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=========================== |
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Django 2.1.11 release notes |
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=========================== |
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*August 1, 2019* |
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Django 2.1.11 fixes security issues in 2.1.10. |
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CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator`` |
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================================================================================ |
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If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods |
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were passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate |
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certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular |
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expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the |
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:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template |
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filters, which were thus vulnerable. |
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The regular expressions used by ``Truncator`` have been simplified in order to |
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avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation may |
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now at times be included in the truncated output. |
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CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()`` |
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================================================================= |
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Due to the behavior of the underlying ``HTMLParser``, |
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:func:`django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate |
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certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities. |
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The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding |
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:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable. |
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``strip_tags()`` now avoids recursive calls to ``HTMLParser`` when progress |
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removing tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made. |
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Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of |
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``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a |
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``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with |
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:func:`django.utils.html.escape`. |
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CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for ``JSONField``/``HStoreField`` |
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==================================================================================================== |
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:lookup:`Key and index lookups <jsonfield.key>` for |
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``django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField`` and :lookup:`key lookups |
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<hstorefield.key>` for :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField` |
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were subject to SQL injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with |
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dictionary expansion, as the ``**kwargs`` passed to ``QuerySet.filter()``. |
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CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in ``django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri()`` |
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===================================================================================== |
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If passed certain inputs, :func:`django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri` could lead |
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to significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding |
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invalid UTF-8 octet sequences. |
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``uri_to_iri()`` now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8 |
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octet sequences. |