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.\" ======================================================================== |
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.IX Title "DES_MODES 7SSL" |
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.TH DES_MODES 7SSL 2026-04-07 3.6.2 OpenSSL |
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.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
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.if n .ad l |
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.nh |
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.SH NAME |
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des_modes \- the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL |
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.SH DESCRIPTION |
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.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" |
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Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those |
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are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among |
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other things. |
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.SH OVERVIEW |
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.IX Header "OVERVIEW" |
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.SS "Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)" |
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.IX Subsection "Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_ecb_encrypt()\fR. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block |
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(for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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An error will only affect one ciphertext block. |
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.SS "Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)" |
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.IX Subsection "Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_cbc_encrypt()\fR. |
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Be aware that \fBdes_cbc_encrypt()\fR is not really DES CBC (it does |
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not update the IV); use \fBdes_ncbc_encrypt()\fR instead. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
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plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the |
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current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not |
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be rearranged. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
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enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. |
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.SS "Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)" |
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.IX Subsection "Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_cfb_encrypt()\fR. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
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plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the |
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current and all preceding variables and therefore j\-bit variables are |
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chained together and can not be rearranged. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
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enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if |
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j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
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the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
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greater processing overheads. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. |
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.SS "Output Feedback Mode (OFB)" |
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.IX Subsection "Output Feedback Mode (OFB)" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_ofb_encrypt()\fR. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
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plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More |
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over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same |
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key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons |
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a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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The use of different start variables values prevents the same |
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plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different |
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key streams. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
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the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
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greater processing overheads. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the |
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resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes |
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only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of |
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encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs |
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to be re-initialized. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable |
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different from the start variable values used before with the same |
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key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be |
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produced each time from the same parameters. This would be |
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susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. |
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.SS "Triple ECB Mode" |
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.IX Subsection "Triple ECB Mode" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_ecb3_encrypt()\fR. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. |
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There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective |
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key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of |
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memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with |
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just one key. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. |
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There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength |
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to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal |
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ecb mode. |
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.SS "Triple CBC Mode" |
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.IX Subsection "Triple CBC Mode" |
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Normally, this is found as the function \fIalgorithm\fR\fB_ede3_cbc_encrypt()\fR. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. |
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.IP \(bu 2 |
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As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with |
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the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. |
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.SH NOTES |
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.IX Header "NOTES" |
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This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original |
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documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed |
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it to: |
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.PP |
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.Vb 5 |
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\& AS 2805.5.2 |
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\& Australian Standard |
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\& Electronic funds transfer \- Requirements for interfaces, |
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\& Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n\-bit block cipher algorithm |
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\& Appendix A |
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.Ve |
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.SH "SEE ALSO" |
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.IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
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\&\fBBF_encrypt\fR\|(3), \fBDES_crypt\fR\|(3) |
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.SH COPYRIGHT |
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.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" |
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Copyright 2000\-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
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.PP |
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Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
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this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
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in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
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<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |