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.\" ======================================================================== |
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.\" |
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.IX Title "PROXY-CERTIFICATES 7SSL" |
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.TH PROXY-CERTIFICATES 7SSL 2026-04-07 3.6.2 OpenSSL |
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.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
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.if n .ad l |
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.nh |
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.SH NAME |
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proxy\-certificates \- Proxy certificates in OpenSSL |
| 65 |
.SH DESCRIPTION |
| 66 |
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" |
| 67 |
Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are used to |
| 68 |
extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or |
| 69 |
sometimes to the user itself). This allows the entity to perform |
| 70 |
operations on behalf of the owner of the EE (End Entity) certificate. |
| 71 |
.PP |
| 72 |
The requirements for a valid proxy certificate are: |
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.IP \(bu 4 |
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They are issued by an End Entity, either a normal EE certificate, or |
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another proxy certificate. |
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.IP \(bu 4 |
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They must not have the \fBsubjectAltName\fR or \fBissuerAltName\fR |
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extensions. |
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.IP \(bu 4 |
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They must have the \fBproxyCertInfo\fR extension. |
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.IP \(bu 4 |
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They must have the subject of their issuer, with one \fBcommonName\fR |
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added. |
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.SS "Enabling proxy certificate verification" |
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.IX Subsection "Enabling proxy certificate verification" |
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OpenSSL expects applications that want to use proxy certificates to be |
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specially aware of them, and make that explicit. This is done by |
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setting an X509 verification flag: |
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.PP |
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.Vb 1 |
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\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); |
| 92 |
.Ve |
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.PP |
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or |
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.PP |
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.Vb 1 |
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\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); |
| 98 |
.Ve |
| 99 |
.PP |
| 100 |
See "NOTES" for a discussion on this requirement. |
| 101 |
.SS "Creating proxy certificates" |
| 102 |
.IX Subsection "Creating proxy certificates" |
| 103 |
Creating proxy certificates can be done using the \fBopenssl\-x509\fR\|(1) |
| 104 |
command, with some extra extensions: |
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.PP |
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.Vb 7 |
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\& [ proxy ] |
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\& # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate. |
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\& basicConstraints = CA:FALSE |
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\& # Usual authority key ID |
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\& authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer:always |
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\& # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy |
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\& proxyCertInfo = critical,language:id\-ppl\-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB |
| 114 |
.Ve |
| 115 |
.PP |
| 116 |
It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section: |
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.PP |
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.Vb 1 |
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\& proxyCertInfo = critical,@proxy_ext |
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\& |
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\& [ proxy_ext ] |
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\& language = id\-ppl\-anyLanguage |
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\& pathlen = 0 |
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\& policy = text:BC |
| 125 |
.Ve |
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.PP |
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The policy value has a specific syntax, \fIsyntag\fR:\fIstring\fR, where the |
| 128 |
\&\fIsyntag\fR determines what will be done with the string. The following |
| 129 |
\&\fIsyntag\fRs are recognised: |
| 130 |
.IP \fBtext\fR 4 |
| 131 |
.IX Item "text" |
| 132 |
indicates that the string is a byte sequence, without any encoding: |
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.Sp |
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.Vb 1 |
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\& policy=text:räksmörgås |
| 136 |
.Ve |
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.IP \fBhex\fR 4 |
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.IX Item "hex" |
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indicates the string is encoded hexadecimal encoded binary data, with |
| 140 |
colons between each byte (every second hex digit): |
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.Sp |
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.Vb 1 |
