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1 .TH TCPD 8
2 .SH NAME
3 tcpd \- access control facility for internet services
4 .SH DESCRIPTION
5 .PP
6 The \fItcpd\fR program can be set up to monitor incoming requests for
7 \fItelnet\fR, \fIfinger\fR, \fIftp\fR, \fIexec\fR, \fIrsh\fR,
8 \fIrlogin\fR, \fItftp\fR, \fItalk\fR, \fIcomsat\fR and other services
9 that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files.
10 .PP
11 The program supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style
12 TLI. Functionality may be limited when the protocol underneath TLI is
13 not an internet protocol.
14 .PP
15 There are two possible modes of operation: execution of \fItcpd\fP
16 before a service started by \fIinetd\fP, or linking a daemon with
17 the \fIlibwrap\fP shared library as documented in the \fIhosts_access\fR(3)
18 manual page. Operation when started by \fIinetd\fP
19 is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the
20 \fIinetd\fP daemon is tricked into running the \fItcpd\fP program
21 instead of the desired server. \fItcpd\fP logs the request and does
22 some additional checks. When all is well, \fItcpd\fP runs the
23 appropriate server program and goes away.
24 .PP
25 Optional features are: pattern-based access control, client username
26 lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection against hosts that
27 pretend to have someone elses host name, and protection against hosts
28 that pretend to have someone elses network address.
29 .SH LOGGING
30 Connections that are monitored by
31 .I tcpd
32 are reported through the \fIsyslog\fR(3) facility. Each record contains
33 a time stamp, the client host name and the name of the requested
34 service. The information can be useful to detect unwanted activities,
35 especially when logfile information from several hosts is merged.
36 .PP
37 In order to find out where your logs are going, examine the syslog
38 configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf.
39 .SH ACCESS CONTROL
40 Optionally,
41 .I tcpd
42 supports a simple form of access control that is based on pattern
43 matching. The access-control software provides hooks for the execution
44 of shell commands when a pattern fires. For details, see the
45 \fIhosts_access\fR(5) manual page.
46 .SH HOST NAME VERIFICATION
47 The authentication scheme of some protocols (\fIrlogin, rsh\fR) relies
48 on host names. Some implementations believe the host name that they get
49 from any random name server; other implementations are more careful but
50 use a flawed algorithm.
51 .PP
52 .I tcpd
53 verifies the client host name that is returned by the address->name DNS
54 server by looking at the host name and address that are returned by the
55 name->address DNS server. If any discrepancy is detected,
56 .I tcpd
57 concludes that it is dealing with a host that pretends to have someone
58 elses host name.
59 .PP
60 If the sources are compiled with -DPARANOID,
61 .I tcpd
62 will drop the connection in case of a host name/address mismatch.
63 Otherwise, the hostname can be matched with the \fIPARANOID\fR wildcard,
64 after which suitable action can be taken.
65 .SH HOST ADDRESS SPOOFING
66 Optionally,
67 .I tcpd
68 disables source-routing socket options on every connection that it
69 deals with. This will take care of most attacks from hosts that pretend
70 to have an address that belongs to someone elses network. UDP services
71 do not benefit from this protection. This feature must be turned on
72 at compile time.
73 .SH RFC 931
74 When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time option) \fItcpd\fR
75 will attempt to establish the name of the client user. This will
76 succeed only if the client host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon.
77 Client user name lookups will not work for datagram-oriented
78 connections, and may cause noticeable delays in the case of connections
79 from PCs.
80 .SH EXAMPLES
81 The details of using \fItcpd\fR depend on pathname information that was
82 compiled into the program.
83 .SH EXAMPLE 1
84 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the original network
85 daemons will be moved to an "other" place.
86 .PP
87 In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, move the
88 original finger daemon to the "other" place and install tcpd in the
89 place of the original finger daemon. No changes are required to
90 configuration files.
91 .nf
92 .sp
93 .in +5
94 # mkdir /other/place
95 # mv /usr/sbin/in.fingerd /other/place
96 # cp tcpd /usr/sbin/in.fingerd
97 .fi
98 .PP
99 The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/sbin. On some
100 systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
101 no `in.\' prefix to their name.
102 .SH EXAMPLE 2
103 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
104 are left in their original place.
105 .PP
106 In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, perform the
107 following edits on the \fIinetd\fR configuration file (usually
108 \fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR):
109 .nf
110 .sp
111 .ti +5
112 finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/in.fingerd in.fingerd
113 .sp
114 becomes:
115 .sp
116 .ti +5
117 finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd
118 .sp
119 .fi
120 .PP
121 The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/sbin. On some
122 systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
123 daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
124 field in the inetd configuration file.
125 .PP
126 Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
127 covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
128 process to make the changes effective.
129 .SH EXAMPLE 3
130 In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
131 or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
132 specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
133 .nf
134 .sp
135 ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
136 .sp
137 .fi
138 .PP
139 Only the last component (ntalkd) of the pathname will be used for
140 access control and logging.
141 .SH BUGS
142 Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a while after they have
143 finished their work, in case another request comes in. In the inetd
144 configuration file these services are registered with the \fIwait\fR
145 option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be logged.
146 .PP
147 The program does not work with RPC services over TCP. These services
148 are registered as \fIrpc/tcp\fR in the inetd configuration file. The
149 only non-trivial service that is affected by this limitation is
150 \fIrexd\fR, which is used by the \fIon(1)\fR command. This is no great
151 loss. On most systems, \fIrexd\fR is less secure than a wildcard in
152 /etc/hosts.equiv.
153 .PP
154 RPC broadcast requests (for example: \fIrwall, rup, rusers\fR) always
155 appear to come from the responding host. What happens is that the
156 client broadcasts the request to all \fIportmap\fR daemons on its
157 network; each \fIportmap\fR daemon forwards the request to a local
158 daemon. As far as the \fIrwall\fR etc. daemons know, the request comes
159 from the local host.
160 .SH FILES
161 .PP
162 The default locations of the host access control tables are:
163 .PP
164 /etc/hosts.allow
165 .br
166 /etc/hosts.deny
167 .SH SEE ALSO
168 .na
169 .nf
170 hosts_access(3), functions provided by the libwrap library.
171 hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables.
172 syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file.
173 inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file.
174 .SH AUTHORS
175 .na
176 .nf
177 Wietse Venema ([email protected]),
178 Department of Mathematics and Computing Science,
179 Eindhoven University of Technology
180 Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
181 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
182 \" @(#) tcpd.8 1.5 96/02/21 16:39:16