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<pre>Network Working Group R. Housley |
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Request for Comments: 2951 T. Horting |
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Category: Informational P. Yee |
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SPYRUS |
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September 2000 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">TELNET Authentication Using KEA and SKIPJACK</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document defines a method to authenticate TELNET using the Key |
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Exchange Algorithm (KEA), and encryption of the TELNET stream using |
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SKIPJACK. Two encryption modes are specified; one provides data |
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integrity and the other does not. The method relies on the TELNET |
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Authentication Option. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Command Names and Codes</span> |
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AUTHENTICATION 37 |
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Authentication Commands: |
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|
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IS 0 |
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SEND 1 |
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REPLY 2 |
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NAME 3 |
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Authentication Types: |
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KEA_SJ 12 |
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KEA_SJ_INTEG 13 |
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Modifiers: |
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AUTH_WHO_MASK 1 |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER 0 |
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AUTH_SERVER_TO CLIENT 1 |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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AUTH_HOW_MASK 2 |
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AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY 0 |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL 2 |
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ENCRYPT_MASK 20 |
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ENCRYPT_OFF 0 |
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ENCRYPT_USING_TELOPT 4 |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE 16 |
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ENCRYPT_RESERVED 20 |
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|
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INI_CRED_FWD_MASK 8 |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF 0 |
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INI_CRED_FWD_ON 8 |
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Sub-option Commands: |
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KEA_CERTA_RA 1 |
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KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB 2 |
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KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA 3 |
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KEA_RESPONSEA 4 |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. TELNET Security Extensions</span> |
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TELNET, as a protocol, has no concept of security. Without |
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negotiated options, it merely passes characters back and forth |
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between the NVTs represented by the two TELNET processes. In its |
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most common usage as a protocol for remote terminal access (TCP port |
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23), TELNET normally connects to a server that requires user-level |
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authentication through a user name and password in the clear. The |
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server does not authenticate itself to the user. |
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The TELNET Authentication Option provides for: |
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* User authentication -- replacing or augmenting the normal host |
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password mechanism; |
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* Server authentication -- normally done in conjunction with user |
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authentication; |
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* Session parameter negotiation -- in particular, encryption key |
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and attributes; |
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* Session protection -- primarily encryption of the data and |
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embedded command stream, but the encryption algorithm may also |
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provide data integrity. |
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In order to support these security services, the two TELNET entities |
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must first negotiate their willingness to support the TELNET |
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Authentication Option. Upon agreeing to support this option, the |
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parties are then able to perform sub-option negotiations to determine |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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the authentication protocol to be used, and possibly the remote user |
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name to be used for authorization checking. Encryption is negotiated |
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along with the type of the authentication. |
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Authentication and parameter negotiation occur within an unbounded |
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series of exchanges. The server proposes a preference-ordered list |
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of authentication types (mechanisms) that it supports. In addition |
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to listing the mechanisms it supports, the server qualifies each |
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mechanism with a modifier that specifies whether encryption of data |
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is desired. The client selects one mechanism from the list and |
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responds to the server indicating its choice and the first set of |
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authentication data needed for the selected authentication type. The |
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client may ignore a request to encrypt data and so indicate, but the |
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server may also terminate the connection if the client refuses |
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encryption. The server and the client then proceed through whatever |
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number of iterations is required to arrive at the requested |
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authentication. |
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Encryption is started immediately after the Authentication Option is |
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completed. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Use of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA)</span> |
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This paper specifies the method in which KEA is used to achieve |
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TELNET Authentication. KEA (in conjunction with SKIPJACK) [<a href="#ref-4" title=""SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification"">4</a>] |
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provides authentication and confidentiality. Integrity may also be |
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provided. |
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TELNET entities may use KEA to provide mutual authentication and |
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support for the setup of data encryption keys. A simple token format |
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and set of exchanges delivers these services. |
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NonceA and NonceB used in this exchange are 64-bit bit strings. The |
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client generates NonceA, and the server generates NonceB. The nonce |
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value is selected randomly. The nonce is sent in a big endian form. |
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The encryption of the nonce will be done with the same mechanism that |
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the session will use, detailed in the next section. |
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|
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Ra and Rb used in this exchange are 1024 bit strings and are defined |
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by the KEA Algorithm [<a href="#ref-4" title=""SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification"">4</a>]. |
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The IVa and IVb are 24 byte Initialization Vectors. They are |
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composed of "THIS IS NOT LEAF" followed by 8 random bytes. |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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CertA is the client's certificate. CertB is the server's |
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certificate. Both certificates are X.509 certificates [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile"">6</a>] that |
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contain KEA public keys [<a href="#ref-7" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates"">7</a>]. The client must validate the server's |
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certificate before using the KEA public key it contains. Likewise, |
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the server must validate the client's certificate before using the |
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KEA public key it contains. |
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|
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On completing these exchanges, the parties have a common SKIPJACK |
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key. Mutual authentication is provided by verification of the |
