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=========================== |
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Django 4.2.14 release notes |
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=========================== |
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*July 9, 2024* |
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Django 4.2.14 fixes two security issues with severity "moderate" and two |
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security issues with severity "low" in 4.2.13. |
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CVE-2024-38875: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``django.utils.html.urlize()`` |
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=========================================================================================== |
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:tfilter:`urlize` and :tfilter:`urlizetrunc` were subject to a potential |
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denial-of-service attack via certain inputs with a very large number of |
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brackets. |
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CVE-2024-39329: Username enumeration through timing difference for users with unusable passwords |
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================================================================================================ |
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The :meth:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend.authenticate()` method |
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allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack involving login |
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requests for users with unusable passwords. |
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CVE-2024-39330: Potential directory-traversal via ``Storage.save()`` |
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==================================================================== |
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Derived classes of the :class:`~django.core.files.storage.Storage` base class |
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which override :meth:`generate_filename() |
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<django.core.files.storage.Storage.generate_filename()>` without replicating |
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the file path validations existing in the parent class, allowed for potential |
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directory-traversal via certain inputs when calling :meth:`save() |
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<django.core.files.storage.Storage.save()>`. |
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Built-in ``Storage`` sub-classes were not affected by this vulnerability. |
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CVE-2024-39614: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability in ``get_supported_language_variant()`` |
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================================================================================================= |
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:meth:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` was subject to |
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a potential denial-of-service attack when used with very long strings |
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containing specific characters. |
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To mitigate this vulnerability, the language code provided to |
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:meth:`~django.utils.translation.get_supported_language_variant` is now parsed |
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up to a maximum length of 500 characters. |
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When the language code is over 500 characters, a :exc:`ValueError` will now be |
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raised if ``strict`` is ``True``, or if there is no generic variant and |
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``strict`` is ``False``. |