| 1 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 2 |
* All rights reserved. |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 5 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 6 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 7 |
* |
| 8 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 9 |
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 10 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 11 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 12 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 13 |
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
| 14 |
* |
| 15 |
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 16 |
* the code are not to be removed. |
| 17 |
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 18 |
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 19 |
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 20 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 21 |
* |
| 22 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 23 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 24 |
* are met: |
| 25 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 26 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 27 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 28 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 29 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 30 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 31 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 32 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 33 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 34 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 35 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 36 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 37 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 38 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
| 39 |
* |
| 40 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 41 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 43 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 44 |
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 45 |
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 46 |
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 47 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 48 |
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 49 |
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 50 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 51 |
* |
| 52 |
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 53 |
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 55 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 56 |
*/ |
| 57 |
/* ==================================================================== |
| 58 |
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 59 |
* |
| 60 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 61 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 62 |
* are met: |
| 63 |
* |
| 64 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 65 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 66 |
* |
| 67 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 68 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 69 |
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 70 |
* distribution. |
| 71 |
* |
| 72 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 73 |
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 74 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 75 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 76 |
* |
| 77 |
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 78 |
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 79 |
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 80 |
* [email protected]. |
| 81 |
* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 83 |
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 84 |
* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 85 |
* |
| 86 |
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 87 |
* acknowledgment: |
| 88 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 89 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 90 |
* |
| 91 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 92 |
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 93 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 94 |
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 95 |
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 96 |
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 97 |
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 98 |
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 99 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 100 |
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 101 |
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 102 |
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 103 |
* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 106 |
* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 107 |
* Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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*/ |
| 110 |
/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| 112 |
* |
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| 114 |
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
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* |
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 117 |
* license provided above. |
| 118 |
* |
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| 120 |
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| 121 |
* |
| 122 |
*/ |
| 123 |
/* ==================================================================== |
| 124 |
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| 125 |
* |
| 126 |
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| 127 |
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 128 |
* license. |
| 129 |
* |
| 130 |
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| 131 |
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| 132 |
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| 133 |
* |
| 134 |
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| 135 |
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| 136 |
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| 137 |
* |
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| 139 |
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| 140 |
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| 141 |
* to make use of the Contribution. |
| 142 |
* |
| 143 |
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| 144 |
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| 145 |
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| 146 |
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| 147 |
* OTHERWISE. |
| 148 |
*/ |
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|
| 150 |
#include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| 151 |
|
| 152 |
#include <assert.h> |
| 153 |
#include <string.h> |
| 154 |
|
| 155 |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 156 |
#include <openssl/buf.h> |
| 157 |
#include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| 158 |
#include <openssl/dh.h> |
| 159 |
#include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| 160 |
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| 161 |
#include <openssl/err.h> |
| 162 |
#include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 163 |
#include <openssl/md5.h> |
| 164 |
#include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 165 |
#include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 166 |
#include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 167 |
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
#include "internal.h" |
| 170 |
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| 171 |
|
| 172 |
|
| 173 |
static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| 174 |
static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl); |
| 175 |
static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| 176 |
static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| 177 |
static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl); |
| 178 |
static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl); |
| 179 |
static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| 180 |
static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl); |
| 181 |
static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl); |
| 182 |
static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| 183 |
static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| 184 |
static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl); |
| 185 |
static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl); |
| 186 |
static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl); |
| 187 |
static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl); |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
int ssl3_connect(SSL *ssl) { |
| 190 |
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; |
| 191 |
int ret = -1; |
| 192 |
int state, skip = 0; |
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); |
| 195 |
assert(!ssl->server); |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
for (;;) { |
| 198 |
state = ssl->state; |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
switch (ssl->state) { |
| 201 |
case SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
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ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); |
| 203 |
|
| 204 |
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { |
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buf = BUF_MEM_new(); |
| 206 |
if (buf == NULL || |
| 207 |
!BUF_MEM_reserve(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
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ret = -1; |
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goto end; |
| 210 |
} |
| 211 |
|
| 212 |
ssl->init_buf = buf; |
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buf = NULL; |
| 214 |
} |
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ssl->init_num = 0; |
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) { |
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ret = -1; |
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goto end; |
| 220 |
} |
| 221 |
|
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ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 223 |
break; |
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
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ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(ssl); |
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if (ret <= 0) { |
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goto end; |
| 230 |
} |
| 231 |
|
| 232 |
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) { |
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ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
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} else { |
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ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; |
| 236 |
} |
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ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
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break; |
| 239 |
|
| 240 |
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: |
| 241 |
assert(SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); |
| 242 |
ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(ssl); |
| 243 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
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goto end; |
| 245 |
} |
| 246 |
if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) { |
| 247 |
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| 248 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 249 |
} else { |
| 250 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| 251 |
} |
| 252 |
break; |
| 253 |
|
| 254 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| 255 |
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(ssl); |
| 256 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 257 |
goto end; |
| 258 |
} |
| 259 |
|
| 260 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 261 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| 262 |
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| 263 |
/* receive renewed session ticket */ |
| 264 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 265 |
} |
| 266 |
} else { |
| 267 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; |
| 268 |
} |
| 269 |
break; |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: |
| 272 |
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 273 |
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(ssl); |
| 274 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 275 |
goto end; |
| 276 |
} |
| 277 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { |
| 278 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| 279 |
} else { |
| 280 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; |
| 281 |
} |
| 282 |
} else { |
| 283 |
skip = 1; |
| 284 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 285 |
} |
| 286 |
break; |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| 289 |
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(ssl); |
| 290 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 291 |
goto end; |
| 292 |
} |
| 293 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; |
| 294 |
break; |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: |
| 297 |
ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(ssl); |
| 298 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 299 |
goto end; |
| 300 |
} |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 303 |
break; |
| 304 |
|
| 305 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 306 |
ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(ssl); |
| 307 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 308 |
goto end; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 311 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; |
| 312 |
} else { |
| 313 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| 314 |
} |
| 315 |
break; |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: |
| 318 |
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(ssl); |
| 319 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 320 |
goto end; |
| 321 |
} |
| 322 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| 323 |
break; |
| 324 |
|
| 325 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| 326 |
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(ssl); |
| 327 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 328 |
goto end; |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| 331 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req) { |
| 332 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; |
| 333 |
} else { |
| 334 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 335 |
} |
| 336 |
break; |
| 337 |
|
| 338 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: |
| 339 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: |
| 340 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: |
| 341 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: |
| 342 |
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(ssl); |
| 343 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 344 |
goto end; |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 347 |
break; |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 350 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| 351 |
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(ssl); |
| 352 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 353 |
goto end; |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain |
| 356 |
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ |
| 357 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { |
| 358 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| 359 |
} else { |
| 360 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| 361 |
} |
| 362 |
break; |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| 365 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| 366 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: |
| 367 |
ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(ssl); |
| 368 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 369 |
goto end; |
| 370 |
} |
| 371 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| 372 |
break; |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: |
| 375 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: |
| 376 |
ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, |
| 377 |
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); |
| 378 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 379 |
goto end; |
| 380 |
} |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| 383 |
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 384 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| 385 |
} |
| 386 |
if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { |
| 387 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
| 391 |
ret = -1; |
| 392 |
goto end; |
| 393 |
} |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
break; |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| 398 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: |
| 399 |
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(ssl); |
| 400 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 401 |
goto end; |
| 402 |
} |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 405 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| 406 |
} else { |
| 407 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| 408 |
} |
| 409 |
break; |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| 412 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: |
| 413 |
ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(ssl); |
| 414 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 415 |
goto end; |
| 416 |
} |
| 417 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| 418 |
break; |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: |
| 421 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: |
| 422 |
ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, |
| 423 |
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B); |
| 424 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 425 |
goto end; |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 430 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| 431 |
} else { |
| 432 |
/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then |
| 433 |
* record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that |
| 434 |
* any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those |
| 435 |
* hashes. */ |
| 436 |
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl); |
| 437 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 438 |
goto end; |
| 439 |
} |
| 440 |
if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && |
| 441 |
ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) && |
| 442 |
/* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state |
| 443 |
* machine). */ |
| 444 |
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| 445 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; |
| 446 |
} else { |
| 447 |
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| 448 |
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| 449 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 450 |
} else { |
| 451 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| 452 |
} |
| 453 |
} |
| 454 |
} |
| 455 |
break; |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: |
| 458 |
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| 459 |
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| 460 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 461 |
} else { |
| 462 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| 463 |
} |
| 464 |
ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1; |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); |
| 467 |
ret = 1; |
| 468 |
goto end; |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| 471 |
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(ssl); |
| 472 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 473 |
goto end; |
| 474 |
} |
| 475 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| 476 |
break; |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
| 479 |
ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| 480 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 481 |
goto end; |
| 482 |
} |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
| 485 |
ret = -1; |
| 486 |
goto end; |
| 487 |
} |
| 488 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; |
| 489 |
break; |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: |
| 492 |
ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl); |
| 493 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 494 |
goto end; |
| 495 |
} |
| 496 |
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 499 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| 500 |
} else { |
| 501 |
ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| 502 |
} |
| 503 |
break; |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: |
| 506 |
if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { |
| 507 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| 508 |
ret = -1; |
| 509 |
goto end; |
| 510 |
} |
| 511 |
ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| 512 |
if (ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| 513 |
ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); |
| 514 |
} |
| 515 |
break; |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
case SSL_ST_OK: |
| 518 |
/* clean a few things up */ |
| 519 |
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl); |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
/* |init_buf| cannot be released in DTLS because post-handshake |
| 522 |
* retransmit relies on that buffer being available as scratch space. |
| 523 |
* |
| 524 |
* TODO(davidben): Fix this. */ |
| 525 |
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 526 |
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); |
| 527 |
ssl->init_buf = NULL; |
| 528 |
ssl->init_num = 0; |
| 529 |
} |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
/* Remove write buffering now. */ |
| 532 |
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0; |
| 537 |
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
if (is_initial_handshake) { |
| 540 |
/* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| 541 |
ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
| 542 |
} |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 545 |
ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; |
| 546 |
ssl->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
ret = 1; |
| 550 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
| 551 |
goto end; |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
default: |
| 554 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| 555 |
ret = -1; |
| 556 |
goto end; |
| 557 |
} |
| 558 |
|
| 559 |
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && ssl->state != state) { |
| 560 |
int new_state = ssl->state; |
| 561 |
ssl->state = state; |
| 562 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); |
| 563 |
ssl->state = new_state; |
| 564 |
} |
| 565 |
skip = 0; |
| 566 |
} |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
end: |
| 569 |
BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
| 570 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); |
| 571 |
return ret; |
| 572 |
} |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
static int ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { |
| 575 |
/* Prepare disabled cipher masks. */ |
| 576 |
ssl_set_client_disabled(ssl); |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
CBB child; |
| 579 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) { |
| 580 |
return 0; |
| 581 |
} |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
int any_enabled = 0; |
| 586 |
size_t i; |
| 587 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
| 588 |
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); |
| 589 |
/* Skip disabled ciphers */ |
| 590 |
if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & ssl->cert->mask_k) || |
| 591 |
(cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl->cert->mask_a)) { |
| 592 |
continue; |
| 593 |
} |
| 594 |
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > |
| 595 |
ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->client_version)) { |
| 596 |
continue; |
| 597 |
} |
| 598 |
any_enabled = 1; |
| 599 |
if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) { |
| 600 |
return 0; |
| 601 |
} |
| 602 |
} |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
/* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ |
| 605 |
if (!any_enabled) { |
| 606 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); |
| 607 |
return 0; |
| 608 |
} |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
/* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is |
| 611 |
* added. */ |
| 612 |
if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && |
| 613 |
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| 614 |
if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| 615 |
return 0; |
| 616 |
} |
| 617 |
/* The renegotiation extension is required to be at index zero. */ |
| 618 |
ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << 0); |
| 619 |
} |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) && |
| 622 |
!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| 623 |
return 0; |
| 624 |
} |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
return CBB_flush(out); |
| 627 |
} |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| 630 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B) { |
| 631 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 632 |
} |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
/* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we |
| 635 |
* may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ |
| 636 |
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) { |
| 637 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 638 |
return -1; |
| 639 |
} |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
CBB cbb; |
| 642 |
CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A); |
| 645 |
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| 646 |
uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(ssl); |
| 647 |
/* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ |
| 648 |
if (max_version == 0) { |
| 649 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| 650 |
goto err; |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
ssl->version = max_version; |
| 654 |
/* Only set |ssl->client_version| on the initial handshake. Renegotiations, |
| 655 |
* although locked to a version, reuse the value. When using the plain RSA |
| 656 |
* key exchange, the ClientHello version is checked in the premaster secret. |
| 657 |
* Some servers fail when this value changes. */ |
| 658 |
ssl->client_version = max_version; |
| 659 |
} |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
/* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled |
| 662 |
* version, drop it. */ |
| 663 |
if (ssl->session != NULL && |
| 664 |
(ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 || ssl->session->not_resumable || |
| 665 |
ssl->session->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ssl->session->time) || |
| 666 |
!ssl3_is_version_enabled(ssl, ssl->session->ssl_version))) { |
| 667 |
SSL_set_session(ssl, NULL); |
| 668 |
} |
| 669 |
|
| 670 |
/* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't |
| 671 |
* renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ |
| 672 |
if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) && |
| 673 |
!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->client_random, |
| 674 |
sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random), 0 /* client */)) { |
| 675 |
goto err; |
| 676 |
} |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
/* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| 679 |
int has_session = ssl->session != NULL && |
| 680 |
!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
CBB child; |
| 683 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 684 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 685 |
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->client_version) || |
| 686 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| 687 |
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 688 |
(has_session && |
| 689 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id, |
| 690 |
ssl->session->session_id_length))) { |
| 691 |
goto err; |
| 692 |
} |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 695 |
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 696 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) { |
| 697 |
goto err; |
| 698 |
} |
| 699 |
} |
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
size_t length; |
| 702 |
if (!ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, &cbb) || |
| 703 |
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 1 /* one compression method */) || |
| 704 |
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* null compression */) || |
| 705 |
!ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb, |
| 706 |
CBB_len(&cbb) + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 707 |
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 708 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, length)) { |
| 709 |
goto err; |
| 710 |
} |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| 713 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
err: |
| 716 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 717 |
return -1; |
| 718 |
} |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl) { |
| 721 |
long n; |
| 722 |
int al, ok = 0; |
| 723 |
CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; |
| 724 |
uint16_t server_version; |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
if (!ok) { |
| 729 |
return n; |
| 730 |
} |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { |
| 733 |
ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0; |
| 734 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 735 |
return 1; |
| 736 |
} |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) || |
| 741 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) || |
| 742 |
CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) { |
| 743 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 744 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 745 |
goto f_err; |
| 746 |
} |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie)) { |
| 749 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 750 |
goto f_err; |
| 751 |
} |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)); |
| 754 |
ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie); |
| 755 |
|
| 756 |
ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1; |
| 757 |
return 1; |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
f_err: |
| 760 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 761 |
return -1; |
| 762 |
} |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| 765 |
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| 766 |
const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| 767 |
CERT *ct = ssl->cert; |
| 768 |
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; |
| 769 |
long n; |
| 770 |
CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; |
| 771 |
uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; |
| 772 |
uint8_t compression_method; |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, ssl_hash_message, |
| 775 |
&ok); |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
if (!ok) { |
| 778 |
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| 779 |
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && |
| 780 |
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { |
| 781 |
/* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert |
| 782 |
* in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and |
| 783 |
* gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial |
| 784 |
* parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. |
| 785 |
* |
| 786 |
* See https://crbug.com/446505. */ |
| 787 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); |
| 788 |
} |
| 789 |
return n; |
| 790 |
} |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) || |
| 795 |
!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| 796 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || |
| 797 |
CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || |
| 798 |
!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || |
| 799 |
!CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { |
| 800 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 801 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 802 |
goto f_err; |
| 803 |
} |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); |
| 806 |
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| 807 |
if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(ssl, server_version)) { |
| 808 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
| 809 |
ssl->version = server_version; |
| 810 |
/* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped |
| 811 |
* to TLS 1.0. */ |
| 812 |
ssl->s3->have_version = 1; |
| 813 |
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 814 |
goto f_err; |
| 815 |
} |
| 816 |
ssl->version = server_version; |
| 817 |
ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); |
| 818 |
assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL); |
| 819 |
/* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is |
| 820 |
* fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ |
| 821 |
ssl->s3->have_version = 1; |
| 822 |
} else if (server_version != ssl->version) { |
| 823 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| 824 |
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 825 |
goto f_err; |
| 826 |
} |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
/* Copy over the server random. */ |
| 829 |
memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
assert(ssl->session == NULL || ssl->session->session_id_length > 0); |
| 832 |
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL && |
| 833 |
CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, |
| 834 |
ssl->session->session_id_length)) { |
| 835 |
if (ssl->sid_ctx_length != ssl->session->sid_ctx_length || |
| 836 |
memcmp(ssl->session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length)) { |
| 837 |
/* actually a client application bug */ |
| 838 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 839 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, |
| 840 |
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); |
| 841 |
goto f_err; |
| 842 |
} |
| 843 |
ssl->hit = 1; |
| 844 |
} else { |
| 845 |
/* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to |
| 846 |
* fill out. */ |
| 847 |
ssl->hit = 0; |
| 848 |
if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0 /* client */)) { |
| 849 |
goto f_err; |
| 850 |
} |
| 851 |
/* Note: session_id could be empty. */ |
| 852 |
ssl->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); |
| 853 |
memcpy(ssl->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), |
| 854 |
CBS_len(&session_id)); |
| 855 |
} |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| 858 |
if (c == NULL) { |
| 859 |
/* unknown cipher */ |
| 860 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 861 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| 862 |
goto f_err; |
| 863 |
} |
| 864 |
/* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if |
| 865 |
* the server selected it, it's an error. */ |
| 866 |
if ((c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) || |
| 867 |
SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) { |
| 868 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 869 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| 870 |
goto f_err; |
| 871 |
} |
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(ssl); |
| 874 |
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { |
| 875 |
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */ |
| 876 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 877 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| 878 |
goto f_err; |
| 879 |
} |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 882 |
if (ssl->session->cipher != c) { |
| 883 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 884 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); |
| 885 |
goto f_err; |
| 886 |
} |
| 887 |
if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { |
| 888 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 889 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); |
| 890 |
goto f_err; |
| 891 |
} |
| 892 |
} else { |
| 893 |
ssl->session->cipher = c; |
| 894 |
} |
| 895 |
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; |
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
/* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ |
| 898 |
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) { |
| 899 |
goto f_err; |
| 900 |
} |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
/* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client |
| 903 |
* certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a |
| 904 |
* different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */ |
| 905 |
if (ssl->hit || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION || |
| 906 |
!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 907 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 908 |
} |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
/* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ |
| 911 |
if (compression_method != 0) { |
| 912 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 913 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
| 914 |
goto f_err; |
| 915 |
} |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
/* TLS extensions */ |
| 918 |
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &server_hello)) { |
| 919 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| 920 |
goto err; |
| 921 |
} |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
/* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| 924 |
if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { |
| 925 |
/* wrong packet length */ |
| 926 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 927 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); |
| 928 |
goto f_err; |
| 929 |
} |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
if (ssl->hit && |
| 932 |
ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != |
| 933 |
ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| 934 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 935 |
if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| 936 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| 937 |
} else { |
| 938 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| 939 |
} |
| 940 |
goto f_err; |
| 941 |
} |
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
return 1; |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
f_err: |
| 946 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 947 |
err: |
| 948 |
return -1; |
| 949 |
} |
| 950 |
|
| 951 |
/* ssl3_check_leaf_certificate returns one if |leaf| is a suitable leaf server |
| 952 |
* certificate for |ssl|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error on the |
| 953 |
* error queue. */ |
| 954 |
static int ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) { |
| 955 |
int ret = 0; |
| 956 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); |
| 957 |
if (pkey == NULL) { |
| 958 |
goto err; |
| 959 |
} |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
/* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ |
| 962 |
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| 963 |
int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); |
| 964 |
assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); |
| 965 |
if (pkey->type != expected_type) { |
| 966 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| 967 |
goto err; |
| 968 |
} |
| 969 |
|
| 970 |
if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { |
| 971 |
/* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key |
| 972 |
* usages be checked in other cases as well? */ |
| 973 |
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ |
| 974 |
X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); |
| 975 |
if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && |
| 976 |
!(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { |
| 977 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
| 978 |
goto err; |
| 979 |
} |
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, leaf)) { |
| 982 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); |
| 983 |
goto err; |
| 984 |
} |
| 985 |
} |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
ret = 1; |
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
err: |
| 990 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 991 |
return ret; |
| 992 |
} |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| 995 |
int al, ok, ret = -1; |
| 996 |
unsigned long n; |
| 997 |
X509 *x = NULL; |
| 998 |
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
| 999 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| 1000 |
CBS cbs, certificate_list; |
| 1001 |
const uint8_t *data; |
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, ssl_hash_message, |
| 1004 |
&ok); |
| 1005 |
|
| 1006 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1007 |
return n; |
| 1008 |
} |
| 1009 |
|
| 1010 |
CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
sk = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| 1013 |
if (sk == NULL) { |
| 1014 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1015 |
goto err; |
| 1016 |
} |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || |
| 1019 |
CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 || |
| 1020 |
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { |
| 1021 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1022 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1023 |
goto f_err; |
| 1024 |
} |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| 1027 |
CBS certificate; |
| 1028 |
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { |
| 1029 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1030 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1031 |
goto f_err; |
| 1032 |
} |
| 1033 |
/* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ |
| 1034 |
data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| 1035 |
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| 1036 |
if (x == NULL) { |
| 1037 |
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| 1038 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| 1039 |
goto f_err; |
| 1040 |
} |
| 1041 |
if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { |
| 1042 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1043 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1044 |
goto f_err; |
| 1045 |
} |
| 1046 |
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
| 1047 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1048 |
goto err; |
| 1049 |
} |
| 1050 |
x = NULL; |
| 1051 |
} |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); |
| 1054 |
if (!ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(ssl, leaf)) { |
| 1055 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1056 |
goto f_err; |
| 1057 |
} |
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
/* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes |
| 1060 |
* the leaf. */ |
| 1061 |
sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| 1062 |
ssl->session->cert_chain = sk; |
| 1063 |
sk = NULL; |
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
X509_free(ssl->session->peer); |
| 1066 |
ssl->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf); |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result; |
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 |
ret = 1; |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
if (0) { |
| 1073 |
f_err: |
| 1074 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1075 |
} |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
err: |
| 1078 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1079 |
X509_free(x); |
| 1080 |
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); |
| 1081 |
return ret; |
| 1082 |
} |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1085 |
int ok, al; |
| 1086 |
long n; |
| 1087 |
CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; |
| 1088 |
uint8_t status_type; |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1093 |
return n; |
| 1094 |
} |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
| 1097 |
/* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change |
| 1098 |
* its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ |
| 1099 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 1100 |
return 1; |
| 1101 |
} |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1104 |
if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || |
| 1105 |
status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || |
| 1106 |
!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || |
| 1107 |
CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || |
| 1108 |
CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { |
| 1109 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1110 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1111 |
goto f_err; |
| 1112 |
} |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->session->ocsp_response, |
| 1115 |
&ssl->session->ocsp_response_length)) { |
| 1116 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1117 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1118 |
goto f_err; |
| 1119 |
} |
| 1120 |
return 1; |
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
f_err: |
| 1123 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1124 |
return -1; |
| 1125 |
} |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1128 |
int ret = ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, ssl->session->cert_chain); |
| 1129 |
if (ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && ret <= 0) { |
| 1130 |
int al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result); |
| 1131 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1132 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| 1133 |
} else { |
| 1134 |
ret = 1; |
| 1135 |
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep ssl->verify_result */ |
| 1136 |
} |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
return ret; |
| 1139 |
} |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1142 |
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| 1143 |
int al, ok; |
| 1144 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| 1145 |
DH *dh = NULL; |
| 1146 |
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; |
| 1147 |
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1150 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1151 |
return n; |
| 1152 |
} |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
| 1155 |
if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 1156 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1157 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1158 |
return -1; |
| 1159 |
} |
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 |
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange may be omitted to send no |
| 1162 |
* identity hint. */ |
| 1163 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1164 |
/* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the |
| 1165 |
* handshake state. */ |
| 1166 |
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint); |
| 1167 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| 1168 |
} |
| 1169 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 1170 |
return 1; |
| 1171 |
} |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
/* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ |
| 1174 |
CBS server_key_exchange; |
| 1175 |
CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1176 |
CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; |
| 1177 |
|
| 1178 |
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1179 |
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1180 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1183 |
CBS psk_identity_hint; |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
/* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ |
| 1186 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, |
| 1187 |
&psk_identity_hint)) { |
| 1188 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1189 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1190 |
goto f_err; |
| 1191 |
} |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in |
| 1194 |
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK |
| 1195 |
* identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. |
| 1196 |
* Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. |
| 1197 |
* |
| 1198 |
* TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than |
| 1199 |
* a specific identity. */ |
| 1200 |
if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| 1201 |
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { |
| 1202 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1203 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 1204 |
goto f_err; |
| 1205 |
} |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
/* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ |
| 1208 |
if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) { |
| 1209 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1210 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1211 |
goto f_err; |
| 1212 |
} |
| 1213 |
} |
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { |
| 1216 |
CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; |
| 1217 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || |
| 1218 |
CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || |
| 1219 |
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || |
| 1220 |
CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || |
| 1221 |
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || |
| 1222 |
CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { |
| 1223 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1224 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1225 |
goto f_err; |
| 1226 |
} |
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
dh = DH_new(); |
| 1229 |
if (dh == NULL) { |
| 1230 |
goto err; |
| 1231 |
} |
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL); |
| 1234 |
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL); |
| 1235 |
if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { |
| 1236 |
goto err; |
| 1237 |
} |
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 |
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh); |
| 1240 |
if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info < 1024) { |
| 1241 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); |
| 1242 |
goto err; |
| 1243 |
} else if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info > 4096) { |
| 1244 |
/* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit |
| 1245 |
* to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a |
| 1246 |
* computation. */ |
| 1247 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG); |
| 1248 |
goto err; |
| 1249 |
} |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh); |
| 1252 |
dh = NULL; |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
/* Save the peer public key for later. */ |
| 1255 |
size_t peer_key_len; |
| 1256 |
if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { |
| 1257 |
goto err; |
| 1258 |
} |
| 1259 |
/* |dh_Ys| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len |
| 1260 |
* fits in a uint16_t. */ |
| 1261 |
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); |
| 1262 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; |
| 1263 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { |
| 1264 |
/* Parse the server parameters. */ |
| 1265 |
uint8_t group_type; |
| 1266 |
uint16_t group_id; |
| 1267 |
CBS point; |
| 1268 |
if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) || |
| 1269 |
group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || |
| 1270 |
!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) || |
| 1271 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { |
| 1272 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1273 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1274 |
goto f_err; |
| 1275 |
} |
| 1276 |
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = group_id; |
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
/* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */ |
| 1279 |
if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { |
| 1280 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1281 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); |
| 1282 |
goto f_err; |
| 1283 |
} |
| 1284 |
|
| 1285 |
/* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */ |
| 1286 |
size_t peer_key_len; |
| 1287 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, group_id) || |
| 1288 |
!CBS_stow(&point, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { |
| 1289 |
goto err; |
| 1290 |
} |
| 1291 |
/* |point| was initialized with CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len |
| 1292 |
* fits in a uint16_t. */ |
| 1293 |
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); |
| 1294 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; |
| 1295 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) { |
| 1296 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, SSL_GROUP_CECPQ1)) { |
| 1297 |
goto err; |
| 1298 |
} |
| 1299 |
CBS key; |
| 1300 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &key)) { |
| 1301 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1302 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1303 |
goto f_err; |
| 1304 |
} |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
size_t peer_key_len; |
| 1307 |
if (!CBS_stow(&key, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { |
| 1308 |
goto err; |
| 1309 |
} |
| 1310 |
/* |key| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len |
| 1311 |
* fits in a uint16_t. */ |
| 1312 |
assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); |
| 1313 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; |
| 1314 |
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| 1315 |
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1316 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1317 |
goto f_err; |
| 1318 |
} |
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
/* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while |
| 1321 |
* |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive |
| 1322 |
* a CBS containing just the parameter. */ |
| 1323 |
CBS parameter; |
| 1324 |
CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), |
| 1325 |
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); |
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
/* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ |
| 1328 |
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 1329 |
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer); |
| 1330 |
if (pkey == NULL) { |
| 1331 |
goto err; |
| 1332 |
} |
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| 1335 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1336 |
uint8_t hash, signature; |
| 1337 |
if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &hash) || |
| 1338 |
!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &signature)) { |
| 1339 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1340 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1341 |
goto f_err; |
| 1342 |
} |
| 1343 |
if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature, pkey)) { |
| 1344 |
goto f_err; |
| 1345 |
} |
| 1346 |
ssl->s3->tmp.server_key_exchange_hash = hash; |
| 1347 |
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| 1348 |
md = EVP_md5_sha1(); |
| 1349 |
} else { |
| 1350 |
md = EVP_sha1(); |
| 1351 |
} |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
/* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ |
| 1354 |
CBS signature; |
| 1355 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || |
| 1356 |
CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { |
| 1357 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1358 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1359 |
goto f_err; |
| 1360 |
} |
| 1361 |
|
| 1362 |
int sig_ok = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) && |
| 1363 |
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, |
| 1364 |
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && |
| 1365 |
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, |
| 1366 |
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && |
| 1367 |
EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), |
| 1368 |
CBS_len(¶meter)) && |
| 1369 |
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), |
| 1370 |
CBS_len(&signature)); |
| 1371 |
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| 1372 |
sig_ok = 1; |
| 1373 |
ERR_clear_error(); |
| 1374 |
#endif |
| 1375 |
if (!sig_ok) { |
| 1376 |
/* bad signature */ |
| 1377 |
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 1378 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| 1379 |
goto f_err; |
| 1380 |
} |
| 1381 |
} else { |
| 1382 |
/* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ |
| 1383 |
assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); |
| 1384 |
|
| 1385 |
if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { |
| 1386 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1387 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); |
| 1388 |
goto f_err; |
| 1389 |
} |
| 1390 |
} |
| 1391 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1392 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 1393 |
return 1; |
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
f_err: |
| 1396 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1397 |
err: |
| 1398 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1399 |
DH_free(dh); |
| 1400 |
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| 1401 |
EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| 1402 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 1403 |
return -1; |
| 1404 |
} |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { |
| 1407 |
return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); |
| 1408 |
} |
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 |
static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1411 |
int ok, ret = 0; |
| 1412 |
X509_NAME *xn = NULL; |
| 1413 |
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
| 1414 |
|
| 1415 |
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1416 |
|
| 1417 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1418 |
return n; |
| 1419 |
} |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { |
| 1424 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 1425 |
/* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing |
| 1426 |
* client auth. */ |
| 1427 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1428 |
return 1; |
| 1429 |
} |
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
| 1432 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1433 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1434 |
goto err; |
| 1435 |
} |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
CBS cbs; |
| 1438 |
CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); |
| 1441 |
if (ca_sk == NULL) { |
| 1442 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1443 |
goto err; |
| 1444 |
} |
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 |
/* get the certificate types */ |
| 1447 |
CBS certificate_types; |
| 1448 |
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { |
| 1449 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1450 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1451 |
goto err; |
| 1452 |
} |
| 1453 |
|
| 1454 |
if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_types, |
| 1455 |
&ssl->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) { |
| 1456 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1457 |
goto err; |
| 1458 |
} |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1461 |
CBS supported_signature_algorithms; |
| 1462 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || |
| 1463 |
!tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { |
| 1464 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1465 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1466 |
goto err; |
| 1467 |
} |
| 1468 |
} |
| 1469 |
|
| 1470 |
/* get the CA RDNs */ |
| 1471 |
CBS certificate_authorities; |
| 1472 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) { |
| 1473 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1474 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1475 |
goto err; |
| 1476 |
} |
| 1477 |
|
| 1478 |
while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) { |
| 1479 |
CBS distinguished_name; |
| 1480 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, |
| 1481 |
&distinguished_name)) { |
| 1482 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1483 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); |
| 1484 |
goto err; |
| 1485 |
} |
| 1486 |
|
| 1487 |
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); |
| 1488 |
/* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ |
| 1489 |
xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); |
| 1490 |
if (xn == NULL || |
| 1491 |
data != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { |
| 1492 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1493 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1494 |
goto err; |
| 1495 |
} |
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { |
| 1498 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1499 |
goto err; |
| 1500 |
} |
| 1501 |
xn = NULL; |
| 1502 |
} |
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
| 1505 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; |
| 1506 |
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
| 1507 |
ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; |
| 1508 |
ca_sk = NULL; |
| 1509 |
|
| 1510 |
ret = 1; |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
err: |
| 1513 |
X509_NAME_free(xn); |
| 1514 |
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); |
| 1515 |
return ret; |
| 1516 |
} |
| 1517 |
|
| 1518 |
static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1519 |
int ok; |
| 1520 |
long n; |
| 1521 |
|
| 1522 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, |
| 1523 |
ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1526 |
return n; |
| 1527 |
} |
| 1528 |
|
| 1529 |
if (n > 0) { |
| 1530 |
/* should contain no data */ |
| 1531 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1532 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1533 |
return -1; |
| 1534 |
} |
| 1535 |
|
| 1536 |
return 1; |
| 1537 |
} |
| 1538 |
|
| 1539 |
/* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is |
| 1540 |
* configured. */ |
| 1541 |
static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1542 |
return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); |
| 1543 |
} |
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 |
static int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509, |
| 1546 |
EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { |
| 1547 |
if (ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { |
| 1548 |
return 0; |
| 1549 |
} |
| 1550 |
|
| 1551 |
int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, out_x509, out_pkey); |
| 1552 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 1553 |
return ret; |
| 1554 |
} |
| 1555 |
|
| 1556 |
assert(*out_x509 != NULL); |
| 1557 |
assert(*out_pkey != NULL); |
| 1558 |
return 1; |
| 1559 |
} |
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1562 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { |
| 1563 |
/* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */ |
| 1564 |
if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { |
| 1565 |
int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| 1566 |
if (ret < 0) { |
| 1567 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| 1568 |
return -1; |
| 1569 |
} |
| 1570 |
if (ret == 0) { |
| 1571 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1572 |
return -1; |
| 1573 |
} |
| 1574 |
} |
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 |
if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) { |
| 1577 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| 1578 |
} else { |
| 1579 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| 1580 |
} |
| 1581 |
} |
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { |
| 1584 |
/* Call client_cert_cb to update the certificate. */ |
| 1585 |
X509 *x509 = NULL; |
| 1586 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| 1587 |
int ret = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); |
| 1588 |
if (ret < 0) { |
| 1589 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| 1590 |
return -1; |
| 1591 |
} |
| 1592 |
|
| 1593 |
int setup_error = ret == 1 && (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || |
| 1594 |
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)); |
| 1595 |
X509_free(x509); |
| 1596 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1597 |
if (setup_error) { |
| 1598 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1599 |
return -1; |
| 1600 |
} |
| 1601 |
|
| 1602 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| 1603 |
} |
| 1604 |
|
| 1605 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { |
| 1606 |
if (!ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) { |
| 1607 |
/* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */ |
| 1608 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1609 |
|
| 1610 |
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| 1611 |
/* In SSL 3.0, send no certificate by skipping both messages. */ |
| 1612 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; |
| 1613 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
| 1614 |
return 1; |
| 1615 |
} |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
/* In TLS, send an empty Certificate message. */ |
| 1618 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; |
| 1619 |
uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 1620 |
l2n3(0, p); |
| 1621 |
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, 3)) { |
| 1622 |
return -1; |
| 1623 |
} |
| 1624 |
} else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { |
| 1625 |
return -1; |
| 1626 |
} |
| 1627 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; |
| 1628 |
} |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D); |
| 1631 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1632 |
} |
| 1633 |
|
| 1634 |
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned), |
| 1635 |
SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED); |
| 1636 |
|
| 1637 |
static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1638 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B) { |
| 1639 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1640 |
} |
| 1641 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A); |
| 1642 |
|
| 1643 |
uint8_t *pms = NULL; |
| 1644 |
size_t pms_len = 0; |
| 1645 |
CBB cbb; |
| 1646 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1647 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { |
| 1648 |
goto err; |
| 1649 |
} |
| 1650 |
|
| 1651 |
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1652 |
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
/* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ |
| 1655 |
unsigned psk_len = 0; |
| 1656 |
uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| 1657 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1658 |
if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { |
| 1659 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); |
| 1660 |
goto err; |
| 1661 |
} |
| 1662 |
|
| 1663 |
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; |
| 1664 |
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
| 1665 |
psk_len = ssl->psk_client_callback( |
| 1666 |
ssl, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity), |
| 1667 |
psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| 1668 |
if (psk_len == 0) { |
| 1669 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| 1670 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 1671 |
goto err; |
| 1672 |
} |
| 1673 |
assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); |
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
OPENSSL_free(ssl->session->psk_identity); |
| 1676 |
ssl->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); |
| 1677 |
if (ssl->session->psk_identity == NULL) { |
| 1678 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1679 |
goto err; |
| 1680 |
} |
| 1681 |
|
| 1682 |
/* Write out psk_identity. */ |
| 1683 |
CBB child; |
| 1684 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1685 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity, |
| 1686 |
OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) || |
| 1687 |
!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { |
| 1688 |
goto err; |
| 1689 |
} |
| 1690 |
} |
| 1691 |
|
| 1692 |
/* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ |
| 1693 |
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { |
| 1694 |
pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| 1695 |
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| 1696 |
if (pms == NULL) { |
| 1697 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1698 |
goto err; |
| 1699 |
} |
| 1700 |
|
| 1701 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer); |
| 1702 |
if (pkey == NULL) { |
| 1703 |
goto err; |
| 1704 |
} |
| 1705 |
|
| 1706 |
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); |
| 1707 |
if (rsa == NULL) { |
| 1708 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1709 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1710 |
goto err; |
| 1711 |
} |
| 1712 |
|
| 1713 |
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
| 1714 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1715 |
|
| 1716 |
pms[0] = ssl->client_version >> 8; |
| 1717 |
pms[1] = ssl->client_version & 0xff; |
| 1718 |
if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { |
| 1719 |
goto err; |
| 1720 |
} |
| 1721 |
|
| 1722 |
CBB child, *enc_pms = &cbb; |
| 1723 |
size_t enc_pms_len; |
| 1724 |
/* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */ |
| 1725 |
if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { |
| 1726 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child)) { |
| 1727 |
goto err; |
| 1728 |
} |
| 1729 |
enc_pms = &child; |
| 1730 |
} |
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
uint8_t *ptr; |
| 1733 |
if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) || |
| 1734 |
!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, |
| 1735 |
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) || |
| 1736 |
/* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| 1737 |
!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(ssl, ptr, enc_pms_len, pms, pms_len) || |
| 1738 |
!CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) || |
| 1739 |
!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { |
| 1740 |
goto err; |
| 1741 |
} |
| 1742 |
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE|SSL_kCECPQ1)) { |
| 1743 |
/* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */ |
| 1744 |
CBB child; |
| 1745 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &cbb, &child)) { |
| 1746 |
goto err; |
| 1747 |
} |
| 1748 |
|
| 1749 |
/* Compute the premaster. */ |
| 1750 |
uint8_t alert; |
| 1751 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, |
| 1752 |
&alert, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, |
| 1753 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len)) { |
| 1754 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| 1755 |
goto err; |
| 1756 |
} |
| 1757 |
if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { |
| 1758 |
goto err; |
| 1759 |
} |
| 1760 |
|
| 1761 |
/* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ |
| 1762 |
SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx); |
| 1763 |
OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key); |
| 1764 |
ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key = NULL; |
| 1765 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { |
| 1766 |
/* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as |
| 1767 |
* the pre-shared key. */ |
| 1768 |
pms_len = psk_len; |
| 1769 |
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| 1770 |
if (pms == NULL) { |
| 1771 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1772 |
goto err; |
| 1773 |
} |
| 1774 |
memset(pms, 0, pms_len); |
| 1775 |
} else { |
| 1776 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 1777 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1778 |
goto err; |
| 1779 |
} |
| 1780 |
|
| 1781 |
/* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared |
| 1782 |
* key. */ |
| 1783 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1784 |
CBB pms_cbb, child; |
| 1785 |
uint8_t *new_pms; |
| 1786 |
size_t new_pms_len; |
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
CBB_zero(&pms_cbb); |
| 1789 |
if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || |
| 1790 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || |
| 1791 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || |
| 1792 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || |
| 1793 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || |
| 1794 |
!CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { |
| 1795 |
CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb); |
| 1796 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1797 |
goto err; |
| 1798 |
} |
| 1799 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| 1800 |
OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| 1801 |
pms = new_pms; |
| 1802 |
pms_len = new_pms_len; |
| 1803 |
} |
| 1804 |
|
| 1805 |
/* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the |
| 1806 |
* master secret. */ |
| 1807 |
size_t length; |
| 1808 |
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 1809 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) { |
| 1810 |
goto err; |
| 1811 |
} |
| 1812 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| 1813 |
|
| 1814 |
ssl->session->master_key_length = |
| 1815 |
tls1_generate_master_secret(ssl, ssl->session->master_key, pms, pms_len); |
| 1816 |
if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) { |
| 1817 |
goto err; |
| 1818 |
} |
| 1819 |
ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; |
| 1820 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| 1821 |
OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| 1822 |
|
| 1823 |
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ |
| 1824 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
err: |
| 1827 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 1828 |
if (pms != NULL) { |
| 1829 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| 1830 |
OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| 1831 |
} |
| 1832 |
return -1; |
| 1833 |
} |
| 1834 |
|
| 1835 |
static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1836 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C) { |
| 1837 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1838 |
} |
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 |
CBB cbb, child; |
| 1841 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1842 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { |
| 1843 |
goto err; |
| 1844 |
} |
| 1845 |
|
| 1846 |
assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl)); |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); |
| 1849 |
size_t sig_len; |
| 1850 |
enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; |
| 1851 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { |
| 1852 |
/* Select and write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */ |
| 1853 |
const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| 1854 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1855 |
md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl); |
| 1856 |
if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) { |
| 1857 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1858 |
goto err; |
| 1859 |
} |
| 1860 |
} |
| 1861 |
|
| 1862 |
/* Compute the digest. In TLS 1.1 and below, the digest type is also |
| 1863 |
* selected here. */ |
| 1864 |
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1865 |
size_t digest_len; |
| 1866 |
if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len, &md, |
| 1867 |
ssl_private_key_type(ssl))) { |
| 1868 |
goto err; |
| 1869 |
} |
| 1870 |
|
| 1871 |
/* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ |
| 1872 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1873 |
|
| 1874 |
/* Sign the digest. */ |
| 1875 |
uint8_t *ptr; |
| 1876 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1877 |
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { |
| 1878 |
goto err; |
| 1879 |
} |
| 1880 |
sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md, |
| 1881 |
digest, digest_len); |
| 1882 |
} else { |
| 1883 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B); |
| 1884 |
|
| 1885 |
/* Skip over the already written signature algorithm and retry the |
| 1886 |
* signature. */ |
| 1887 |
uint8_t *ptr; |
| 1888 |
if ((ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && |
| 1889 |
!CBB_did_write(&cbb, 2)) || |
| 1890 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1891 |
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { |
| 1892 |
goto err; |
| 1893 |
} |
| 1894 |
sign_result = |
| 1895 |
ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); |
| 1896 |
} |
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
switch (sign_result) { |
| 1899 |
case ssl_private_key_success: |
| 1900 |
break; |
| 1901 |
case ssl_private_key_failure: |
| 1902 |
goto err; |
| 1903 |
case ssl_private_key_retry: |
| 1904 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| 1905 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; |
| 1906 |
goto err; |
| 1907 |
} |
| 1908 |
|
| 1909 |
size_t length; |
| 1910 |
if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || |
| 1911 |
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 1912 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, length)) { |
| 1913 |
goto err; |
| 1914 |
} |
| 1915 |
|
| 1916 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; |
| 1917 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1918 |
|
| 1919 |
err: |
| 1920 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 1921 |
return -1; |
| 1922 |
} |
| 1923 |
|
| 1924 |
static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1925 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B) { |
| 1926 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1927 |
} |
| 1928 |
|
| 1929 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A); |
| 1930 |
|
| 1931 |
static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0}; |
| 1932 |
size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32); |
| 1933 |
|
| 1934 |
CBB cbb, child; |
| 1935 |
size_t length; |
| 1936 |
CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| 1937 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1938 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 1939 |
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1940 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, |
| 1941 |
ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) || |
| 1942 |
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1943 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) || |
| 1944 |
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 1945 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, length)) { |
| 1946 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1947 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 1948 |
return -1; |
| 1949 |
} |
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; |
| 1952 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1953 |
} |
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1956 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B) { |
| 1957 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1958 |
} |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A); |
| 1961 |
|
| 1962 |
if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL && |
| 1963 |
ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb != NULL) { |
| 1964 |
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; |
| 1965 |
ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(ssl, &key); |
| 1966 |
if (key != NULL && |
| 1967 |
!SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(ssl, key)) { |
| 1968 |
EVP_PKEY_free(key); |
| 1969 |
return -1; |
| 1970 |
} |
| 1971 |
EVP_PKEY_free(key); |
| 1972 |
} |
| 1973 |
|
| 1974 |
if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { |
| 1975 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| 1976 |
return -1; |
| 1977 |
} |
| 1978 |
|
| 1979 |
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| 1980 |
if (ec_key == NULL) { |
| 1981 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1982 |
return -1; |
| 1983 |
} |
| 1984 |
|
| 1985 |
int ret = -1; |
| 1986 |
BIGNUM *x = BN_new(); |
| 1987 |
BIGNUM *y = BN_new(); |
| 1988 |
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; |
| 1989 |
if (x == NULL || y == NULL || |
| 1990 |
!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key), |
| 1991 |
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key), |
| 1992 |
x, y, NULL)) { |
| 1993 |
goto err; |
| 1994 |
} |
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 |
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1997 |
size_t digest_len; |
| 1998 |
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len)) { |
| 1999 |
goto err; |
| 2000 |
} |
| 2001 |
|
| 2002 |
sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); |
| 2003 |
if (sig == NULL) { |
| 2004 |
goto err; |
| 2005 |
} |
| 2006 |
|
| 2007 |
CBB cbb, child; |
| 2008 |
size_t length; |
| 2009 |
CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| 2010 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 2011 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 2012 |
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || |
| 2013 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 2014 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x) || |
| 2015 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y) || |
| 2016 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) || |
| 2017 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) || |
| 2018 |
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 2019 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| 2020 |
length)) { |
| 2021 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 2022 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 2023 |
goto err; |
| 2024 |
} |
| 2025 |
|
| 2026 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; |
| 2027 |
ret = ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 2028 |
|
| 2029 |
err: |
| 2030 |
BN_free(x); |
| 2031 |
BN_free(y); |
| 2032 |
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
| 2033 |
return ret; |
| 2034 |
} |
| 2035 |
|
| 2036 |
static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) { |
| 2037 |
int ok, al; |
| 2038 |
long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
| 2039 |
ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 2040 |
|
| 2041 |
if (!ok) { |
| 2042 |
return n; |
| 2043 |
} |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; |
| 2046 |
uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| 2047 |
CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 2048 |
if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || |
| 2049 |
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || |
| 2050 |
CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { |
| 2051 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2052 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 2053 |
goto f_err; |
| 2054 |
} |
| 2055 |
|
| 2056 |
if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) { |
| 2057 |
/* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after |
| 2058 |
* negotiating the extension. The value of |tlsext_ticket_expected| is |
| 2059 |
* checked in |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary |
| 2060 |
* update. */ |
| 2061 |
ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| 2062 |
return 1; |
| 2063 |
} |
| 2064 |
|
| 2065 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 2066 |
/* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are |
| 2067 |
* immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the |
| 2068 |
* existing session. */ |
| 2069 |
uint8_t *bytes; |
| 2070 |
size_t bytes_len; |
| 2071 |
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) { |
| 2072 |
goto err; |
| 2073 |
} |
| 2074 |
SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len); |
| 2075 |
OPENSSL_free(bytes); |
| 2076 |
if (new_session == NULL) { |
| 2077 |
/* This should never happen. */ |
| 2078 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 2079 |
goto err; |
| 2080 |
} |
| 2081 |
|
| 2082 |
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| 2083 |
ssl->session = new_session; |
| 2084 |
} |
| 2085 |
|
| 2086 |
if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &ssl->session->tlsext_tick, |
| 2087 |
&ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { |
| 2088 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2089 |
goto err; |
| 2090 |
} |
| 2091 |
ssl->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| 2092 |
|
| 2093 |
/* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use |
| 2094 |
* the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in |
| 2095 |
* with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ |
| 2096 |
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), ssl->session->session_id, |
| 2097 |
&ssl->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { |
| 2098 |
goto err; |
| 2099 |
} |
| 2100 |
|
| 2101 |
return 1; |
| 2102 |
|
| 2103 |
f_err: |
| 2104 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 2105 |
err: |
| 2106 |
return -1; |
| 2107 |
} |