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\& policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73 |
| 144 |
.Ve |
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.IP \fBfile\fR 4 |
| 146 |
.IX Item "file" |
| 147 |
indicates that the text of the policy should be taken from a file. |
| 148 |
The string is then a filename. This is useful for policies that are |
| 149 |
more than a few lines, such as XML or other markup. |
| 150 |
.PP |
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Note that the proxy policy value is what determines the rights granted |
| 152 |
to the process during the proxy certificate, and it is up to the |
| 153 |
application to interpret and combine these policies.> |
| 154 |
.PP |
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With a proxy extension, creating a proxy certificate is a matter of |
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two commands: |
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.PP |
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.Vb 3 |
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\& openssl req \-new \-config proxy.cnf \e |
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\& \-out proxy.req \-keyout proxy.key \e |
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\& \-subj "/DC=org/DC=openssl/DC=users/CN=proxy" |
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\& |
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\& openssl x509 \-req \-CAcreateserial \-in proxy.req \-out proxy.crt \e |
| 164 |
\& \-CA user.crt \-CAkey user.key \-days 7 \e |
| 165 |
\& \-extfile proxy.cnf \-extensions proxy |
| 166 |
.Ve |
| 167 |
.PP |
| 168 |
You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy |
| 169 |
certificate as issuer. Note that this example uses a different |
| 170 |
configuration section for the proxy extensions: |
| 171 |
.PP |
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.Vb 3 |
| 173 |
\& openssl req \-new \-config proxy.cnf \e |
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\& \-out proxy2.req \-keyout proxy2.key \e |
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\& \-subj "/DC=org/DC=openssl/DC=users/CN=proxy/CN=proxy 2" |
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\& |
| 177 |
\& openssl x509 \-req \-CAcreateserial \-in proxy2.req \-out proxy2.crt \e |
| 178 |
\& \-CA proxy.crt \-CAkey proxy.key \-days 7 \e |
| 179 |
\& \-extfile proxy.cnf \-extensions proxy_2 |
| 180 |
.Ve |
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.SS "Using proxy certs in applications" |
| 182 |
.IX Subsection "Using proxy certs in applications" |
| 183 |
To interpret proxy policies, the application would normally start with |
| 184 |
some default rights (perhaps none at all), then compute the resulting |
| 185 |
rights by checking the rights against the chain of proxy certificates, |
| 186 |
user certificate and CA certificates. |
| 187 |
.PP |
| 188 |
The complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your |
| 189 |
application and the certificate validation procedure. |
| 190 |
.PP |
| 191 |
The following ingredients are needed for such processing: |
| 192 |
.IP \(bu 4 |
| 193 |
a callback function that will be called for every certificate being |
| 194 |
validated. The callback is called several times for each certificate, |
| 195 |
so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the |
| 196 |
right time. You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE |
| 197 |
certificate is checked. |
| 198 |
.IP \(bu 4 |
| 199 |
a data structure that is shared between your application code and the |
| 200 |
callback. |
| 201 |
.IP \(bu 4 |
| 202 |
a wrapper function that sets it all up. |
| 203 |
.IP \(bu 4 |
| 204 |
an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic |
| 205 |
ex_data store that is attached to an X509 validation context. |
| 206 |
.PP |
| 207 |
The following skeleton code can be used as a starting point: |
| 208 |
.PP |
| 209 |
.Vb 4 |
| 210 |
\& #include <string.h> |
| 211 |
\& #include <netdb.h> |
| 212 |
\& #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 213 |
\& #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 214 |
\& |
| 215 |
\& #define total_rights 25 |
| 216 |
\& |
| 217 |
\& /* |
| 218 |
\& * In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit |
| 219 |
\& * array, one bit for each possible right. |
| 220 |
\& */ |
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\& typedef struct your_rights { |
| 222 |
\& unsigned char rights[(total_rights + 7) / 8]; |
| 223 |
\& } YOUR_RIGHTS; |
| 224 |
\& |
| 225 |
\& /* |
| 226 |
\& * The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data |
| 227 |
\& * store in the X509 validation context the first time it\*(Aqs |
| 228 |
\& * called. Subsequent calls will return the same index. |
| 229 |
\& */ |
| 230 |
\& static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 231 |
\& { |
| 232 |
\& static volatile int idx = \-1; |
| 233 |
\& |
| 234 |
\& if (idx < 0) { |
| 235 |
\& X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx)); |
| 236 |
\& if (idx < 0) { |
| 237 |
\& idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, |
| 238 |
\& "for verify callback", |
| 239 |
\& NULL,NULL,NULL); |
| 240 |
\& } |
| 241 |
\& X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx)); |
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\& } |
| 243 |
\& return idx; |
| 244 |
\& } |
| 245 |
\& |
| 246 |
\& /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */ |
| 247 |
\& static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 248 |
\& { |
| 249 |
\& if (ok == 1) { |
| 250 |
\& /* |
| 251 |
\& * It\*(Aqs REALLY important you keep the proxy policy check |
| 252 |
\& * within this section. It\*(Aqs important to know that when |
| 253 |
\& * ok is 1, the certificates are checked from top to |
| 254 |
\& * bottom. You get the CA root first, followed by the |
| 255 |
\& * possible chain of intermediate CAs, followed by the EE |
| 256 |
\& * certificate, followed by the possible proxy |
| 257 |
\& * certificates. |
| 258 |
\& */ |
| 259 |
\& X509 *xs = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); |
| 260 |
\& |
| 261 |
\& if (X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| 262 |
\& YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = |
| 263 |
\& (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, |
| 264 |
\& get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx)); |
| 265 |
\& PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = |
| 266 |
\& X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL); |
| 267 |
\& |
| 268 |
\& switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci\->proxyPolicy\->policyLanguage)) { |
| 269 |
\& case NID_Independent: |
| 270 |
\& /* |
| 271 |
\& * Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights |
| 272 |
\& * to this particular proxy certificate, usually |
| 273 |
\& * by pulling them from some database. If there |
| 274 |
\& * are none to be found, clear all rights (making |
| 275 |
\& * this and any subsequent proxy certificate void |
| 276 |
\& * of any rights). |
| 277 |
\& */ |
| 278 |
\& memset(rights\->rights, 0, sizeof(rights\->rights)); |
| 279 |
\& break; |
| 280 |
\& case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll: |
| 281 |
\& /* |
| 282 |
\& * This is basically a NOP, we simply let the |
| 283 |
\& * current rights stand as they are. |
| 284 |
\& */ |
| 285 |
\& break; |
| 286 |
\& default: |
| 287 |
\& /* |
| 288 |
\& * This is usually the most complex section of |
| 289 |
\& * code. You really do whatever you want as long |
| 290 |
\& * as you follow RFC 3820. In the example we use |
| 291 |
\& * here, the simplest thing to do is to build |
| 292 |
\& * another, temporary bit array and fill it with |
| 293 |
\& * the rights granted by the current proxy |
| 294 |
\& * certificate, then use it as a mask on the |
| 295 |
\& * accumulated rights bit array, and voilà, you |
| 296 |
\& * now have a new accumulated rights bit array. |
| 297 |
\& */ |
| 298 |
\& { |
| 299 |
\& int i; |
| 300 |
\& YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights; |
| 301 |
\& memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, |
| 302 |
\& sizeof(tmp_rights.rights)); |
| 303 |
\& |
| 304 |
\& /* |
| 305 |
\& * process_rights() is supposed to be a |
| 306 |
\& * procedure that takes a string and its |
| 307 |
\& * length, interprets it and sets the bits |
| 308 |
\& * in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed at by the |
| 309 |
\& * third argument. |
| 310 |
\& */ |
| 311 |
\& process_rights((char *) pci\->proxyPolicy\->policy\->data, |
| 312 |
\& pci\->proxyPolicy\->policy\->length, |
| 313 |
\& &tmp_rights); |
| 314 |
\& |
| 315 |
\& for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++) |
| 316 |
\& rights\->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i]; |
| 317 |
\& } |
| 318 |
\& break; |
| 319 |
\& } |
| 320 |
\& PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
| 321 |
\& } else if (!(X509_get_extension_flags(xs) & EXFLAG_CA)) { |
| 322 |
\& /* We have an EE certificate, let\*(Aqs use it to set default! */ |
| 323 |
\& YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = |
| 324 |
\& (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, |
| 325 |
\& get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx)); |
| 326 |
\& |
| 327 |
\& /* |
| 328 |
\& * The following procedure finds out what rights the |
| 329 |
\& * owner of the current certificate has, and sets them |
| 330 |
\& * in the YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the |
| 331 |
\& * second argument. |
| 332 |
\& */ |
| 333 |
\& set_default_rights(xs, rights); |
| 334 |
\& } |
| 335 |
\& } |
| 336 |
\& return ok; |
| 337 |
\& } |
| 338 |
\& |
| 339 |
\& static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 340 |
\& YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights) |
| 341 |
\& { |
| 342 |
\& int ok; |
| 343 |
\& int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) = |
| 344 |
\& X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx); |
| 345 |
\& YOUR_RIGHTS rights; |
| 346 |
\& |
| 347 |
\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback); |
| 348 |
\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(ctx), |
| 349 |
\& &rights); |
| 350 |
\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); |
| 351 |
\& ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); |
| 352 |
\& |
| 353 |
\& if (ok == 1) { |
| 354 |
\& ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights); |
| 355 |
\& } |
| 356 |
\& |
| 357 |
\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb); |
| 358 |
\& |
| 359 |
\& return ok; |
| 360 |
\& } |
| 361 |
.Ve |
| 362 |
.PP |
| 363 |
If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the |
| 364 |
certificates checked properly, using the code above: |
| 365 |
.PP |
| 366 |
.Vb 2 |
| 367 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, |
| 368 |
\& &needed_rights); |
| 369 |
.Ve |
| 370 |
.SH NOTES |
| 371 |
.IX Header "NOTES" |
| 372 |
To this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in |
| 373 |
environments that are aware of them, and no one seems to have |
| 374 |
investigated how they can be used or misused outside of such an |
| 375 |
environment. |
| 376 |
.PP |
| 377 |
For that reason, OpenSSL requires that applications aware of proxy |
| 378 |
certificates must also make that explicit. |
| 379 |
.PP |
| 380 |
\&\fBsubjectAltName\fR and \fBissuerAltName\fR are forbidden in proxy |
| 381 |
certificates, and this is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be |
| 382 |
the same as the issuer, with one commonName added on. |
| 383 |
.SH "SEE ALSO" |
| 384 |
.IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
| 385 |
\&\fBX509_STORE_CTX_set_flags\fR\|(3), |
| 386 |
\&\fBX509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb\fR\|(3), |
| 387 |
\&\fBX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags\fR\|(3), |
| 388 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3), |
| 389 |
\&\fBopenssl\-req\fR\|(1), \fBopenssl\-x509\fR\|(1), |
| 390 |
RFC 3820 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3820> |
| 391 |
.SH COPYRIGHT |
| 392 |
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" |
| 393 |
Copyright 2019\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 394 |
.PP |
| 395 |
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 396 |
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 397 |
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 398 |
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |