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.\" Copyright 1992, Drew Eckhardt <[email protected]> |
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.\" Copyright, the authors of the Linux man-pages project |
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.\" |
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.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft |
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.\" |
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.TH chroot 2 2026-02-08 "Linux man-pages 6.18" |
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.SH NAME |
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chroot \- change root directory |
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.SH LIBRARY |
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Standard C library |
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.RI ( libc ,\~ \-lc ) |
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.SH SYNOPSIS |
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.nf |
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.B #include <unistd.h> |
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.P |
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.BI "int chroot(const char *" path ); |
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.fi |
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.P |
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.RS -4 |
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Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see |
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.BR feature_test_macros (7)): |
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.RE |
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.P |
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.BR chroot (): |
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.nf |
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Since glibc 2.2.2: |
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_XOPEN_SOURCE && ! (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) |
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|| /* Since glibc 2.20: */ _DEFAULT_SOURCE |
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|| /* glibc <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE |
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Before glibc 2.2.2: |
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none |
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.fi |
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.SH DESCRIPTION |
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.BR chroot () |
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changes the root directory of the calling process to that specified in |
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.IR path . |
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This directory will be used for pathnames beginning with |
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.IR / . |
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The root directory is inherited by all children of the calling process. |
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.P |
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Only a privileged process (Linux: one with the |
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.B CAP_SYS_CHROOT |
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capability in its user namespace) may call |
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.BR chroot (). |
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.P |
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This call changes an ingredient in the pathname resolution process |
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and does nothing else. |
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In particular, it is not intended to be used |
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for any kind of security purpose, neither to fully sandbox a process nor |
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to restrict filesystem system calls. |
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In the past, |
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.BR chroot () |
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has been used by daemons to restrict themselves prior to passing paths |
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supplied by untrusted users to system calls such as |
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.BR open (2). |
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However, if a folder is moved out of the chroot directory, an attacker |
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can exploit that to get out of the chroot directory as well. |
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The easiest way to do that is to |
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.BR chdir (2) |
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to the to-be-moved directory, wait for it to be moved out, then open a |
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path like ../../../etc/passwd. |
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.P |
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.\" This is how the "slightly trickier variation" works: |
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.\" https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-014-2015.txt#L142 |
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A slightly |
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trickier variation also works under some circumstances if |
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.BR chdir (2) |
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is not permitted. |
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If a daemon allows a "chroot directory" to be specified, |
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that usually means that if you want to prevent remote users from accessing |
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files outside the chroot directory, you must ensure that folders are never |
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moved out of it. |
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.P |
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This call does not change the current working directory, |
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so that after the call |
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.RI \[aq] . \[aq] |
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can be outside the tree rooted at |
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.RI \[aq] / \[aq]. |
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In particular, the superuser can escape from a "chroot jail" |
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by doing: |
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.P |
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.in +4n |
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.EX |
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mkdir foo; |
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chroot foo; |
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cd ..; |
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.EE |
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.in |
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.P |
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This call does not close open file descriptors, and such file |
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descriptors may allow access to files outside the chroot tree. |
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.SH RETURN VALUE |
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On success, zero is returned. |
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On error, \-1 is returned, and |
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.I errno |
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is set to indicate the error. |
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.SH ERRORS |
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Depending on the filesystem, other errors can be returned. |
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The more general errors are listed below: |
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.TP |
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.B EACCES |
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Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix. |
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(See also |
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.BR path_resolution (7).) |
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.\" Also search permission is required on the final component, |
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.\" maybe just to guarantee that it is a directory? |
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.TP |
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.B EFAULT |
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.I path |
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points outside your accessible address space. |
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.TP |
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.B EIO |
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An I/O error occurred. |
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.TP |
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.B ELOOP |
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Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving |
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.IR path . |
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.TP |
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.B ENAMETOOLONG |
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.I path |
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is too long. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOENT |
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The file does not exist. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOMEM |
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Insufficient kernel memory was available. |
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.TP |
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.B ENOTDIR |
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A component of |
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.I path |
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is not a directory. |
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.TP |
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.B EPERM |
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The caller has insufficient privilege. |
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.SH STANDARDS |
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None. |
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.SH HISTORY |
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SVr4, |
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4.4BSD, |
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SUSv1 (marked TO BE WITHDRAWN), |
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SUSv2 (marked LEGACY). |
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This function is not part of POSIX.1-2001. |
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.\" SVr4 documents additional EINTR, ENOLINK and EMULTIHOP error conditions. |
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.\" X/OPEN does not document EIO, ENOMEM or EFAULT error conditions. |
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.SH NOTES |
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A child process created via |
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.BR fork (2) |
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inherits its parent's root directory. |
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The root directory is left unchanged by |
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.BR execve (2). |
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.P |
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The magic symbolic link, |
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.IR /proc/ pid /root , |
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can be used to discover a process's root directory; |
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see |
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.BR proc (5) |
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for details. |
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.P |
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FreeBSD has a stronger |
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.BR jail () |
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system call. |
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.SH SEE ALSO |
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.BR chroot (1), |
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.BR chdir (2), |
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.BR pivot_root (2), |
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.BR path_resolution (7), |
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.BR switch_root (8) |