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.\" ======================================================================== |
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.\" |
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.IX Title "OSSL-GUIDE-TLS-SERVER-BLOCK 7SSL" |
| 58 |
.TH OSSL-GUIDE-TLS-SERVER-BLOCK 7SSL 2026-04-07 3.6.2 OpenSSL |
| 59 |
.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
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.if n .ad l |
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.nh |
| 63 |
.SH NAME |
| 64 |
ossl\-guide\-tls\-server\-block |
| 65 |
\&\- OpenSSL Guide: Writing a simple blocking TLS server |
| 66 |
.SH "SIMPLE BLOCKING TLS SERVER EXAMPLE" |
| 67 |
.IX Header "SIMPLE BLOCKING TLS SERVER EXAMPLE" |
| 68 |
This page will present various source code samples demonstrating how to write a |
| 69 |
simple, non-concurrent, TLS "echo" server application which accepts one client |
| 70 |
connection at a time, echoing input from the client back to the same client. |
| 71 |
Once the current client disconnects, the next client connection is accepted. |
| 72 |
.PP |
| 73 |
Both the acceptor socket and client connections are "blocking". A more typical |
| 74 |
server might use nonblocking sockets with an event loop and callbacks for I/O |
| 75 |
events. |
| 76 |
.PP |
| 77 |
The complete source code for this example blocking TLS server is available in |
| 78 |
the \fBdemos/guide\fR directory of the OpenSSL source distribution in the file |
| 79 |
\&\fBtls\-server\-block.c\fR. It is also available online at |
| 80 |
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/demos/guide/tls\-server\-block.c>. |
| 81 |
.PP |
| 82 |
We assume that you already have OpenSSL installed on your system; that you |
| 83 |
already have some fundamental understanding of OpenSSL concepts and TLS (see |
| 84 |
\&\fBossl\-guide\-libraries\-introduction\fR\|(7) and \fBossl\-guide\-tls\-introduction\fR\|(7)); |
| 85 |
and that you know how to write and build C code and link it against the |
| 86 |
libcrypto and libssl libraries that are provided by OpenSSL. It also assumes |
| 87 |
that you have a basic understanding of TCP/IP and sockets. |
| 88 |
.SS "Creating the SSL_CTX and SSL objects" |
| 89 |
.IX Subsection "Creating the SSL_CTX and SSL objects" |
| 90 |
The first step is to create an \fBSSL_CTX\fR object for our server. We use the |
| 91 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_new\fR\|(3) function for this purpose. We could alternatively use |
| 92 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_new_ex\fR\|(3) if we want to associate the \fBSSL_CTX\fR with a particular |
| 93 |
\&\fBOSSL_LIB_CTX\fR (see \fBossl\-guide\-libraries\-introduction\fR\|(7) to learn about |
| 94 |
\&\fBOSSL_LIB_CTX\fR). We pass as an argument the return value of the function |
| 95 |
\&\fBTLS_server_method\fR\|(3). You should use this method whenever you are writing a |
| 96 |
TLS server. This method will automatically use TLS version negotiation to select |
| 97 |
the highest version of the protocol that is mutually supported by both the |
| 98 |
server and the client. |
| 99 |
.PP |
| 100 |
.Vb 9 |
| 101 |
\& /* |
| 102 |
\& * An SSL_CTX holds shared configuration information for multiple |
| 103 |
\& * subsequent per\-client SSL connections. |
| 104 |
\& */ |
| 105 |
\& ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); |
| 106 |
\& if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 107 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 108 |
\& errx(res, "Failed to create server SSL_CTX"); |
| 109 |
\& } |
| 110 |
.Ve |
| 111 |
.PP |
| 112 |
We would also like to restrict the TLS versions that we are willing to accept to |
| 113 |
TLSv1.2 or above. TLS protocol versions earlier than that are generally to be |
| 114 |
avoided where possible. We can do that using |
| 115 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version\fR\|(3): |
| 116 |
.PP |
| 117 |
.Vb 9 |
| 118 |
\& /* |
| 119 |
\& * TLS versions older than TLS 1.2 are deprecated by IETF and SHOULD |
| 120 |
\& * be avoided if possible. |
| 121 |
\& */ |
| 122 |
\& if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION)) { |
| 123 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 124 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 125 |
\& errx(res, "Failed to set the minimum TLS protocol version"); |
| 126 |
\& } |
| 127 |
.Ve |
| 128 |
.PP |
| 129 |
Next we configure some option flags, see \fBSSL_CTX_set_options\fR\|(3) for details: |
| 130 |
.PP |
| 131 |
.Vb 6 |
| 132 |
\& /* |
| 133 |
\& * Tolerate clients hanging up without a TLS "shutdown". Appropriate in all |
| 134 |
\& * application protocols which perform their own message "framing", and |
| 135 |
\& * don\*(Aqt rely on TLS to defend against "truncation" attacks. |
| 136 |
\& */ |
| 137 |
\& opts = SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF; |
| 138 |
\& |
| 139 |
\& /* |
| 140 |
\& * Block potential CPU\-exhaustion attacks by clients that request frequent |
| 141 |
\& * renegotiation. This is of course only effective if there are existing |
| 142 |
\& * limits on initial full TLS handshake or connection rates. |
| 143 |
\& */ |
| 144 |
\& opts |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION; |
| 145 |
\& |
| 146 |
\& /* |
| 147 |
\& * Most servers elect to use their own cipher, group or signature preference |
| 148 |
\& * rather than that of the client. |
| 149 |
\& */ |
| 150 |
\& opts |= SSL_OP_SERVER_PREFERENCE; |
| 151 |
\& |
| 152 |
\& /* Apply the selection options */ |
| 153 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, opts); |
| 154 |
.Ve |
| 155 |
.PP |
| 156 |
Servers need a private key and certificate. Though anonymous ciphers (no |
| 157 |
server certificate) are possible in TLS 1.2, they are rarely applicable, and |
| 158 |
are not currently defined for TLS 1.3. Additional intermediate issuer CA |
| 159 |
certificates are often also required, and both the server (end-entity or EE) |
| 160 |
certificate and the issuer ("chain") certificates are most easily configured in |
| 161 |
a single "chain file". Below we load such a chain file (the EE certificate |
| 162 |
must appear first), and then load the corresponding private key, checking that |
| 163 |
it matches the server certificate. No checks are performed to check the |
| 164 |
integrity of the chain (CA signatures or certificate expiration dates, for |
| 165 |
example). |
| 166 |
.PP |
| 167 |
.Vb 10 |
| 168 |
\& /* |
| 169 |
\& * Load the server\*(Aqs certificate *chain* file (PEM format), which includes |
| 170 |
\& * not only the leaf (end\-entity) server certificate, but also any |
| 171 |
\& * intermediate issuer\-CA certificates. The leaf certificate must be the |
| 172 |
\& * first certificate in the file. |
| 173 |
\& * |
| 174 |
\& * In advanced use\-cases this can be called multiple times, once per public |
| 175 |
\& * key algorithm for which the server has a corresponding certificate. |
| 176 |
\& * However, the corresponding private key (see below) must be loaded first, |
| 177 |
\& * *before* moving on to the next chain file. |
| 178 |
\& */ |
| 179 |
\& if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, "chain.pem") <= 0) { |
| 180 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 181 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 182 |
\& errx(res, "Failed to load the server certificate chain file"); |
| 183 |
\& } |
| 184 |
\& |
| 185 |
\& /* |
| 186 |
\& * Load the corresponding private key, this also checks that the private |
| 187 |
\& * key matches the just loaded end\-entity certificate. It does not check |
| 188 |
\& * whether the certificate chain is valid, the certificates could be |
| 189 |
\& * expired, or may otherwise fail to form a chain that a client can validate. |
| 190 |
\& */ |
| 191 |
\& if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "pkey.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { |
| 192 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 193 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 194 |
\& errx(res, "Error loading the server private key file, " |
| 195 |
\& "possible key/cert mismatch???"); |
| 196 |
\& } |
| 197 |
.Ve |
| 198 |
.PP |
| 199 |
Next we enable session caching, which makes it possible for clients to more |
| 200 |
efficiently make additional TLS connections after completing an initial full |
| 201 |
TLS handshake. With TLS 1.3, session resumption typically still performs a fresh |
| 202 |
key agreement, but the certificate exchange is avoided. |
| 203 |
.PP |
| 204 |
.Vb 7 |
| 205 |
\& /* |
| 206 |
\& * Servers that want to enable session resumption must specify a cache id |
| 207 |
\& * byte array, that identifies the server application, and reduces the |
| 208 |
\& * chance of inappropriate cache sharing. |
| 209 |
\& */ |
| 210 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)cache_id, sizeof(cache_id)); |
| 211 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
| 212 |
\& |
| 213 |
\& /* |
| 214 |
\& * How many client TLS sessions to cache. The default is |
| 215 |
\& * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (20k in recent OpenSSL versions), |
| 216 |
\& * which may be too small or too large. |
| 217 |
\& */ |
| 218 |
\& SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1024); |
| 219 |
\& |
| 220 |
\& /* |
| 221 |
\& * Sessions older than this are considered a cache miss even if still in |
| 222 |
\& * the cache. The default is two hours. Busy servers whose clients make |
| 223 |
\& * many connections in a short burst may want a shorter timeout, on lightly |
| 224 |
\& * loaded servers with sporadic connections from any given client, a longer |
| 225 |
\& * time may be appropriate. |
| 226 |
\& */ |
| 227 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, 3600); |
| 228 |
.Ve |
| 229 |
.PP |
| 230 |
Most servers, including this one, do not solicit client certificates. We |
| 231 |
therefore do not need a "trust store" and allow the handshake to complete even |
| 232 |
when the client does not present a certificate. Note: Even if a client did |
| 233 |
present a trusted ceritificate, for it to be useful, the server application |
| 234 |
would still need custom code to use the verified identity to grant nondefault |
| 235 |
access to that particular client. Some servers grant access to all clients |
| 236 |
with certificates from a private CA, this then requires processing of |
| 237 |
certificate revocation lists to deauthorise a client. It is often simpler and |
| 238 |
more secure to instead keep a list of authorised public keys. |
| 239 |
.PP |
| 240 |
Though this is the default setting, we explicitly call the |
| 241 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify\fR\|(3) function and pass the \fBSSL_VERIFY_NONE\fR value to it. |
| 242 |
The final argument to this function is a callback that you can optionally |
| 243 |
supply to override the default handling for certificate verification. Most |
| 244 |
applications do not need to do this so this can safely be set to NULL to get |
| 245 |
the default handling. |
| 246 |
.PP |
| 247 |
.Vb 12 |
| 248 |
\& /* |
| 249 |
\& * Clients rarely employ certificate\-based authentication, and so we don\*(Aqt |
| 250 |
\& * require "mutual" TLS authentication (indeed there\*(Aqs no way to know |
| 251 |
\& * whether or how the client authenticated the server, so the term "mutual" |
| 252 |
\& * is potentially misleading). |
| 253 |
\& * |
| 254 |
\& * Since we\*(Aqre not soliciting or processing client certificates, we don\*(Aqt |
| 255 |
\& * need to configure a trusted\-certificate store, so no call to |
| 256 |
\& * SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() is needed. The server\*(Aqs own |
| 257 |
\& * certificate chain is assumed valid. |
| 258 |
\& */ |
| 259 |
\& SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); |
| 260 |
.Ve |
| 261 |
.PP |
| 262 |
That is all the setup that we need to do for the \fBSSL_CTX\fR. Next we create an |
| 263 |
acceptor BIO on which to accept client connections. This just records the |
| 264 |
intended port (and optional "host:" prefix), without actually creating the |
| 265 |
socket. This delayed processing allows the programmer to specify additional |
| 266 |
behaviours before the listening socket is actually created. |
| 267 |
.PP |
| 268 |
.Vb 10 |
| 269 |
\& /* |
| 270 |
\& * Create a listener socket wrapped in a BIO. |
| 271 |
\& * The first call to BIO_do_accept() initialises the socket |
| 272 |
\& */ |
| 273 |
\& acceptor_bio = BIO_new_accept(hostport); |
| 274 |
\& if (acceptor_bio == NULL) { |
| 275 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 276 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 277 |
\& errx(res, "Error creating acceptor bio"); |
| 278 |
\& } |
| 279 |
.Ve |
| 280 |
.PP |
| 281 |
Servers almost always want to use the "SO_REUSEADDR" option to avoid startup |
| 282 |
failures if there are still lingering client connections, so we do that before |
| 283 |
making the \fBfirst\fR call to \fBBIO_do_accept\fR\|(3) which creates the listening |
| 284 |
socket, without accepting a client connection. Subsequent calls to the same |
| 285 |
function will accept new connections. |
| 286 |
.PP |
| 287 |
.Vb 6 |
| 288 |
\& BIO_set_bind_mode(acceptor_bio, BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR); |
| 289 |
\& if (BIO_do_accept(acceptor_bio) <= 0) { |
| 290 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 291 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 292 |
\& errx(res, "Error setting up acceptor socket"); |
| 293 |
\& } |
| 294 |
.Ve |
| 295 |
.SS "Server loop" |
| 296 |
.IX Subsection "Server loop" |
| 297 |
The server now enters a "forever" loop handling one client connection at a |
| 298 |
time. Before each connection we clear the OpenSSL error stack, so that any |
| 299 |
error reports are related to just the new connection. |
