| 1 |
.\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*- |
| 2 |
.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 5.0102 (Pod::Simple 3.45) |
| 3 |
.\" |
| 4 |
.\" Standard preamble: |
| 5 |
.\" ======================================================================== |
| 6 |
.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) |
| 7 |
.if t .sp .5v |
| 8 |
.if n .sp |
| 9 |
.. |
| 10 |
.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text |
| 11 |
.ft CW |
| 12 |
.nf |
| 13 |
.ne \\$1 |
| 14 |
.. |
| 15 |
.de Ve \" End verbatim text |
| 16 |
.ft R |
| 17 |
.fi |
| 18 |
.. |
| 19 |
.\" \*(C` and \*(C' are quotes in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>. |
| 20 |
.ie n \{\ |
| 21 |
. ds C` "" |
| 22 |
. ds C' "" |
| 23 |
'br\} |
| 24 |
.el\{\ |
| 25 |
. ds C` |
| 26 |
. ds C' |
| 27 |
'br\} |
| 28 |
.\" |
| 29 |
.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform. |
| 30 |
.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq |
| 31 |
.el .ds Aq ' |
| 32 |
.\" |
| 33 |
.\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for |
| 34 |
.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index |
| 35 |
.\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the |
| 36 |
.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion. |
| 37 |
.\" |
| 38 |
.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'. |
| 39 |
.de IX |
| 40 |
.. |
| 41 |
.nr rF 0 |
| 42 |
.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1 |
| 43 |
.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{\ |
| 44 |
. if \nF \{\ |
| 45 |
. de IX |
| 46 |
. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" |
| 47 |
.. |
| 48 |
. if !\nF==2 \{\ |
| 49 |
. nr % 0 |
| 50 |
. nr F 2 |
| 51 |
. \} |
| 52 |
. \} |
| 53 |
.\} |
| 54 |
.rr rF |
| 55 |
.\" ======================================================================== |
| 56 |
.\" |
| 57 |
.IX Title "EVP_RAND 7SSL" |
| 58 |
.TH EVP_RAND 7SSL 2026-04-07 3.6.2 OpenSSL |
| 59 |
.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
| 60 |
.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
| 61 |
.if n .ad l |
| 62 |
.nh |
| 63 |
.SH NAME |
| 64 |
EVP_RAND \- the random bit generator |
| 65 |
.SH SYNOPSIS |
| 66 |
.IX Header "SYNOPSIS" |
| 67 |
.Vb 2 |
| 68 |
\& #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 69 |
\& #include <rand.h> |
| 70 |
.Ve |
| 71 |
.SH DESCRIPTION |
| 72 |
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" |
| 73 |
The default OpenSSL RAND method is based on the EVP_RAND classes to provide |
| 74 |
non-deterministic inputs to other cryptographic algorithms. |
| 75 |
.PP |
| 76 |
While the RAND API is the 'frontend' which is intended to be used by |
| 77 |
application developers for obtaining random bytes, the EVP_RAND API |
| 78 |
serves as the 'backend', connecting the former with the operating |
| 79 |
systems's entropy sources and providing access to deterministic random |
| 80 |
bit generators (DRBG) and their configuration parameters. |
| 81 |
A DRBG is a certain type of cryptographically-secure pseudo-random |
| 82 |
number generator (CSPRNG), which is described in |
| 83 |
[NIST SP 800\-90A Rev. 1]. |
| 84 |
.SS Disclaimer |
| 85 |
.IX Subsection "Disclaimer" |
| 86 |
Unless you have very specific requirements for your random generator, |
| 87 |
it is in general not necessary to utilize the EVP_RAND API directly. |
| 88 |
The usual way to obtain random bytes is to use \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) or |
| 89 |
\&\fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3), see also \fBRAND\fR\|(7). |
| 90 |
.SS "Typical Use Cases" |
| 91 |
.IX Subsection "Typical Use Cases" |
| 92 |
Typical examples for such special use cases are the following: |
| 93 |
.IP \(bu 2 |
| 94 |
You want to use your own private DRBG instances. |
| 95 |
Multiple DRBG instances which are accessed only by a single thread provide |
| 96 |
additional security (because their internal states are independent) and |
| 97 |
better scalability in multithreaded applications (because they don't need |
| 98 |
to be locked). |
| 99 |
.IP \(bu 2 |
| 100 |
You need to integrate a previously unsupported entropy source. |
| 101 |
Refer to \fBprovider\-rand\fR\|(7) for the implementation details to support adding |
| 102 |
randomness sources to EVP_RAND. |
| 103 |
.IP \(bu 2 |
| 104 |
You need to change the default settings of the standard OpenSSL RAND |
| 105 |
implementation to meet specific requirements. |
| 106 |
.SH "EVP_RAND CHAINING" |
| 107 |
.IX Header "EVP_RAND CHAINING" |
| 108 |
An EVP_RAND instance can be used as the entropy source of another |
| 109 |
EVP_RAND instance, provided it has itself access to a valid entropy source. |
| 110 |
The EVP_RAND instance which acts as entropy source is called the \fIparent\fR, |
| 111 |
the other instance the \fIchild\fR. Typically, the child will be a DRBG because |
| 112 |
it does not make sense for the child to be an entropy source. |
| 113 |
.PP |
| 114 |
This is called chaining. A chained EVP_RAND instance is created by passing |
| 115 |
a pointer to the parent EVP_RAND_CTX as argument to the \fBEVP_RAND_CTX_new()\fR call. |
| 116 |
It is possible to create chains of more than two DRBG in a row. |
| 117 |
It is also possible to use any EVP_RAND_CTX class as the parent, however, only |
| 118 |
a live entropy source may ignore and not use its parent. |
| 119 |
.SH "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" |
| 120 |
.IX Header "THE THREE SHARED DRBG INSTANCES" |
| 121 |
Currently, there are three shared DRBG instances, |
| 122 |
the <primary>, <public>, and <private> DRBG. |
| 123 |
While the <primary> DRBG is a single global instance, the <public> and <private> |
| 124 |
DRBG are created per thread and accessed through thread-local storage. |
| 125 |
.PP |
| 126 |
By default, the functions \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3) and \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) use |
| 127 |
the thread-local <public> and <private> DRBG instance, respectively. |
| 128 |
.SS "The <primary> DRBG instance" |
| 129 |
.IX Subsection "The <primary> DRBG instance" |
| 130 |
The <primary> DRBG is not used directly by the application, only for reseeding |
| 131 |
the two other two DRBG instances. It reseeds itself by obtaining randomness |
| 132 |
either from os entropy sources or by consuming randomness which was added |
| 133 |
previously by \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3). |
| 134 |
.SS "The <public> DRBG instance" |
| 135 |
.IX Subsection "The <public> DRBG instance" |
| 136 |
This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_bytes\fR\|(3). |
| 137 |
.SS "The <private> DRBG instance" |
| 138 |
.IX Subsection "The <private> DRBG instance" |
| 139 |
This instance is used per default by \fBRAND_priv_bytes\fR\|(3) |
| 140 |
.SH LOCKING |
| 141 |
.IX Header "LOCKING" |
| 142 |
The <primary> DRBG is intended to be accessed concurrently for reseeding |
| 143 |
by its child DRBG instances. The necessary locking is done internally. |
| 144 |
It is \fInot\fR thread-safe to access the <primary> DRBG directly via the |
| 145 |
EVP_RAND interface. |
| 146 |
The <public> and <private> DRBG are thread-local, i.e. there is an |
| 147 |
instance of each per thread. So they can safely be accessed without |
| 148 |
locking via the EVP_RAND interface. |
| 149 |
.PP |
| 150 |
Pointers to these DRBG instances can be obtained using |
| 151 |
\&\fBRAND_get0_primary()\fR, \fBRAND_get0_public()\fR and \fBRAND_get0_private()\fR, respectively. |
| 152 |
Note that it is not allowed to store a pointer to one of the thread-local |
| 153 |
DRBG instances in a variable or other memory location where it will be |
| 154 |
accessed and used by multiple threads. |
| 155 |
.PP |
| 156 |
All other DRBG instances created by an application don't support locking, |
| 157 |
because they are intended to be used by a single thread. |
| 158 |
Instead of accessing a single DRBG instance concurrently from different |
| 159 |
threads, it is recommended to instantiate a separate DRBG instance per |
| 160 |
thread. Using the <primary> DRBG as entropy source for multiple DRBG |
| 161 |
instances on different threads is thread-safe, because the DRBG instance |
| 162 |
will lock the <primary> DRBG automatically for obtaining random input. |
| 163 |
.SH "THE OVERALL PICTURE" |
| 164 |
.IX Header "THE OVERALL PICTURE" |
| 165 |
The following picture gives an overview over how the DRBG instances work |
| 166 |
together and are being used. |
| 167 |
.PP |
| 168 |
.Vb 10 |
| 169 |
\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 170 |
\& | os entropy sources | |
| 171 |
\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 172 |
\& | |
| 173 |
\& v +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 174 |
\& RAND_add() ==> <primary> <\-| shared DRBG (with locking) | |
| 175 |
\& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 176 |
\& / \e +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 177 |
\& <public> <private> <\- | per\-thread DRBG instances | |
| 178 |
\& | | +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 179 |
