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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Hoeper
2 Request for Comments: 6678 Motorola Solutions, Inc.
3 Category: Informational S. Hanna
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Juniper Networks
5 H. Zhou
6 J. Salowey, Ed.
7 Cisco Systems, Inc.
8 July 2012
9
10
11 <span class="h1">Requirements for a</span>
12 <span class="h1">Tunnel-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method</span>
13
14 Abstract
15
16 This memo defines the requirements for a tunnel-based Extensible
17 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method. This tunnel method will use
18 Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish a secure tunnel. The
19 tunnel will provide support for password authentication, EAP
20 authentication, and the transport of additional data for other
21 purposes.
22
23 Status of This Memo
24
25 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
26 published for informational purposes.
27
28 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
29 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
30 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
31 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
32 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
33 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
34
35 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
36 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
37 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6678">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6678</a>.
38
39 Copyright Notice
40
41 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
42 document authors. All rights reserved.
43
44 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
45 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
46 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
47 publication of this document. Please review these documents
48 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
55
56
57 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
58 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
59 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
60 described in the Simplified BSD License.
61
62 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
63 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
64 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
65 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
66 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
67 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
68 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
69 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
70 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
71 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
72 than English.
73
74 Table of Contents
75
76 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
78 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Password Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Protection of Weak EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Chained EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
82 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Identity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
83 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Anonymous Service Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
84 <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Network Endpoint Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
85 <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Client Authentication during Tunnel Establishment . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
86 <a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
87 3.9. Certificate-Less Authentication and Generic EAP Method
88 Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
89 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
90 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
91 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. RFC Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
92 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Tunnel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
93 <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
94 <a href="#section-4.2.1.1">4.2.1.1</a>. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
95 <a href="#section-4.2.1.1.1">4.2.1.1.1</a>. Cipher Suite Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
96 <a href="#section-4.2.1.1.2">4.2.1.1.2</a>. Tunnel Data Protection Algorithms . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
97 4.2.1.1.3. Tunnel Authentication and Key Establishment . 11
98 <a href="#section-4.2.1.2">4.2.1.2</a>. Tunnel Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
99 <a href="#section-4.2.1.3">4.2.1.3</a>. TLS Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
100 <a href="#section-4.2.1.4">4.2.1.4</a>. Peer Identity Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
101 <a href="#section-4.2.1.5">4.2.1.5</a>. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
102 <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
103 <a href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Protection of Data External to Tunnel . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
104 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Tunnel Payload Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
105
106
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112
113 <a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Extensible Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
114 <a href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Request/Challenge Response Operation . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
115 <a href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. Indicating Criticality of Attributes . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
116 <a href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. Vendor-Specific Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
117 <a href="#section-4.3.5">4.3.5</a>. Result Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
118 <a href="#section-4.3.6">4.3.6</a>. Internationalization of Display Strings . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
119 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. EAP Channel Binding Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
120 4.5. Requirements Associated with Carrying Username and
121 Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
122 <a href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
123 <a href="#section-4.5.1.1">4.5.1.1</a>. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
124 <a href="#section-4.5.1.2">4.5.1.2</a>. Authentication of Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
125 <a href="#section-4.5.1.3">4.5.1.3</a>. Server Certificate Revocation Checking . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
126 <a href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
127 <a href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
128 <a href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Password Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
129 <a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying EAP Methods . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
130 <a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Method Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
131 <a href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Chained Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
132 <a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Cryptographic Binding with the TLS Tunnel . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
133 <a href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
134 <a href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Method Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
135 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
136 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Cipher Suite Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
137 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Tunneled Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
138 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Data External to Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
139 5.4. Separation of TLS Tunnel and Inner Authentication
140 Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
141 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
142 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
143 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
144
145
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147
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
170
171 An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) tunnel method is an EAP
172 method that establishes a secure tunnel and executes other EAP
173 methods under the protection of that secure tunnel. An EAP tunnel
174 method can be used in any lower-layer protocol that supports EAP
175 authentication. There are several existing EAP tunnel methods that
176 use Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish the secure tunnel.
177 EAP methods supporting this include Protected EAP [<a href="#ref-PEAP" title="&quot;[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) Specification&quot;">PEAP</a>], Tunneled
178 Transport Layer Security EAP (TTLS) [<a href="./rfc5281" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- TTLSv0)&quot;">RFC5281</a>] and EAP Flexible
179 Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST) [<a href="./rfc4851" title="&quot;The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)&quot;">RFC4851</a>]. In
180 general, this has worked well so there is consensus to continue to
181 use TLS as the basis for a tunnel method. There have been various
182 reasons for employing a protected tunnel for EAP processes. They
183 include protecting weak authentication exchanges, such as username
184 and password. In addition, a protected tunnel can provide means to
185 provide peer identity protection and EAP method chaining. Finally,
186 systems have found it useful to transport additional types of data
187 within the protected tunnel.
188
189 This document describes the requirements for a EAP tunnel method as
190 well as for a password protocol supporting legacy password
191 verification within the tunnel method.
192
193 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
194
195 Use of each capitalized word within a sentence or phrase carries the
196 following meaning during the EAP Method Update (EMU) WG's method
197 selection process:
198
199 MUST - indicates an absolute requirement
200
201 MUST NOT - indicates something absolutely prohibited
202
203 SHOULD - indicates a strong recommendation of a desired result
204
205 SHOULD NOT - indicates a strong recommendation against a result
206
207 MAY - indicates a willingness to allow an optional outcome
208
209 Lowercase uses of "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and
210 "MAY" carry their normal meaning and are not subject to these
211 definitions.
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Use Cases</span>
226
227 To motivate and explain the requirements in this document, a
228 representative set of use cases for the EAP tunnel method are
229 supplied here. It is mandatory for a candidate tunnel method to
230 support all of the use cases that are marked below as "MUST".
231
232 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Password Authentication</span>
233
234 Many legacy systems only support user authentication with passwords.
235 Some of these systems require transport of the actual username and
236 password to the authentication server. This is true for systems
237 where the authentication server does not have access to the cleartext
238 password or a consistent transform of the cleartext password.
239 Examples of such systems are some one-time password (OTP) systems and
240 other systems where the username and password are submitted to an
241 external party for validation. The tunnel method MUST support
242 transporting cleartext username and password to the EAP server. It
243 MUST NOT reveal information about the username and password to
244 parties in the communication path between the peer and the EAP
245 server. The advantage any attacker gains against the tunnel method
246 when employing a username and password for authentication MUST be
247 through interaction and not computation. The tunnel MUST support
248 protection from man-in-the-middle attacks. The combination of the
249 tunnel authentication and password authentication MUST enable mutual
250 authentication.
251
252 Since EAP authentication occurs before network access is granted the
253 tunnel method SHOULD enable an inner exchange to provide support for
254 minimal password management tasks including password change, "new PIN
255 mode", and "next token mode" required by some systems.
256
257 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Protection of Weak EAP Methods</span>
258
259 Some existing EAP methods have vulnerabilities that could be
260 eliminated or reduced by running them inside a protected tunnel. For
261 example, an EAP-MD5 method does not provide mutual authentication or
262 protection from dictionary attacks. Without extra protection, EAP
263 tunnel methods are vulnerable to a special type of tunnel man-in-the-
264 middle (MitM) attack [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title="&quot;Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols&quot;">TUNNEL-MITM</a>]. This attack is referred to as
265 "tunnel MitM attack" in the remainder of this document. The
266 additional protection needed to thwart tunnel MitM attacks depends on
267 the inner method executed within the tunnel. When weak methods are
268 used, these attacks can be mitigated via security policies that
269 require the method to be used only within a tunnel. On the other
270 hand, a technical solution (so-called cryptographic bindings) can be
271 used whenever the inner method derives key material and is not
272 susceptible to attacks outside a tunnel. Only the latter mitigation
273
274
275
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278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
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280
281 technique can be made an actual requirement for EAP tunnel methods
282 (see <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a>), while security policies are outside the scope of
283 this requirement document. Please refer to the NIST "Recommendation
284 for EAP Methods Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication"
285 [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>] and [<a href="#ref-LCN-2010" title="&quot;An Inconvenient Truth about Tunneled Authentications&quot;">LCN-2010</a>] for a discussion on security
286 policies and complete solutions for thwarting tunnel MitM attacks.
287
288 The tunnel method MUST support protection of weak EAP methods.
289 Cryptographic protection from tunnel MitM attacks MUST be provided
290 for all key-generating methods. In combination with an appropriate
291 security policy this will thwart MitM attacks against inner methods.
292
293 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Chained EAP Methods</span>
294
295 Several circumstances are best addressed by using chained EAP
296 methods. For example, it may be desirable to authenticate the user
297 and also authenticate the device being used. However, chained EAP
298 methods from different conversations can be redirected into the same
299 conversation by an attacker giving the authenticator the impression
300 that both conversations terminate at the same endpoint.
301 Cryptographic binding can be used to bind the results of chained key-
302 generating methods together or to an encompassing tunnel.
303
304 The tunnel method MUST support chained EAP methods while including
305 protection against attacks on method chaining.
306
307 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Identity Protection</span>
308
309 When performing an EAP authentication, the peer may want to protect
310 its identity and only disclose it to a trusted EAP server. This
311 helps to maintain peer privacy.
312
313 The tunnel method MUST support identity protection, therefore the
314 identity of the peer used for authentication purposes MUST NOT be
315 obtainable by any entity other than the EAP server terminating the
316 tunnel method. Peer identity protection provided by the tunnel
317 method applies to the identities that are specific to the tunnel
318 method and inner method being used. In a roaming scenario, note that
319 the peer may need to expose the realm portion of the EAP outer
320 identity in the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [<a href="./rfc4282" title="&quot;The Network Access Identifier&quot;">RFC4282</a>] in order to
321 reach the appropriate authentication server.
322
323
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336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Anonymous Service Access</span>
338
339 When network service is provided, it is sometimes desirable for a
340 user to gain network access in order to access limited services for
341 emergency communication or troubleshooting information. To avoid
342 eavesdropping, it's best to negotiate link-layer security as with any
343 other authentication.
344
345 Therefore, the tunnel method SHOULD allow anonymous peers or server-
346 only authentication, while still deriving keys that can be used for
347 link-layer security. The tunnel method MAY also allow for the bypass
348 of server authentication processing on the client.
349
350 Foregoing user or server authentication increases the chance of man-
351 in-the-middle and other types of attacks that can compromise the
352 derived keys used for link-layer security. Therefore, passwords and
353 other sensitive information MUST NOT be disclosed to an
354 unauthenticated server, or to a server that is not authorized to
355 authenticate the user.
356
357 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Network Endpoint Assessment</span>
358
359 The Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) protocols and reference model
360 described in [<a href="./rfc5209" title="&quot;Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements&quot;">RFC5209</a>] provide a standard way to check the health
361 ("posture") of a device at or after the time it connects to a
362 network. If the device does not comply with the network's
363 requirements, it can be denied access to the network or granted
364 limited access to remediate itself. EAP is a convenient place for
365 conducting an NEA exchange.
366
367 The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying NEA protocols such as a
368 Posture Broker protocol compatible with Trusted Network Connect
369 (PB-TNC) [<a href="./rfc5793" title="&quot;PB-TNC: A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect (TNC)&quot;">RFC5793</a>]. Depending on the specifics of the tunnel method,
370 these protocols may be required to be carried in an EAP method.