| 300 |
.PP |
| 301 |
.Vb 2 |
| 302 |
\& /* Pristine error stack for each new connection */ |
| 303 |
\& ERR_clear_error(); |
| 304 |
.Ve |
| 305 |
.PP |
| 306 |
At this point the server blocks to accept the next client: |
| 307 |
.PP |
| 308 |
.Vb 5 |
| 309 |
\& /* Wait for the next client to connect */ |
| 310 |
\& if (BIO_do_accept(acceptor_bio) <= 0) { |
| 311 |
\& /* Client went away before we accepted the connection */ |
| 312 |
\& continue; |
| 313 |
\& } |
| 314 |
.Ve |
| 315 |
.PP |
| 316 |
On success the accepted client connection has been wrapped in a fresh BIO and |
| 317 |
pushed onto the end of the acceptor BIO chain. We pop it off returning the |
| 318 |
acceptor BIO to its initial state. |
| 319 |
.PP |
| 320 |
.Vb 3 |
| 321 |
\& /* Pop the client connection from the BIO chain */ |
| 322 |
\& client_bio = BIO_pop(acceptor_bio); |
| 323 |
\& fprintf(stderr, "New client connection accepted\en"); |
| 324 |
.Ve |
| 325 |
.PP |
| 326 |
Next, we create an \fBSSL\fR object by calling the \fBSSL_new\|(3)\fR function and |
| 327 |
passing the \fBSSL_CTX\fR we created as an argument. The client connection BIO is |
| 328 |
configured as the I/O conduit for this SSL handle. SSL_set_bio transfers |
| 329 |
ownership of the BIO or BIOs involved (our \fBclient_bio\fR) to the SSL handle. |
| 330 |
.PP |
| 331 |
.Vb 8 |
| 332 |
\& /* Associate a new SSL handle with the new connection */ |
| 333 |
\& if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) { |
| 334 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 335 |
\& warnx("Error creating SSL handle for new connection"); |
| 336 |
\& BIO_free(client_bio); |
| 337 |
\& continue; |
| 338 |
\& } |
| 339 |
\& SSL_set_bio(ssl, client_bio, client_bio); |
| 340 |
.Ve |
| 341 |
.PP |
| 342 |
And now we're ready to attempt the SSL handshake. With a blocking socket |
| 343 |
OpenSSL will perform all the read and write operations required to complete the |
| 344 |
handshake (or detect and report a failure) before returning. |
| 345 |
.PP |
| 346 |
.Vb 7 |
| 347 |
\& /* Attempt an SSL handshake with the client */ |
| 348 |
\& if (SSL_accept(ssl) <= 0) { |
| 349 |
\& ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); |
| 350 |
\& warnx("Error performing SSL handshake with client"); |
| 351 |
\& SSL_free(ssl); |
| 352 |
\& continue; |
| 353 |
\& } |
| 354 |
.Ve |
| 355 |
.PP |
| 356 |
With the handshake complete, the server loops echoing client input back to the |
| 357 |
client: |
| 358 |
.PP |
| 359 |
.Vb 9 |
| 360 |
\& while (SSL_read_ex(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf), &nread) > 0) { |
| 361 |
\& if (SSL_write_ex(ssl, buf, nread, &nwritten) > 0 && |
| 362 |
\& nwritten == nread) { |
| 363 |
\& total += nwritten; |
| 364 |
\& continue; |
| 365 |
\& } |
| 366 |
\& warnx("Error echoing client input"); |
| 367 |
\& break; |
| 368 |
\& } |
| 369 |
.Ve |
| 370 |
.PP |
| 371 |
Once the client closes its connection, we report the number of bytes sent to |
| 372 |
\&\fBstderr\fR and free the SSL handle, which also frees the \fBclient_bio\fR and |
| 373 |
closes the underlying socket. |
| 374 |
.PP |
| 375 |
.Vb 2 |
| 376 |
\& fprintf(stderr, "Client connection closed, %zu bytes sent\en", total); |
| 377 |
\& SSL_free(ssl); |
| 378 |
.Ve |
| 379 |
.PP |
| 380 |
The server is now ready to accept the next client connection. |
| 381 |
.SS "Final clean up" |
| 382 |
.IX Subsection "Final clean up" |
| 383 |
If the server could somehow manage to break out of the infinite loop, and |
| 384 |
be ready to exit, it would first deallocate the constructed \fBSSL_CTX\fR. |
| 385 |
.PP |
| 386 |
.Vb 5 |
| 387 |
\& /* |
| 388 |
\& * Unreachable placeholder cleanup code, the above loop runs forever. |
| 389 |
\& */ |
| 390 |
\& SSL_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 391 |
\& return EXIT_SUCCESS; |
| 392 |
.Ve |
| 393 |
.SH "SEE ALSO" |
| 394 |
.IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
| 395 |
\&\fBossl\-guide\-introduction\fR\|(7), \fBossl\-guide\-libraries\-introduction\fR\|(7), |
| 396 |
\&\fBossl\-guide\-libssl\-introduction\fR\|(7), \fBossl\-guide\-tls\-introduction\fR\|(7), |
| 397 |
\&\fBossl\-guide\-tls\-client\-non\-block\fR\|(7), \fBossl\-guide\-quic\-client\-block\fR\|(7) |
| 398 |
.SH COPYRIGHT |
| 399 |
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" |
| 400 |
Copyright 2024\-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 401 |
.PP |
| 402 |
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 403 |
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 404 |
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 405 |
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |