| 1 |
=========================== |
| 2 |
Django 1.10.3 release notes |
| 3 |
=========================== |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
*November 1, 2016* |
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
Django 1.10.3 fixes two security issues and several bugs in 1.10.2. |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
User with hardcoded password created when running tests on Oracle |
| 10 |
================================================================= |
| 11 |
|
| 12 |
When running tests with an Oracle database, Django creates a temporary database |
| 13 |
user. In older versions, if a password isn't manually specified in the database |
| 14 |
settings ``TEST`` dictionary, a hardcoded password is used. This could allow |
| 15 |
an attacker with network access to the database server to connect. |
| 16 |
|
| 17 |
This user is usually dropped after the test suite completes, but not when using |
| 18 |
the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session |
| 19 |
(such as an attacker's connection). |
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
A randomly generated password is now used for each test run. |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True`` |
| 24 |
=============================================== |
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against |
| 27 |
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them |
| 28 |
vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack |
| 29 |
<https://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_. |
| 30 |
|
| 31 |
While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is |
| 32 |
at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if |
| 33 |
developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to |
| 34 |
some production services for which there's no development instance, for |
| 35 |
example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then |
| 36 |
the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the |
| 37 |
developers connect to the database with a superuser account. |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For |
| 40 |
convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following |
| 41 |
variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If |
| 42 |
your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must |
| 43 |
now omit it to get those fallback values. |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
Bugfixes |
| 46 |
======== |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
* Allowed ``User.is_authenticated`` and ``User.is_anonymous`` properties to be |
| 49 |
tested for ``set`` membership (:ticket:`27309`). |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
* Fixed a performance regression when running ``migrate`` in projects |
| 52 |
with ``RenameModel`` operations (:ticket:`27279`). |
| 53 |
|
| 54 |
* Added ``model_name`` to the ``allow_migrate()`` calls in ``makemigrations`` |
| 55 |
(:ticket:`27200`). |
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
* Made the ``JavaScriptCatalog`` view respect the ``packages`` argument; |
| 58 |
previously it was ignored (:ticket:`27374`). |
| 59 |
|
| 60 |
* Fixed ``QuerySet.bulk_create()`` on PostgreSQL when the number of objects is |
| 61 |
a multiple plus one of ``batch_size`` (:ticket:`27385`). |
| 62 |
|
| 63 |
* Prevented ``i18n_patterns()`` from using too much of the URL as the language |
| 64 |
to fix a use case for ``prefix_default_language=False`` (:ticket:`27063`). |
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
* Replaced a possibly incorrect redirect from ``SessionMiddleware`` when a |
| 67 |
session is destroyed in a concurrent request with a ``SuspiciousOperation`` |
| 68 |
to indicate that the request can't be completed (:ticket:`27363`). |