| 1 |
=========================== |
| 2 |
Django 1.4.18 release notes |
| 3 |
=========================== |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
*January 13, 2015* |
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
Django 1.4.18 fixes several security issues in 1.4.17 as well as a regression |
| 8 |
on Python 2.5 in the 1.4.17 release. |
| 9 |
|
| 10 |
WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation |
| 11 |
=================================================== |
| 12 |
|
| 13 |
When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by |
| 14 |
converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending |
| 15 |
``HTTP_``. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become |
| 16 |
``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's |
| 17 |
``request.META`` dictionary). |
| 18 |
|
| 19 |
Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between |
| 20 |
headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User`` |
| 21 |
and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a |
| 22 |
header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing |
| 23 |
authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy |
| 24 |
carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be |
| 25 |
able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this |
| 26 |
protection. |
| 27 |
|
| 28 |
In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers |
| 29 |
containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in |
| 30 |
development server now does the same. Django's development server is not |
| 31 |
recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production |
| 32 |
servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment. |
| 33 |
|
| 34 |
Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs |
| 35 |
============================================================= |
| 36 |
|
| 37 |
Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. |
| 38 |
``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`) |
| 39 |
to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these |
| 40 |
redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading |
| 41 |
whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like |
| 42 |
``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to |
| 43 |
provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer |
| 44 |
from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put |
| 45 |
this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore |
| 46 |
JavaScript there. |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
Denial-of-service attack against ``django.views.static.serve`` |
| 49 |
============================================================== |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
In older versions of Django, the :func:`django.views.static.serve` view read |
| 52 |
the files it served one line at a time. Therefore, a big file with no newlines |
| 53 |
would result in memory usage equal to the size of that file. An attacker could |
| 54 |
exploit this and launch a denial-of-service attack by simultaneously requesting |
| 55 |
many large files. This view now reads the file in chunks to prevent large |
| 56 |
memory usage. |
| 57 |
|
| 58 |
Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not |
| 59 |
hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid. Now |
| 60 |
may be a good time to audit your project and serve your files in production |
| 61 |
using a real front-end web server if you are not doing so. |
| 62 |
|
| 63 |
Bugfixes |
| 64 |
======== |
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
* To maintain compatibility with Python 2.5, Django's vendored version of six, |
| 67 |
``django.utils.six``, has been downgraded to 1.8.0 which is the last |
| 68 |
version to support Python 2.5. |