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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Hoeper |
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Request for Comments: 6678 Motorola Solutions, Inc. |
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Category: Informational S. Hanna |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Juniper Networks |
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H. Zhou |
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J. Salowey, Ed. |
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Cisco Systems, Inc. |
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July 2012 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Requirements for a</span> |
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<span class="h1">Tunnel-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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This memo defines the requirements for a tunnel-based Extensible |
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Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method. This tunnel method will use |
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish a secure tunnel. The |
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tunnel will provide support for password authentication, EAP |
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authentication, and the transport of additional data for other |
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purposes. |
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6678">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6678</a>. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
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|
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|
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
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10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
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material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
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modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
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not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
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it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
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than English. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Password Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Protection of Weak EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Chained EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Identity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Anonymous Service Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Network Endpoint Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Client Authentication during Tunnel Establishment . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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3.9. Certificate-Less Authentication and Generic EAP Method |
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Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. RFC Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Tunnel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.1">4.2.1.1</a>. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.1.1">4.2.1.1.1</a>. Cipher Suite Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.1.2">4.2.1.1.2</a>. Tunnel Data Protection Algorithms . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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4.2.1.1.3. Tunnel Authentication and Key Establishment . 11 |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.2">4.2.1.2</a>. Tunnel Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.3">4.2.1.3</a>. TLS Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.4">4.2.1.4</a>. Peer Identity Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1.5">4.2.1.5</a>. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Protection of Data External to Tunnel . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Tunnel Payload Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Extensible Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Request/Challenge Response Operation . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. Indicating Criticality of Attributes . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. Vendor-Specific Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.5">4.3.5</a>. Result Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.6">4.3.6</a>. Internationalization of Display Strings . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. EAP Channel Binding Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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4.5. Requirements Associated with Carrying Username and |
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Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.1.1">4.5.1.1</a>. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.1.2">4.5.1.2</a>. Authentication of Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.1.3">4.5.1.3</a>. Server Certificate Revocation Checking . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Password Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying EAP Methods . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Method Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Chained Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Cryptographic Binding with the TLS Tunnel . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Method Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Cipher Suite Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Tunneled Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Data External to Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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5.4. Separation of TLS Tunnel and Inner Authentication |
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Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) tunnel method is an EAP |
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method that establishes a secure tunnel and executes other EAP |
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methods under the protection of that secure tunnel. An EAP tunnel |
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method can be used in any lower-layer protocol that supports EAP |
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authentication. There are several existing EAP tunnel methods that |
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use Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish the secure tunnel. |
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EAP methods supporting this include Protected EAP [<a href="#ref-PEAP" title=""[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) Specification"">PEAP</a>], Tunneled |
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Transport Layer Security EAP (TTLS) [<a href="./rfc5281" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- TTLSv0)"">RFC5281</a>] and EAP Flexible |
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Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST) [<a href="./rfc4851" title=""The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)"">RFC4851</a>]. In |
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general, this has worked well so there is consensus to continue to |
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use TLS as the basis for a tunnel method. There have been various |
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reasons for employing a protected tunnel for EAP processes. They |
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include protecting weak authentication exchanges, such as username |
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and password. In addition, a protected tunnel can provide means to |
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provide peer identity protection and EAP method chaining. Finally, |
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systems have found it useful to transport additional types of data |
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within the protected tunnel. |
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This document describes the requirements for a EAP tunnel method as |
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well as for a password protocol supporting legacy password |
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verification within the tunnel method. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span> |
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Use of each capitalized word within a sentence or phrase carries the |
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following meaning during the EAP Method Update (EMU) WG's method |
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selection process: |
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MUST - indicates an absolute requirement |
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MUST NOT - indicates something absolutely prohibited |
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SHOULD - indicates a strong recommendation of a desired result |
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SHOULD NOT - indicates a strong recommendation against a result |
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MAY - indicates a willingness to allow an optional outcome |
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Lowercase uses of "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and |
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"MAY" carry their normal meaning and are not subject to these |
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definitions. |
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<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Use Cases</span> |
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To motivate and explain the requirements in this document, a |
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representative set of use cases for the EAP tunnel method are |
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supplied here. It is mandatory for a candidate tunnel method to |
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support all of the use cases that are marked below as "MUST". |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Password Authentication</span> |
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Many legacy systems only support user authentication with passwords. |
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Some of these systems require transport of the actual username and |
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password to the authentication server. This is true for systems |
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where the authentication server does not have access to the cleartext |
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password or a consistent transform of the cleartext password. |
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Examples of such systems are some one-time password (OTP) systems and |
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other systems where the username and password are submitted to an |
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external party for validation. The tunnel method MUST support |
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transporting cleartext username and password to the EAP server. It |
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MUST NOT reveal information about the username and password to |
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parties in the communication path between the peer and the EAP |
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server. The advantage any attacker gains against the tunnel method |
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when employing a username and password for authentication MUST be |
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through interaction and not computation. The tunnel MUST support |
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protection from man-in-the-middle attacks. The combination of the |
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tunnel authentication and password authentication MUST enable mutual |
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authentication. |
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Since EAP authentication occurs before network access is granted the |
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tunnel method SHOULD enable an inner exchange to provide support for |
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minimal password management tasks including password change, "new PIN |
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mode", and "next token mode" required by some systems. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Protection of Weak EAP Methods</span> |
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Some existing EAP methods have vulnerabilities that could be |
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eliminated or reduced by running them inside a protected tunnel. For |
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example, an EAP-MD5 method does not provide mutual authentication or |
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protection from dictionary attacks. Without extra protection, EAP |
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tunnel methods are vulnerable to a special type of tunnel man-in-the- |
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middle (MitM) attack [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title=""Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols"">TUNNEL-MITM</a>]. This attack is referred to as |
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"tunnel MitM attack" in the remainder of this document. The |
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additional protection needed to thwart tunnel MitM attacks depends on |
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the inner method executed within the tunnel. When weak methods are |
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used, these attacks can be mitigated via security policies that |
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require the method to be used only within a tunnel. On the other |
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hand, a technical solution (so-called cryptographic bindings) can be |
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used whenever the inner method derives key material and is not |
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susceptible to attacks outside a tunnel. Only the latter mitigation |
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<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
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technique can be made an actual requirement for EAP tunnel methods |
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(see <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a>), while security policies are outside the scope of |
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this requirement document. Please refer to the NIST "Recommendation |
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for EAP Methods Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication" |
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[<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>] and [<a href="#ref-LCN-2010" title=""An Inconvenient Truth about Tunneled Authentications"">LCN-2010</a>] for a discussion on security |
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policies and complete solutions for thwarting tunnel MitM attacks. |
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The tunnel method MUST support protection of weak EAP methods. |
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Cryptographic protection from tunnel MitM attacks MUST be provided |
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for all key-generating methods. In combination with an appropriate |
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security policy this will thwart MitM attacks against inner methods. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Chained EAP Methods</span> |
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Several circumstances are best addressed by using chained EAP |
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methods. For example, it may be desirable to authenticate the user |
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and also authenticate the device being used. However, chained EAP |
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methods from different conversations can be redirected into the same |
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conversation by an attacker giving the authenticator the impression |
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that both conversations terminate at the same endpoint. |
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Cryptographic binding can be used to bind the results of chained key- |
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generating methods together or to an encompassing tunnel. |
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The tunnel method MUST support chained EAP methods while including |
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protection against attacks on method chaining. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Identity Protection</span> |
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When performing an EAP authentication, the peer may want to protect |
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its identity and only disclose it to a trusted EAP server. This |
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helps to maintain peer privacy. |
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The tunnel method MUST support identity protection, therefore the |
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identity of the peer used for authentication purposes MUST NOT be |
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obtainable by any entity other than the EAP server terminating the |
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tunnel method. Peer identity protection provided by the tunnel |
| 317 |
method applies to the identities that are specific to the tunnel |
| 318 |
method and inner method being used. In a roaming scenario, note that |
| 319 |
the peer may need to expose the realm portion of the EAP outer |
| 320 |
identity in the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [<a href="./rfc4282" title=""The Network Access Identifier"">RFC4282</a>] in order to |
| 321 |
reach the appropriate authentication server. |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
|
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
|
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Anonymous Service Access</span> |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
When network service is provided, it is sometimes desirable for a |
| 340 |
user to gain network access in order to access limited services for |
| 341 |
emergency communication or troubleshooting information. To avoid |
| 342 |
eavesdropping, it's best to negotiate link-layer security as with any |
| 343 |
other authentication. |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
Therefore, the tunnel method SHOULD allow anonymous peers or server- |
| 346 |
only authentication, while still deriving keys that can be used for |
| 347 |
link-layer security. The tunnel method MAY also allow for the bypass |
| 348 |
of server authentication processing on the client. |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
Foregoing user or server authentication increases the chance of man- |
| 351 |
in-the-middle and other types of attacks that can compromise the |
| 352 |
derived keys used for link-layer security. Therefore, passwords and |
| 353 |
other sensitive information MUST NOT be disclosed to an |
| 354 |
unauthenticated server, or to a server that is not authorized to |
| 355 |
authenticate the user. |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Network Endpoint Assessment</span> |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
The Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) protocols and reference model |
| 360 |
described in [<a href="./rfc5209" title=""Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements"">RFC5209</a>] provide a standard way to check the health |
| 361 |
("posture") of a device at or after the time it connects to a |
| 362 |
network. If the device does not comply with the network's |
| 363 |
requirements, it can be denied access to the network or granted |
| 364 |
limited access to remediate itself. EAP is a convenient place for |
| 365 |
conducting an NEA exchange. |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying NEA protocols such as a |
| 368 |
Posture Broker protocol compatible with Trusted Network Connect |
| 369 |
(PB-TNC) [<a href="./rfc5793" title=""PB-TNC: A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect (TNC)"">RFC5793</a>]. Depending on the specifics of the tunnel method, |
| 370 |
these protocols may be required to be carried in an EAP method. |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Client Authentication during Tunnel Establishment</span> |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
In some cases, the peer will have credentials that allow it to |
| 375 |
authenticate during tunnel establishment. These credentials may only |
| 376 |
partially authenticate the identity of the peer and additional |
| 377 |
authentication may be required inside the tunnel. For example, a |
| 378 |
communication device may be authenticated during tunnel |
| 379 |
establishment; in addition, user authentication may be required to |
| 380 |
satisfy authentication policy. The tunnel method MUST be capable of |
| 381 |
providing client-side authentication during tunnel establishment. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Extensibility</span> |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
The tunnel method MUST provide extensibility so that additional data |
| 396 |
related to authentication, authorization, and network access can be |
| 397 |
carried inside the tunnel in the future. This removes the need to |
| 398 |
develop new tunneling methods for specific purposes. |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
An application for extensibility is credential provisioning. When a |
| 401 |
peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient time to |
| 402 |
distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for later |
| 403 |
authentication exchanges. For example, the authentication server can |
| 404 |
provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be used by |
| 405 |
the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming. In addition, |
| 406 |
there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, such as |
| 407 |
[<a href="#ref-EAP-ENROLL" title=""An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Enrollment Method"">EAP-ENROLL</a>]. Another use for extensibility is support for alternate |
| 408 |
authentication frameworks within the tunnel. |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.9" href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>. Certificate-Less Authentication and Generic EAP Method Extension</span> |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
In some cases, the peer will not have a way to verify a server |
| 413 |
certificate and, in some cases, a server might not have a certificate |
| 414 |
to verify. Therefore, it is desirable to support certificate-less |
| 415 |
authentication. An application for this is credential provisioning |
| 416 |
where the peer and server authenticate each other with a shared |
| 417 |
password and credentials for subsequent authentication (e.g., a key |
| 418 |
pair and certificate, or a shared key) can be passed inside the |
| 419 |
tunnel. Another application is to extend existing EAP methods with |
| 420 |
new features such as EAP channel bindings. |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
Great care must be taken when using tunnels with no server |
| 423 |
authentication for the protection of an inner method. For example, |
| 424 |
the client may lack the appropriate trust roots to fully authenticate |
| 425 |
the server, but may still establish the tunnel to execute an inner |
| 426 |
EAP method to perform mutual authentication and key derivation. In |
| 427 |
these cases, the inner EAP method MUST provide resistance to |
| 428 |
dictionary attack and a cryptographic binding between the inner |
| 429 |
method and the tunnel method MUST be established. Furthermore, the |
| 430 |
cipher suite used to establish the tunnel MUST derive the master key |
| 431 |
using contributions from both client and server, as in ephemeral |
| 432 |
Diffie-Hellman cipher suites. |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
The tunnel method MAY allow for certificate-less authentication. |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Requirements</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General Requirements</span> |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. RFC Compliance</span> |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
The tunnel method MUST include a Security Claims section with all |
| 456 |
security claims specified in <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.2">Section 7.2 in RFC 3748</a> [<a href="./rfc3748" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">RFC3748</a>]. In |
| 457 |
addition, it MUST meet the requirement in Sections <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> and <a href="#section-7.4">7.4</a> of <a href="./rfc3748">RFC</a> |
| 458 |
<a href="./rfc3748">3748</a> that tunnel methods MUST support protection against man-in-the- |
| 459 |
middle attacks. Furthermore, the tunnel method MUST support identity |
| 460 |
protection as specified in <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.3">Section 7.3 of RFC 3748</a>. |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
The tunnel method MUST be unconditionally compliant with <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a> |
| 463 |
[<a href="./rfc4017" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless LANs"">RFC4017</a>] (using the definition of "unconditionally compliant" |
| 464 |
contained in <a href="./rfc4017#section-1.1">Section 1.1 of RFC 4017</a>). This means that the method |
| 465 |
MUST satisfy all the "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" |
| 466 |
requirements in <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
The tunnel method MUST meet all the "MUST" and "SHOULD" requirements |
| 469 |
relevant to EAP methods contained in the EAP key management framework |
| 470 |
[<a href="./rfc5247" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework"">RFC5247</a>] or any successor. This includes the generation of the |
| 471 |
Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), |
| 472 |
Peer-Id, Server-Id, and Session-Id. These requirements will enable |
| 473 |
the tunnel method to properly fit into the EAP key management |
| 474 |
framework, maintaining all of the security properties and guarantees |
| 475 |
of that framework. |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
The tunnel method MUST NOT be tied to any single cryptographic |
| 478 |
algorithm. Instead, it MUST support run-time negotiation to select |
| 479 |
among an extensible set of cryptographic algorithms, such as |
| 480 |
algorithms used with certificates presented during tunnel |
| 481 |
establishment. This "cryptographic algorithm agility" provides |
| 482 |
several advantages. Most important, when a weakness in an algorithm |
| 483 |
is discovered or increased processing power overtakes an algorithm, |
| 484 |
users can easily transition to a new algorithm. Also, users can |
| 485 |
choose the algorithm that best meets their needs. |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
The tunnel method MUST meet the SHOULD and MUST requirements |
| 488 |
pertinent to EAP method contained in <a href="./rfc4962#section-3">Section 3 of RFC 4962</a> [<a href="./rfc4962" title=""Guidance for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management"">RFC4962</a>]. |
| 489 |
This includes: cryptographic algorithm independence; strong, fresh |
| 490 |
session keys; replay detection; keying material confidentiality and |
| 491 |
integrity; and confirmation of cipher suite selection. |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Tunnel Requirements</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
The following section discusses requirements for TLS tunnel |
| 508 |
establishment. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. TLS Requirements</span> |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
The tunnel-based method MUST support TLS version 1.2 [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] and |
| 513 |
may support earlier versions greater than SSL 2.0 in order to enable |
| 514 |
the possibility of backwards compatibility. |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1" href="#section-4.2.1.1">4.2.1.1</a>. Cipher Suites</span> |
| 517 |
|
| 518 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.1" href="#section-4.2.1.1.1">4.2.1.1.1</a>. Cipher Suite Negotiation</span> |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
Cipher suite negotiations always suffer from downgrading attacks when |
| 521 |
they are not secured by any kind of integrity protection. A common |
| 522 |
practice is a post-negotiation integrity check in which, as soon as |
| 523 |
available, the established keys (here, the tunnel key) are used to |
| 524 |
derive integrity keys. These integrity keys are then used by the |
| 525 |
peer and authentication server to verify whether the cipher suite |
| 526 |
negotiation has been maliciously altered by another party. |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
Integrity checks prevent downgrading attacks only if the derived |
| 529 |
integrity keys and the employed integrity algorithms cannot be broken |
| 530 |
in real-time. See <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> or [<a href="#ref-HC07" title=""Where EAP Security Claims Fail"">HC07</a>] for more information on |
| 531 |
this. Hence, the tunnel method MUST provide integrity-protected |
| 532 |
cipher suite negotiation with secure integrity algorithms and |
| 533 |
integrity keys. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
TLS provides protected cipher suite negotiation as long as all the |
| 536 |
cipher suites supported provide authentication, key establishment, |
| 537 |
and data integrity protection as discussed in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>. |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.2" href="#section-4.2.1.1.2">4.2.1.1.2</a>. Tunnel Data Protection Algorithms</span> |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
In order to prevent attacks on the cryptographic algorithms employed |
| 542 |
by inner authentication methods, a tunnel protocol's protection needs |
| 543 |
to provide a basic level of algorithm strength. The tunnel method |
| 544 |
MUST provide at least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite that |
| 545 |
provides the equivalent security of 128-bit AES for encryption and |
| 546 |
message authentication. See Part 1 of the NIST "Recommendation for |
| 547 |
Key Management" [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-57">NIST-SP-800-57</a>] for a discussion of the relative |
| 548 |
strengths of common algorithms. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.3" href="#section-4.2.1.1.3">4.2.1.1.3</a>. Tunnel Authentication and Key Establishment</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
A tunnel method MUST provide unidirectional authentication from |
| 564 |
authentication server to EAP peer and mutual authentication between |
| 565 |
authentication server and EAP peer. The tunnel method MUST provide |
| 566 |
at least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite that provides |
| 567 |
certificate-based authentication of the server and provides optional |
| 568 |
certificate-based authentication of the client. Other types of |
| 569 |
authentication MAY be supported. |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
At least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite MUST be approved by |
| 572 |
the NIST "Draft Recommendation for Key Management", Part 3 |
| 573 |
[<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-57p3">NIST-SP-800-57p3</a>], i.e., the cipher suite MUST be listed in Table |
| 574 |
4-1, 4-2, or 4-3 in that document. |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites MUST only include cipher |
| 577 |
suites that use strong cryptographic algorithms. They MUST NOT |
| 578 |
include cipher suites providing mutually anonymous authentication or |
| 579 |
static Diffie-Hellman cipher suites. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
Other cipher suites MAY be selected following the security |
| 582 |
requirements for tunnel protocols in the NIST "Recommendation for EAP |
| 583 |
Methods Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication" |
| 584 |
[<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>]. |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.2" href="#section-4.2.1.2">4.2.1.2</a>. Tunnel Replay Protection</span> |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
In order to prevent replay attacks on a tunnel protocol, the message |
| 589 |
authentication MUST be generated using a time-variant input such as |
| 590 |
timestamps, sequence numbers, nonces, or a combination of these, so |
| 591 |
that any reuse of the authentication data can be detected as invalid. |
| 592 |
TLS provides sufficient replay protection to meet this requirement as |
| 593 |
long as weak cipher suites discussed in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> are avoided. |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.3" href="#section-4.2.1.3">4.2.1.3</a>. TLS Extensions</span> |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
In order to meet the requirements in this document, TLS extensions |
| 598 |
MAY be used. For example, TLS extensions may be useful in providing |
| 599 |
certificate revocation information via the TLS Online Certificate |
| 600 |
Status Protocol (OCSP) extension [<a href="./rfc6066" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions"">RFC6066</a>] (thus meeting the |
| 601 |
requirement in <a href="#section-4.5.1.3">Section 4.5.1.3</a>). |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.4" href="#section-4.2.1.4">4.2.1.4</a>. Peer Identity Privacy</span> |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
A tunnel protocol MUST support peer privacy. This requires that the |
| 606 |
username and other attributes associated with the peer are not |
| 607 |
transmitted in the clear or to an unauthenticated, unauthorized |
| 608 |
party. Peer identity protection provided by the tunnel method |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
applies to establishment of the tunnel and protection of inner method |
| 618 |
specific identities. If applicable, the peer certificate is sent |
| 619 |
confidentially (i.e., encrypted). |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.5" href="#section-4.2.1.5">4.2.1.5</a>. Session Resumption</span> |
| 622 |
|
| 623 |
The tunnel method MUST support TLS session resumption as defined in |
| 624 |
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]. The tunnel method MAY support other methods of session |
| 625 |
resumption such as those defined in [<a href="./rfc5077" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State"">RFC5077</a>]. |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Fragmentation</span> |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
Tunnel establishment sometimes requires the exchange of information |
| 630 |
that exceeds what can be carried in a single EAP message. In |
| 631 |
addition, information carried within the tunnel may also exceed this |
| 632 |
limit. Therefore, a tunnel method MUST support fragmentation and |
| 633 |
reassembly. |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Protection of Data External to Tunnel</span> |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
A man-in-the-middle attacker can modify cleartext values such as |
| 638 |
protocol version and type code information communicated outside the |
| 639 |
TLS tunnel. The tunnel method MUST provide implicit or explicit |
| 640 |
protection of the protocol version and type code. If modification of |
| 641 |
other information external to the tunnel can cause exploitable |
| 642 |
vulnerabilities, the tunnel method MUST provide protection against |
| 643 |
modification of this additional data. |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Tunnel Payload Requirements</span> |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
This section describes the payload requirements inside the tunnel. |
| 648 |
These requirements frequently express features that a candidate |
| 649 |
protocol must be capable of offering so that a deployer can decide |
| 650 |
whether to make use of that feature. This section does not state |
| 651 |
requirements about what features of each protocol must be used during |
| 652 |
a deployment. |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Extensible Attribute Types</span> |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
The payload MUST be extensible. Some standard payload attribute |
| 657 |
types will be defined to meet known requirements listed below, such |
| 658 |
as password authentication, inner EAP method, vendor-specific |
| 659 |
attributes, and result indication. Additional payload attributes MAY |
| 660 |
be defined in the future to support additional features and data |
| 661 |
types. |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Request/Challenge Response Operation</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
The payload MUST support the request and response type of half-duplex |
| 676 |
operation typical of EAP. Multiple attributes may be sent in a |
| 677 |
single payload. The payload MAY support transporting multiple |
| 678 |
authentications in a single payload packet. |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.3" href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. Indicating Criticality of Attributes</span> |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
It is expected that new attributes will be defined to be carried |
| 683 |
within the tunnel method. In some cases, it is necessary for the |
| 684 |
sender to know if the receiver did not understand the attribute. To |
| 685 |
support this, there MUST be a way for the sender to mark attributes |
| 686 |
such that the receiver will indicate if an attribute is not |
| 687 |
understood. |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.4" href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. Vendor-Specific Support</span> |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
The payload MUST support communication of an extensible set of |
| 692 |
vendor-specific attributes. These attributes will be segmented into |
| 693 |
uniquely identified vendor-specific namespaces. They can be used for |
| 694 |
experiments or vendor-specific features. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.5" href="#section-4.3.5">4.3.5</a>. Result Indication</span> |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
The payload MUST support result indication and its acknowledgement, |
| 699 |
so both the EAP peer and server will end up with a synchronized |
| 700 |
state. The result indication is needed after each chained inner |
| 701 |
authentication method and at the end of the authentication, so |
| 702 |
separate result indications for intermediate and final results MUST |
| 703 |
be supported. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.6" href="#section-4.3.6">4.3.6</a>. Internationalization of Display Strings</span> |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
The payload MAY provide a standard attribute format that supports |
| 708 |
international strings. This attribute format MUST support encoding |
| 709 |
strings in UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title=""UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646"">RFC3629</a>] format. Any strings sent by the server |
| 710 |
intended for display to the user MUST be sent in UTF-8 format and |
| 711 |
SHOULD be able to be marked with language information and adapted to |
| 712 |
the user's language preference as indicated by <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a> [<a href="./rfc5646" title=""Tags for Identifying Languages"">RFC5646</a>]. |
| 713 |
Note that in some cases, such as when transmitting error codes, it is |
| 714 |
acceptable to exchange numeric codes that can be translated by the |
| 715 |
client to support the particular local language. These numeric codes |
| 716 |
are not subject to internationalization during transmission. |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. EAP Channel Binding Requirements</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
The tunnel method MUST be capable of meeting EAP channel binding |
| 732 |
requirements described in [<a href="./rfc6677" title=""Channel Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Methods"">RFC6677</a>]. As discussed in [<a href="./rfc5056" title=""On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels"">RFC5056</a>], EAP |
| 733 |
channel bindings differ from channel bindings discussed in other |
| 734 |
contexts. Cryptographic binding between the TLS tunnel and the inner |
| 735 |
method discussed in <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a> relates directly to the non-EAP |
| 736 |
channel binding concepts discussed in <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>. |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying Username and Passwords</span> |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
This section describes the requirements associated with tunneled |
| 741 |
password authentication. The password authentication mentioned here |
| 742 |
refers to user or machine authentication using a legacy password |
| 743 |
database or verifier, such as the Lightweight Directory Access |
| 744 |
Protocol (LDAP) [<a href="./rfc4511" title=""Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol"">RFC4511</a>], OTP, etc. These typically require the |
| 745 |
password in its original text form in order to authenticate the peer; |
| 746 |
hence, they require the peer to send the cleartext username and |
| 747 |
password to the EAP server. |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1" href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Security</span> |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
Many internal EAP methods have the peer send its password in the |
| 752 |
clear to the EAP server. Other methods (e.g., challenge-response |
| 753 |
methods) are vulnerable to attacks if an eavesdropper can intercept |
| 754 |
the traffic. For any such methods, the security measures in the |
| 755 |
following sections MUST be met. |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.1" href="#section-4.5.1.1">4.5.1.1</a>. Confidentiality and Integrity</span> |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
The cleartext password exchange MUST be integrity and confidentiality |
| 760 |
protected. As long as the password exchange occurs inside an |
| 761 |
authenticated and encrypted tunnel, this requirement is met. |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.2" href="#section-4.5.1.2">4.5.1.2</a>. Authentication of Server</span> |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
The EAP server MUST be authenticated before the peer sends the |
| 766 |
cleartext password to the server. |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.3" href="#section-4.5.1.3">4.5.1.3</a>. Server Certificate Revocation Checking</span> |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
When certificate authentication is used during tunnel establishment, |
| 771 |
the EAP peer may need to present its password to the server before it |
| 772 |
has network access to check the revocation status of the server's |
| 773 |
credentials. Therefore, the tunnel method MUST support mechanisms to |
| 774 |
check the revocation status of a credential. The tunnel method |
| 775 |
SHOULD make use of Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>] or Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) |
| 786 |
[<a href="./rfc5055" title=""Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)"">RFC5055</a>] to obtain the revocation status of the EAP server |
| 787 |
certificate. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.2" href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Internationalization</span> |
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
The password authentication exchange MUST support usernames and |
| 792 |
passwords in international languages. It MUST support encoding of |
| 793 |
username and password strings in UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title=""UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646"">RFC3629</a>] format. The method |
| 794 |
MUST specify how username and password normalizations and/or |
| 795 |
comparisons are performed in reference to SASLprep [<a href="./rfc4013" title=""SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords"">RFC4013</a>], |
| 796 |
Net-UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc5198" title=""Unicode Format for Network Interchange"">RFC5198</a>], or their replacements. |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
Any strings sent by the server intended for display to the user MUST |
| 799 |
be sent in UTF-8 format and SHOULD be able to be marked with language |
| 800 |
information and adapted to the user's language preference as |
| 801 |
indicated by <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a> [<a href="./rfc5646" title=""Tags for Identifying Languages"">RFC5646</a>]. Note that, in some cases, such as |
| 802 |
when transmitting error codes, it is acceptable to exchange numeric |
| 803 |
codes that can be translated by the client to support the particular |
| 804 |
local language. These numeric codes are not subject to |
| 805 |
internationalization during transmission. |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.3" href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Metadata</span> |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
The password authentication exchange SHOULD support additional |
| 810 |
associated metadata that can be used to indicate whether the |
| 811 |
authentication is for a user or a machine. This allows the EAP |
| 812 |
server and peer to request and negotiate authentication specifically |
| 813 |
for a user or machine. This is useful in the case of multiple inner |
| 814 |
authentications where the user and machine both need to be |
| 815 |
authenticated. |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.4" href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Password Change</span> |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
The password authentication exchange MUST support password change. |
| 820 |
The exchange SHOULD be extensible to support other "housekeeping" |
| 821 |
functions, such as the management of PINs or other data, required by |
| 822 |
some systems. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying EAP Methods</span> |
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
The tunnel method MUST be able to carry inner EAP methods without |
| 827 |
modifying them. EAP methods MUST NOT be redefined inside the tunnel. |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Method Negotiation</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
The tunnel method MUST support the protected negotiation of the inner |
| 844 |
EAP method. It MUST NOT allow the inner EAP method negotiation to be |
| 845 |
manipulated by intermediaries. |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Chained Methods</span> |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
The tunnel method SHOULD support the chaining of multiple EAP |
| 850 |
methods. The tunnel method MUST allow for the communication of |
| 851 |
intermediate results and for the verification of compound binding |
| 852 |
between executed inner methods when chained methods are employed. |
| 853 |
|
| 854 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Cryptographic Binding with the TLS Tunnel</span> |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
The tunnel method MUST provide a mechanism to bind the tunnel |
| 857 |
protocol and the inner EAP method. This property is referred to as |
| 858 |
cryptographic binding. Such bindings are an important tool for |
| 859 |
mitigating the tunnel MitM attacks [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title=""Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols"">TUNNEL-MITM</a>]. Cryptographic |
| 860 |
bindings enable the complete prevention of tunnel MitM attacks |
| 861 |
without the need of additional security policies, as long as the |
| 862 |
inner method derives keys and is not vulnerable to attacks outside a |
| 863 |
protected tunnel [<a href="#ref-LCN-2010" title=""An Inconvenient Truth about Tunneled Authentications"">LCN-2010</a>]. Even though weak or non-key-deriving |
| 864 |
inner methods may be permitted. Thus, security policies preventing |
| 865 |
tunnel MitM attacks are still necessary, and the tunnel method MUST |
| 866 |
provide cryptographic bindings, because only this allows migrating to |
| 867 |
more secure, policy-independent implementations. |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
Cryptographic bindings are typically achieved by securely mixing the |
| 870 |
established keying material (say, tunnel key TK) from the tunnel |
| 871 |
protocol with the established keying material (say, method key MK) |
| 872 |
from the inner authentication method(s) in order to derive fresh |
| 873 |
keying material. If chained EAP methods are executed in the tunnel, |
| 874 |
all derived inner keys are combined with the tunnel key to create a |
| 875 |
new compound tunnel key (CTK). In particular, CTK is used to derive |
| 876 |
the EAP MSK, EMSK and other transient keys (shown as "TEK" below), |
| 877 |
such as transient encryption keys and integrity protection keys. The |
| 878 |
key hierarchy for tunnel method executions that derive compound keys |
| 879 |
for the purpose of cryptographic binding is depicted in Figure 1. |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
In the case of the sequential executions of n inner methods, a |
| 882 |
chained compound key CTK_i MUST be computed upon the completion of |
| 883 |
each inner method i such that it contains the compound key of all |
| 884 |
previous inner methods, i.e., CTK_i=f(CTK_i-1, MK_i) with 0 < i <= n |
| 885 |
and CTK_0=TK, where f() is a key derivation function, such as one |
| 886 |
that complies with the NIST "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using |
| 887 |
Pseudorandom Functions" [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>]. CTK_n SHOULD serve as the |
| 888 |
key to derive further keys. Figure 1 depicts the key hierarchy in |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
the case of a single inner method. Transient keys derived from the |
| 898 |
compound key CTK are used in a cryptographic protocol to verify the |
| 899 |
integrity of the tunnel and the inner authentication method. |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
----------- |
| 902 |
| TK | MK | |
| 903 |
----------- |
| 904 |
| | |
| 905 |
v v |
| 906 |
-------- |
| 907 |
| CTK | |
| 908 |
-------- |
| 909 |
| |
| 910 |
v |
| 911 |
---------------- |
| 912 |
| | | |
| 913 |
v v v |
| 914 |
------- ------ ------- |
| 915 |
| TEK | | MSK | | EMSK | |
| 916 |
------- ------- -------- |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
Figure 1: Compound Keys |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
Furthermore, all compound keys CTK_i and all keys derived from it |
| 921 |
SHOULD follow the recommendations for key derivations and key |
| 922 |
hierarchies as specified in [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>]. In particular, all |
| 923 |
derived keys MUST have a lifetime assigned that does not exceed the |
| 924 |
lifetime of any key higher in the key hierarchy. The derivation MUST |
| 925 |
prevent a compromise in one part of the system from leading to |
| 926 |
compromises in other parts of the system that relay on keys at the |
| 927 |
same or higher level in the hierarchy. |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.4" href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication</span> |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
The tunnel method SHOULD allow for the peer to initiate an inner EAP |
| 932 |
authentication in order to meet its policy requirements for |
| 933 |
authenticating the server. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.5" href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Method Metadata</span> |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
The tunnel method SHOULD allow for the communication of additional |
| 938 |
data associated with an EAP method. This can be used to indicate |
| 939 |
whether the authentication is for a user or a machine. This allows |
| 940 |
the EAP server and peer to request and negotiate authentication |
| 941 |
specifically for a user or machine. This is useful in the case of |
| 942 |
multiple inner EAP authentications where the user and machine both |
| 943 |
need to be authenticated. |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
A tunnel method is often deployed to provide mutual authentication |
| 956 |
between EAP Peer and EAP Server and to generate key material for use |
| 957 |
in protecting lower-layer protocols. In addition the tunnel is used |
| 958 |
to protect the communication of additional data, including peer |
| 959 |
identity between the EAP Peer and EAP Server from disclosure to or |
| 960 |
modification by an attacker. These sections cover considerations |
| 961 |
that affect the ability for a method to achieve these goals. |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Cipher Suite Selection</span> |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
TLS supports a wide range of cipher suites providing a variety of |
| 966 |
security properties. The selection of cipher suites is critical to |
| 967 |
the security of the tunnel method. Selection of a cipher suite with |
| 968 |
weak or no authentication, such as an anonymous Diffie-Hellman-based |
| 969 |
cipher suite, will greatly increase the risk of system compromise. |
| 970 |
Since a tunnel method uses the TLS tunnel to transport data, the |
| 971 |
selection of a cipher suite with weak data encryption and integrity |
| 972 |
algorithms will also increase the vulnerability of the method to |
| 973 |
attacks. |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
A tunnel protocol is prone to downgrading attacks if the tunnel |
| 976 |
protocol supports any key establishment algorithm that can be broken |
| 977 |
on-line. In a successful downgrading attack, an adversary breaks the |
| 978 |
selected "weak" key establishment algorithm and optionally the "weak" |
| 979 |
authentication algorithm without being detected. Here, "weak" refers |
| 980 |
to a key establishment algorithm that can be broken in real-time, and |
| 981 |
an authentication scheme that can be broken off-line, respectively. |
| 982 |
See [<a href="#ref-HC07" title=""Where EAP Security Claims Fail"">HC07</a>] for more details. The requirements in this document |
| 983 |
disapprove the use of key establishment algorithms that can be broken |
| 984 |
on-line. |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
Mutually anonymous tunnel protocols are prone to man-in-the-middle |
| 987 |
attacks described in [<a href="#ref-HC07" title=""Where EAP Security Claims Fail"">HC07</a>]. During such an attack, an adversary |
| 988 |
establishes one tunnel with the peer and one with the authentication |
| 989 |
server, while the peer and server believe that they established a |
| 990 |
tunnel with each other. Once both tunnels have been established, the |
| 991 |
adversary can eavesdrop on all communications within the tunnels, |
| 992 |
i.e., the execution of the inner authentication method(s). |
| 993 |
Consequently, the adversary can eavesdrop on the identifiers that are |
| 994 |
exchanged as part of the EAP method, and thus the privacy of peer |
| 995 |
and/or authentication server is compromised along with any other data |
| 996 |
transmitted within the tunnels. This document requires server |
| 997 |
authentication to avoid the risks associated with anonymous cipher |
| 998 |
suites. |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Tunneled Authentication</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
In many cases, a tunnel method provides mutual authentication by |
| 1012 |
authenticating the server during tunnel establishment and |
| 1013 |
authenticating the peer within the tunnel using an EAP method. As |
| 1014 |
described in [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title=""Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols"">TUNNEL-MITM</a>], this mode of operation can allow tunnel |
| 1015 |
man-in-the-middle attackers to authenticate to the server as the peer |
| 1016 |
by tunneling the inner EAP protocol messages to and from a peer that |
| 1017 |
is executing the method outside a tunnel or with an untrustworthy |
| 1018 |
server. Cryptographic binding between the established keying |
| 1019 |
material from the inner authentication method(s) and the tunnel |
| 1020 |
protocol verifies that the endpoints of the tunnel and the inner |
| 1021 |
authentication method(s) are the same. This can thwart the attack if |
| 1022 |
the inner-method-derived keys are of sufficient strength that they |
| 1023 |
cannot be broken in real-time. |
| 1024 |
|
| 1025 |
In cases where the inner authentication method does not generate any |
| 1026 |
key material or only weak key material, security policies MUST be |
| 1027 |
enforced such that the peer cannot execute the inner method with the |
| 1028 |
same credentials outside a protective tunnel or with an untrustworthy |
| 1029 |
server. |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Data External to Tunnel</span> |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
The tunnel method will use data that is outside the TLS tunnel such |
| 1034 |
as the EAP type code or version numbers. If an attacker can |
| 1035 |
compromise the protocol by modifying these values, the tunnel method |
| 1036 |
MUST protect this data from modification. In some cases, external |
| 1037 |
data may not need additional protection because it is implicitly |
| 1038 |
verified during the protocol operation. |
| 1039 |
|
| 1040 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Separation of TLS Tunnel and Inner Authentication Termination</span> |
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 |
Terminating the inner method at a different location than the outer |
| 1043 |
tunnel needs careful consideration. The inner method data may be |
| 1044 |
vulnerable to modification and eavesdropping between the server that |
| 1045 |
terminates the tunnel and the server that terminates the inner |
| 1046 |
method. For example, if a cleartext password is used, then it may be |
| 1047 |
sent to the inner method server in a RADIUS password attribute, which |
| 1048 |
uses weak encryption that may not be suitable protection for many |
| 1049 |
environments. |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
In some cases, terminating the tunnel at a different location may |
| 1052 |
make it difficult for a peer to authenticate the server and trust it |
| 1053 |
for further communication. For example, if the TLS tunnel is |
| 1054 |
terminated by a different organization, the peer needs to be able to |
| 1055 |
authenticate and authorize the tunnel server to handle secret |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
credentials that the peer shares with the home server that terminates |
| 1066 |
the inner method. This may not meet the security policy of many |
| 1067 |
environments. |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span> |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and |
| 1074 |
C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure |
| 1075 |
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, |
| 1076 |
June 1999. |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO |
| 1079 |
10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003. |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3748">RFC3748</a>] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and |
| 1082 |
H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol |
| 1083 |
(EAP)", <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, June 2004. |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4017">RFC4017</a>] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible |
| 1086 |
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for |
| 1087 |
Wireless LANs", <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>, March 2005. |
| 1088 |
|
| 1089 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4962">RFC4962</a>] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for Authentication, |
| 1090 |
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management", |
| 1091 |
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp132">BCP 132</a>, <a href="./rfc4962">RFC 4962</a>, July 2007. |
| 1092 |
|
| 1093 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5055">RFC5055</a>] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and |
| 1094 |
W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol |
| 1095 |
(SCVP)", <a href="./rfc5055">RFC 5055</a>, December 2007. |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer |
| 1098 |
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August |
| 1099 |
2008. |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible |
| 1102 |
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management |
| 1103 |
Framework", <a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008. |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6677">RFC6677</a>] Hartman, S., Ed., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel |
| 1106 |
Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol |
| 1107 |
(EAP) Methods", <a href="./rfc6677">RFC 6677</a>, July 2012. |
| 1108 |
|
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
[<a id="ref-EAP-ENROLL">EAP-ENROLL</a>] Mahy, R., "An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) |
| 1124 |
Enrollment Method", Work in Progress, March 2006. |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
[<a id="ref-HC07">HC07</a>] Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "Where EAP Security Claims |
| 1127 |
Fail", Institute for Computer Sciences, Social |
| 1128 |
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (ICST), |
| 1129 |
The Fourth International Conference on Heterogeneous |
| 1130 |
Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and |
| 1131 |
Robustness (QShine 2007), August 2007. |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
[<a id="ref-LCN-2010">LCN-2010</a>] Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "An Inconvenient Truth about |
| 1134 |
Tunneled Authentications", Proceedings of 35th Annual |
| 1135 |
IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN 2010), |
| 1136 |
September 2009. |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
[<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>] |
| 1139 |
Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using |
| 1140 |
Pseudorandom Functions", Draft NIST Special Publication |
| 1141 |
800-108, April 2008. |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
[<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>] |
| 1144 |
Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "Recommendation for EAP Methods |
| 1145 |
Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication", NIST |
| 1146 |
Special Publication 800-120, September 2009. |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
[<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-57">NIST-SP-800-57</a>] |
| 1149 |
Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. |
| 1150 |
Smid, "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: |
| 1151 |
General (Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, |
| 1152 |
part 1, March 2007. |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
[<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-57p3">NIST-SP-800-57p3</a>] |
| 1155 |
Barker, E., Burr, W., Jones, A., Polk, W., Rose, S., |
| 1156 |
and M. Smid, "Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3 |
| 1157 |
Application-Specific Key Management Guidance", Draft |
| 1158 |
NIST Special Publication 800-57, part 3, October 2008. |
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
[<a id="ref-PEAP">PEAP</a>] Microsoft Corporation, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible |
| 1161 |
Authentication Protocol (PEAP) Specification", August |
| 1162 |
2009, <http:// download.microsoft.com/download/9/5/E/ |
| 1163 |
95EF66AF-9026-4BB0-A41D-A4F81802D92C/%5BMS- |
| 1164 |
PEAP%5D.pdf>. |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4013">RFC4013</a>] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User |
| 1167 |
Names and Passwords", <a href="./rfc4013">RFC 4013</a>, February 2005. |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4282">RFC4282</a>] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The |
| 1178 |
Network Access Identifier", <a href="./rfc4282">RFC 4282</a>, December 2005. |
| 1179 |
|
| 1180 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4511">RFC4511</a>] Sermersheim, J., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
| 1181 |
(LDAP): The Protocol", <a href="./rfc4511">RFC 4511</a>, June 2006. |
| 1182 |
|
| 1183 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4851">RFC4851</a>] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, |
| 1184 |
"The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling |
| 1185 |
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", |
| 1186 |
<a href="./rfc4851">RFC 4851</a>, May 2007. |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5056">RFC5056</a>] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure |
| 1189 |
Channels", <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>, November 2007. |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5077">RFC5077</a>] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig, |
| 1192 |
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption |
| 1193 |
without Server-Side State", <a href="./rfc5077">RFC 5077</a>, January 2008. |
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5198">RFC5198</a>] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for |
| 1196 |
Network Interchange", <a href="./rfc5198">RFC 5198</a>, March 2008. |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5209">RFC5209</a>] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and |
| 1199 |
J. Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview |
| 1200 |
and Requirements", <a href="./rfc5209">RFC 5209</a>, June 2008. |
| 1201 |
|
| 1202 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5281">RFC5281</a>] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible |
| 1203 |
Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer |
| 1204 |
Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- |
| 1205 |
TTLSv0)", <a href="./rfc5281">RFC 5281</a>, August 2008. |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5646">RFC5646</a>] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying |
| 1208 |
Languages", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp47">BCP 47</a>, <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a>, September 2009. |
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5793">RFC5793</a>] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., and K. Narayan, |
| 1211 |
"PB-TNC: A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with |
| 1212 |
Trusted Network Connect (TNC)", <a href="./rfc5793">RFC 5793</a>, March 2010. |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6066">RFC6066</a>] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 1215 |
Extensions: Extension Definitions", <a href="./rfc6066">RFC 6066</a>, January |
| 1216 |
2011. |
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
[<a id="ref-TUNNEL-MITM">TUNNEL-MITM</a>] Asokan, N., Niemi, V., and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the- |
| 1219 |
Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols", |
| 1220 |
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2002/163, November |
| 1221 |
2002. |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
Katrin Hoeper |
| 1236 |
Motorola Solutions, Inc. |
| 1237 |
1301 E. Algonquin Road |
| 1238 |
Schaumburg, IL 60196 |
| 1239 |
USA |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
Stephen Hanna |
| 1245 |
Juniper Networks |
| 1246 |
3 Beverly Road |
| 1247 |
Bedford, MA 01730 |
| 1248 |
USA |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
|
| 1253 |
Hao Zhou |
| 1254 |
Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 1255 |
4125 Highlander Parkway |
| 1256 |
Richfield, OH 44286 |
| 1257 |
USA |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
Joseph Salowey (editor) |
| 1263 |
Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 1264 |
2901 3rd. Ave |
| 1265 |
Seattle, WA 98121 |
| 1266 |
USA |
| 1267 |
|
| 1268 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
|
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 23] |
| 1285 |
</pre> |