| 1 |
.\" Copyright 1994, Graeme W. Wilford <[email protected]> |
| 2 |
.\" Copyright 2010-2015, Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]> |
| 3 |
.\" Copyright, the authors of the Linux man-pages project |
| 4 |
.\" |
| 5 |
.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft |
| 6 |
.\" |
| 7 |
.TH setuid 2 2026-02-08 "Linux man-pages 6.18" |
| 8 |
.SH NAME |
| 9 |
setuid \- set user identity |
| 10 |
.SH LIBRARY |
| 11 |
Standard C library |
| 12 |
.RI ( libc ,\~ \-lc ) |
| 13 |
.SH SYNOPSIS |
| 14 |
.nf |
| 15 |
.B #include <unistd.h> |
| 16 |
.P |
| 17 |
.BI "int setuid(uid_t " uid ); |
| 18 |
.fi |
| 19 |
.SH DESCRIPTION |
| 20 |
.BR setuid () |
| 21 |
sets the effective user ID of the calling process. |
| 22 |
If the calling process is privileged |
| 23 |
(more precisely: if the process has the |
| 24 |
.B CAP_SETUID |
| 25 |
capability in its user namespace), |
| 26 |
the real UID and saved set-user-ID are also set. |
| 27 |
.P |
| 28 |
Under Linux, |
| 29 |
.BR setuid () |
| 30 |
is implemented like the POSIX version with the |
| 31 |
.B _POSIX_SAVED_IDS |
| 32 |
feature. |
| 33 |
This allows a set-user-ID (other than root) program to drop all of its user |
| 34 |
privileges, do some un-privileged work, and then reengage the original |
| 35 |
effective user ID in a secure manner. |
| 36 |
.P |
| 37 |
If the user is root or the program is set-user-ID-root, special care must be |
| 38 |
taken: |
| 39 |
.BR setuid () |
| 40 |
checks the effective user ID of the caller and if it is |
| 41 |
the superuser, all process-related user ID's are set to |
| 42 |
.IR uid . |
| 43 |
After this has occurred, it is impossible for the program to regain root |
| 44 |
privileges. |
| 45 |
.P |
| 46 |
Thus, a set-user-ID-root program wishing to temporarily drop root |
| 47 |
privileges, assume the identity of an unprivileged user, and then regain |
| 48 |
root privileges afterward cannot use |
| 49 |
.BR setuid (). |
| 50 |
You can accomplish this with |
| 51 |
.BR seteuid (2). |
| 52 |
.SH RETURN VALUE |
| 53 |
On success, zero is returned. |
| 54 |
On error, \-1 is returned, and |
| 55 |
.I errno |
| 56 |
is set to indicate the error. |
| 57 |
.P |
| 58 |
.IR Note : |
| 59 |
there are cases where |
| 60 |
.BR setuid () |
| 61 |
can fail even when the caller is UID 0; |
| 62 |
it is a grave security error to omit checking for a failure return from |
| 63 |
.BR setuid (). |
| 64 |
.SH ERRORS |
| 65 |
.TP |
| 66 |
.B EAGAIN |
| 67 |
The call would change the caller's real UID (i.e., |
| 68 |
.I uid |
| 69 |
does not match the caller's real UID), |
| 70 |
but there was a temporary failure allocating the |
| 71 |
necessary kernel data structures. |
| 72 |
.TP |
| 73 |
.B EAGAIN |
| 74 |
.I uid |
| 75 |
does not match the real user ID of the caller and this call would |
| 76 |
bring the number of processes belonging to the real user ID |
| 77 |
.I uid |
| 78 |
over the caller's |
| 79 |
.B RLIMIT_NPROC |
| 80 |
resource limit. |
| 81 |
Since Linux 3.1, this error case no longer occurs |
| 82 |
(but robust applications should check for this error); |
| 83 |
see the description of |
| 84 |
.B EAGAIN |
| 85 |
in |
| 86 |
.BR execve (2). |
| 87 |
.TP |
| 88 |
.B EINVAL |
| 89 |
The user ID specified in |
| 90 |
.I uid |
| 91 |
is not valid in this user namespace. |
| 92 |
.TP |
| 93 |
.B EPERM |
| 94 |
The user is not privileged (Linux: does not have the |
| 95 |
.B CAP_SETUID |
| 96 |
capability in its user namespace) and |
| 97 |
.I uid |
| 98 |
does not match the real UID or saved set-user-ID of the calling process. |
| 99 |
.SH VERSIONS |
| 100 |
.SS C library/kernel differences |
| 101 |
At the kernel level, user IDs and group IDs are a per-thread attribute. |
| 102 |
However, POSIX requires that all threads in a process |
| 103 |
share the same credentials. |
| 104 |
The NPTL threading implementation handles the POSIX requirements by |
| 105 |
providing wrapper functions for |
| 106 |
the various system calls that change process UIDs and GIDs. |
| 107 |
These wrapper functions (including the one for |
| 108 |
.BR setuid ()) |
| 109 |
employ a signal-based technique to ensure |
| 110 |
that when one thread changes credentials, |
| 111 |
all of the other threads in the process also change their credentials. |
| 112 |
For details, see |
| 113 |
.BR nptl (7). |
| 114 |
.SH STANDARDS |
| 115 |
POSIX.1-2024. |
| 116 |
.SH HISTORY |
| 117 |
POSIX.1-2001, SVr4. |
| 118 |
.P |
| 119 |
Not quite compatible with the 4.4BSD call, which |
| 120 |
sets all of the real, saved, and effective user IDs. |
| 121 |
.\" SVr4 documents an additional EINVAL error condition. |
| 122 |
.P |
| 123 |
The original Linux |
| 124 |
.BR setuid () |
| 125 |
system call supported only 16-bit user IDs. |
| 126 |
Subsequently, Linux 2.4 added |
| 127 |
.BR setuid32 () |
| 128 |
supporting 32-bit IDs. |
| 129 |
The glibc |
| 130 |
.BR setuid () |
| 131 |
wrapper function transparently deals with the variation across kernel versions. |
| 132 |
.SH NOTES |
| 133 |
Linux has the concept of the filesystem user ID, normally equal to the |
| 134 |
effective user ID. |
| 135 |
The |
| 136 |
.BR setuid () |
| 137 |
call also sets the filesystem user ID of the calling process. |
| 138 |
See |
| 139 |
.BR setfsuid (2). |
| 140 |
.P |
| 141 |
If |
| 142 |
.I uid |
| 143 |
is different from the old effective UID, the process will |
| 144 |
be forbidden from leaving core dumps. |
| 145 |
.SH SEE ALSO |
| 146 |
.BR getuid (2), |
| 147 |
.BR seteuid (2), |
| 148 |
.BR setfsuid (2), |
| 149 |
.BR setreuid (2), |
| 150 |
.BR capabilities (7), |
| 151 |
.BR credentials (7), |
| 152 |
.BR user_namespaces (7) |