371
372 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Client Authentication during Tunnel Establishment</span>
373
374 In some cases, the peer will have credentials that allow it to
375 authenticate during tunnel establishment. These credentials may only
376 partially authenticate the identity of the peer and additional
377 authentication may be required inside the tunnel. For example, a
378 communication device may be authenticated during tunnel
379 establishment; in addition, user authentication may be required to
380 satisfy authentication policy. The tunnel method MUST be capable of
381 providing client-side authentication during tunnel establishment.
382
383
384
385
386
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390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
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392
393 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Extensibility</span>
394
395 The tunnel method MUST provide extensibility so that additional data
396 related to authentication, authorization, and network access can be
397 carried inside the tunnel in the future. This removes the need to
398 develop new tunneling methods for specific purposes.
399
400 An application for extensibility is credential provisioning. When a
401 peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient time to
402 distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for later
403 authentication exchanges. For example, the authentication server can
404 provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be used by
405 the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming. In addition,
406 there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, such as
407 [<a href="#ref-EAP-ENROLL" title="&quot;An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Enrollment Method&quot;">EAP-ENROLL</a>]. Another use for extensibility is support for alternate
408 authentication frameworks within the tunnel.
409
410 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.9" href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>. Certificate-Less Authentication and Generic EAP Method Extension</span>
411
412 In some cases, the peer will not have a way to verify a server
413 certificate and, in some cases, a server might not have a certificate
414 to verify. Therefore, it is desirable to support certificate-less
415 authentication. An application for this is credential provisioning
416 where the peer and server authenticate each other with a shared
417 password and credentials for subsequent authentication (e.g., a key
418 pair and certificate, or a shared key) can be passed inside the
419 tunnel. Another application is to extend existing EAP methods with
420 new features such as EAP channel bindings.
421
422 Great care must be taken when using tunnels with no server
423 authentication for the protection of an inner method. For example,
424 the client may lack the appropriate trust roots to fully authenticate
425 the server, but may still establish the tunnel to execute an inner
426 EAP method to perform mutual authentication and key derivation. In
427 these cases, the inner EAP method MUST provide resistance to
428 dictionary attack and a cryptographic binding between the inner
429 method and the tunnel method MUST be established. Furthermore, the
430 cipher suite used to establish the tunnel MUST derive the master key
431 using contributions from both client and server, as in ephemeral
432 Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.
433
434 The tunnel method MAY allow for certificate-less authentication.
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Requirements</span>
450
451 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General Requirements</span>
452
453 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. RFC Compliance</span>
454
455 The tunnel method MUST include a Security Claims section with all
456 security claims specified in <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.2">Section&nbsp;7.2 in RFC 3748</a> [<a href="./rfc3748" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3748</a>]. In
457 addition, it MUST meet the requirement in Sections <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> and <a href="#section-7.4">7.4</a> of <a href="./rfc3748">RFC</a>
458 <a href="./rfc3748">3748</a> that tunnel methods MUST support protection against man-in-the-
459 middle attacks. Furthermore, the tunnel method MUST support identity
460 protection as specified in <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.3">Section&nbsp;7.3 of RFC 3748</a>.
461
462 The tunnel method MUST be unconditionally compliant with <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>
463 [<a href="./rfc4017" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless LANs&quot;">RFC4017</a>] (using the definition of "unconditionally compliant"
464 contained in <a href="./rfc4017#section-1.1">Section&nbsp;1.1 of RFC 4017</a>). This means that the method
465 MUST satisfy all the "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT"
466 requirements in <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>.
467
468 The tunnel method MUST meet all the "MUST" and "SHOULD" requirements
469 relevant to EAP methods contained in the EAP key management framework
470 [<a href="./rfc5247" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework&quot;">RFC5247</a>] or any successor. This includes the generation of the
471 Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK),
472 Peer-Id, Server-Id, and Session-Id. These requirements will enable
473 the tunnel method to properly fit into the EAP key management
474 framework, maintaining all of the security properties and guarantees
475 of that framework.
476
477 The tunnel method MUST NOT be tied to any single cryptographic
478 algorithm. Instead, it MUST support run-time negotiation to select
479 among an extensible set of cryptographic algorithms, such as
480 algorithms used with certificates presented during tunnel
481 establishment. This "cryptographic algorithm agility" provides
482 several advantages. Most important, when a weakness in an algorithm
483 is discovered or increased processing power overtakes an algorithm,
484 users can easily transition to a new algorithm. Also, users can
485 choose the algorithm that best meets their needs.
486
487 The tunnel method MUST meet the SHOULD and MUST requirements
488 pertinent to EAP method contained in <a href="./rfc4962#section-3">Section&nbsp;3 of RFC 4962</a> [<a href="./rfc4962" title="&quot;Guidance for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management&quot;">RFC4962</a>].
489 This includes: cryptographic algorithm independence; strong, fresh
490 session keys; replay detection; keying material confidentiality and
491 integrity; and confirmation of cipher suite selection.
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
503
504
505 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Tunnel Requirements</span>
506
507 The following section discusses requirements for TLS tunnel
508 establishment.
509
510 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. TLS Requirements</span>
511
512 The tunnel-based method MUST support TLS version 1.2 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] and
513 may support earlier versions greater than SSL 2.0 in order to enable
514 the possibility of backwards compatibility.
