| 1 |
=========================== |
| 2 |
Django 1.4.11 release notes |
| 3 |
=========================== |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
*April 21, 2014* |
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
Django 1.4.11 fixes three security issues in 1.4.10. Additionally, |
| 8 |
Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has been |
| 9 |
upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1). |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()`` |
| 12 |
============================================= |
| 13 |
|
| 14 |
Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns |
| 15 |
(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing |
| 16 |
consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to |
| 17 |
determine the appropriate view to invoke. |
| 18 |
|
| 19 |
Django also provides a convenience function -- ``reverse()`` -- which performs |
| 20 |
this process in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes |
| 21 |
information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that view. Use |
| 22 |
of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers, as the output of |
| 23 |
``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL patterns, meaning developers |
| 24 |
do not need to change other code when making changes to URLs. |
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python |
| 27 |
path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the |
| 28 |
module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the |
| 29 |
resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those |
| 30 |
side effects will occur. |
| 31 |
|
| 32 |
Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code |
| 33 |
execution, given the following conditions: |
| 34 |
|
| 35 |
1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user |
| 36 |
input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating |
| 37 |
where to redirect upon successful completion of an action). |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the |
| 40 |
server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side |
| 41 |
effects on importing. |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted |
| 44 |
paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL |
| 45 |
pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules |
| 46 |
the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported. |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token |
| 49 |
================================================== |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system |
| 52 |
for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks |
| 53 |
</ref/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce |
| 54 |
sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future |
| 55 |
requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the |
| 56 |
form. |
| 57 |
|
| 58 |
The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to |
| 59 |
anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients. |
| 60 |
|
| 61 |
When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which |
| 62 |
did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the |
| 63 |
CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who |
| 64 |
do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a |
| 65 |
valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for |
| 66 |
the cookie. |
| 67 |
|
| 68 |
To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such |
| 69 |
responses. The heuristic for this will be: |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and |
| 72 |
|
| 73 |
2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and |
| 74 |
|
| 75 |
3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the |
| 76 |
response will not be cached. |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
MySQL typecasting |
| 79 |
================= |
| 80 |
|
| 81 |
The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for |
| 82 |
example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using |
| 83 |
a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first |
| 84 |
silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that. |
| 85 |
|
| 86 |
If a query is performed without first converting values to the |
| 87 |
appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what |
| 88 |
would occur if the query itself had been manipulated. |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most |
| 91 |
such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the |
| 92 |
correct database-level type before querying. However, three model |
| 93 |
field classes did not correctly convert their arguments: |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField` |
| 96 |
* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField` |
| 97 |
* ``IPAddressField`` |
| 98 |
|
| 99 |
These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the |
| 100 |
correct types before querying. |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via |
| 103 |
documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform |
| 104 |
appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw() |
| 105 |
<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra() |
| 106 |
<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the |
| 107 |
developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they |
| 108 |
perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries. |