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certificates used to establish the SKIPJACK encryption key and |
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successful use of the derived SKIPJACK session key. To protect |
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against active attacks, encryption will take place after successful |
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authentication. There will be no way to turn off encryption and |
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safely turn it back on; repeating the entire authentication is the |
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only safe way to restart it. If the user does not want to use |
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encryption, he may disable encryption after the session is |
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established. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. SKIPJACK Modes</span> |
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|
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There are two distinct modes for encrypting TELNET streams; one |
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provides integrity and the other does not. Because TELNET is |
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normally operated in a character-by-character mode, the SKIPJACK with |
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stream integrity mechanism requires the transmission of 4 bytes for |
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every TELNET data byte. However, a simplified mode SKIPJACK without |
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integrity mechanism will only require the transmission of one byte |
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for every TELNET data byte. |
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|
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The cryptographic mode for SKIPJACK with stream integrity is Cipher |
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Feedback on 32 bits of data (CFB-32) and the mode of SKIPJACK is |
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Cipher Feedback on 8 bits of data (CFB-8). |
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|
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. SKIPJACK without stream integrity</span> |
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|
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The first and least complicated mode uses SKIPJACK CFB-8. This mode |
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provides no stream integrity. |
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For SKIPJACK without stream integrity, the two-octet authentication |
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type pair is KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the |
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SKIPJACK without integrity mechanism will be used for mutual |
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authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 1 illustrates |
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the authentication mechanism of KEA followed by SKIPJACK without |
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stream integrity. |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Client (Party A) Server (Party B) |
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|
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<-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION |
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|
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IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION --> |
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|
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND |
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<list of authentication options> |
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IAC SE |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION |
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NAME <user name> --> |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS |
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KEA_SJ |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_CERTA_RA |
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CertA||Ra IAC SE --> |
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|
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY |
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KEA_SJ |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA |
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KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB |
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CertB||Rb||IVb|| |
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Encrypt( NonceB ) |
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IAC SE |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS |
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KEA_SJ |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA |
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IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0C12)||NonceA ) |
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IAC SE --> |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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|
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Client (Party A) Server (Party B) |
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<client begins encryption> |
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY |
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KEA_SJ |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_RESPONSEA |
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Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0C12 ) |
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IAC SE |
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|
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<server begins encryption> |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Figure 1. |
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|
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. SKIPJACK with stream integrity</span> |
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|
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SKIPJACK with stream integrity is more complicated. It uses the |
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SHA-1 [<a href="#ref-3">3</a>] one-way hash function to provide integrity of the |
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encryption stream as follows: |
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Set H0 to be the SHA-1 hash of a zero-length string. |
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Cn is the nth character in the TELNET stream. |
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Hn = SHA-1( Hn-1||Cn ), where Hn is the hash value |
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associated with the nth character in the stream. |
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ICVn is set to the three most significant bytes of Hn. |
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Transmit Encrypt( Cn||ICVn ). |
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|
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The ciphertext that is transmitted is the SKIPJACK CFB-32 encryption |
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of ( Cn||ICVn ). The receiving end of the TELNET link reverses the |
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process, first decrypting the ciphertext, separating Cn and ICVn, |
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recalculating Hn, recalculating ICVn, and then comparing the received |
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ICVn with the recalculated ICVn. Integrity is indicated if the |
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comparison succeeds, and Cn can then be processed normally as part of |
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the TELNET stream. Failure of the comparison indicates some loss of |
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integrity, whether due to active manipulation or loss of |
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cryptographic synchronization. In either case, the only recourse is |
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to drop the TELNET connection and start over. |
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|
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For SKIPJACK with stream integrity, the two-octet authentication type |
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pair is KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the |
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KEA SKIPJACK with integrity mechanism will be used for mutual |
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authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 2 illustrates |
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the authentication mechanism of KEA SKIPJACK with stream integrity. |
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|
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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|
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|
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--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Client (Party A) Server (Party B) |
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|
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<-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION |
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|
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IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION --> |
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|
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND |
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<list of authentication options> |
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IAC SE |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION |
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NAME <user name> --> |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS |
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KEA_SJ_INTEG |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_CERTA_RA |
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CertA||Ra IAC SE --> |
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|
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY |
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KEA_SJ_INTEG |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA |
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KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB |
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CertB||Rb||IVb|| |
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Encrypt( NonceB ) |
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IAC SE |
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|
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IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS |
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KEA_SJ_INTEG |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA |
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IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0D12)||NonceA ) |
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IAC SE --> |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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|
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|
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Client (Party A) Server (Party B) |
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|
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<client begins encryption> |
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<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY |
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KEA_SJ_INTEG |
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AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | |
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AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | |
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ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | |
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INI_CRED_FWD_OFF |
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KEA_RESPONSEA |
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Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0D12 ) |
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IAC SE |
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|
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<server begins encryption> |
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--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Figure 2 |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.0" href="#section-4.0">4.0</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
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|
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This entire memo is about security mechanisms. For KEA to provide |
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the authentication discussed, the implementation must protect the |
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private key from disclosure. Likewise, the SKIPJACK keys must be |
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protected from disclosure. |
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|
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Implementations must randomly generate KEA private keys, |
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initialization vectors (IVs), and nonces. The use of inadequate |
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pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic |
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keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it |
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much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, |
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searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute |
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force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality |
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random numbers is difficult. <a href="./rfc1750">RFC 1750</a> [<a href="#ref-8" title=""Randomness Recommendations for Security"">8</a>] offers important guidance |
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in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186 [9] provides one quality |
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PRNG technique. |
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|
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By linking the enabling of encryption as a side effect of successful |
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authentication, protection is provided against an active attacker. |
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If encryption were enabled as a separate negotiation, it would |
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provide a window of vulnerability from when the authentication |
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completes, up to and including the negotiation to turn on encryption. |
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The only safe way to restart encryption, if it is turned off, is to |
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repeat the entire authentication process. |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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|
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
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|
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The authentication types KEA_SJ and KEA_SJ_INTEG and their associated |
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suboption values are registered with IANA. Any suboption values used |
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to extend the protocol as described in this document must be |
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registered with IANA before use. IANA is instructed not to issue new |
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suboption values without submission of documentation of their use. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.0" href="#section-6.0">6.0</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
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|
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We would like to thank William Nace for support during implementation |
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of this specification. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.0" href="#section-7.0">7.0</a>. References</span> |
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|
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[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Protocol Specification", ASTD |
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8, <a href="./rfc854">RFC 854</a>, May 1983. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Ts'o, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", <a href="./rfc2941">RFC 2941</a>, |
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September 2000. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Secure Hash Standard. FIPS Pub 180-1. April 17, 1995. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] "SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0, May 29, |
| 473 |
1998. Available from <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm">http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-</a> |
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<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm">kea.htm</a> |
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|
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[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Option Specifications", STD |
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8, <a href="./rfc855">RFC 855</a>, May 1983. |
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|
| 479 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 |
| 480 |
Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile", |
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<a href="./rfc2459">RFC 2459</a>, January 1999. |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Housley, R. and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key |
| 484 |
Infrastructure - Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) |
| 485 |
Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates", |
| 486 |
<a href="./rfc2528">RFC 2528</a>, March 1999. |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness |
| 489 |
Recommendations for Security", <a href="./rfc1750">RFC 1750</a>, December 1994. |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
[9) National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 186: |
| 492 |
Digital Signature Standard. 19 May 1994. |
| 493 |
|
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.0" href="#section-8.0">8.0</a>. Authors' Addresses</span> |
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|
| 507 |
Russell Housley |
| 508 |
SPYRUS |
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381 Elden Street, Suite 1120 |
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Herndon, VA 20170 |
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USA |
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EMail: [email protected] |
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|
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|
| 516 |
Todd Horting |
| 517 |
SPYRUS |
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381 Elden Street, Suite 1120 |
| 519 |
Herndon, VA 20170 |
| 520 |
USA |
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|
| 522 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 523 |
|
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|
| 525 |
Peter Yee |
| 526 |
SPYRUS |
| 527 |
5303 Betsy Ross Drive |
| 528 |
Santa Clara, CA 95054 |
| 529 |
USA |
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| 531 |
EMail: [email protected] |
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<span class="grey">Housley, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2951">RFC 2951</a> TELNET Authentication Using KEA & SKIPJACK September 2000</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
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| 561 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span> |
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|
| 563 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. |
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| 565 |
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
| 566 |
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
| 567 |
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
| 568 |
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
| 569 |
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
| 570 |
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
| 571 |
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
| 572 |
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
| 573 |
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
| 574 |
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
| 575 |
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
| 576 |
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
| 577 |
English. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
| 580 |
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
| 583 |
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
| 584 |
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
| 585 |
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
| 586 |
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| 587 |
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
Acknowledgement |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the |
| 592 |
Internet Society. |
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Housley, et al. Informational [Page 11] |
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</pre> |