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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. McGrew |
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Request for Comments: 7321 Cisco Systems |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc4835">4835</a> P. Hoffman |
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Category: Standards Track VPN Consortium |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 August 2014 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance</span> |
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for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document updates the Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation |
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Requirements for the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and |
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Authentication Header (AH). It also adds usage guidance to help in |
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the selection of these algorithms. |
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|
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ESP and AH protocols make use of various cryptographic algorithms to |
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provide confidentiality and/or data origin authentication to |
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protected data communications in the IP Security (IPsec) |
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architecture. To ensure interoperability between disparate |
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implementations, the IPsec standard specifies a set of mandatory-to- |
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implement algorithms. This document specifies the current set of |
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mandatory-to-implement algorithms for ESP and AH, specifies |
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algorithms that should be implemented because they may be promoted to |
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mandatory at some future time, and also recommends against the |
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implementation of some obsolete algorithms. Usage guidance is also |
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provided to help the user of ESP and AH best achieve their security |
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goals through appropriate choices of cryptographic algorithms. |
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This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>. |
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321</a>. |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
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10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
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material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
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modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
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not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
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it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
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than English. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Implementation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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2.1. ESP Authenticated Encryption (Combined Mode Algorithms) . 4 |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. ESP Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. ESP Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. AH Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Summary of Changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Usage Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Authenticated Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Encryption Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Authentication Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Algorithm Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] and the |
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Authentication Header (AH) [<a href="./rfc4302" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC4302</a>] are the mechanisms for applying |
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cryptographic protection to data being sent over an IPsec Security |
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Association (SA) [<a href="./rfc4301" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">RFC4301</a>]. |
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To ensure interoperability between disparate implementations, it is |
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necessary to specify a set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. |
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This ensures that there is at least one algorithm that all |
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implementations will have in common. This document specifies the |
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current set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms for ESP and AH, |
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specifies algorithms that should be implemented because they may be |
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promoted to mandatory at some future time, and also recommends |
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against the implementation of some obsolete algorithms. Usage |
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guidance is also provided to help the user of ESP and AH best achieve |
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their security goals through appropriate choices of mechanisms. |
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|
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The nature of cryptography is that new algorithms surface |
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continuously and existing algorithms are continuously attacked. An |
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algorithm believed to be strong today may be demonstrated to be weak |
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tomorrow. Given this, the choice of mandatory-to-implement algorithm |
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should be conservative so as to minimize the likelihood of it being |
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compromised quickly. Thought should also be given to performance |
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considerations, as many uses of IPsec will be in environments where |
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performance is a concern. |
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The ESP and AH mandatory-to-implement algorithm(s) may need to change |
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over time to adapt to new developments in cryptography. For this |
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reason, the specification of the mandatory-to-implement algorithms is |
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not included in the main IPsec, ESP, or AH specifications, but is |
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instead placed in this document. Ideally, the mandatory-to-implement |
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algorithm of tomorrow should already be available in most |
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implementations of IPsec by the time it is made mandatory. To |
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facilitate this, this document identifies such algorithms, as they |
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are known today. There is no guarantee that the algorithms that we |
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predict will be mandatory in the future will actually be so. All |
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algorithms known today are subject to cryptographic attack and may be |
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broken in the future. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in |
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[<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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We define some additional keywords here: |
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MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, we expect that at |
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some point in the future this algorithm will no longer be a MUST. |
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SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely |
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that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at some |
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future time to be a MUST. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Implementation Requirements</span> |
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This section specifies the cryptographic algorithms that MUST be |
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implemented, and provides guidance about ones that SHOULD or SHOULD |
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NOT be implemented. |
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In the following sections, all AES modes are for 128-bit AES. 192-bit |
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and 256-bit AES MAY be supported for those modes, but the |
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requirements here are for 128-bit AES. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. ESP Authenticated Encryption (Combined Mode Algorithms)</span> |
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|
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ESP combined mode algorithms provide both confidentiality and |
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authentication services; in cryptographic terms, these are |
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authenticated encryption algorithms [<a href="./rfc5116" title=""An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"">RFC5116</a>]. Authenticated |
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encryption transforms are listed in the ESP encryption transforms |
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IANA registry. |
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Requirement Authenticated Encryption Algorithm |
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----------- ---------------------------------- |
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SHOULD+ AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV [<a href="./rfc4106" title=""The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4106</a>] |
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MAY AES-CCM [<a href="./rfc4309" title=""Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4309</a>] |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. ESP Encryption Algorithms</span> |
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Requirement Encryption Algorithm |
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----------- -------------------------- |
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MUST NULL [<a href="./rfc2410" title=""The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC2410</a>] |
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MUST AES-CBC [<a href="./rfc3602" title=""The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec"">RFC3602</a>] |
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MAY AES-CTR [<a href="./rfc3686" title=""Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC3686</a>] |
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MAY TripleDES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2451" title=""The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms"">RFC2451</a>] |
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MUST NOT DES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2405" title=""The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV"">RFC2405</a>] |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. ESP Authentication Algorithms</span> |
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Requirement Authentication Algorithm (notes) |
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----------- ----------------------------- |
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MUST HMAC-SHA1-96 [<a href="./rfc2404" title=""The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH"">RFC2404</a>] |
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SHOULD+ AES-GMAC with AES-128 [<a href="./rfc4543" title=""The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH"">RFC4543</a>] |
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SHOULD AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [<a href="./rfc3566" title=""The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC3566</a>] |
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MAY NULL [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] |
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Note that the requirement level for NULL authentication depends on |
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the type of encryption used. When using authenticated encryption |
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from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>, the requirement for NULL encryption is the same as |
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the requirement for the authenticated encryption itself. When using |
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the encryption from <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>, the requirement for NULL encryption |
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is truly "MAY"; see <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> for more detail. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. AH Authentication Algorithms</span> |
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The requirements for AH are the same as for ESP Authentication |
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Algorithms, except that NULL authentication is inapplicable. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Summary of Changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a></span> |
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The following is a summary of the changes from <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>. |
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Old New |
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Requirement Requirement Algorithm (notes) |
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---- ----------- ----------------- |
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MAY SHOULD+ AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV [<a href="./rfc4106" title=""The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4106</a>] |
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MAY SHOULD+ AES-GMAC with AES-128 [<a href="./rfc4543" title=""The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH"">RFC4543</a>] |
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MUST- MAY TripleDES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2451" title=""The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms"">RFC2451</a>] |
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SHOULD NOT MUST NOT DES-CBC [<a href="./rfc2405" title=""The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV"">RFC2405</a>] |
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SHOULD+ SHOULD AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [<a href="./rfc3566" title=""The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC3566</a>] |
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SHOULD MAY AES-CTR [<a href="./rfc3686" title=""Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC3686</a>] |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Usage Guidance</span> |
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Since ESP and AH can be used in several different ways, this document |
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provides guidance on the best way to utilize these mechanisms. |
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ESP can provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, or the |
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combination of both of those security services. AH provides only |
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data origin authentication. Background information on those security |
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services is available [<a href="./rfc4949" title=""Internet Security Glossary, Version 2"">RFC4949</a>]. In the following, we shorten "data |
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origin authentication" to "authentication". |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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Providing both confidentiality and authentication offers the best |
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security. If confidentiality is not needed, providing authentication |
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can still be useful. Confidentiality without authentication is not |
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effective [<a href="#ref-DP07" title=""Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations"">DP07</a>] and therefore SHOULD NOT be used. We describe each |
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of these cases in more detail below. |
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To provide both confidentiality and authentication, an authenticated |
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encryption transform from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> SHOULD be used in ESP, in |
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conjunction with NULL authentication. Alternatively, an ESP |
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encryption transform and ESP authentication transform MAY be used |
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together. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use ESP with NULL authentication |
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in conjunction with AH; some configurations of this combination of |
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services have been shown to be insecure [<a href="#ref-PD10" title=""On the (in)security of IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations"">PD10</a>]. |
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To provide authentication without confidentiality, an authentication |
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transform MUST be used in either ESP or AH. The IPsec community |
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generally prefers ESP with NULL encryption over AH. AH is still |
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required in some protocols and operational environments when there |
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are security-sensitive options in the IP header, such as source |
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routing headers; ESP inherently cannot protect those IP options. It |
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is not possible to provide effective confidentiality without |
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authentication, because the lack of authentication undermines the |
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trustworthiness of encryption [<a href="#ref-B96" title=""Problem areas for the IP security protocols"">B96</a>][V02]. Therefore, an encryption |
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transform MUST NOT be used with a NULL authentication transform |
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(unless the encryption transform is an authenticated encryption |
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transform from <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>). |
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Triple-DES SHOULD NOT be used in any scenario in which multiple |
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gigabytes of data will be encrypted with a single key. As a 64-bit |
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block cipher, it leaks information about plaintexts above that |
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"birthday bound" [<a href="#ref-M13" title=""Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block cipher modes"">M13</a>]. Triple-DES CBC is listed as a MAY implement |
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for the sake of backwards compatibility, but its use is discouraged. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Rationale</span> |
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This section explains the principles behind the implementation |
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requirements described above. |
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The algorithms listed as "MAY implement" are not meant to be endorsed |
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over other non-standard alternatives. All of the algorithms that |
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appeared in [<a href="./rfc4835" title=""Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)"">RFC4835</a>] are included in this document, for the sake of |
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continuity. In some cases, these algorithms have moved from being |
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"SHOULD implement" to "MAY implement". |
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<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Authenticated Encryption</span> |
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This document encourages the use of authenticated encryption |
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algorithms because they can provide significant efficiency and |