515
516 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1" href="#section-4.2.1.1">4.2.1.1</a>. Cipher Suites</span>
517
518 <span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.1" href="#section-4.2.1.1.1">4.2.1.1.1</a>. Cipher Suite Negotiation</span>
519
520 Cipher suite negotiations always suffer from downgrading attacks when
521 they are not secured by any kind of integrity protection. A common
522 practice is a post-negotiation integrity check in which, as soon as
523 available, the established keys (here, the tunnel key) are used to
524 derive integrity keys. These integrity keys are then used by the
525 peer and authentication server to verify whether the cipher suite
526 negotiation has been maliciously altered by another party.
527
528 Integrity checks prevent downgrading attacks only if the derived
529 integrity keys and the employed integrity algorithms cannot be broken
530 in real-time. See <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> or [<a href="#ref-HC07" title="&quot;Where EAP Security Claims Fail&quot;">HC07</a>] for more information on
531 this. Hence, the tunnel method MUST provide integrity-protected
532 cipher suite negotiation with secure integrity algorithms and
533 integrity keys.
534
535 TLS provides protected cipher suite negotiation as long as all the
536 cipher suites supported provide authentication, key establishment,
537 and data integrity protection as discussed in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>.
538
539 <span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.2" href="#section-4.2.1.1.2">4.2.1.1.2</a>. Tunnel Data Protection Algorithms</span>
540
541 In order to prevent attacks on the cryptographic algorithms employed
542 by inner authentication methods, a tunnel protocol's protection needs
543 to provide a basic level of algorithm strength. The tunnel method
544 MUST provide at least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite that
545 provides the equivalent security of 128-bit AES for encryption and
546 message authentication. See Part 1 of the NIST "Recommendation for
547 Key Management" [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-57">NIST-SP-800-57</a>] for a discussion of the relative
548 strengths of common algorithms.
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.1.3" href="#section-4.2.1.1.3">4.2.1.1.3</a>. Tunnel Authentication and Key Establishment</span>
562
563 A tunnel method MUST provide unidirectional authentication from
564 authentication server to EAP peer and mutual authentication between
565 authentication server and EAP peer. The tunnel method MUST provide
566 at least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite that provides
567 certificate-based authentication of the server and provides optional
568 certificate-based authentication of the client. Other types of
569 authentication MAY be supported.
570
571 At least one mandatory-to-implement cipher suite MUST be approved by
572 the NIST "Draft Recommendation for Key Management", Part 3
573 [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-57p3">NIST-SP-800-57p3</a>], i.e., the cipher suite MUST be listed in Table
574 4-1, 4-2, or 4-3 in that document.
575
576 The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites MUST only include cipher
577 suites that use strong cryptographic algorithms. They MUST NOT
578 include cipher suites providing mutually anonymous authentication or
579 static Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.
580
581 Other cipher suites MAY be selected following the security
582 requirements for tunnel protocols in the NIST "Recommendation for EAP
583 Methods Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication"
584 [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>].
585
586 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.2" href="#section-4.2.1.2">4.2.1.2</a>. Tunnel Replay Protection</span>
587
588 In order to prevent replay attacks on a tunnel protocol, the message
589 authentication MUST be generated using a time-variant input such as
590 timestamps, sequence numbers, nonces, or a combination of these, so
591 that any reuse of the authentication data can be detected as invalid.
592 TLS provides sufficient replay protection to meet this requirement as
593 long as weak cipher suites discussed in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> are avoided.
594
595 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.3" href="#section-4.2.1.3">4.2.1.3</a>. TLS Extensions</span>
596
597 In order to meet the requirements in this document, TLS extensions
598 MAY be used. For example, TLS extensions may be useful in providing
599 certificate revocation information via the TLS Online Certificate
600 Status Protocol (OCSP) extension [<a href="./rfc6066" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions&quot;">RFC6066</a>] (thus meeting the
601 requirement in <a href="#section-4.5.1.3">Section 4.5.1.3</a>).
602
603 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.4" href="#section-4.2.1.4">4.2.1.4</a>. Peer Identity Privacy</span>
604
605 A tunnel protocol MUST support peer privacy. This requires that the
606 username and other attributes associated with the peer are not
607 transmitted in the clear or to an unauthenticated, unauthorized
608 party. Peer identity protection provided by the tunnel method
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
615
616
617 applies to establishment of the tunnel and protection of inner method
618 specific identities. If applicable, the peer certificate is sent
619 confidentially (i.e., encrypted).
620
621 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1.5" href="#section-4.2.1.5">4.2.1.5</a>. Session Resumption</span>
622
623 The tunnel method MUST support TLS session resumption as defined in
624 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>]. The tunnel method MAY support other methods of session
625 resumption such as those defined in [<a href="./rfc5077" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State&quot;">RFC5077</a>].
626
627 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Fragmentation</span>
628
629 Tunnel establishment sometimes requires the exchange of information
630 that exceeds what can be carried in a single EAP message. In
631 addition, information carried within the tunnel may also exceed this
632 limit. Therefore, a tunnel method MUST support fragmentation and
633 reassembly.
634
635 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Protection of Data External to Tunnel</span>
636
637 A man-in-the-middle attacker can modify cleartext values such as
638 protocol version and type code information communicated outside the
639 TLS tunnel. The tunnel method MUST provide implicit or explicit
640 protection of the protocol version and type code. If modification of
641 other information external to the tunnel can cause exploitable
642 vulnerabilities, the tunnel method MUST provide protection against
643 modification of this additional data.
644
645 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Tunnel Payload Requirements</span>
646
647 This section describes the payload requirements inside the tunnel.
648 These requirements frequently express features that a candidate
649 protocol must be capable of offering so that a deployer can decide
650 whether to make use of that feature. This section does not state
651 requirements about what features of each protocol must be used during
652 a deployment.
653
654 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Extensible Attribute Types</span>
655
656 The payload MUST be extensible. Some standard payload attribute
657 types will be defined to meet known requirements listed below, such
658 as password authentication, inner EAP method, vendor-specific
659 attributes, and result indication. Additional payload attributes MAY
660 be defined in the future to support additional features and data
661 types.
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Request/Challenge Response Operation</span>
674
675 The payload MUST support the request and response type of half-duplex
676 operation typical of EAP. Multiple attributes may be sent in a
677 single payload. The payload MAY support transporting multiple
678 authentications in a single payload packet.
679
680 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.3" href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. Indicating Criticality of Attributes</span>
681
682 It is expected that new attributes will be defined to be carried
683 within the tunnel method. In some cases, it is necessary for the
684 sender to know if the receiver did not understand the attribute. To
685 support this, there MUST be a way for the sender to mark attributes
686 such that the receiver will indicate if an attribute is not
687 understood.
688
689 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.4" href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. Vendor-Specific Support</span>
690
691 The payload MUST support communication of an extensible set of
692 vendor-specific attributes. These attributes will be segmented into
693 uniquely identified vendor-specific namespaces. They can be used for
694 experiments or vendor-specific features.
695
696 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.5" href="#section-4.3.5">4.3.5</a>. Result Indication</span>
697
698 The payload MUST support result indication and its acknowledgement,
699 so both the EAP peer and server will end up with a synchronized
700 state. The result indication is needed after each chained inner
701 authentication method and at the end of the authentication, so
702 separate result indications for intermediate and final results MUST
703 be supported.
704
705 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.6" href="#section-4.3.6">4.3.6</a>. Internationalization of Display Strings</span>
706
707 The payload MAY provide a standard attribute format that supports
708 international strings. This attribute format MUST support encoding
709 strings in UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title="&quot;UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646&quot;">RFC3629</a>] format. Any strings sent by the server
710 intended for display to the user MUST be sent in UTF-8 format and
711 SHOULD be able to be marked with language information and adapted to
712 the user's language preference as indicated by <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a> [<a href="./rfc5646" title="&quot;Tags for Identifying Languages&quot;">RFC5646</a>].
713 Note that in some cases, such as when transmitting error codes, it is
714 acceptable to exchange numeric codes that can be translated by the
715 client to support the particular local language. These numeric codes
716 are not subject to internationalization during transmission.
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. EAP Channel Binding Requirements</span>
730
731 The tunnel method MUST be capable of meeting EAP channel binding
732 requirements described in [<a href="./rfc6677" title="&quot;Channel Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Methods&quot;">RFC6677</a>]. As discussed in [<a href="./rfc5056" title="&quot;On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels&quot;">RFC5056</a>], EAP
733 channel bindings differ from channel bindings discussed in other
734 contexts. Cryptographic binding between the TLS tunnel and the inner
735 method discussed in <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a> relates directly to the non-EAP
736 channel binding concepts discussed in <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>.
737
738 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying Username and Passwords</span>
739
740 This section describes the requirements associated with tunneled
741 password authentication. The password authentication mentioned here
742 refers to user or machine authentication using a legacy password
743 database or verifier, such as the Lightweight Directory Access
744 Protocol (LDAP) [<a href="./rfc4511" title="&quot;Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol&quot;">RFC4511</a>], OTP, etc. These typically require the
745 password in its original text form in order to authenticate the peer;
746 hence, they require the peer to send the cleartext username and
747 password to the EAP server.
748
749 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1" href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Security</span>
750
751 Many internal EAP methods have the peer send its password in the
752 clear to the EAP server. Other methods (e.g., challenge-response
753 methods) are vulnerable to attacks if an eavesdropper can intercept
754 the traffic. For any such methods, the security measures in the
755 following sections MUST be met.
756
757 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.1" href="#section-4.5.1.1">4.5.1.1</a>. Confidentiality and Integrity</span>
758
759 The cleartext password exchange MUST be integrity and confidentiality
760 protected. As long as the password exchange occurs inside an
761 authenticated and encrypted tunnel, this requirement is met.
762
763 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.2" href="#section-4.5.1.2">4.5.1.2</a>. Authentication of Server</span>
764
765 The EAP server MUST be authenticated before the peer sends the
766 cleartext password to the server.
767
768 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1.3" href="#section-4.5.1.3">4.5.1.3</a>. Server Certificate Revocation Checking</span>
769
770 When certificate authentication is used during tunnel establishment,
771 the EAP peer may need to present its password to the server before it
772 has network access to check the revocation status of the server's
773 credentials. Therefore, the tunnel method MUST support mechanisms to
774 check the revocation status of a credential. The tunnel method
775 SHOULD make use of Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
783
784
785 [<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>] or Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
786 [<a href="./rfc5055" title="&quot;Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)&quot;">RFC5055</a>] to obtain the revocation status of the EAP server
787 certificate.
788
789 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.2" href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Internationalization</span>
790
791 The password authentication exchange MUST support usernames and
792 passwords in international languages. It MUST support encoding of
793 username and password strings in UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title="&quot;UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646&quot;">RFC3629</a>] format. The method
794 MUST specify how username and password normalizations and/or
795 comparisons are performed in reference to SASLprep [<a href="./rfc4013" title="&quot;SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords&quot;">RFC4013</a>],
796 Net-UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc5198" title="&quot;Unicode Format for Network Interchange&quot;">RFC5198</a>], or their replacements.
797
798 Any strings sent by the server intended for display to the user MUST
799 be sent in UTF-8 format and SHOULD be able to be marked with language
800 information and adapted to the user's language preference as
801 indicated by <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a> [<a href="./rfc5646" title="&quot;Tags for Identifying Languages&quot;">RFC5646</a>]. Note that, in some cases, such as
802 when transmitting error codes, it is acceptable to exchange numeric
803 codes that can be translated by the client to support the particular
804 local language. These numeric codes are not subject to
805 internationalization during transmission.
806
807 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.3" href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Metadata</span>
808
809 The password authentication exchange SHOULD support additional
810 associated metadata that can be used to indicate whether the
811 authentication is for a user or a machine. This allows the EAP
812 server and peer to request and negotiate authentication specifically
813 for a user or machine. This is useful in the case of multiple inner
814 authentications where the user and machine both need to be
815 authenticated.
816
817 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.4" href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Password Change</span>
818
819 The password authentication exchange MUST support password change.
820 The exchange SHOULD be extensible to support other "housekeeping"
821 functions, such as the management of PINs or other data, required by
822 some systems.
823
824 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Requirements Associated with Carrying EAP Methods</span>
825
826 The tunnel method MUST be able to carry inner EAP methods without
827 modifying them. EAP methods MUST NOT be redefined inside the tunnel.
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Method Negotiation</span>
842
843 The tunnel method MUST support the protected negotiation of the inner
844 EAP method. It MUST NOT allow the inner EAP method negotiation to be
845 manipulated by intermediaries.
846
847 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Chained Methods</span>
848
849 The tunnel method SHOULD support the chaining of multiple EAP
850 methods. The tunnel method MUST allow for the communication of
851 intermediate results and for the verification of compound binding
852 between executed inner methods when chained methods are employed.
853
854 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Cryptographic Binding with the TLS Tunnel</span>
855
856 The tunnel method MUST provide a mechanism to bind the tunnel
857 protocol and the inner EAP method. This property is referred to as
858 cryptographic binding. Such bindings are an important tool for
859 mitigating the tunnel MitM attacks [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title="&quot;Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols&quot;">TUNNEL-MITM</a>]. Cryptographic
860 bindings enable the complete prevention of tunnel MitM attacks
861 without the need of additional security policies, as long as the
862 inner method derives keys and is not vulnerable to attacks outside a
863 protected tunnel [<a href="#ref-LCN-2010" title="&quot;An Inconvenient Truth about Tunneled Authentications&quot;">LCN-2010</a>]. Even though weak or non-key-deriving
864 inner methods may be permitted. Thus, security policies preventing
865 tunnel MitM attacks are still necessary, and the tunnel method MUST
866 provide cryptographic bindings, because only this allows migrating to
867 more secure, policy-independent implementations.
868
869 Cryptographic bindings are typically achieved by securely mixing the
870 established keying material (say, tunnel key TK) from the tunnel
871 protocol with the established keying material (say, method key MK)
872 from the inner authentication method(s) in order to derive fresh
873 keying material. If chained EAP methods are executed in the tunnel,
874 all derived inner keys are combined with the tunnel key to create a
875 new compound tunnel key (CTK). In particular, CTK is used to derive
876 the EAP MSK, EMSK and other transient keys (shown as "TEK" below),
877 such as transient encryption keys and integrity protection keys. The
878 key hierarchy for tunnel method executions that derive compound keys
879 for the purpose of cryptographic binding is depicted in Figure 1.
880
881 In the case of the sequential executions of n inner methods, a
882 chained compound key CTK_i MUST be computed upon the completion of
883 each inner method i such that it contains the compound key of all
884 previous inner methods, i.e., CTK_i=f(CTK_i-1, MK_i) with 0 &lt; i &lt;= n
885 and CTK_0=TK, where f() is a key derivation function, such as one
886 that complies with the NIST "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
887 Pseudorandom Functions" [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>]. CTK_n SHOULD serve as the
888 key to derive further keys. Figure 1 depicts the key hierarchy in
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
895
896
897 the case of a single inner method. Transient keys derived from the
898 compound key CTK are used in a cryptographic protocol to verify the
899 integrity of the tunnel and the inner authentication method.
900
901 -----------
902 | TK | MK |
903 -----------
904 | |
905 v v
906 --------
907 | CTK |
908 --------
909 |
910 v
911 ----------------
912 | | |
913 v v v
914 ------- ------ -------
915 | TEK | | MSK | | EMSK |
916 ------- ------- --------
917
918 Figure 1: Compound Keys
919
920 Furthermore, all compound keys CTK_i and all keys derived from it
921 SHOULD follow the recommendations for key derivations and key
922 hierarchies as specified in [<a href="#ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>]. In particular, all
923 derived keys MUST have a lifetime assigned that does not exceed the
924 lifetime of any key higher in the key hierarchy. The derivation MUST
925 prevent a compromise in one part of the system from leading to
926 compromises in other parts of the system that relay on keys at the
927 same or higher level in the hierarchy.
928
929 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.4" href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication</span>
930
931 The tunnel method SHOULD allow for the peer to initiate an inner EAP
932 authentication in order to meet its policy requirements for
933 authenticating the server.
934
935 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.5" href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Method Metadata</span>
936
937 The tunnel method SHOULD allow for the communication of additional
938 data associated with an EAP method. This can be used to indicate
939 whether the authentication is for a user or a machine. This allows
940 the EAP server and peer to request and negotiate authentication
941 specifically for a user or machine. This is useful in the case of
942 multiple inner EAP authentications where the user and machine both
943 need to be authenticated.
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
951
952
953 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
954
955 A tunnel method is often deployed to provide mutual authentication
956 between EAP Peer and EAP Server and to generate key material for use
957 in protecting lower-layer protocols. In addition the tunnel is used
958 to protect the communication of additional data, including peer
959 identity between the EAP Peer and EAP Server from disclosure to or
960 modification by an attacker. These sections cover considerations
961 that affect the ability for a method to achieve these goals.
962
963 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Cipher Suite Selection</span>
964
965 TLS supports a wide range of cipher suites providing a variety of
966 security properties. The selection of cipher suites is critical to
967 the security of the tunnel method. Selection of a cipher suite with
968 weak or no authentication, such as an anonymous Diffie-Hellman-based
969 cipher suite, will greatly increase the risk of system compromise.
970 Since a tunnel method uses the TLS tunnel to transport data, the
971 selection of a cipher suite with weak data encryption and integrity
972 algorithms will also increase the vulnerability of the method to
973 attacks.
974
975 A tunnel protocol is prone to downgrading attacks if the tunnel
976 protocol supports any key establishment algorithm that can be broken
977 on-line. In a successful downgrading attack, an adversary breaks the
978 selected "weak" key establishment algorithm and optionally the "weak"
979 authentication algorithm without being detected. Here, "weak" refers
980 to a key establishment algorithm that can be broken in real-time, and
981 an authentication scheme that can be broken off-line, respectively.
982 See [<a href="#ref-HC07" title="&quot;Where EAP Security Claims Fail&quot;">HC07</a>] for more details. The requirements in this document
983 disapprove the use of key establishment algorithms that can be broken
984 on-line.
985
986 Mutually anonymous tunnel protocols are prone to man-in-the-middle
987 attacks described in [<a href="#ref-HC07" title="&quot;Where EAP Security Claims Fail&quot;">HC07</a>]. During such an attack, an adversary
988 establishes one tunnel with the peer and one with the authentication
989 server, while the peer and server believe that they established a
990 tunnel with each other. Once both tunnels have been established, the
991 adversary can eavesdrop on all communications within the tunnels,
992 i.e., the execution of the inner authentication method(s).
993 Consequently, the adversary can eavesdrop on the identifiers that are
994 exchanged as part of the EAP method, and thus the privacy of peer
995 and/or authentication server is compromised along with any other data
996 transmitted within the tunnels. This document requires server
997 authentication to avoid the risks associated with anonymous cipher
998 suites.
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
1007
1008
1009 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Tunneled Authentication</span>
1010
1011 In many cases, a tunnel method provides mutual authentication by
1012 authenticating the server during tunnel establishment and
1013 authenticating the peer within the tunnel using an EAP method. As
1014 described in [<a href="#ref-TUNNEL-MITM" title="&quot;Man-in-the- Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols&quot;">TUNNEL-MITM</a>], this mode of operation can allow tunnel
1015 man-in-the-middle attackers to authenticate to the server as the peer
1016 by tunneling the inner EAP protocol messages to and from a peer that
1017 is executing the method outside a tunnel or with an untrustworthy
1018 server. Cryptographic binding between the established keying
1019 material from the inner authentication method(s) and the tunnel
1020 protocol verifies that the endpoints of the tunnel and the inner
1021 authentication method(s) are the same. This can thwart the attack if
1022 the inner-method-derived keys are of sufficient strength that they
1023 cannot be broken in real-time.
1024
1025 In cases where the inner authentication method does not generate any
1026 key material or only weak key material, security policies MUST be
1027 enforced such that the peer cannot execute the inner method with the
1028 same credentials outside a protective tunnel or with an untrustworthy
1029 server.
1030
1031 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Data External to Tunnel</span>
1032
1033 The tunnel method will use data that is outside the TLS tunnel such
1034 as the EAP type code or version numbers. If an attacker can
1035 compromise the protocol by modifying these values, the tunnel method
1036 MUST protect this data from modification. In some cases, external
1037 data may not need additional protection because it is implicitly
1038 verified during the protocol operation.
1039
1040 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Separation of TLS Tunnel and Inner Authentication Termination</span>
1041
1042 Terminating the inner method at a different location than the outer
1043 tunnel needs careful consideration. The inner method data may be
1044 vulnerable to modification and eavesdropping between the server that
1045 terminates the tunnel and the server that terminates the inner
1046 method. For example, if a cleartext password is used, then it may be
1047 sent to the inner method server in a RADIUS password attribute, which
1048 uses weak encryption that may not be suitable protection for many
1049 environments.
1050
1051 In some cases, terminating the tunnel at a different location may
1052 make it difficult for a peer to authenticate the server and trust it
1053 for further communication. For example, if the TLS tunnel is
1054 terminated by a different organization, the peer needs to be able to
1055 authenticate and authorize the tunnel server to handle secret
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
1063
1064
1065 credentials that the peer shares with the home server that terminates
1066 the inner method. This may not meet the security policy of many
1067 environments.
1068
1069 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span>
1070
1071 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span>
1072
1073 [<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
1074 C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
1075 Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>,
1076 June 1999.
1077
1078 [<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
1079 10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003.
1080
1081 [<a id="ref-RFC3748">RFC3748</a>] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
1082 H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
1083 (EAP)", <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, June 2004.
1084
1085 [<a id="ref-RFC4017">RFC4017</a>] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
1086 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
1087 Wireless LANs", <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>, March 2005.
1088
1089 [<a id="ref-RFC4962">RFC4962</a>] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for Authentication,
1090 Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
1091 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp132">BCP 132</a>, <a href="./rfc4962">RFC 4962</a>, July 2007.
1092
1093 [<a id="ref-RFC5055">RFC5055</a>] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and
1094 W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
1095 (SCVP)", <a href="./rfc5055">RFC 5055</a>, December 2007.
1096
1097 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
1098 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August
1099 2008.
1100
1101 [<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
1102 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
1103 Framework", <a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008.
1104
1105 [<a id="ref-RFC6677">RFC6677</a>] Hartman, S., Ed., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel
1106 Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol
1107 (EAP) Methods", <a href="./rfc6677">RFC 6677</a>, July 2012.
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
1119
1120
1121 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1122
1123 [<a id="ref-EAP-ENROLL">EAP-ENROLL</a>] Mahy, R., "An Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
1124 Enrollment Method", Work in Progress, March 2006.
1125
1126 [<a id="ref-HC07">HC07</a>] Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "Where EAP Security Claims
1127 Fail", Institute for Computer Sciences, Social
1128 Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (ICST),
1129 The Fourth International Conference on Heterogeneous
1130 Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and
1131 Robustness (QShine 2007), August 2007.
1132
1133 [<a id="ref-LCN-2010">LCN-2010</a>] Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "An Inconvenient Truth about
1134 Tunneled Authentications", Proceedings of 35th Annual
1135 IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN 2010),
1136 September 2009.
1137
1138 [<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-108">NIST-SP-800-108</a>]
1139 Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
1140 Pseudorandom Functions", Draft NIST Special Publication
1141 800-108, April 2008.
1142
1143 [<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-120">NIST-SP-800-120</a>]
1144 Hoeper, K. and L. Chen, "Recommendation for EAP Methods
1145 Used in Wireless Network Access Authentication", NIST
1146 Special Publication 800-120, September 2009.
1147
1148 [<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-57">NIST-SP-800-57</a>]
1149 Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M.
1150 Smid, "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1:
1151 General (Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57,
1152 part 1, March 2007.
1153
1154 [<a id="ref-NIST-SP-800-57p3">NIST-SP-800-57p3</a>]
1155 Barker, E., Burr, W., Jones, A., Polk, W., Rose, S.,
1156 and M. Smid, "Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3
1157 Application-Specific Key Management Guidance", Draft
1158 NIST Special Publication 800-57, part 3, October 2008.
1159
1160 [<a id="ref-PEAP">PEAP</a>] Microsoft Corporation, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible
1161 Authentication Protocol (PEAP) Specification", August
1162 2009, &lt;http:// download.microsoft.com/download/9/5/E/
1163 95EF66AF-9026-4BB0-A41D-A4F81802D92C/%5BMS-
1164 PEAP%5D.pdf&gt;.
1165
1166 [<a id="ref-RFC4013">RFC4013</a>] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User
1167 Names and Passwords", <a href="./rfc4013">RFC 4013</a>, February 2005.
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
1175
1176
1177 [<a id="ref-RFC4282">RFC4282</a>] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
1178 Network Access Identifier", <a href="./rfc4282">RFC 4282</a>, December 2005.
1179
1180 [<a id="ref-RFC4511">RFC4511</a>] Sermersheim, J., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
1181 (LDAP): The Protocol", <a href="./rfc4511">RFC 4511</a>, June 2006.
1182
1183 [<a id="ref-RFC4851">RFC4851</a>] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
1184 "The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling
1185 Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)",
1186 <a href="./rfc4851">RFC 4851</a>, May 2007.
1187
1188 [<a id="ref-RFC5056">RFC5056</a>] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
1189 Channels", <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>, November 2007.
1190
1191 [<a id="ref-RFC5077">RFC5077</a>] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
1192 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption
1193 without Server-Side State", <a href="./rfc5077">RFC 5077</a>, January 2008.
1194
1195 [<a id="ref-RFC5198">RFC5198</a>] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for
1196 Network Interchange", <a href="./rfc5198">RFC 5198</a>, March 2008.
1197
1198 [<a id="ref-RFC5209">RFC5209</a>] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and
1199 J. Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview
1200 and Requirements", <a href="./rfc5209">RFC 5209</a>, June 2008.
1201
1202 [<a id="ref-RFC5281">RFC5281</a>] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible
1203 Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer
1204 Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-
1205 TTLSv0)", <a href="./rfc5281">RFC 5281</a>, August 2008.
1206
1207 [<a id="ref-RFC5646">RFC5646</a>] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
1208 Languages", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp47">BCP 47</a>, <a href="./rfc5646">RFC 5646</a>, September 2009.
1209
1210 [<a id="ref-RFC5793">RFC5793</a>] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., and K. Narayan,
1211 "PB-TNC: A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with
1212 Trusted Network Connect (TNC)", <a href="./rfc5793">RFC 5793</a>, March 2010.
1213
1214 [<a id="ref-RFC6066">RFC6066</a>] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
1215 Extensions: Extension Definitions", <a href="./rfc6066">RFC 6066</a>, January
1216 2011.
1217
1218 [<a id="ref-TUNNEL-MITM">TUNNEL-MITM</a>] Asokan, N., Niemi, V., and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the-
1219 Middle in Tunnelled Authentication Protocols",
1220 Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2002/163, November
1221 2002.
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6678">RFC 6678</a> EAP Tunnel Method Requirements July 2012</span>
1231
1232
1233 Authors' Addresses
1234
1235 Katrin Hoeper
1236 Motorola Solutions, Inc.
1237 1301 E. Algonquin Road
1238 Schaumburg, IL 60196
1239 USA
1240
1241 EMail: [email protected]
1242
1243
1244 Stephen Hanna
1245 Juniper Networks
1246 3 Beverly Road
1247 Bedford, MA 01730
1248 USA
1249
1250 EMail: [email protected]
1251
1252
1253 Hao Zhou
1254 Cisco Systems, Inc.
1255 4125 Highlander Parkway
1256 Richfield, OH 44286
1257 USA
1258
1259 EMail: [email protected]
1260
1261
1262 Joseph Salowey (editor)
1263 Cisco Systems, Inc.
1264 2901 3rd. Ave
1265 Seattle, WA 98121
1266 USA
1267
1268 EMail: [email protected]
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 Hoeper, et al. Informational [Page 23]
1285 </pre>