\& v v |
| 180 |
\& RAND_bytes() RAND_priv_bytes() |
| 181 |
\& | ^ |
| 182 |
\& | | |
| 183 |
\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 184 |
\& | general purpose | | used for secrets like session keys | |
| 185 |
\& | random generator | | and private keys for certificates | |
| 186 |
\& +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ +\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-+ |
| 187 |
.Ve |
| 188 |
.PP |
| 189 |
The usual way to obtain random bytes is to call RAND_bytes(...) or |
| 190 |
RAND_priv_bytes(...). These calls are roughly equivalent to calling |
| 191 |
EVP_RAND_generate(<public>, ...) and |
| 192 |
EVP_RAND_generate(<private>, ...), |
| 193 |
respectively. |
| 194 |
.SH RESEEDING |
| 195 |
.IX Header "RESEEDING" |
| 196 |
A DRBG instance seeds itself automatically, pulling random input from |
| 197 |
its entropy source. The entropy source can be either a trusted operating |
| 198 |
system entropy source, or another DRBG with access to such a source. |
| 199 |
.PP |
| 200 |
Automatic reseeding occurs after a predefined number of generate requests. |
| 201 |
The selection of the trusted entropy sources is configured at build |
| 202 |
time using the \-\-with\-rand\-seed option. The following sections explain |
| 203 |
the reseeding process in more detail. |
| 204 |
.SS "Automatic Reseeding" |
| 205 |
.IX Subsection "Automatic Reseeding" |
| 206 |
Before satisfying a generate request (\fBEVP_RAND_generate\fR\|(3)), the DRBG |
| 207 |
reseeds itself automatically, if one of the following conditions holds: |
| 208 |
.PP |
| 209 |
\&\- the DRBG was not instantiated (=seeded) yet or has been uninstantiated. |
| 210 |
.PP |
| 211 |
\&\- the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a |
| 212 |
certain threshold, the so called \fIreseed_interval\fR. |
| 213 |
This behaviour can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_interval\fR to 0. |
| 214 |
.PP |
| 215 |
\&\- the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time |
| 216 |
interval, the so called \fIreseed_time_interval\fR. |
| 217 |
This can be disabled by setting the \fIreseed_time_interval\fR to 0. |
| 218 |
.PP |
| 219 |
\&\- the DRBG is in an error state. |
| 220 |
.PP |
| 221 |
\&\fBNote\fR: An error state is entered if the entropy source fails while |
| 222 |
the DRBG is seeding or reseeding. |
| 223 |
The last case ensures that the DRBG automatically recovers |
| 224 |
from the error as soon as the entropy source is available again. |
| 225 |
.SS "Manual Reseeding" |
| 226 |
.IX Subsection "Manual Reseeding" |
| 227 |
In addition to automatic reseeding, the caller can request an immediate |
| 228 |
reseeding of the DRBG with fresh entropy by setting the |
| 229 |
\&\fIprediction resistance\fR parameter to 1 when calling |
| 230 |
\&\fBEVP_RAND_generate\fR\|(3). |
| 231 |
.PP |
| 232 |
The document [NIST SP 800\-90C] describes prediction resistance requests |
| 233 |
in detail and imposes strict conditions on the entropy sources that are |
| 234 |
approved for providing prediction resistance. |
| 235 |
A request for prediction resistance can only be satisfied by pulling fresh |
| 236 |
entropy from a live entropy source (section 5.5.2 of [NIST SP 800\-90C]). |
| 237 |
It is up to the user to ensure that a live entropy source is configured |
| 238 |
and is being used. |
| 239 |
.PP |
| 240 |
For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to |
| 241 |
reseed them manually: |
| 242 |
If \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3) is called with a positive \fIrandomness\fR argument |
| 243 |
(or \fBRAND_seed\fR\|(3)), then this will immediately reseed the <primary> DRBG. |
| 244 |
The <public> and <private> DRBG will detect this on their next generate |
| 245 |
call and reseed, pulling randomness from <primary>. |
| 246 |
.PP |
| 247 |
The last feature has been added to support the common practice used with |
| 248 |
previous OpenSSL versions to call \fBRAND_add()\fR before calling \fBRAND_bytes()\fR. |
| 249 |
.SS "Entropy Input and Additional Data" |
| 250 |
.IX Subsection "Entropy Input and Additional Data" |
| 251 |
The DRBG distinguishes two different types of random input: \fIentropy\fR, |
| 252 |
which comes from a trusted source, and \fIadditional input\fR', |
| 253 |
which can optionally be added by the user and is considered untrusted. |
| 254 |
It is possible to add \fIadditional input\fR not only during reseeding, |
| 255 |
but also for every generate request. |
| 256 |
.SS "Configuring the Random Seed Source" |