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throughput advantages, and the tight binding between authentication |
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and encryption can be a security advantage [<a href="./rfc5116" title=""An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"">RFC5116</a>]. |
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|
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AES-GCM [<a href="./rfc4106" title=""The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4106</a>] brings significant performance benefits [<a href="#ref-KKGEGD" title=""Encrypting the Internet"">KKGEGD</a>], |
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has been incorporated into IPsec recommendations [<a href="./rfc6379" title=""Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec"">RFC6379</a>], and has |
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emerged as the preferred authenticated encryption method in IPsec and |
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other standards. |
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|
| 349 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Encryption Transforms</span> |
| 350 |
|
| 351 |
Since ESP encryption is optional, support for the "NULL" algorithm is |
| 352 |
required to maintain consistency with the way services are |
| 353 |
negotiated. Note that while authentication and encryption can each |
| 354 |
be "NULL", they MUST NOT both be "NULL" [<a href="./rfc4301" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">RFC4301</a>] [<a href="#ref-H10" title=""Using Intel AES New Instructions and PCLMULQDQ to Significantly Improve IPSec Performance on Linux"">H10</a>]. |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
AES Counter Mode (AES-CTR) is an efficient encryption method, but it |
| 357 |
provides no authentication capability. The AES-GCM authenticated |
| 358 |
encryption method has all of the advantages of AES-CTR, while also |
| 359 |
providing authentication. Thus, this document moves AES-CTR from a |
| 360 |
SHOULD to a MAY. |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
The Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) is obsolete because of its |
| 363 |
small block size; as with all 64-bit block ciphers, it SHOULD NOT be |
| 364 |
used to encrypt more than one gigabyte of data with a single key |
| 365 |
[<a href="#ref-M13" title=""Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block cipher modes"">M13</a>]. Its key size is smaller than that of the Advanced Encryption |
| 366 |
Standard (AES), while at the same time its performance and efficiency |
| 367 |
are worse. Thus, its use in new implementations is discouraged. |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is obsolete because of its small |
| 370 |
key size and small block size. There have been publicly demonstrated |
| 371 |
and open-design special-purpose cracking hardware. Therefore, its |
| 372 |
use is has been changed to MUST NOT in this document. |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Authentication Transforms</span> |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
AES-GMAC provides good security along with performance advantages, |
| 377 |
even over HMAC-MD5. In addition, it uses the same internal |
| 378 |
components as AES-GCM and is easy to implement in a way that shares |
| 379 |
components with that authenticated encryption algorithm. |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
The MD5 hash function has been found to not meet its goal of |
| 382 |
collision resistance; it is so weak that its use in digital |
| 383 |
signatures is highly discouraged [<a href="./rfc6151" title=""Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms"">RFC6151</a>]. There have been |
| 384 |
theoretical results against HMAC-MD5, but that message authentication |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
code does not seem to have a practical vulnerability. Thus, it may |
| 394 |
not be urgent to remove HMAC-MD5 from the existing protocols. |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
SHA-1 has been found to not meet its goal of collision resistance. |
| 397 |
However, HMAC-SHA-1 does not rely on this property, and HMAC-SHA-1 is |
| 398 |
believed to be secure. |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 are believed to provide |
| 401 |
a good security margin, and they perform adequately on many |
| 402 |
platforms. However, these algorithms are not recommended for |
| 403 |
implementation in this document, because HMAC-SHA-1 support is |
| 404 |
widespread and its security is good, AES-GMAC provides good security |
| 405 |
with better performance, and Authenticated Encryption algorithms do |
| 406 |
not need any authentication methods. |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
AES-XCBC has not seen widespread deployment, despite being previously |
| 409 |
recommended as a SHOULD+ in <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>. Thus, this document lists it |
| 410 |
only as a SHOULD. |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Algorithm Diversity</span> |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
When the AES cipher was first adopted, it was decided to continue |
| 415 |
encouraging the implementation of Triple-DES, in order to provide |
| 416 |
algorithm diversity. But the passage of time has eroded the |
| 417 |
viability of Triple-DES as an alternative to AES. As it is a 64-bit |
| 418 |
block cipher, its security is inadequate at high data rates (see |
| 419 |
<a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>). Its performance in software and Field-Programmable |
| 420 |
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is considerably worse than that of AES. Since it |
| 421 |
would not be possible to use Triple-DES as an alternative to AES in |
| 422 |
high data rate environments, or in environments where its performance |
| 423 |
could not keep up the requirements, the rationale of retaining |
| 424 |
Triple-DES to provide algorithm diversity is disappearing. (Of |
| 425 |
course, this does not change the rationale of retaining Triple-DES in |
| 426 |
IPsec implementations for backwards compatibility.) |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
Recent discussions in the IETF have started considering how to make |
| 429 |
the selection of a different cipher that could provide algorithm |
| 430 |
diversity in IPsec and other IETF standards. That work is expected |
| 431 |
to take a long time and involve discussions among many participants |
| 432 |
and organizations. |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
It is important to bear in mind that it is very unlikely that an |
| 435 |
exploitable flaw will be found in AES (e.g., a flaw that required |
| 436 |
less than a terabyte of known plaintext, when AES is used in a |
| 437 |
conventional mode of operation). The only reason that algorithm |
| 438 |
diversity deserves any consideration is because there would be large |
| 439 |
problems if such a flaw were found. |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
Some of the wording herein was adapted from [<a href="./rfc4835" title=""Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)"">RFC4835</a>], the document |
| 452 |
that this one obsoletes. That RFC itself borrows from earlier RFCs, |
| 453 |
notably <a href="./rfc4305">RFC 4305</a> and 4307. <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>, <a href="./rfc4305">RFC 4305</a>, and <a href="./rfc4307">RFC 4307</a> were |
| 454 |
authored by Vishwas Manral, Donald Eastlake, and Jeffrey Schiller |
| 455 |
respectively. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
Thanks are due to Wajdi Feghali, Brian Weis, Cheryl Madson, Dan |
| 458 |
Harkins, Paul Wouters, Ran Atkinson, Scott Fluhrer, Tero Kivinen, and |
| 459 |
Valery Smyslov for insightful feedback on this document. |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
The security of a system that uses cryptography depends on both the |
| 464 |
strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of |
| 465 |
the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on |
| 466 |
the engineering and administration of the protocol used by the system |
| 467 |
to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the |
| 468 |
security of the overall system. |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic |
| 471 |
algorithms for the use of ESP and AH, specifically with the selection |
| 472 |
of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. The algorithms identified in |
| 473 |
this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known |
| 474 |
to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research to date |
| 475 |
leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the |
| 476 |
foreseeable future. However, this is not necessarily forever. |
| 477 |
Therefore, we expect that revisions of that document will be issued |
| 478 |
from time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area. |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 485 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the |
| 488 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005. |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>, December |
| 491 |
2005. |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4303">RFC</a> |
| 494 |
<a href="./rfc4303">4303</a>, December 2005. |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
[<a id="ref-B96">B96</a>] Bellovin, S., "Problem areas for the IP security |
| 508 |
protocols", Proceedings of the Sixth Usenix Unix Security |
| 509 |
Symposium, 1996. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
[<a id="ref-DP07">DP07</a>] Degabriele, J. and K. Paterson, "Attacking the IPsec |
| 512 |
Standards in Encryption-only Configurations", IEEE |
| 513 |
Symposium on Privacy and Security, 2007. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
[<a id="ref-H10">H10</a>] Hoban, A., "Using Intel AES New Instructions and PCLMULQDQ |
| 516 |
to Significantly Improve IPSec Performance on Linux", |
| 517 |
Intel White Paper, August 2010. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
[<a id="ref-KKGEGD">KKGEGD</a>] Kounavis, M., Kang, X., Grewal, K., Eszenyi, M., Gueron, |
| 520 |
S., and D. Durham, "Encrypting the Internet", SIGCOMM, |
| 521 |
2010. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
[<a id="ref-M13">M13</a>] McGrew, D., "Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and |
| 524 |
probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block |
| 525 |
cipher modes", IACR ePrint, 2012. |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
[<a id="ref-PD10">PD10</a>] Paterson, K. and J. Degabriele, "On the (in)security of |
| 528 |
IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations", CCS '10, ACM |
| 529 |
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2010. |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2404">RFC2404</a>] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within |
| 532 |
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2404">RFC 2404</a>, November 1998. |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2405">RFC2405</a>] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher |
| 535 |
Algorithm With Explicit IV", <a href="./rfc2405">RFC 2405</a>, November 1998. |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2410">RFC2410</a>] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and |
| 538 |
Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc2410">RFC 2410</a>, November 1998. |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2451">RFC2451</a>] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher |
| 541 |
Algorithms", <a href="./rfc2451">RFC 2451</a>, November 1998. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3566">RFC3566</a>] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm |
| 544 |
and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc3566">RFC 3566</a>, September 2003. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3602">RFC3602</a>] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher |
| 547 |
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", <a href="./rfc3602">RFC 3602</a>, September |
| 548 |
2003. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3686">RFC3686</a>] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) |
| 551 |
Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload |
| 552 |
(ESP)", <a href="./rfc3686">RFC 3686</a>, January 2004. |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7321">RFC 7321</a> Requirements for ESP and AH August 2014</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4106">RFC4106</a>] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode |
| 562 |
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4106">RFC</a> |
| 563 |
<a href="./rfc4106">4106</a>, June 2005. |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4309">RFC4309</a>] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM |
| 566 |
Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4309">RFC</a> |
| 567 |
<a href="./rfc4309">4309</a>, December 2005. |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4543">RFC4543</a>] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message |
| 570 |
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc4543">RFC 4543</a>, |
| 571 |
May 2006. |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4835">RFC4835</a>] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation |
| 574 |
Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and |
| 575 |
Authentication Header (AH)", <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>, April 2007. |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4949">RFC4949</a>] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", <a href="./rfc4949">RFC</a> |
| 578 |
<a href="./rfc4949">4949</a>, August 2007. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated |
| 581 |
Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, January 2008. |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6151">RFC6151</a>] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations |
| 584 |
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", |
| 585 |
<a href="./rfc6151">RFC 6151</a>, March 2011. |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6379">RFC6379</a>] Law, L. and J. Solinas, "Suite B Cryptographic Suites for |
| 588 |
IPsec", <a href="./rfc6379">RFC 6379</a>, October 2011. |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
[<a id="ref-V02">V02</a>] Vaudenay, S., "Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - |
| 591 |
Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS ...", EUROCRYPT, 2002. |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
David McGrew |
| 596 |
Cisco Systems |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
Paul Hoffman |
| 602 |
VPN Consortium |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
McGrew & Hoffman Standards Track [Page 11] |
| 613 |
</pre> |