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docs/releases/1.4.11.txt

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1 ===========================
2 Django 1.4.11 release notes
3 ===========================
4
5 *April 21, 2014*
6
7 Django 1.4.11 fixes three security issues in 1.4.10. Additionally,
8 Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has been
9 upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1).
10
11 Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
12 =============================================
13
14 Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
15 (representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
16 consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
17 determine the appropriate view to invoke.
18
19 Django also provides a convenience function -- ``reverse()`` -- which performs
20 this process in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
21 information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that view. Use
22 of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers, as the output of
23 ``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL patterns, meaning developers
24 do not need to change other code when making changes to URLs.
25
26 One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
27 path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
28 module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
29 resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
30 side effects will occur.
31
32 Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
33 execution, given the following conditions:
34
35 1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
36 input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
37 where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
38
39 2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
40 server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
41 effects on importing.
42
43 To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
44 paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
45 pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
46 the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
47
48 Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
49 ==================================================
50
51 Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
52 for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
53 </ref/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
54 sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
55 requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
56 form.
57
58 The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
59 anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
60
61 When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
62 did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
63 CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
64 do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
65 valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
66 the cookie.
67
68 To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
69 responses. The heuristic for this will be:
70
71 1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
72
73 2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
74
75 3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
76 response will not be cached.
77
78 MySQL typecasting
79 =================
80
81 The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
82 example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
83 a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
84 silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
85
86 If a query is performed without first converting values to the
87 appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
88 would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
89
90 Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
91 such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
92 correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
93 field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
94
95 * :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
96 * :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
97 * ``IPAddressField``
98
99 These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
100 correct types before querying.
101
102 Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
103 documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
104 appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
105 <django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
106 <django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
107 developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
108 perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.