| 257 |
.IX Subsection "Configuring the Random Seed Source" |
| 258 |
In most cases OpenSSL will automatically choose a suitable seed source |
| 259 |
for automatically seeding and reseeding its <primary> DRBG. The |
| 260 |
default seed source can be configured when OpenSSL is compiled by |
| 261 |
setting \fB\-DOPENSSL_DEFAULT_SEED_SRC=SEED\-SRC\fR. If not set then |
| 262 |
"SEED-SRC" is used. One can specify a third-party provider seed-source, |
| 263 |
or \fB\-DOPENSSL_DEFAULT_SEED_SRC=JITTER\fR if available. |
| 264 |
.PP |
| 265 |
In some cases however, it will be necessary to explicitly specify a |
| 266 |
seed source used by "SEED-SRC" during configuration, using the |
| 267 |
\&\-\-with\-rand\-seed option. For more information, see the INSTALL |
| 268 |
instructions. There are also operating systems where no seed source is |
| 269 |
available and automatic reseeding is disabled by default. |
| 270 |
.PP |
| 271 |
The following two sections describe the reseeding process of the primary |
| 272 |
DRBG, depending on whether automatic reseeding is available or not. |
| 273 |
.SS "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding enabled" |
| 274 |
.IX Subsection "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding enabled" |
| 275 |
Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR or \fBRAND_add()\fR is not necessary, because the DRBG |
| 276 |
pulls the necessary entropy from its source automatically. |
| 277 |
However, both calls are permitted, and do reseed the RNG. |
| 278 |
.PP |
| 279 |
\&\fBRAND_add()\fR can be used to add both kinds of random input, depending on the |
| 280 |
value of the \fIrandomness\fR argument: |
| 281 |
.IP "randomness == 0:" 4 |
| 282 |
.IX Item "randomness == 0:" |
| 283 |
The random bytes are mixed as additional input into the current state of |
| 284 |
the DRBG. |
| 285 |
Mixing in additional input is not considered a full reseeding, hence the |
| 286 |
reseed counter is not reset. |
| 287 |
.IP "randomness > 0:" 4 |
| 288 |
.IX Item "randomness > 0:" |
| 289 |
The random bytes are used as entropy input for a full reseeding |
| 290 |
(resp. reinstantiation) if the DRBG is instantiated |
| 291 |
(resp. uninstantiated or in an error state). |
| 292 |
The number of random bits required for reseeding is determined by the |
| 293 |
security strength of the DRBG. Currently it defaults to 256 bits (32 bytes). |
| 294 |
It is possible to provide less randomness than required. |
| 295 |
In this case the missing randomness will be obtained by pulling random input |
| 296 |
from the trusted entropy sources. |
| 297 |
.PP |
| 298 |
NOTE: Manual reseeding is *not allowed* in FIPS mode, because |
| 299 |
[NIST SP\-800\-90Ar1] mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided by |
| 300 |
the consuming application for instantiation (Section 9.1) or |
| 301 |
reseeding (Section 9.2). For that reason, the \fIrandomness\fR |
| 302 |
argument is ignored and the random bytes provided by the \fBRAND_add\fR\|(3) and |
| 303 |
\&\fBRAND_seed\fR\|(3) calls are treated as additional data. |
| 304 |
.SS "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding disabled" |
| 305 |
.IX Subsection "Reseeding the primary DRBG with automatic seeding disabled" |
| 306 |
Calling \fBRAND_poll()\fR will always fail. |
| 307 |
.PP |
| 308 |
\&\fBRAND_add()\fR needs to be called for initial seeding and periodic reseeding. |
| 309 |
At least 48 bytes (384 bits) of randomness have to be provided, otherwise |
| 310 |
the (re\-)seeding of the DRBG will fail. This corresponds to one and a half |
| 311 |
times the security strength of the DRBG. The extra half is used for the |
| 312 |
nonce during instantiation. |
| 313 |
.PP |
| 314 |
More precisely, the number of bytes needed for seeding depend on the |
| 315 |
\&\fIsecurity strength\fR of the DRBG, which is set to 256 by default. |
| 316 |
.SH "SEE ALSO" |
| 317 |
.IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
| 318 |
\&\fBRAND\fR\|(7), \fBEVP_RAND\fR\|(3) |
| 319 |
.SH HISTORY |
| 320 |
.IX Header "HISTORY" |
| 321 |
This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0. |
| 322 |
.SH COPYRIGHT |
| 323 |
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" |
| 324 |
Copyright 2017\-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 325 |
.PP |
| 326 |
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 327 |
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 328 |
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 329 |
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |