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.\" Copyright 1992, Drew Eckhardt <[email protected]> |
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.\" Copyright 1993, Ian Jackson <[email protected]> |
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.\" Copyright 2004-2014, Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]> |
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.\" Copyright, the authors of the Linux man-pages project |
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.\" |
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.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft |
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.\" |
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.TH access 2 2026-02-08 "Linux man-pages 6.18" |
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.SH NAME |
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access, faccessat, faccessat2 \- check user's permissions for a file |
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.SH LIBRARY |
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Standard C library |
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.RI ( libc ,\~ \-lc ) |
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.SH SYNOPSIS |
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.nf |
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.B #include <unistd.h> |
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.P |
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.BI "int access(const char *" path ", int " mode ); |
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.P |
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.BR "#include <fcntl.h>" " /* Definition of " AT_* " constants */" |
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.B #include <unistd.h> |
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.P |
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.BI "int faccessat(int " dirfd ", const char *" path ", int " mode \ |
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", int " flags ); |
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/* But see C library/kernel differences, below */ |
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.P |
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.BR "#include <fcntl.h>" " /* Definition of " AT_* " constants */" |
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.BR "#include <sys/syscall.h>" " /* Definition of " SYS_* " constants */" |
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.B #include <unistd.h> |
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.P |
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.B int syscall(SYS_faccessat2, |
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.BI " int " dirfd ", const char *" path ", int " mode \ |
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", int " flags ); |
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.fi |
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.P |
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.RS -4 |
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Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see |
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.BR feature_test_macros (7)): |
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.RE |
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.P |
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.BR faccessat (): |
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.nf |
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Since glibc 2.10: |
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_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L |
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Before glibc 2.10: |
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_ATFILE_SOURCE |
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.fi |
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.SH DESCRIPTION |
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.BR access () |
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checks whether the calling process can access the file |
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.IR path . |
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If |
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.I path |
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is a symbolic link, it is dereferenced. |
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.P |
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The |
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.I mode |
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specifies the accessibility check(s) to be performed, |
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and is either the value |
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.BR F_OK , |
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.\" F_OK is defined as 0 on every system that I know of. |
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or a mask consisting of the bitwise OR of one or more of |
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.BR R_OK ", " W_OK ", and " X_OK . |
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.B F_OK |
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tests for the existence of the file. |
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.BR R_OK ", " W_OK ", and " X_OK |
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test whether the file exists and grants read, write, and |
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execute permissions, respectively. |
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.P |
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The check is done using the calling process's |
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.I real |
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UID and GID, rather than the effective IDs as is done when |
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actually attempting an operation (e.g., |
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.BR open (2)) |
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on the file. |
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Similarly, |
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for the root user, |
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the check uses the set of permitted capabilities |
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rather than the set of effective capabilities; |
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and for non-root users, |
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the check uses an empty set of capabilities. |
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.P |
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This allows set-user-ID programs and capability-endowed programs |
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to easily determine the invoking user's authority. |
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In other words, |
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.BR access () |
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does not answer the "can I read/write/execute this file?" question. |
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It answers a slightly different question: |
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"(assuming I'm a setuid binary) can |
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.I the user who invoked me |
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read/write/execute this file?", |
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which gives set-user-ID programs the possibility to |
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prevent malicious users from causing them to read files |
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which users shouldn't be able to read. |
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.P |
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If the calling process is privileged (i.e., its real UID is zero), |
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then an |
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.B X_OK |
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check is successful for a regular file if execute permission |
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is enabled for any of the file owner, group, or other. |
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.SS faccessat() |
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.BR faccessat () |
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operates in exactly the same way as |
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.BR access (), |
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except for the differences described here. |
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.P |
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If |
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.I path |
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is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory |
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referred to by the file descriptor |
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.I dirfd |
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(rather than relative to the current working directory of |
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the calling process, as is done by |
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.BR access () |
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for a relative pathname). |
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.P |
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If |
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.I path |
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is relative and |
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.I dirfd |
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is the special value |
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.BR AT_FDCWD , |
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then |
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.I path |
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is interpreted relative to the current working |
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directory of the calling process (like |
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.BR access ()). |
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.P |
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If |
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.I path |
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is absolute, then |
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.I dirfd |
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is ignored. |
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.P |
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.I flags |
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is constructed by ORing together zero or more of the following values: |
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.TP |
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.B AT_EACCESS |
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Perform access checks using the effective user and group IDs. |
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By default, |
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.BR faccessat () |
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uses the real IDs (like |
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.BR access ()). |
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.TP |
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.BR AT_EMPTY_PATH " (since Linux 5.8)" |
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If |
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.I path |
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is an empty string, operate on the file referred to by |
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.I dirfd |
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(which may have been obtained using the |
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.BR open (2) |
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.B O_PATH |
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flag). |
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In this case, |
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.I dirfd |
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can refer to any type of file, not just a directory. |
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If |
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.I dirfd |
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is |
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.BR AT_FDCWD , |
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the call operates on the current working directory. |
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This flag is Linux-specific; |
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define |
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.B _GNU_SOURCE |
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to obtain its definition. |
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.TP |
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.B AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW |
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If |
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.I path |
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is a symbolic link, do not dereference it: |
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instead return information about the link itself. |
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.P |
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See |
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.BR openat (2) |
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for an explanation of the need for |
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.BR faccessat (). |
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.\" |
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.SS faccessat2() |
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The description of |
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.BR faccessat () |
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given above corresponds to POSIX.1 and |
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to the implementation provided by glibc. |
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However, the glibc implementation was an imperfect emulation (see BUGS) |
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that papered over the fact that the raw Linux |
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.BR faccessat () |
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system call does not have a |
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.I flags |
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argument. |
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To allow for a proper implementation, Linux 5.8 added the |
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.BR faccessat2 () |
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system call, which supports the |
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.I flags |
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argument and allows a correct implementation of the |
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.BR faccessat () |
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wrapper function. |
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.SH RETURN VALUE |
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On success (all requested permissions granted, or |
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.I mode |
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is |
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.B F_OK |
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and the file exists), zero is returned. |
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On error (at least one bit in |
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.I mode |
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asked for a permission that is denied, or |
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.I mode |
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is |
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.B F_OK |
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and the file does not exist, or some other error occurred), |
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\-1 is returned, and |
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.I errno |
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is set to indicate the error. |
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.SH ERRORS |
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.TP |
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.B EACCES |
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The requested access would be denied to the file, or search permission |
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is denied for one of the directories in the path prefix of |
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.IR path . |
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(See also |
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.BR path_resolution (7).) |
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.TP |
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.B EBADF |
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.RB ( faccessat ()) |
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.I path |
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is relative but |
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.I dirfd |
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is neither |
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.B AT_FDCWD |
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.RB ( faccessat ()) |
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nor a valid file descriptor. |
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.TP |
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.B EFAULT |
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.I path |
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points outside your accessible address space. |
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.TP |
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.B EINVAL |
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.I mode |
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was incorrectly specified. |
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.TP |
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.B EINVAL |
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.RB ( faccessat ()) |
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Invalid flag specified in |
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.IR flags . |
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.TP |
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.B EIO |
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An I/O error occurred. |
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.TP |
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.B ELOOP |
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Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving |
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.IR path . |
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.TP |
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.B ENAMETOOLONG |
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.I path |
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is too long. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOENT |
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A component of |
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.I path |
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does not exist or is a dangling symbolic link. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOMEM |
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Insufficient kernel memory was available. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOTDIR |
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A component used as a directory in |
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.I path |
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is not, in fact, a directory. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOTDIR |
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.RB ( faccessat ()) |
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.I path |
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is relative and |
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.I dirfd |
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is a file descriptor referring to a file other than a directory. |
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.TP |
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.B EPERM |
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Write permission was requested to a file that has the immutable flag set. |
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See also |
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.BR FS_IOC_SETFLAGS (2const). |
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.TP |
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.B EROFS |
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Write permission was requested for a file on a read-only filesystem. |
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.TP |
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.B ETXTBSY |
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Write access was requested to an executable which is being |
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executed. |
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.SH VERSIONS |
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If the calling process has appropriate privileges (i.e., is superuser), |
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POSIX.1-2001 permits an implementation to indicate success for an |
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.B X_OK |
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check even if none of the execute file permission bits are set. |
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.\" HPU-UX 11 and Tru64 5.1 do this. |
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Linux does not do this. |
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.\" |
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.SS C library/kernel differences |
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The raw |
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.BR faccessat () |
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system call takes only the first three arguments. |
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The |
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.B AT_EACCESS |
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and |
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.B AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW |
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flags are actually implemented within the glibc wrapper function for |
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.BR faccessat (). |
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If either of these flags is specified, then the wrapper function employs |
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.BR fstatat (2) |
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to determine access permissions, but see BUGS. |
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.\" |
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.SS glibc notes |
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On older kernels where |
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.BR faccessat () |
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is unavailable (and when the |
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.B AT_EACCESS |
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and |
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.B AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW |
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flags are not specified), |
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the glibc wrapper function falls back to the use of |
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.BR access (). |
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When |
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.I path |
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is relative, |
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glibc constructs a pathname based on the symbolic link in |
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.I /proc/self/fd |
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that corresponds to the |
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.I dirfd |
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argument. |
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.SH STANDARDS |
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.TP |
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.BR access () |
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.TQ |
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.BR faccessat () |
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POSIX.1-2024. |
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.TP |
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.BR faccessat2 () |
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Linux. |
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.SH HISTORY |
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.TP |
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.BR access () |
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4.3BSD, |
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SVr4, |
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POSIX.1-1988. |
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.TP |
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.BR faccessat () |
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Linux 2.6.16, |
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glibc 2.4, |
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POSIX.1-2008. |
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.TP |
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.BR faccessat2 () |
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Linux 5.8. |
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.SH NOTES |
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.BR Warning : |
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Using these calls to check if a user is authorized to, for example, |
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open a file before actually doing so using |
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.BR open (2) |
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creates a security hole, because the user might exploit the short time |
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interval between checking and opening the file to manipulate it. |
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.BR "For this reason, the use of this system call should be avoided" . |
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(In the example just described, |
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a safer alternative would be to temporarily switch the process's |
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effective user ID to the real ID and then call |
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.BR open (2).) |
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.P |
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.BR access () |
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always dereferences symbolic links. |
| 364 |
If you need to check the permissions on a symbolic link, use |
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.BR faccessat () |
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with the flag |
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.BR AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW . |
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.P |
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These calls return an error if any of the access types in |
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.I mode |
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is denied, even if some of the other access types in |
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.I mode |
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are permitted. |
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.P |
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A file is accessible only if the permissions on each of the |
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directories in the path prefix of |
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.I path |
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grant search (i.e., execute) access. |
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If any directory is inaccessible, then the |
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.BR access () |
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call fails, regardless of the permissions on the file itself. |
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.P |
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Only access bits are checked, not the file type or contents. |
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Therefore, if a directory is found to be writable, |
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it probably means that files can be created in the directory, |
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and not that the directory can be written as a file. |
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Similarly, a DOS file may be reported as executable, but the |
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.BR execve (2) |
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call will still fail. |
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.P |
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These calls |
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may not work correctly on NFSv2 filesystems with UID mapping enabled, |
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because UID mapping is done on the server and hidden from the client, |
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which checks permissions. |
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(NFS versions 3 and higher perform the check on the server.) |
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Similar problems can occur to FUSE mounts. |
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.\" |
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.SH BUGS |
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Because the Linux kernel's |
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.BR faccessat () |
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system call does not support a |
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.I flags |
| 403 |
argument, the glibc |
| 404 |
.BR faccessat () |
| 405 |
wrapper function provided in glibc 2.32 and earlier |
| 406 |
emulates the required functionality using |
| 407 |
a combination of the |
| 408 |
.BR faccessat () |
| 409 |
system call and |
| 410 |
.BR fstatat (2). |
| 411 |
However, this emulation does not take ACLs into account. |
| 412 |
Starting with glibc 2.33, the wrapper function avoids this bug |
| 413 |
by making use of the |
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.BR faccessat2 () |
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system call where it is provided by the underlying kernel. |
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.P |
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In Linux 2.4 (and earlier) there is some strangeness in the handling of |
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.B X_OK |
| 419 |
tests for superuser. |
| 420 |
If all categories of execute permission are disabled |
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for a nondirectory file, then the only |
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.BR access () |
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test that returns \-1 is when |
| 424 |
.I mode |
| 425 |
is specified as just |
| 426 |
.BR X_OK ; |
| 427 |
if |
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.B R_OK |
| 429 |
or |
| 430 |
.B W_OK |
| 431 |
is also specified in |
| 432 |
.IR mode , |
| 433 |
then |
| 434 |
.BR access () |
| 435 |
returns 0 for such files. |
| 436 |
.\" This behavior appears to have been an implementation accident. |
| 437 |
Early Linux 2.6 (up to and including Linux 2.6.3) |
| 438 |
also behaved in the same way as Linux 2.4. |
| 439 |
.P |
| 440 |
Before Linux 2.6.20, |
| 441 |
these calls ignored the effect of the |
| 442 |
.B MS_NOEXEC |
| 443 |
flag if it was used to |
| 444 |
.BR mount (2) |
| 445 |
the underlying filesystem. |
| 446 |
Since Linux 2.6.20, the |
| 447 |
.B MS_NOEXEC |
| 448 |
flag is honored. |
| 449 |
.SH SEE ALSO |
| 450 |
.BR chmod (2), |
| 451 |
.BR chown (2), |
| 452 |
.BR open (2), |
| 453 |
.BR setgid (2), |
| 454 |
.BR setuid (2), |
| 455 |
.BR stat (2), |
| 456 |
.BR euidaccess (3), |
| 457 |
.BR credentials (7), |
| 458 |
.BR path_resolution (7), |
| 459 |
.BR symlink (7) |