| 1 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 2 |
* All rights reserved. |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 5 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 6 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 7 |
* |
| 8 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 9 |
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 10 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 11 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 12 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 13 |
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
| 14 |
* |
| 15 |
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 16 |
* the code are not to be removed. |
| 17 |
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 18 |
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 19 |
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 20 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 21 |
* |
| 22 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 23 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 24 |
* are met: |
| 25 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 26 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 27 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 28 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 29 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 30 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 31 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 32 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 33 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 34 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 35 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 36 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 37 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 38 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
| 39 |
* |
| 40 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 41 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 43 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 44 |
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 45 |
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 46 |
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 47 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 48 |
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 49 |
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 50 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 51 |
* |
| 52 |
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 53 |
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 54 |
* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 55 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 56 |
*/ |
| 57 |
/* ==================================================================== |
| 58 |
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 59 |
* |
| 60 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 61 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 62 |
* are met: |
| 63 |
* |
| 64 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 65 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 66 |
* |
| 67 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 68 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 69 |
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 70 |
* distribution. |
| 71 |
* |
| 72 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 73 |
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 74 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 75 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 76 |
* |
| 77 |
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 78 |
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 79 |
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 80 |
* [email protected]. |
| 81 |
* |
| 82 |
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 83 |
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 84 |
* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 85 |
* |
| 86 |
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 87 |
* acknowledgment: |
| 88 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 89 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 90 |
* |
| 91 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 92 |
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 93 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 94 |
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 95 |
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 96 |
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 97 |
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 98 |
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 99 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 100 |
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 101 |
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 102 |
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 103 |
* ==================================================================== |
| 104 |
* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 106 |
* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 107 |
* Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| 112 |
* |
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| 114 |
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
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* |
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 117 |
* license provided above. |
| 118 |
* |
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| 120 |
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| 121 |
* |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| 125 |
* |
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| 127 |
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 128 |
* license. |
| 129 |
* |
| 130 |
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| 131 |
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| 132 |
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| 133 |
* |
| 134 |
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| 135 |
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| 136 |
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
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* |
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| 139 |
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| 140 |
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| 141 |
* to make use of the Contribution. |
| 142 |
* |
| 143 |
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| 144 |
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| 145 |
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| 146 |
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| 147 |
* OTHERWISE. */ |
| 148 |
|
| 149 |
#include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
#include <assert.h> |
| 152 |
#include <string.h> |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 155 |
#include <openssl/buf.h> |
| 156 |
#include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| 157 |
#include <openssl/cipher.h> |
| 158 |
#include <openssl/dh.h> |
| 159 |
#include <openssl/ec.h> |
| 160 |
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| 161 |
#include <openssl/err.h> |
| 162 |
#include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 163 |
#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 164 |
#include <openssl/md5.h> |
| 165 |
#include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 166 |
#include <openssl/nid.h> |
| 167 |
#include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 168 |
#include <openssl/sha.h> |
| 169 |
#include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
#include "internal.h" |
| 172 |
#include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| 173 |
#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| 174 |
|
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
static int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl); |
| 177 |
static int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| 178 |
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| 179 |
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| 180 |
static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| 181 |
static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL *ssl); |
| 182 |
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| 183 |
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl); |
| 184 |
static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl); |
| 185 |
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| 186 |
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| 187 |
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *ssl); |
| 188 |
static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *ssl); |
| 189 |
static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *ssl); |
| 190 |
static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl); |
| 191 |
|
| 192 |
int ssl3_accept(SSL *ssl) { |
| 193 |
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; |
| 194 |
uint32_t alg_a; |
| 195 |
int ret = -1; |
| 196 |
int state, skip = 0; |
| 197 |
|
| 198 |
assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept); |
| 199 |
assert(ssl->server); |
| 200 |
|
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for (;;) { |
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state = ssl->state; |
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|
| 204 |
switch (ssl->state) { |
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case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
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ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); |
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|
| 208 |
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { |
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buf = BUF_MEM_new(); |
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if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_reserve(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
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ret = -1; |
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goto end; |
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} |
| 214 |
ssl->init_buf = buf; |
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buf = NULL; |
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} |
| 217 |
ssl->init_num = 0; |
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
/* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a flight |
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* into a single write. */ |
| 221 |
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) { |
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ret = -1; |
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goto end; |
| 224 |
} |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
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ret = -1; |
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goto end; |
| 230 |
} |
| 231 |
|
| 232 |
if (!ssl->s3->have_version && !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
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ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES; |
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} else { |
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ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 236 |
} |
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break; |
| 238 |
|
| 239 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES: |
| 240 |
assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); |
| 241 |
ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(ssl); |
| 242 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 243 |
goto end; |
| 244 |
} |
| 245 |
/* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets ssl->state to one of |
| 246 |
* SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */ |
| 247 |
break; |
| 248 |
|
| 249 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO: |
| 250 |
assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); |
| 251 |
ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(ssl); |
| 252 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 253 |
goto end; |
| 254 |
} |
| 255 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 256 |
break; |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| 259 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| 260 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| 261 |
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(ssl); |
| 262 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 263 |
goto end; |
| 264 |
} |
| 265 |
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| 266 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| 267 |
break; |
| 268 |
|
| 269 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| 270 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| 271 |
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(ssl); |
| 272 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 273 |
goto end; |
| 274 |
} |
| 275 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 276 |
if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| 277 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 278 |
} else { |
| 279 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 280 |
} |
| 281 |
} else { |
| 282 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; |
| 283 |
} |
| 284 |
break; |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: |
| 287 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: |
| 288 |
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 289 |
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(ssl); |
| 290 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 291 |
goto end; |
| 292 |
} |
| 293 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { |
| 294 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| 295 |
} else { |
| 296 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 297 |
} |
| 298 |
} else { |
| 299 |
skip = 1; |
| 300 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
break; |
| 303 |
|
| 304 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| 305 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| 306 |
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(ssl); |
| 307 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 308 |
goto end; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 311 |
break; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 314 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| 315 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C: |
| 316 |
alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 317 |
|
| 318 |
/* PSK ciphers send ServerKeyExchange if there is an identity hint. */ |
| 319 |
if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher) || |
| 320 |
((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) { |
| 321 |
ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(ssl); |
| 322 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 323 |
goto end; |
| 324 |
} |
| 325 |
} else { |
| 326 |
skip = 1; |
| 327 |
} |
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; |
| 330 |
break; |
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: |
| 333 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: |
| 334 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
| 335 |
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(ssl); |
| 336 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 337 |
goto end; |
| 338 |
} |
| 339 |
} else { |
| 340 |
skip = 1; |
| 341 |
} |
| 342 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| 343 |
break; |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| 346 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| 347 |
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello_done(ssl); |
| 348 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 349 |
goto end; |
| 350 |
} |
| 351 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| 352 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 353 |
break; |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: |
| 356 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
| 357 |
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(ssl); |
| 358 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 359 |
goto end; |
| 360 |
} |
| 361 |
} |
| 362 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 363 |
break; |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 366 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| 367 |
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(ssl); |
| 368 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 369 |
goto end; |
| 370 |
} |
| 371 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| 372 |
break; |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| 375 |
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(ssl); |
| 376 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 377 |
goto end; |
| 378 |
} |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; |
| 381 |
break; |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: |
| 384 |
ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| 385 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 386 |
goto end; |
| 387 |
} |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
| 390 |
ret = -1; |
| 391 |
goto end; |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { |
| 395 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| 396 |
} else if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 397 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| 398 |
} else { |
| 399 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 400 |
} |
| 401 |
break; |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| 404 |
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(ssl); |
| 405 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 406 |
goto end; |
| 407 |
} |
| 408 |
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 409 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| 410 |
} else { |
| 411 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 412 |
} |
| 413 |
break; |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| 416 |
ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(ssl); |
| 417 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 418 |
goto end; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 421 |
break; |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: |
| 424 |
ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl); |
| 425 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 426 |
goto end; |
| 427 |
} |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| 430 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 431 |
ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| 432 |
} else if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| 433 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 434 |
} else { |
| 435 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 436 |
} |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
/* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake |
| 439 |
* hashes in |ssl->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID |
| 440 |
* signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */ |
| 441 |
if (!ssl->hit && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 442 |
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl); |
| 443 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 444 |
goto end; |
| 445 |
} |
| 446 |
} |
| 447 |
break; |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| 450 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| 451 |
ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(ssl); |
| 452 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 453 |
goto end; |
| 454 |
} |
| 455 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 456 |
break; |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: |
| 459 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: |
| 460 |
ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, |
| 461 |
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); |
| 462 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 463 |
goto end; |
| 464 |
} |
| 465 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { |
| 468 |
ret = -1; |
| 469 |
goto end; |
| 470 |
} |
| 471 |
break; |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: |
| 474 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: |
| 475 |
ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, |
| 476 |
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B); |
| 477 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 478 |
goto end; |
| 479 |
} |
| 480 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 481 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 482 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; |
| 483 |
} else { |
| 484 |
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| 485 |
} |
| 486 |
break; |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: |
| 489 |
if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { |
| 490 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| 491 |
ret = -1; |
| 492 |
goto end; |
| 493 |
} |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| 496 |
if (ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| 497 |
ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); |
| 498 |
} |
| 499 |
break; |
| 500 |
|
| 501 |
case SSL_ST_OK: |
| 502 |
/* clean a few things up */ |
| 503 |
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl); |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
/* In DTLS, |init_buf| cannot be released because post-handshake |
| 506 |
* retransmit relies on that buffer being available as scratch space. |
| 507 |
* |
| 508 |
* TODO(davidben): Fix this. */ |
| 509 |
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 510 |
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); |
| 511 |
ssl->init_buf = NULL; |
| 512 |
ssl->init_num = 0; |
| 513 |
} |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
/* remove buffering on output */ |
| 516 |
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); |
| 517 |
|
| 518 |
/* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it |
| 519 |
* now. */ |
| 520 |
if (ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { |
| 521 |
X509_free(ssl->session->peer); |
| 522 |
ssl->session->peer = NULL; |
| 523 |
sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| 524 |
ssl->session->cert_chain = NULL; |
| 525 |
} |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 528 |
ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; |
| 529 |
ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; |
| 530 |
ssl->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; |
| 531 |
} |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
ret = 1; |
| 540 |
goto end; |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
default: |
| 543 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| 544 |
ret = -1; |
| 545 |
goto end; |
| 546 |
} |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && ssl->state != state) { |
| 549 |
int new_state = ssl->state; |
| 550 |
ssl->state = state; |
| 551 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); |
| 552 |
ssl->state = new_state; |
| 553 |
} |
| 554 |
skip = 0; |
| 555 |
} |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
end: |
| 558 |
BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
| 559 |
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); |
| 560 |
return ret; |
| 561 |
} |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
static int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl) { |
| 564 |
/* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is |
| 565 |
* sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond |
| 566 |
* the first record. */ |
| 567 |
int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| 568 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 569 |
return ret; |
| 570 |
} |
| 571 |
assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| 572 |
const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
/* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish |
| 575 |
* to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or |
| 576 |
* V2ClientHello.) */ |
| 577 |
if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 || |
| 578 |
strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || |
| 579 |
strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 || |
| 580 |
strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) { |
| 581 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); |
| 582 |
return -1; |
| 583 |
} |
| 584 |
if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) { |
| 585 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); |
| 586 |
return -1; |
| 587 |
} |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
/* Determine if this is a V2ClientHello. */ |
| 590 |
if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO && |
| 591 |
p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
| 592 |
/* This is a V2ClientHello. */ |
| 593 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO; |
| 594 |
return 1; |
| 595 |
} |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
/* Fall through to the standard logic. */ |
| 598 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 599 |
return 1; |
| 600 |
} |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
static int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| 603 |
const uint8_t *p; |
| 604 |
int ret; |
| 605 |
CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge; |
| 606 |
size_t msg_length, rand_len; |
| 607 |
uint8_t msg_type; |
| 608 |
uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length; |
| 609 |
CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites; |
| 610 |
uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
/* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */ |
| 613 |
assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| 614 |
p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl); |
| 615 |
msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; |
| 616 |
if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) { |
| 617 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); |
| 618 |
return -1; |
| 619 |
} |
| 620 |
if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) { |
| 621 |
/* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read |
| 622 |
* |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an |
| 623 |
* (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */ |
| 624 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 625 |
return -1; |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
/* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */ |
| 629 |
ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length); |
| 630 |
if (ret <= 0) { |
| 631 |
return ret; |
| 632 |
} |
| 633 |
assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == msg_length + 2); |
| 634 |
CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length); |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
/* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake |
| 637 |
* hash. */ |
| 638 |
if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), |
| 639 |
CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) { |
| 640 |
return -1; |
| 641 |
} |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL2_VERSION, 0, |
| 644 |
CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello)); |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) || |
| 647 |
!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) || |
| 648 |
!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) || |
| 649 |
!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) || |
| 650 |
!CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) || |
| 651 |
!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) || |
| 652 |
!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) || |
| 653 |
!CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) || |
| 654 |
CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) { |
| 655 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 656 |
return -1; |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
/* msg_type has already been checked. */ |
| 660 |
assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
/* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or |
| 663 |
* left-pad with zeros as needed. */ |
| 664 |
memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 665 |
rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge); |
| 666 |
if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) { |
| 667 |
rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| 668 |
} |
| 669 |
memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge), |
| 670 |
rand_len); |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
/* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */ |
| 673 |
CBB_zero(&client_hello); |
| 674 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, |
| 675 |
ssl->init_buf->max) || |
| 676 |
!CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || |
| 677 |
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) || |
| 678 |
!CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) || |
| 679 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| 680 |
/* No session id. */ |
| 681 |
!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
| 682 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) { |
| 683 |
CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); |
| 684 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 685 |
return -1; |
| 686 |
} |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
/* Copy the cipher suites. */ |
| 689 |
while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) { |
| 690 |
uint32_t cipher_spec; |
| 691 |
if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) { |
| 692 |
CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); |
| 693 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 694 |
return -1; |
| 695 |
} |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
/* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */ |
| 698 |
if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) { |
| 699 |
continue; |
| 700 |
} |
| 701 |
if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) { |
| 702 |
CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); |
| 703 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 704 |
return -1; |
| 705 |
} |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
/* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */ |
| 709 |
if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) || |
| 710 |
!CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) { |
| 711 |
CBB_cleanup(&client_hello); |
| 712 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 713 |
return -1; |
| 714 |
} |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
/* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */ |
| 717 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 718 |
ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; |
| 719 |
ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 1; |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
/* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */ |
| 722 |
ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length); |
| 723 |
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl); |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
return 1; |
| 726 |
} |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| 729 |
int ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1; |
| 730 |
long n; |
| 731 |
const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| 732 |
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; |
| 733 |
struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx; |
| 734 |
CBS client_hello; |
| 735 |
uint16_t client_version; |
| 736 |
CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods; |
| 737 |
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1 |
| 740 |
* and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should |
| 741 |
* be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with |
| 742 |
* SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */ |
| 743 |
switch (ssl->state) { |
| 744 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| 745 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| 746 |
ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
if (!ok) { |
| 749 |
return n; |
| 750 |
} |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| 753 |
/* fallthrough */ |
| 754 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| 755 |
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| 756 |
/* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call |
| 757 |
* ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished |
| 758 |
* digest again. */ |
| 759 |
n = ssl->init_num; |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx)); |
| 762 |
early_ctx.ssl = ssl; |
| 763 |
early_ctx.client_hello = ssl->init_msg; |
| 764 |
early_ctx.client_hello_len = n; |
| 765 |
if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) { |
| 766 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 767 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED); |
| 768 |
goto f_err; |
| 769 |
} |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B && |
| 772 |
ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) { |
| 773 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; |
| 774 |
switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) { |
| 775 |
case 0: |
| 776 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; |
| 777 |
goto err; |
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
case -1: |
| 780 |
/* Connection rejected. */ |
| 781 |
al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; |
| 782 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); |
| 783 |
goto f_err; |
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
default: |
| 786 |
/* fallthrough */; |
| 787 |
} |
| 788 |
} |
| 789 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; |
| 790 |
break; |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
default: |
| 793 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| 794 |
return -1; |
| 795 |
} |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
CBS_init(&client_hello, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 798 |
if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) || |
| 799 |
!CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| 800 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) || |
| 801 |
CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| 802 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 803 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 804 |
goto f_err; |
| 805 |
} |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ: |
| 808 |
* see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ |
| 809 |
ssl->client_version = client_version; |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
/* Load the client random. */ |
| 812 |
memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { |
| 815 |
CBS cookie; |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) || |
| 818 |
CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) { |
| 819 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 820 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 821 |
goto f_err; |
| 822 |
} |
| 823 |
} |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
/* Note: This codepath may run twice if |ssl_get_prev_session| completes |
| 826 |
* asynchronously. |
| 827 |
* |
| 828 |
* TODO(davidben): Clean up the order of events around ClientHello |
| 829 |
* processing. */ |
| 830 |
if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| 831 |
/* Select version to use */ |
| 832 |
uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(ssl, client_version); |
| 833 |
if (version == 0) { |
| 834 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
| 835 |
ssl->version = ssl->client_version; |
| 836 |
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 837 |
goto f_err; |
| 838 |
} |
| 839 |
ssl->version = version; |
| 840 |
ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version); |
| 841 |
assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL); |
| 842 |
/* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is |
| 843 |
* fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ |
| 844 |
ssl->s3->have_version = 1; |
| 845 |
} else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? (ssl->client_version > ssl->version) |
| 846 |
: (ssl->client_version < ssl->version)) { |
| 847 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| 848 |
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 849 |
goto f_err; |
| 850 |
} |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
ssl->hit = 0; |
| 853 |
int send_new_ticket = 0; |
| 854 |
switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &send_new_ticket, &early_ctx)) { |
| 855 |
case ssl_session_success: |
| 856 |
break; |
| 857 |
case ssl_session_error: |
| 858 |
goto err; |
| 859 |
case ssl_session_retry: |
| 860 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; |
| 861 |
goto err; |
| 862 |
} |
| 863 |
ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket; |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
/* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but |
| 866 |
* extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS |
| 867 |
* extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result |
