on the best way to utilize these mechanisms.
264
265 ESP can provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, or the
266 combination of both of those security services. AH provides only
267 data origin authentication. Background information on those security
268 services is available [<a href="./rfc4949" title="&quot;Internet Security Glossary, Version 2&quot;">RFC4949</a>]. In the following, we shorten "data
269 origin authentication" to "authentication".
270
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
279
280
281 Providing both confidentiality and authentication offers the best
282 security. If confidentiality is not needed, providing authentication
283 can still be useful. Confidentiality without authentication is not
284 effective [<a href="#ref-DP07" title="&quot;Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations&quot;">DP07</a>] and therefore SHOULD NOT be used. We describe each
285 of these cases in more detail below.
286
287 To provide both confidentiality and authentication, an authenticated
288 encryption transform from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> SHOULD be used in ESP, in
289 conjunction with NULL authentication. Alternatively, an ESP
290 encryption transform and ESP authentication transform MAY be used
291 together. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use ESP with NULL authentication
292 in conjunction with AH; some configurations of this combination of
293 services have been shown to be insecure [<a href="#ref-PD10" title="&quot;On the (in)security of IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations&quot;">PD10</a>].
294
295 To provide authentication without confidentiality, an authentication
296 transform MUST be used in either ESP or AH. The IPsec community
297 generally prefers ESP with NULL encryption over AH. AH is still
298 required in some protocols and operational environments when there
299 are security-sensitive options in the IP header, such as source
300 routing headers; ESP inherently cannot protect those IP options. It
301 is not possible to provide effective confidentiality without
302 authentication, because the lack of authentication undermines the
303 trustworthiness of encryption [<a href="#ref-B96" title="&quot;Problem areas for the IP security protocols&quot;">B96</a>][V02]. Therefore, an encryption
304 transform MUST NOT be used with a NULL authentication transform
305 (unless the encryption transform is an authenticated encryption
306 transform from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>).
307
308 Triple-DES SHOULD NOT be used in any scenario in which multiple
309 gigabytes of data will be encrypted with a single key. As a 64-bit
310 block cipher, it leaks information about plaintexts above that
311 "birthday bound" [<a href="#ref-M13" title="&quot;Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block cipher modes&quot;">M13</a>]. Triple-DES CBC is listed as a MAY implement
312 for the sake of backwards compatibility, but its use is discouraged.
313
314 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Rationale</span>
315
316 This section explains the principles behind the implementation
317 requirements described above.
318
319 The algorithms listed as "MAY implement" are not meant to be endorsed
320 over other non-standard alternatives. All of the algorithms that
321 appeared in [<a href="./rfc4835" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)&quot;">RFC4835</a>] are included in this document, for the sake of
322 continuity. In some cases, these algorithms have moved from being
323 "SHOULD implement" to "MAY implement".
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Authenticated Encryption</span>
338
339 This document encourages the use of authenticated encryption
340 algorithms because they can provide significant efficiency and
341 throughput advantages, and the tight binding between authentication
342 and encryption can be a security advantage [<a href="./rfc5116" title="&quot;An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption&quot;">RFC5116</a>].
343
344 AES-GCM [<a href="./rfc4106" title="&quot;The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4106</a>] brings significant performance benefits [<a href="#ref-KKGEGD" title="&quot;Encrypting the Internet&quot;">KKGEGD</a>],
345 has been incorporated into IPsec recommendations [<a href="./rfc6379" title="&quot;Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec&quot;">RFC6379</a>], and has
346 emerged as the preferred authenticated encryption method in IPsec and
347 other standards.
348
349 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Encryption Transforms</span>
350
351 Since ESP encryption is optional, support for the "NULL" algorithm is
352 required to maintain consistency with the way services are
353 negotiated. Note that while authentication and encryption can each
354 be "NULL", they MUST NOT both be "NULL" [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>] [<a href="#ref-H10" title="&quot;Using Intel AES New Instructions and PCLMULQDQ to Significantly Improve IPSec Performance on Linux&quot;">H10</a>].
355
356 AES Counter Mode (AES-CTR) is an efficient encryption method, but it
357 provides no authentication capability. The AES-GCM authenticated
358 encryption method has all of the advantages of AES-CTR, while also
359 providing authentication. Thus, this document moves AES-CTR from a
360 SHOULD to a MAY.
361
362 The Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) is obsolete because of its
363 small block size; as with all 64-bit block ciphers, it SHOULD NOT be
364 used to encrypt more than one gigabyte of data with a single key
365 [<a href="#ref-M13" title="&quot;Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block cipher modes&quot;">M13</a>]. Its key size is smaller than that of the Advanced Encryption
366 Standard (AES), while at the same time its performance and efficiency
367 are worse. Thus, its use in new implementations is discouraged.
368
369 The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is obsolete because of its small
370 key size and small block size. There have been publicly demonstrated
371 and open-design special-purpose cracking hardware. Therefore, its
372 use is has been changed to MUST NOT in this document.
373
374 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Authentication Transforms</span>
375
376 AES-GMAC provides good security along with performance advantages,
377 even over HMAC-MD5. In addition, it uses the same internal
378 components as AES-GCM and is easy to implement in a way that shares
379 components with that authenticated encryption algorithm.
380
381 The MD5 hash function has been found to not meet its goal of
382 collision resistance; it is so weak that its use in digital
383 signatures is highly discouraged [<a href="./rfc6151" title="&quot;Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms&quot;">RFC6151</a>]. There have been
384 theoretical results against HMAC-MD5, but that message authentication
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
391
392
393 code does not seem to have a practical vulnerability. Thus, it may
394 not be urgent to remove HMAC-MD5 from the existing protocols.
395
396 SHA-1 has been found to not meet its goal of collision resistance.
397 However, HMAC-SHA-1 does not rely on this property, and HMAC-SHA-1 is
398 believed to be secure.
399
400 HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 are believed to provide
401 a good security margin, and they perform adequately on many
402 platforms. However, these algorithms are not recommended for
403 implementation in this document, because HMAC-SHA-1 support is
404 widespread and its security is good, AES-GMAC provides good security
405 with better performance, and Authenticated Encryption algorithms do
406 not need any authentication methods.
407
408 AES-XCBC has not seen widespread deployment, despite being previously
409 recommended as a SHOULD+ in <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>. Thus, this document lists it
410 only as a SHOULD.
411
412 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Algorithm Diversity</span>
413
414 When the AES cipher was first adopted, it was decided to continue
415 encouraging the implementation of Triple-DES, in order to provide
416 algorithm diversity. But the passage of time has eroded the
417 viability of Triple-DES as an alternative to AES. As it is a 64-bit
418 block cipher, its security is inadequate at high data rates (see
419 <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>). Its performance in software and Field-Programmable
420 Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is considerably worse than that of AES. Since it
421 would not be possible to use Triple-DES as an alternative to AES in
422 high data rate environments, or in environments where its performance
423 could not keep up the requirements, the rationale of retaining
424 Triple-DES to provide algorithm diversity is disappearing. (Of
425 course, this does not change the rationale of retaining Triple-DES in
426 IPsec implementations for backwards compatibility.)
427
428 Recent discussions in the IETF have started considering how to make
429 the selection of a different cipher that could provide algorithm
430 diversity in IPsec and other IETF standards. That work is expected
431 to take a long time and involve discussions among many participants
432 and organizations.
433
434 It is important to bear in mind that it is very unlikely that an
435 exploitable flaw will be found in AES (e.g., a flaw that required
436 less than a terabyte of known plaintext, when AES is used in a
437 conventional mode of operation). The only reason that algorithm
438 diversity deserves any consideration is because there would be large
439 problems if such a flaw were found.
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
450
451 Some of the wording herein was adapted from [<a href="./rfc4835" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)&quot;">RFC4835</a>], the document
452 that this one obsoletes. That RFC itself borrows from earlier RFCs,
453 notably <a href="./rfc4305">RFC 4305</a> and 4307. <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>, <a href="./rfc4305">RFC 4305</a>, and <a href="./rfc4307">RFC 4307</a> were
454 authored by Vishwas Manral, Donald Eastlake, and Jeffrey Schiller
455 respectively.
456
457 Thanks are due to Wajdi Feghali, Brian Weis, Cheryl Madson, Dan
458 Harkins, Paul Wouters, Ran Atkinson, Scott Fluhrer, Tero Kivinen, and
459 Valery Smyslov for insightful feedback on this document.
460
461 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
462
463 The security of a system that uses cryptography depends on both the
464 strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of
465 the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on
466 the engineering and administration of the protocol used by the system
467 to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the
468 security of the overall system.
469
470 This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
471 algorithms for the use of ESP and AH, specifically with the selection
472 of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. The algorithms identified in
473 this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known
474 to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research to date
475 leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the
476 foreseeable future. However, this is not necessarily forever.
477 Therefore, we expect that revisions of that document will be issued
478 from time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area.
479
480 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
481
482 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
483
484 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
485 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
486
487 [<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
488 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.
489
490 [<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>, December
491 2005.
492
493 [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4303">RFC</a>
494 <a href="./rfc4303">4303</a>, December 2005.
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
503
504
505 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
506
507 [<a id="ref-B96">B96</a>] Bellovin, S., "Problem areas for the IP security
508 protocols", Proceedings of the Sixth Usenix Unix Security
509 Symposium, 1996.
510
511 [<a id="ref-DP07">DP07</a>] Degabriele, J. and K. Paterson, "Attacking the IPsec
512 Standards in Encryption-only Configurations", IEEE
513 Symposium on Privacy and Security, 2007.
514
515 [<a id="ref-H10">H10</a>] Hoban, A., "Using Intel AES New Instructions and PCLMULQDQ
516 to Significantly Improve IPSec Performance on Linux",
517 Intel White Paper, August 2010.
518
519 [<a id="ref-KKGEGD">KKGEGD</a>] Kounavis, M., Kang, X., Grewal, K., Eszenyi, M., Gueron,
520 S., and D. Durham, "Encrypting the Internet", SIGCOMM,
521 2010.
522
523 [<a id="ref-M13">M13</a>] McGrew, D., "Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and
524 probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block
525 cipher modes", IACR ePrint, 2012.
526
527 [<a id="ref-PD10">PD10</a>] Paterson, K. and J. Degabriele, "On the (in)security of
528 IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations", CCS '10, ACM
529 Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2010.
530
531 [<a id="ref-RFC2404">RFC2404</a>] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
532 ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2404">RFC 2404</a>, November 1998.
533
534 [<a id="ref-RFC2405">RFC2405</a>] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher
535 Algorithm With Explicit IV", <a href="./rfc2405">RFC 2405</a>, November 1998.
536
537 [<a id="ref-RFC2410">RFC2410</a>] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
538 Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc2410">RFC 2410</a>, November 1998.
539
540 [<a id="ref-RFC2451">RFC2451</a>] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
541 Algorithms", <a href="./rfc2451">RFC 2451</a>, November 1998.
542
543 [<a id="ref-RFC3566">RFC3566</a>] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm
544 and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc3566">RFC 3566</a>, September 2003.
545
546 [<a id="ref-RFC3602">RFC3602</a>] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
547 Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", <a href="./rfc3602">RFC 3602</a>, September
548 2003.
549
550 [<a id="ref-RFC3686">RFC3686</a>] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
551 Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
552 (ESP)", <a href="./rfc3686">RFC 3686</a>, January 2004.
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span>
559
560
561 [<a id="ref-RFC4106">RFC4106</a>] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
562 (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4106">RFC</a>
563 <a href="./rfc4106">4106</a>, June 2005.
564
565 [<a id="ref-RFC4309">RFC4309</a>] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
566 Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4309">RFC</a>
567 <a href="./rfc4309">4309</a>, December 2005.
568
569 [<a id="ref-RFC4543">RFC4543</a>] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
570 Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc4543">RFC 4543</a>,
571 May 2006.
572
573 [<a id="ref-RFC4835">RFC4835</a>] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
574 Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
575 Authentication Header (AH)", <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>, April 2007.
576
577 [<a id="ref-RFC4949">RFC4949</a>] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", <a href="./rfc4949">RFC</a>
578 <a href="./rfc4949">4949</a>, August 2007.
579
580 [<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
581 Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, January 2008.
582
583 [<a id="ref-RFC6151">RFC6151</a>] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
584 for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
585 <a href="./rfc6151">RFC 6151</a>, March 2011.
586
587 [<a id="ref-RFC6379">RFC6379</a>] Law, L. and J. Solinas, "Suite B Cryptographic Suites for
588 IPsec", <a href="./rfc6379">RFC 6379</a>, October 2011.
589
590 [<a id="ref-V02">V02</a>] Vaudenay, S., "Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding -
591 Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS ...", EUROCRYPT, 2002.
592
593 Authors' Addresses
594
595 David McGrew
596 Cisco Systems
597
598 EMail: [email protected]
599
600
601 Paul Hoffman
602 VPN Consortium
603
604 EMail: [email protected]
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 McGrew &amp; Hoffman Standards Track [Page 11]
613 </pre>