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// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. |
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. |
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|
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// TLS low level connection and record layer |
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|
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package runner |
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|
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import ( |
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"bytes" |
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"crypto/cipher" |
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"crypto/ecdsa" |
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"crypto/subtle" |
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"crypto/x509" |
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"encoding/binary" |
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"errors" |
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"fmt" |
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"io" |
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"net" |
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"sync" |
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"time" |
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) |
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|
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// A Conn represents a secured connection. |
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// It implements the net.Conn interface. |
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type Conn struct { |
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// constant |
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conn net.Conn |
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isDTLS bool |
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isClient bool |
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|
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// constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex |
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handshakeMutex sync.Mutex // handshakeMutex < in.Mutex, out.Mutex, errMutex |
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handshakeErr error // error resulting from handshake |
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vers uint16 // TLS version |
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haveVers bool // version has been negotiated |
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config *Config // configuration passed to constructor |
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handshakeComplete bool |
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didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption |
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extendedMasterSecret bool // whether this session used an extended master secret |
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cipherSuite *cipherSuite |
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ocspResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response |
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sctList []byte // signed certificate timestamp list |
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peerCertificates []*x509.Certificate |
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// verifiedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as |
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// opposed to the ones presented by the server. |
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verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate |
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// serverName contains the server name indicated by the client, if any. |
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serverName string |
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// firstFinished contains the first Finished hash sent during the |
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// handshake. This is the "tls-unique" channel binding value. |
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firstFinished [12]byte |
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// clientCertSignatureHash contains the TLS hash id for the hash that |
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// was used by the client to sign the handshake with a client |
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// certificate. This is only set by a server and is zero if no client |
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// certificates were used. |
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clientCertSignatureHash uint8 |
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|
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clientRandom, serverRandom [32]byte |
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masterSecret [48]byte |
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|
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clientProtocol string |
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clientProtocolFallback bool |
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usedALPN bool |
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|
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// verify_data values for the renegotiation extension. |
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clientVerify []byte |
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serverVerify []byte |
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|
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channelID *ecdsa.PublicKey |
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|
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srtpProtectionProfile uint16 |
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|
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clientVersion uint16 |
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|
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// input/output |
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in, out halfConn // in.Mutex < out.Mutex |
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rawInput *block // raw input, right off the wire |
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input *block // application record waiting to be read |
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hand bytes.Buffer // handshake record waiting to be read |
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|
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// DTLS state |
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sendHandshakeSeq uint16 |
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recvHandshakeSeq uint16 |
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handMsg []byte // pending assembled handshake message |
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handMsgLen int // handshake message length, not including the header |
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pendingFragments [][]byte // pending outgoing handshake fragments. |
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|
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tmp [16]byte |
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} |
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|
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func (c *Conn) init() { |
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c.in.isDTLS = c.isDTLS |
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c.out.isDTLS = c.isDTLS |
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c.in.config = c.config |
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c.out.config = c.config |
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|
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c.out.updateOutSeq() |
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} |
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|
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// Access to net.Conn methods. |
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// Cannot just embed net.Conn because that would |
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// export the struct field too. |
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|
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// LocalAddr returns the local network address. |
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func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { |
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return c.conn.LocalAddr() |
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} |
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|
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// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. |
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func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { |
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return c.conn.RemoteAddr() |
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} |
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|
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// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated with the connection. |
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// A zero value for t means Read and Write will not time out. |
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// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. |
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func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { |
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return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) |
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} |
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|
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// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline on the underlying connection. |
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// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. |
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func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { |
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return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) |
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} |
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|
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// SetWriteDeadline sets the write deadline on the underlying conneciton. |
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// A zero value for t means Write will not time out. |
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// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. |
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func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { |
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return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) |
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} |
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|
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// A halfConn represents one direction of the record layer |
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// connection, either sending or receiving. |
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type halfConn struct { |
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sync.Mutex |
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|
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err error // first permanent error |
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version uint16 // protocol version |
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isDTLS bool |
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cipher interface{} // cipher algorithm |
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mac macFunction |
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seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number |
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outSeq [8]byte // Mapped sequence number |
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bfree *block // list of free blocks |
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|
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nextCipher interface{} // next encryption state |
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nextMac macFunction // next MAC algorithm |
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nextSeq [6]byte // next epoch's starting sequence number in DTLS |
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|
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// used to save allocating a new buffer for each MAC. |
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inDigestBuf, outDigestBuf []byte |
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|
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config *Config |
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} |
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|
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func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error { |
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hc.err = err |
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return err |
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} |
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|
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func (hc *halfConn) error() error { |
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// This should be locked, but I've removed it for the renegotiation |
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// tests since we don't concurrently read and write the same tls.Conn |
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// in any case during testing. |
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err := hc.err |
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return err |
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} |
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|
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// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states |
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// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use. |
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func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher interface{}, mac macFunction) { |
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hc.version = version |
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hc.nextCipher = cipher |
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hc.nextMac = mac |
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} |
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|
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// changeCipherSpec changes the encryption and MAC states |
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// to the ones previously passed to prepareCipherSpec. |
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func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec(config *Config) error { |
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if hc.nextCipher == nil { |
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return alertInternalError |
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} |
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hc.cipher = hc.nextCipher |
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hc.mac = hc.nextMac |
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hc.nextCipher = nil |
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hc.nextMac = nil |
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hc.config = config |
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hc.incEpoch() |
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|
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if config.Bugs.NullAllCiphers { |
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hc.cipher = nil |
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hc.mac = nil |
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} |
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return nil |
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} |
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|
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// incSeq increments the sequence number. |
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func (hc *halfConn) incSeq(isOutgoing bool) { |
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limit := 0 |
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increment := uint64(1) |
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if hc.isDTLS { |
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// Increment up to the epoch in DTLS. |
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limit = 2 |
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} |
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for i := 7; i >= limit; i-- { |
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increment += uint64(hc.seq[i]) |
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hc.seq[i] = byte(increment) |
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increment >>= 8 |
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} |
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|
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// Not allowed to let sequence number wrap. |
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// Instead, must renegotiate before it does. |
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// Not likely enough to bother. |
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if increment != 0 { |
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panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound") |
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} |
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|
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hc.updateOutSeq() |
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} |
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|
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// incNextSeq increments the starting sequence number for the next epoch. |
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func (hc *halfConn) incNextSeq() { |
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for i := len(hc.nextSeq) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { |
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hc.nextSeq[i]++ |
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if hc.nextSeq[i] != 0 { |
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return |
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} |
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} |
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panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound") |
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} |
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|
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// incEpoch resets the sequence number. In DTLS, it also increments the epoch |
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// half of the sequence number. |
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func (hc *halfConn) incEpoch() { |
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if hc.isDTLS { |
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for i := 1; i >= 0; i-- { |
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hc.seq[i]++ |
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if hc.seq[i] != 0 { |
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break |
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} |
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if i == 0 { |
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panic("TLS: epoch number wraparound") |
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} |
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} |
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copy(hc.seq[2:], hc.nextSeq[:]) |
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for i := range hc.nextSeq { |
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hc.nextSeq[i] = 0 |
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} |
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} else { |
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for i := range hc.seq { |
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hc.seq[i] = 0 |
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} |
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} |
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|
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hc.updateOutSeq() |
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} |
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|
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func (hc *halfConn) updateOutSeq() { |
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if hc.config.Bugs.SequenceNumberMapping != nil { |
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seqU64 := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(hc.seq[:]) |
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seqU64 = hc.config.Bugs.SequenceNumberMapping(seqU64) |
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hc.outSeq[:], seqU64) |
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|
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// The DTLS epoch cannot be changed. |
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copy(hc.outSeq[:2], hc.seq[:2]) |
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return |
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} |
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|
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copy(hc.outSeq[:], hc.seq[:]) |
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} |
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|
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func (hc *halfConn) recordHeaderLen() int { |
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if hc.isDTLS { |
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return dtlsRecordHeaderLen |
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} |
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return tlsRecordHeaderLen |
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} |
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|
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// removePadding returns an unpadded slice, in constant time, which is a prefix |
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// of the input. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the padding |
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// was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, section 6.2.3.2 |
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func removePadding(payload []byte) ([]byte, byte) { |
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if len(payload) < 1 { |
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return payload, 0 |
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} |
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|
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paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1] |
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t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen) |
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// if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero |
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good := byte(int32(^t) >> 31) |
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|
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toCheck := 255 // the maximum possible padding length |
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// The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here |
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if toCheck+1 > len(payload) { |
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toCheck = len(payload) - 1 |
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} |
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|
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for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ { |
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t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i) |
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// if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero |
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mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31) |
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b := payload[len(payload)-1-i] |
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good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b |
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} |
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|
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// We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across |
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// all the bits. |
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good &= good << 4 |
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good &= good << 2 |
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good &= good << 1 |
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good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7) |
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|
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toRemove := good&paddingLen + 1 |
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return payload[:len(payload)-int(toRemove)], good |
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} |
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|
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// removePaddingSSL30 is a replacement for removePadding in the case that the |
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// protocol version is SSLv3. In this version, the contents of the padding |
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// are random and cannot be checked. |
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func removePaddingSSL30(payload []byte) ([]byte, byte) { |
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if len(payload) < 1 { |
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return payload, 0 |
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} |
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|
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paddingLen := int(payload[len(payload)-1]) + 1 |
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if paddingLen > len(payload) { |
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return payload, 0 |
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} |
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|
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return payload[:len(payload)-paddingLen], 255 |
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} |
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|
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func roundUp(a, b int) int { |
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return a + (b-a%b)%b |
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} |
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|
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// cbcMode is an interface for block ciphers using cipher block chaining. |
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type cbcMode interface { |
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cipher.BlockMode |
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SetIV([]byte) |
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} |
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|
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// decrypt checks and strips the mac and decrypts the data in b. Returns a |
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// success boolean, the number of bytes to skip from the start of the record in |
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// order to get the application payload, and an optional alert value. |
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func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(b *block) (ok bool, prefixLen int, alertValue alert) { |
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recordHeaderLen := hc.recordHeaderLen() |
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|
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// pull out payload |
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payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:] |
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|
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macSize := 0 |
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if hc.mac != nil { |
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macSize = hc.mac.Size() |
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} |
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|
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paddingGood := byte(255) |
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explicitIVLen := 0 |
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|
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seq := hc.seq[:] |
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if hc.isDTLS { |
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// DTLS sequence numbers are explicit. |
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seq = b.data[3:11] |
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} |
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|
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// decrypt |
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if hc.cipher != nil { |
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switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { |
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case cipher.Stream: |
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c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) |
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case *tlsAead: |
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nonce := seq |
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if c.explicitNonce { |
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explicitIVLen = 8 |
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if len(payload) < explicitIVLen { |
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return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC |
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} |
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nonce = payload[:8] |
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payload = payload[8:] |
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} |
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|
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var additionalData [13]byte |
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copy(additionalData[:], seq) |
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copy(additionalData[8:], b.data[:3]) |
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n := len(payload) - c.Overhead() |
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additionalData[11] = byte(n >> 8) |
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additionalData[12] = byte(n) |
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var err error |
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payload, err = c.Open(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData[:]) |
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if err != nil { |
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return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC |
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} |
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b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(payload)) |
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case cbcMode: |
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blockSize := c.BlockSize() |
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if hc.version >= VersionTLS11 || hc.isDTLS { |
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explicitIVLen = blockSize |
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} |
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|
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if len(payload)%blockSize != 0 || len(payload) < roundUp(explicitIVLen+macSize+1, blockSize) { |
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return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC |
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} |
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|
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if explicitIVLen > 0 { |
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c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen]) |
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payload = payload[explicitIVLen:] |
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} |
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c.CryptBlocks(payload, payload) |
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if hc.version == VersionSSL30 { |
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payload, paddingGood = removePaddingSSL30(payload) |
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} else { |
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payload, paddingGood = removePadding(payload) |
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} |
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b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(payload)) |
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|
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// note that we still have a timing side-channel in the |
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// MAC check, below. An attacker can align the record |
| 421 |
// so that a correct padding will cause one less hash |
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// block to be calculated. Then they can iteratively |
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// decrypt a record by breaking each byte. See |
| 424 |
// "Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel", Brice |
| 425 |
// Canvel et al. |
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// |
| 427 |
// However, our behavior matches OpenSSL, so we leak |
| 428 |
// only as much as they do. |
| 429 |
case nullCipher: |
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break |
| 431 |
default: |
| 432 |
panic("unknown cipher type") |
| 433 |
} |
| 434 |
} |
| 435 |
|
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// check, strip mac |
| 437 |
if hc.mac != nil { |
| 438 |
if len(payload) < macSize { |
| 439 |
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC |
| 440 |
} |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
// strip mac off payload, b.data |
| 443 |
n := len(payload) - macSize |
| 444 |
b.data[recordHeaderLen-2] = byte(n >> 8) |
| 445 |
b.data[recordHeaderLen-1] = byte(n) |
| 446 |
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + n) |
| 447 |
remoteMAC := payload[n:] |
| 448 |
localMAC := hc.mac.MAC(hc.inDigestBuf, seq, b.data[:3], b.data[recordHeaderLen-2:recordHeaderLen], payload[:n]) |
| 449 |
|
| 450 |
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(localMAC, remoteMAC) != 1 || paddingGood != 255 { |
| 451 |
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC |
| 452 |
} |
| 453 |
hc.inDigestBuf = localMAC |
| 454 |
} |
| 455 |
hc.incSeq(false) |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
return true, recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen, 0 |
| 458 |
} |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
// padToBlockSize calculates the needed padding block, if any, for a payload. |
| 461 |
// On exit, prefix aliases payload and extends to the end of the last full |
| 462 |
// block of payload. finalBlock is a fresh slice which contains the contents of |
| 463 |
// any suffix of payload as well as the needed padding to make finalBlock a |
| 464 |
// full block. |
| 465 |
func padToBlockSize(payload []byte, blockSize int, config *Config) (prefix, finalBlock []byte) { |
| 466 |
overrun := len(payload) % blockSize |
| 467 |
prefix = payload[:len(payload)-overrun] |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
paddingLen := blockSize - overrun |
| 470 |
finalSize := blockSize |
| 471 |
if config.Bugs.MaxPadding { |
| 472 |
for paddingLen+blockSize <= 256 { |
| 473 |
paddingLen += blockSize |
| 474 |
} |
| 475 |
finalSize = 256 |
| 476 |
} |
| 477 |
finalBlock = make([]byte, finalSize) |
| 478 |
for i := range finalBlock { |
| 479 |
finalBlock[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1) |
| 480 |
} |
| 481 |
if config.Bugs.PaddingFirstByteBad || config.Bugs.PaddingFirstByteBadIf255 && paddingLen == 256 { |
| 482 |
finalBlock[overrun] ^= 0xff |
| 483 |
} |
| 484 |
copy(finalBlock, payload[len(payload)-overrun:]) |
| 485 |
return |
| 486 |
} |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
// encrypt encrypts and macs the data in b. |
| 489 |
func (hc *halfConn) encrypt(b *block, explicitIVLen int) (bool, alert) { |
| 490 |
recordHeaderLen := hc.recordHeaderLen() |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
// mac |
| 493 |
if hc.mac != nil { |
| 494 |
mac := hc.mac.MAC(hc.outDigestBuf, hc.outSeq[0:], b.data[:3], b.data[recordHeaderLen-2:recordHeaderLen], b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:]) |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
n := len(b.data) |
| 497 |
b.resize(n + len(mac)) |
| 498 |
copy(b.data[n:], mac) |
| 499 |
hc.outDigestBuf = mac |
| 500 |
} |
| 501 |
|
| 502 |
payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:] |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
// encrypt |
| 505 |
if hc.cipher != nil { |
| 506 |
switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { |
| 507 |
case cipher.Stream: |
| 508 |
c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) |
| 509 |
case *tlsAead: |
| 510 |
payloadLen := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen - explicitIVLen |
| 511 |
b.resize(len(b.data) + c.Overhead()) |
| 512 |
nonce := hc.outSeq[:] |
| 513 |
if c.explicitNonce { |
| 514 |
nonce = b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen] |
| 515 |
} |
| 516 |
payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:] |
| 517 |
payload = payload[:payloadLen] |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
var additionalData [13]byte |
| 520 |
copy(additionalData[:], hc.outSeq[:]) |
| 521 |
copy(additionalData[8:], b.data[:3]) |
| 522 |
additionalData[11] = byte(payloadLen >> 8) |
| 523 |
additionalData[12] = byte(payloadLen) |
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
c.Seal(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData[:]) |
| 526 |
case cbcMode: |
| 527 |
blockSize := c.BlockSize() |
| 528 |
if explicitIVLen > 0 { |
| 529 |
c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen]) |
| 530 |
payload = payload[explicitIVLen:] |
| 531 |
} |
| 532 |
prefix, finalBlock := padToBlockSize(payload, blockSize, hc.config) |
| 533 |
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(prefix) + len(finalBlock)) |
| 534 |
c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], prefix) |
| 535 |
c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen+len(prefix):], finalBlock) |
| 536 |
case nullCipher: |
| 537 |
break |
| 538 |
default: |
| 539 |
panic("unknown cipher type") |
| 540 |
} |
| 541 |
} |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
// update length to include MAC and any block padding needed. |
| 544 |
n := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen |
| 545 |
b.data[recordHeaderLen-2] = byte(n >> 8) |
| 546 |
b.data[recordHeaderLen-1] = byte(n) |
| 547 |
hc.incSeq(true) |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
return true, 0 |
| 550 |
} |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
// A block is a simple data buffer. |
| 553 |
type block struct { |
| 554 |
data []byte |
| 555 |
off int // index for Read |
| 556 |
link *block |
| 557 |
} |
| 558 |
|
| 559 |
// resize resizes block to be n bytes, growing if necessary. |
| 560 |
func (b *block) resize(n int) { |
| 561 |
if n > cap(b.data) { |
| 562 |
b.reserve(n) |
| 563 |
} |
| 564 |
b.data = b.data[0:n] |
| 565 |
} |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
// reserve makes sure that block contains a capacity of at least n bytes. |
| 568 |
func (b *block) reserve(n int) { |
| 569 |
if cap(b.data) >= n { |
| 570 |
return |
| 571 |
} |
| 572 |
m := cap(b.data) |
| 573 |
if m == 0 { |
| 574 |
m = 1024 |
| 575 |
} |
| 576 |
for m < n { |
| 577 |
m *= 2 |
| 578 |
} |
| 579 |
data := make([]byte, len(b.data), m) |
| 580 |
copy(data, b.data) |
| 581 |
b.data = data |
| 582 |
} |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
// readFromUntil reads from r into b until b contains at least n bytes |
| 585 |
// or else returns an error. |
| 586 |
func (b *block) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error { |
| 587 |
// quick case |
| 588 |
if len(b.data) >= n { |
| 589 |
return nil |
| 590 |
} |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
// read until have enough. |
| 593 |
b.reserve(n) |
| 594 |
for { |
| 595 |
m, err := r.Read(b.data[len(b.data):cap(b.data)]) |
| 596 |
b.data = b.data[0 : len(b.data)+m] |
| 597 |
if len(b.data) >= n { |
| 598 |
// TODO(bradfitz,agl): slightly suspicious |
| 599 |
// that we're throwing away r.Read's err here. |
| 600 |
break |
| 601 |
} |
| 602 |
if err != nil { |
| 603 |
return err |
| 604 |
} |
| 605 |
} |
| 606 |
return nil |
| 607 |
} |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
func (b *block) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) { |
| 610 |
n = copy(p, b.data[b.off:]) |
| 611 |
b.off += n |
| 612 |
return |
| 613 |
} |
| 614 |
|
| 615 |
// newBlock allocates a new block, from hc's free list if possible. |
| 616 |
func (hc *halfConn) newBlock() *block { |
| 617 |
b := hc.bfree |
| 618 |
if b == nil { |
| 619 |
return new(block) |
| 620 |
} |
| 621 |
hc.bfree = b.link |
| 622 |
b.link = nil |
| 623 |
b.resize(0) |
| 624 |
return b |
| 625 |
} |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
// freeBlock returns a block to hc's free list. |
| 628 |
// The protocol is such that each side only has a block or two on |
| 629 |
// its free list at a time, so there's no need to worry about |
| 630 |
// trimming the list, etc. |
| 631 |
func (hc *halfConn) freeBlock(b *block) { |
| 632 |
b.link = hc.bfree |
| 633 |
hc.bfree = b |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
// splitBlock splits a block after the first n bytes, |
| 637 |
// returning a block with those n bytes and a |
| 638 |
// block with the remainder. the latter may be nil. |
| 639 |
func (hc *halfConn) splitBlock(b *block, n int) (*block, *block) { |
| 640 |
if len(b.data) <= n { |
| 641 |
return b, nil |
| 642 |
} |
| 643 |
bb := hc.newBlock() |
| 644 |
bb.resize(len(b.data) - n) |
| 645 |
copy(bb.data, b.data[n:]) |
| 646 |
b.data = b.data[0:n] |
| 647 |
return b, bb |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
func (c *Conn) doReadRecord(want recordType) (recordType, *block, error) { |
| 651 |
if c.isDTLS { |
| 652 |
return c.dtlsDoReadRecord(want) |
| 653 |
} |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
recordHeaderLen := tlsRecordHeaderLen |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
if c.rawInput == nil { |
| 658 |
c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock() |
| 659 |
} |
| 660 |
b := c.rawInput |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
// Read header, payload. |
| 663 |
if err := b.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil { |
| 664 |
// RFC suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify is |
| 665 |
// an error, but popular web sites seem to do this, |
| 666 |
// so we can't make it an error, outside of tests. |
| 667 |
if err == io.EOF && c.config.Bugs.ExpectCloseNotify { |
| 668 |
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF |
| 669 |
} |
| 670 |
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { |
| 671 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(err) |
| 672 |
} |
| 673 |
return 0, nil, err |
| 674 |
} |
| 675 |
typ := recordType(b.data[0]) |
| 676 |
|
| 677 |
// No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes |
| 678 |
// start with a uint16 length where the MSB is set and the first record |
| 679 |
// is always < 256 bytes long. Therefore typ == 0x80 strongly suggests |
| 680 |
// an SSLv2 client. |
| 681 |
if want == recordTypeHandshake && typ == 0x80 { |
| 682 |
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) |
| 683 |
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unsupported SSLv2 handshake received")) |
| 684 |
} |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
vers := uint16(b.data[1])<<8 | uint16(b.data[2]) |
| 687 |
n := int(b.data[3])<<8 | int(b.data[4]) |
| 688 |
if c.haveVers { |
| 689 |
if vers != c.vers { |
| 690 |
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) |
| 691 |
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers)) |
| 692 |
} |
| 693 |
} else { |
| 694 |
if expect := c.config.Bugs.ExpectInitialRecordVersion; expect != 0 && vers != expect { |
| 695 |
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) |
| 696 |
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, expect)) |
| 697 |
} |
| 698 |
} |
| 699 |
if n > maxCiphertext { |
| 700 |
c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow) |
| 701 |
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: oversized record received with length %d", n)) |
| 702 |
} |
| 703 |
if !c.haveVers { |
| 704 |
// First message, be extra suspicious: |
| 705 |
// this might not be a TLS client. |
| 706 |
// Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible. |
| 707 |
// The current max version is 3.1. |
| 708 |
// If the version is >= 16.0, it's probably not real. |
| 709 |
// Similarly, a clientHello message encodes in |
| 710 |
// well under a kilobyte. If the length is >= 12 kB, |
| 711 |
// it's probably not real. |
| 712 |
if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != want) || vers >= 0x1000 || n >= 0x3000 { |
| 713 |
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| 714 |
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: first record does not look like a TLS handshake")) |
| 715 |
} |
| 716 |
} |
| 717 |
if err := b.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil { |
| 718 |
if err == io.EOF { |
| 719 |
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF |
| 720 |
} |
| 721 |
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { |
| 722 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(err) |
| 723 |
} |
| 724 |
return 0, nil, err |
| 725 |
} |
| 726 |
|
| 727 |
// Process message. |
| 728 |
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n) |
| 729 |
ok, off, err := c.in.decrypt(b) |
| 730 |
if !ok { |
| 731 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err)) |
| 732 |
} |
| 733 |
b.off = off |
| 734 |
return typ, b, nil |
| 735 |
} |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
// readRecord reads the next TLS record from the connection |
| 738 |
// and updates the record layer state. |
| 739 |
// c.in.Mutex <= L; c.input == nil. |
| 740 |
func (c *Conn) readRecord(want recordType) error { |
| 741 |
// Caller must be in sync with connection: |
| 742 |
// handshake data if handshake not yet completed, |
| 743 |
// else application data. |
| 744 |
switch want { |
| 745 |
default: |
| 746 |
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| 747 |
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unknown record type requested")) |
| 748 |
case recordTypeHandshake, recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: |
| 749 |
if c.handshakeComplete { |
| 750 |
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| 751 |
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake or ChangeCipherSpec requested after handshake complete")) |
| 752 |
} |
| 753 |
case recordTypeApplicationData: |
| 754 |
if !c.handshakeComplete && !c.config.Bugs.ExpectFalseStart { |
| 755 |
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) |
| 756 |
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: application data record requested before handshake complete")) |
| 757 |
} |
| 758 |
case recordTypeAlert: |
| 759 |
// Looking for a close_notify. Note: unlike a real |
| 760 |
// implementation, this is not tolerant of additional records. |
| 761 |
// See the documentation for ExpectCloseNotify. |
| 762 |
} |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
Again: |
| 765 |
typ, b, err := c.doReadRecord(want) |
| 766 |
if err != nil { |
| 767 |
return err |
| 768 |
} |
| 769 |
data := b.data[b.off:] |
| 770 |
if len(data) > maxPlaintext { |
| 771 |
err := c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow) |
| 772 |
c.in.freeBlock(b) |
| 773 |
return c.in.setErrorLocked(err) |
| 774 |
} |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
switch typ { |
| 777 |
default: |
| 778 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
case recordTypeAlert: |
| 781 |
if len(data) != 2 { |
| 782 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 783 |
break |
| 784 |
} |
| 785 |
if alert(data[1]) == alertCloseNotify { |
| 786 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF) |
| 787 |
break |
| 788 |
} |
| 789 |
switch data[0] { |
| 790 |
case alertLevelWarning: |
| 791 |
// drop on the floor |
| 792 |
c.in.freeBlock(b) |
| 793 |
goto Again |
| 794 |
case alertLevelError: |
| 795 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])}) |
| 796 |
default: |
| 797 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 798 |
} |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: |
| 801 |
if typ != want || len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 { |
| 802 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 803 |
break |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
err := c.in.changeCipherSpec(c.config) |
| 806 |
if err != nil { |
| 807 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) |
| 808 |
} |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
case recordTypeApplicationData: |
| 811 |
if typ != want { |
| 812 |
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 813 |
break |
| 814 |
} |
| 815 |
c.input = b |
| 816 |
b = nil |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
case recordTypeHandshake: |
| 819 |
// TODO(rsc): Should at least pick off connection close. |
| 820 |
if typ != want { |
| 821 |
// A client might need to process a HelloRequest from |
| 822 |
// the server, thus receiving a handshake message when |
| 823 |
// application data is expected is ok. |
| 824 |
if !c.isClient || want != recordTypeApplicationData { |
| 825 |
return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation)) |
| 826 |
} |
| 827 |
} |
| 828 |
c.hand.Write(data) |
| 829 |
} |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
if b != nil { |
| 832 |
c.in.freeBlock(b) |
| 833 |
} |
| 834 |
return c.in.err |
| 835 |
} |
| 836 |
|
| 837 |
// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. |
| 838 |
// c.out.Mutex <= L. |
| 839 |
func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(level byte, err alert) error { |
| 840 |
c.tmp[0] = level |
| 841 |
c.tmp[1] = byte(err) |
| 842 |
if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAlert { |
| 843 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:1]) |
| 844 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[1:2]) |
| 845 |
} else if c.config.Bugs.DoubleAlert { |
| 846 |
copy(c.tmp[2:4], c.tmp[0:2]) |
| 847 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:4]) |
| 848 |
} else { |
| 849 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2]) |
| 850 |
} |
| 851 |
// Error alerts are fatal to the connection. |
| 852 |
if level == alertLevelError { |
| 853 |
return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) |
| 854 |
} |
| 855 |
return nil |
| 856 |
} |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. |
| 859 |
// L < c.out.Mutex. |
| 860 |
func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error { |
| 861 |
level := byte(alertLevelError) |
| 862 |
if err == alertNoRenegotiation || err == alertCloseNotify || err == alertNoCertficate { |
| 863 |
level = alertLevelWarning |
| 864 |
} |
| 865 |
return c.SendAlert(level, err) |
| 866 |
} |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
func (c *Conn) SendAlert(level byte, err alert) error { |
| 869 |
c.out.Lock() |
| 870 |
defer c.out.Unlock() |
| 871 |
return c.sendAlertLocked(level, err) |
| 872 |
} |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
// writeV2Record writes a record for a V2ClientHello. |
| 875 |
func (c *Conn) writeV2Record(data []byte) (n int, err error) { |
| 876 |
record := make([]byte, 2+len(data)) |
| 877 |
record[0] = uint8(len(data)>>8) | 0x80 |
| 878 |
record[1] = uint8(len(data)) |
| 879 |
copy(record[2:], data) |
| 880 |
return c.conn.Write(record) |
| 881 |
} |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload |
| 884 |
// to the connection and updates the record layer state. |
| 885 |
// c.out.Mutex <= L. |
| 886 |
func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (n int, err error) { |
| 887 |
if c.isDTLS { |
| 888 |
return c.dtlsWriteRecord(typ, data) |
| 889 |
} |
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
recordHeaderLen := tlsRecordHeaderLen |
| 892 |
b := c.out.newBlock() |
| 893 |
first := true |
| 894 |
isClientHello := typ == recordTypeHandshake && len(data) > 0 && data[0] == typeClientHello |
| 895 |
for len(data) > 0 || first { |
| 896 |
m := len(data) |
| 897 |
if m > maxPlaintext && !c.config.Bugs.SendLargeRecords { |
| 898 |
m = maxPlaintext |
| 899 |
} |
| 900 |
if typ == recordTypeHandshake && c.config.Bugs.MaxHandshakeRecordLength > 0 && m > c.config.Bugs.MaxHandshakeRecordLength { |
| 901 |
m = c.config.Bugs.MaxHandshakeRecordLength |
| 902 |
// By default, do not fragment the client_version or |
| 903 |
// server_version, which are located in the first 6 |
| 904 |
// bytes. |
| 905 |
if first && isClientHello && !c.config.Bugs.FragmentClientVersion && m < 6 { |
| 906 |
m = 6 |
| 907 |
} |
| 908 |
} |
| 909 |
explicitIVLen := 0 |
| 910 |
explicitIVIsSeq := false |
| 911 |
first = false |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
var cbc cbcMode |
| 914 |
if c.out.version >= VersionTLS11 { |
| 915 |
var ok bool |
| 916 |
if cbc, ok = c.out.cipher.(cbcMode); ok { |
| 917 |
explicitIVLen = cbc.BlockSize() |
| 918 |
} |
| 919 |
} |
| 920 |
if explicitIVLen == 0 { |
| 921 |
if aead, ok := c.out.cipher.(*tlsAead); ok && aead.explicitNonce { |
| 922 |
explicitIVLen = 8 |
| 923 |
// The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an |
| 924 |
// explicit nonce so that the nonce can be |
| 925 |
// random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes |
| 926 |
// which is too small for a secure, random |
| 927 |
// nonce. Therefore we use the sequence number |
| 928 |
// as the nonce. |
| 929 |
explicitIVIsSeq = true |
| 930 |
} |
| 931 |
} |
| 932 |
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + m) |
| 933 |
b.data[0] = byte(typ) |
| 934 |
vers := c.vers |
| 935 |
if vers == 0 { |
| 936 |
// Some TLS servers fail if the record version is |
| 937 |
// greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello. |
| 938 |
vers = VersionTLS10 |
| 939 |
} |
| 940 |
b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8) |
| 941 |
b.data[2] = byte(vers) |
| 942 |
b.data[3] = byte(m >> 8) |
| 943 |
b.data[4] = byte(m) |
| 944 |
if explicitIVLen > 0 { |
| 945 |
explicitIV := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen] |
| 946 |
if explicitIVIsSeq { |
| 947 |
copy(explicitIV, c.out.seq[:]) |
| 948 |
} else { |
| 949 |
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), explicitIV); err != nil { |
| 950 |
break |
| 951 |
} |
| 952 |
} |
| 953 |
} |
| 954 |
copy(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], data) |
| 955 |
c.out.encrypt(b, explicitIVLen) |
| 956 |
_, err = c.conn.Write(b.data) |
| 957 |
if err != nil { |
| 958 |
break |
| 959 |
} |
| 960 |
n += m |
| 961 |
data = data[m:] |
| 962 |
} |
| 963 |
c.out.freeBlock(b) |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec { |
| 966 |
err = c.out.changeCipherSpec(c.config) |
| 967 |
if err != nil { |
| 968 |
// Cannot call sendAlert directly, |
| 969 |
// because we already hold c.out.Mutex. |
| 970 |
c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError |
| 971 |
c.tmp[1] = byte(err.(alert)) |
| 972 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2]) |
| 973 |
return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) |
| 974 |
} |
| 975 |
} |
| 976 |
return |
| 977 |
} |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
func (c *Conn) doReadHandshake() ([]byte, error) { |
| 980 |
if c.isDTLS { |
| 981 |
return c.dtlsDoReadHandshake() |
| 982 |
} |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
for c.hand.Len() < 4 { |
| 985 |
if err := c.in.err; err != nil { |
| 986 |
return nil, err |
| 987 |
} |
| 988 |
if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil { |
| 989 |
return nil, err |
| 990 |
} |
| 991 |
} |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
data := c.hand.Bytes() |
| 994 |
n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) |
| 995 |
if n > maxHandshake { |
| 996 |
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)) |
| 997 |
} |
| 998 |
for c.hand.Len() < 4+n { |
| 999 |
if err := c.in.err; err != nil { |
| 1000 |
return nil, err |
| 1001 |
} |
| 1002 |
if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil { |
| 1003 |
return nil, err |
| 1004 |
} |
| 1005 |
} |
| 1006 |
return c.hand.Next(4 + n), nil |
| 1007 |
} |
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from |
| 1010 |
// the record layer. |
| 1011 |
// c.in.Mutex < L; c.out.Mutex < L. |
| 1012 |
func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (interface{}, error) { |
| 1013 |
data, err := c.doReadHandshake() |
| 1014 |
if err != nil { |
| 1015 |
return nil, err |
| 1016 |
} |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
var m handshakeMessage |
| 1019 |
switch data[0] { |
| 1020 |
case typeHelloRequest: |
| 1021 |
m = new(helloRequestMsg) |
| 1022 |
case typeClientHello: |
| 1023 |
m = &clientHelloMsg{ |
| 1024 |
isDTLS: c.isDTLS, |
| 1025 |
} |
| 1026 |
case typeServerHello: |
| 1027 |
m = &serverHelloMsg{ |
| 1028 |
isDTLS: c.isDTLS, |
| 1029 |
} |
| 1030 |
case typeNewSessionTicket: |
| 1031 |
m = new(newSessionTicketMsg) |
| 1032 |
case typeCertificate: |
| 1033 |
m = new(certificateMsg) |
| 1034 |
case typeCertificateRequest: |
| 1035 |
m = &certificateRequestMsg{ |
| 1036 |
hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, |
| 1037 |
} |
| 1038 |
case typeCertificateStatus: |
| 1039 |
m = new(certificateStatusMsg) |
| 1040 |
case typeServerKeyExchange: |
| 1041 |
m = new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) |
| 1042 |
case typeServerHelloDone: |
| 1043 |
m = new(serverHelloDoneMsg) |
| 1044 |
case typeClientKeyExchange: |
| 1045 |
m = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) |
| 1046 |
case typeCertificateVerify: |
| 1047 |
m = &certificateVerifyMsg{ |
| 1048 |
hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, |
| 1049 |
} |
| 1050 |
case typeNextProtocol: |
| 1051 |
m = new(nextProtoMsg) |
| 1052 |
case typeFinished: |
| 1053 |
m = new(finishedMsg) |
| 1054 |
case typeHelloVerifyRequest: |
| 1055 |
m = new(helloVerifyRequestMsg) |
| 1056 |
case typeEncryptedExtensions: |
| 1057 |
m = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg) |
| 1058 |
default: |
| 1059 |
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 1060 |
} |
| 1061 |
|
| 1062 |
// The handshake message unmarshallers |
| 1063 |
// expect to be able to keep references to data, |
| 1064 |
// so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten. |
| 1065 |
data = append([]byte(nil), data...) |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
if !m.unmarshal(data) { |
| 1068 |
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) |
| 1069 |
} |
| 1070 |
return m, nil |
| 1071 |
} |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
// skipPacket processes all the DTLS records in packet. It updates |
| 1074 |
// sequence number expectations but otherwise ignores them. |
| 1075 |
func (c *Conn) skipPacket(packet []byte) error { |
| 1076 |
for len(packet) > 0 { |
| 1077 |
if len(packet) < 13 { |
| 1078 |
return errors.New("tls: bad packet") |
| 1079 |
} |
| 1080 |
// Dropped packets are completely ignored save to update |
| 1081 |
// expected sequence numbers for this and the next epoch. (We |
| 1082 |
// don't assert on the contents of the packets both for |
| 1083 |
// simplicity and because a previous test with one shorter |
| 1084 |
// timeout schedule would have done so.) |
| 1085 |
epoch := packet[3:5] |
| 1086 |
seq := packet[5:11] |
| 1087 |
length := uint16(packet[11])<<8 | uint16(packet[12]) |
| 1088 |
if bytes.Equal(c.in.seq[:2], epoch) { |
| 1089 |
if bytes.Compare(seq, c.in.seq[2:]) < 0 { |
| 1090 |
return errors.New("tls: sequence mismatch") |
| 1091 |
} |
| 1092 |
copy(c.in.seq[2:], seq) |
| 1093 |
c.in.incSeq(false) |
| 1094 |
} else { |
| 1095 |
if bytes.Compare(seq, c.in.nextSeq[:]) < 0 { |
| 1096 |
return errors.New("tls: sequence mismatch") |
| 1097 |
} |
| 1098 |
copy(c.in.nextSeq[:], seq) |
| 1099 |
c.in.incNextSeq() |
| 1100 |
} |
| 1101 |
if len(packet) < 13+int(length) { |
| 1102 |
return errors.New("tls: bad packet") |
| 1103 |
} |
| 1104 |
packet = packet[13+length:] |
| 1105 |
} |
| 1106 |
return nil |
| 1107 |
} |
| 1108 |
|
| 1109 |
// simulatePacketLoss simulates the loss of a handshake leg from the |
| 1110 |
// peer based on the schedule in c.config.Bugs. If resendFunc is |
| 1111 |
// non-nil, it is called after each simulated timeout to retransmit |
| 1112 |
// handshake messages from the local end. This is used in cases where |
| 1113 |
// the peer retransmits on a stale Finished rather than a timeout. |
| 1114 |
func (c *Conn) simulatePacketLoss(resendFunc func()) error { |
| 1115 |
if len(c.config.Bugs.TimeoutSchedule) == 0 { |
| 1116 |
return nil |
| 1117 |
} |
| 1118 |
if !c.isDTLS { |
| 1119 |
return errors.New("tls: TimeoutSchedule may only be set in DTLS") |
| 1120 |
} |
| 1121 |
if c.config.Bugs.PacketAdaptor == nil { |
| 1122 |
return errors.New("tls: TimeoutSchedule set without PacketAdapter") |
| 1123 |
} |
| 1124 |
for _, timeout := range c.config.Bugs.TimeoutSchedule { |
| 1125 |
// Simulate a timeout. |
| 1126 |
packets, err := c.config.Bugs.PacketAdaptor.SendReadTimeout(timeout) |
| 1127 |
if err != nil { |
| 1128 |
return err |
| 1129 |
} |
| 1130 |
for _, packet := range packets { |
| 1131 |
if err := c.skipPacket(packet); err != nil { |
| 1132 |
return err |
| 1133 |
} |
| 1134 |
} |
| 1135 |
if resendFunc != nil { |
| 1136 |
resendFunc() |
| 1137 |
} |
| 1138 |
} |
| 1139 |
return nil |
| 1140 |
} |
| 1141 |
|
| 1142 |
// Write writes data to the connection. |
| 1143 |
func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { |
| 1144 |
if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { |
| 1145 |
return 0, err |
| 1146 |
} |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
c.out.Lock() |
| 1149 |
defer c.out.Unlock() |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
if err := c.out.err; err != nil { |
| 1152 |
return 0, err |
| 1153 |
} |
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 |
if !c.handshakeComplete { |
| 1156 |
return 0, alertInternalError |
| 1157 |
} |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
if c.config.Bugs.SendSpuriousAlert != 0 { |
| 1160 |
c.sendAlertLocked(alertLevelError, c.config.Bugs.SendSpuriousAlert) |
| 1161 |
} |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
if c.config.Bugs.SendHelloRequestBeforeEveryAppDataRecord { |
| 1164 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, []byte{typeHelloRequest, 0, 0, 0}) |
| 1165 |
} |
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
// SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are susceptible to a chosen-plaintext |
| 1168 |
// attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs. |
| 1169 |
// This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data |
| 1170 |
// record into two records, effectively randomizing the IV. |
| 1171 |
// |
| 1172 |
// http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt |
| 1173 |
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814 |
| 1174 |
// http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
var m int |
| 1177 |
if len(b) > 1 && c.vers <= VersionTLS10 && !c.isDTLS { |
| 1178 |
if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.BlockMode); ok { |
| 1179 |
n, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeApplicationData, b[:1]) |
| 1180 |
if err != nil { |
| 1181 |
return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) |
| 1182 |
} |
| 1183 |
m, b = 1, b[1:] |
| 1184 |
} |
| 1185 |
} |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
n, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeApplicationData, b) |
| 1188 |
return n + m, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) |
| 1189 |
} |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error { |
| 1192 |
c.handshakeComplete = false |
| 1193 |
if !c.isClient { |
| 1194 |
panic("renegotiation should only happen for a client") |
| 1195 |
} |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
msg, err := c.readHandshake() |
| 1198 |
if err != nil { |
| 1199 |
return err |
| 1200 |
} |
| 1201 |
_, ok := msg.(*helloRequestMsg) |
| 1202 |
if !ok { |
| 1203 |
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) |
| 1204 |
return alertUnexpectedMessage |
| 1205 |
} |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
return c.Handshake() |
| 1208 |
} |
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 |
func (c *Conn) Renegotiate() error { |
| 1211 |
if !c.isClient { |
| 1212 |
helloReq := new(helloRequestMsg).marshal() |
| 1213 |
if c.config.Bugs.BadHelloRequest != nil { |
| 1214 |
helloReq = c.config.Bugs.BadHelloRequest |
| 1215 |
} |
| 1216 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloReq) |
| 1217 |
} |
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
c.handshakeComplete = false |
| 1220 |
return c.Handshake() |
| 1221 |
} |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
// Read can be made to time out and return a net.Error with Timeout() == true |
| 1224 |
// after a fixed time limit; see SetDeadline and SetReadDeadline. |
| 1225 |
func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (n int, err error) { |
| 1226 |
if err = c.Handshake(); err != nil { |
| 1227 |
return |
| 1228 |
} |
| 1229 |
|
| 1230 |
c.in.Lock() |
| 1231 |
defer c.in.Unlock() |
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
// Some OpenSSL servers send empty records in order to randomize the |
| 1234 |
// CBC IV. So this loop ignores a limited number of empty records. |
| 1235 |
const maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords = 100 |
| 1236 |
for emptyRecordCount := 0; emptyRecordCount <= maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords; emptyRecordCount++ { |
| 1237 |
for c.input == nil && c.in.err == nil { |
| 1238 |
if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil { |
| 1239 |
// Soft error, like EAGAIN |
| 1240 |
return 0, err |
| 1241 |
} |
| 1242 |
if c.hand.Len() > 0 { |
| 1243 |
// We received handshake bytes, indicating the |
| 1244 |
// start of a renegotiation. |
| 1245 |
if err := c.handleRenegotiation(); err != nil { |
| 1246 |
return 0, err |
| 1247 |
} |
| 1248 |
continue |
| 1249 |
} |
| 1250 |
} |
| 1251 |
if err := c.in.err; err != nil { |
| 1252 |
return 0, err |
| 1253 |
} |
| 1254 |
|
| 1255 |
n, err = c.input.Read(b) |
| 1256 |
if c.input.off >= len(c.input.data) || c.isDTLS { |
| 1257 |
c.in.freeBlock(c.input) |
| 1258 |
c.input = nil |
| 1259 |
} |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
// If a close-notify alert is waiting, read it so that |
| 1262 |
// we can return (n, EOF) instead of (n, nil), to signal |
| 1263 |
// to the HTTP response reading goroutine that the |
| 1264 |
// connection is now closed. This eliminates a race |
| 1265 |
// where the HTTP response reading goroutine would |
| 1266 |
// otherwise not observe the EOF until its next read, |
| 1267 |
// by which time a client goroutine might have already |
| 1268 |
// tried to reuse the HTTP connection for a new |
| 1269 |
// request. |
| 1270 |
// See https://codereview.appspot.com/76400046 |
| 1271 |
// and http://golang.org/issue/3514 |
| 1272 |
if ri := c.rawInput; ri != nil && |
| 1273 |
n != 0 && err == nil && |
| 1274 |
c.input == nil && len(ri.data) > 0 && recordType(ri.data[0]) == recordTypeAlert { |
| 1275 |
if recErr := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); recErr != nil { |
| 1276 |
err = recErr // will be io.EOF on closeNotify |
| 1277 |
} |
| 1278 |
} |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
if n != 0 || err != nil { |
| 1281 |
return n, err |
| 1282 |
} |
| 1283 |
} |
| 1284 |
|
| 1285 |
return 0, io.ErrNoProgress |
| 1286 |
} |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
// Close closes the connection. |
| 1289 |
func (c *Conn) Close() error { |
| 1290 |
var alertErr error |
| 1291 |
|
| 1292 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1293 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1294 |
if c.handshakeComplete && !c.config.Bugs.NoCloseNotify { |
| 1295 |
alert := alertCloseNotify |
| 1296 |
if c.config.Bugs.SendAlertOnShutdown != 0 { |
| 1297 |
alert = c.config.Bugs.SendAlertOnShutdown |
| 1298 |
} |
| 1299 |
alertErr = c.sendAlert(alert) |
| 1300 |
// Clear local alerts when sending alerts so we continue to wait |
| 1301 |
// for the peer rather than closing the socket early. |
| 1302 |
if opErr, ok := alertErr.(*net.OpError); ok && opErr.Op == "local error" { |
| 1303 |
alertErr = nil |
| 1304 |
} |
| 1305 |
} |
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 |
// Consume a close_notify from the peer if one hasn't been received |
| 1308 |
// already. This avoids the peer from failing |SSL_shutdown| due to a |
| 1309 |
// write failing. |
| 1310 |
if c.handshakeComplete && alertErr == nil && c.config.Bugs.ExpectCloseNotify { |
| 1311 |
for c.in.error() == nil { |
| 1312 |
c.readRecord(recordTypeAlert) |
| 1313 |
} |
| 1314 |
if c.in.error() != io.EOF { |
| 1315 |
alertErr = c.in.error() |
| 1316 |
} |
| 1317 |
} |
| 1318 |
|
| 1319 |
if err := c.conn.Close(); err != nil { |
| 1320 |
return err |
| 1321 |
} |
| 1322 |
return alertErr |
| 1323 |
} |
| 1324 |
|
| 1325 |
// Handshake runs the client or server handshake |
| 1326 |
// protocol if it has not yet been run. |
| 1327 |
// Most uses of this package need not call Handshake |
| 1328 |
// explicitly: the first Read or Write will call it automatically. |
| 1329 |
func (c *Conn) Handshake() error { |
| 1330 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1331 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1332 |
if err := c.handshakeErr; err != nil { |
| 1333 |
return err |
| 1334 |
} |
| 1335 |
if c.handshakeComplete { |
| 1336 |
return nil |
| 1337 |
} |
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
if c.isDTLS && c.config.Bugs.SendSplitAlert { |
| 1340 |
c.conn.Write([]byte{ |
| 1341 |
byte(recordTypeAlert), // type |
| 1342 |
0xfe, 0xff, // version |
| 1343 |
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, // sequence |
| 1344 |
0x0, 0x2, // length |
| 1345 |
}) |
| 1346 |
c.conn.Write([]byte{alertLevelError, byte(alertInternalError)}) |
| 1347 |
} |
| 1348 |
if data := c.config.Bugs.AppDataBeforeHandshake; data != nil { |
| 1349 |
c.writeRecord(recordTypeApplicationData, data) |
| 1350 |
} |
| 1351 |
if c.isClient { |
| 1352 |
c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake() |
| 1353 |
} else { |
| 1354 |
c.handshakeErr = c.serverHandshake() |
| 1355 |
} |
| 1356 |
if c.handshakeErr == nil && c.config.Bugs.SendInvalidRecordType { |
| 1357 |
c.writeRecord(recordType(42), []byte("invalid record")) |
| 1358 |
} |
| 1359 |
return c.handshakeErr |
| 1360 |
} |
| 1361 |
|
| 1362 |
// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. |
| 1363 |
func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { |
| 1364 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1365 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1366 |
|
| 1367 |
var state ConnectionState |
| 1368 |
state.HandshakeComplete = c.handshakeComplete |
| 1369 |
if c.handshakeComplete { |
| 1370 |
state.Version = c.vers |
| 1371 |
state.NegotiatedProtocol = c.clientProtocol |
| 1372 |
state.DidResume = c.didResume |
| 1373 |
state.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual = !c.clientProtocolFallback |
| 1374 |
state.NegotiatedProtocolFromALPN = c.usedALPN |
| 1375 |
state.CipherSuite = c.cipherSuite.id |
| 1376 |
state.PeerCertificates = c.peerCertificates |
| 1377 |
state.VerifiedChains = c.verifiedChains |
| 1378 |
state.ServerName = c.serverName |
| 1379 |
state.ChannelID = c.channelID |
| 1380 |
state.SRTPProtectionProfile = c.srtpProtectionProfile |
| 1381 |
state.TLSUnique = c.firstFinished[:] |
| 1382 |
state.SCTList = c.sctList |
| 1383 |
state.ClientCertSignatureHash = c.clientCertSignatureHash |
| 1384 |
} |
| 1385 |
|
| 1386 |
return state |
| 1387 |
} |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if |
| 1390 |
// any. (Only valid for client connections.) |
| 1391 |
func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte { |
| 1392 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1393 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
return c.ocspResponse |
| 1396 |
} |
| 1397 |
|
| 1398 |
// VerifyHostname checks that the peer certificate chain is valid for |
| 1399 |
// connecting to host. If so, it returns nil; if not, it returns an error |
| 1400 |
// describing the problem. |
| 1401 |
func (c *Conn) VerifyHostname(host string) error { |
| 1402 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1403 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1404 |
if !c.isClient { |
| 1405 |
return errors.New("tls: VerifyHostname called on TLS server connection") |
| 1406 |
} |
| 1407 |
if !c.handshakeComplete { |
| 1408 |
return errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed") |
| 1409 |
} |
| 1410 |
return c.peerCertificates[0].VerifyHostname(host) |
| 1411 |
} |
| 1412 |
|
| 1413 |
// ExportKeyingMaterial exports keying material from the current connection |
| 1414 |
// state, as per RFC 5705. |
| 1415 |
func (c *Conn) ExportKeyingMaterial(length int, label, context []byte, useContext bool) ([]byte, error) { |
| 1416 |
c.handshakeMutex.Lock() |
| 1417 |
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() |
| 1418 |
if !c.handshakeComplete { |
| 1419 |
return nil, errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed") |
| 1420 |
} |
| 1421 |
|
| 1422 |
seedLen := len(c.clientRandom) + len(c.serverRandom) |
| 1423 |
if useContext { |
| 1424 |
seedLen += 2 + len(context) |
| 1425 |
} |
| 1426 |
seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen) |
| 1427 |
seed = append(seed, c.clientRandom[:]...) |
| 1428 |
seed = append(seed, c.serverRandom[:]...) |
| 1429 |
if useContext { |
| 1430 |
seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context))) |
| 1431 |
seed = append(seed, context...) |
| 1432 |
} |
| 1433 |
result := make([]byte, length) |
| 1434 |
prfForVersion(c.vers, c.cipherSuite)(result, c.masterSecret[:], label, seed) |
| 1435 |
return result, nil |
| 1436 |
} |
| 1437 |
|
| 1438 |
// noRenegotiationInfo returns true if the renegotiation info extension |
| 1439 |
// should be supported in the current handshake. |
| 1440 |
func (c *Conn) noRenegotiationInfo() bool { |
| 1441 |
if c.config.Bugs.NoRenegotiationInfo { |
| 1442 |
return true |
| 1443 |
} |
| 1444 |
if c.cipherSuite == nil && c.config.Bugs.NoRenegotiationInfoInInitial { |
| 1445 |
return true |
| 1446 |
} |
| 1447 |
if c.cipherSuite != nil && c.config.Bugs.NoRenegotiationInfoAfterInitial { |
| 1448 |
return true |
| 1449 |
} |
| 1450 |
return false |
| 1451 |
} |