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1 ===========================
2 Django 1.6.10 release notes
3 ===========================
4
5 *January 13, 2015*
6
7 Django 1.6.10 fixes several security issues in 1.6.9.
8
9 WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
10 ===================================================
11
12 When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
13 converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
14 ``HTTP_``. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
15 ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
16 ``request.META`` dictionary).
17
18 Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
19 headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
20 and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
21 header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
22 authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
23 carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
24 able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
25 protection.
26
27 In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
28 containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
29 development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
30 recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
31 servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
32
33 Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
34 =============================================================
35
36 Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
37 ``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
38 to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
39 redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading
40 whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like
41 ``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to
42 provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer
43 from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put
44 this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore
45 JavaScript there.
46
47 Denial-of-service attack against ``django.views.static.serve``
48 ==============================================================
49
50 In older versions of Django, the :func:`django.views.static.serve` view read
51 the files it served one line at a time. Therefore, a big file with no newlines
52 would result in memory usage equal to the size of that file. An attacker could
53 exploit this and launch a denial-of-service attack by simultaneously requesting
54 many large files. This view now reads the file in chunks to prevent large
55 memory usage.
56
57 Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not
58 hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid. Now
59 may be a good time to audit your project and serve your files in production
60 using a real front-end web server if you are not doing so.
61
62 Database denial-of-service with ``ModelMultipleChoiceField``
63 ============================================================
64
65 Given a form that uses ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` and
66 ``show_hidden_initial=True`` (not a documented API), it was possible for a user
67 to cause an unreasonable number of SQL queries by submitting duplicate values
68 for the field's data. The validation logic in ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` now
69 deduplicates submitted values to address this issue.