| 868 |
* of the normal parse later in this function. */ |
| 869 |
const uint8_t *ems_data; |
| 870 |
size_t ems_len; |
| 871 |
int have_extended_master_secret = |
| 872 |
ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION && |
| 873 |
SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(&early_ctx, |
| 874 |
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, |
| 875 |
&ems_data, &ems_len) && |
| 876 |
ems_len == 0; |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
if (session != NULL) { |
| 879 |
if (session->extended_master_secret && |
| 880 |
!have_extended_master_secret) { |
| 881 |
/* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS |
| 882 |
* is fatal to the connection. */ |
| 883 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 884 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| 885 |
goto f_err; |
| 886 |
} |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
ssl->hit = |
| 889 |
/* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version: |
| 890 |
* most clients do not accept a mismatch. */ |
| 891 |
ssl->version == session->ssl_version && |
| 892 |
/* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session |
| 893 |
* didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */ |
| 894 |
have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret; |
| 895 |
} |
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 898 |
/* Use the new session. */ |
| 899 |
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| 900 |
ssl->session = session; |
| 901 |
session = NULL; |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
ssl->verify_result = ssl->session->verify_result; |
| 904 |
} else { |
| 905 |
if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) { |
| 906 |
goto err; |
| 907 |
} |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
/* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */ |
| 910 |
if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) { |
| 911 |
ssl->session->session_id_length = 0; |
| 912 |
} |
| 913 |
} |
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL && |
| 916 |
ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&early_ctx) == 0) { |
| 917 |
/* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */ |
| 918 |
al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; |
| 919 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); |
| 920 |
goto f_err; |
| 921 |
} |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || |
| 924 |
CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 || |
| 925 |
CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0 || |
| 926 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || |
| 927 |
CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) { |
| 928 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 929 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 930 |
goto f_err; |
| 931 |
} |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(ssl, &cipher_suites); |
| 934 |
if (ciphers == NULL) { |
| 935 |
goto err; |
| 936 |
} |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */ |
| 939 |
if (ssl->hit) { |
| 940 |
size_t j; |
| 941 |
int found_cipher = 0; |
| 942 |
uint32_t id = ssl->session->cipher->id; |
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) { |
| 945 |
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j); |
| 946 |
if (c->id == id) { |
| 947 |
found_cipher = 1; |
| 948 |
break; |
| 949 |
} |
| 950 |
} |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
if (!found_cipher) { |
| 953 |
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse |
| 954 |
* it */ |
| 955 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 956 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
| 957 |
goto f_err; |
| 958 |
} |
| 959 |
} |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
/* Only null compression is supported. */ |
| 962 |
if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0, |
| 963 |
CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) { |
| 964 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 965 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
| 966 |
goto f_err; |
| 967 |
} |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
/* TLS extensions. */ |
| 970 |
if (ssl->version >= SSL3_VERSION && |
| 971 |
!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &client_hello)) { |
| 972 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| 973 |
goto err; |
| 974 |
} |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
/* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| 977 |
if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) { |
| 978 |
/* wrong packet length */ |
| 979 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 980 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); |
| 981 |
goto f_err; |
| 982 |
} |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
if (have_extended_master_secret != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { |
| 985 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 986 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT); |
| 987 |
goto f_err; |
| 988 |
} |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
/* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ |
| 991 |
if (!ssl->hit) { |
| 992 |
if (ciphers == NULL) { |
| 993 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 994 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); |
| 995 |
goto f_err; |
| 996 |
} |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
| 999 |
if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { |
| 1000 |
int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| 1001 |
if (rv == 0) { |
| 1002 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1003 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); |
| 1004 |
goto f_err; |
| 1005 |
} |
| 1006 |
if (rv < 0) { |
| 1007 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| 1008 |
goto err; |
| 1009 |
} |
| 1010 |
} |
| 1011 |
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl)); |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
if (c == NULL) { |
| 1014 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1015 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
| 1016 |
goto f_err; |
| 1017 |
} |
| 1018 |
ssl->session->cipher = c; |
| 1019 |
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; |
| 1020 |
|
| 1021 |
/* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */ |
| 1022 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER); |
| 1023 |
/* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */ |
| 1024 |
if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) && |
| 1025 |
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| 1026 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; |
| 1027 |
} |
| 1028 |
/* CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers. */ |
| 1029 |
if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 1030 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; |
| 1031 |
} |
| 1032 |
} else { |
| 1033 |
/* Session-id reuse */ |
| 1034 |
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ssl->session->cipher; |
| 1035 |
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; |
| 1036 |
} |
| 1037 |
|
| 1038 |
/* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ |
| 1039 |
if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) { |
| 1040 |
goto f_err; |
| 1041 |
} |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
/* In TLS 1.2, client authentication requires hashing the handshake transcript |
| 1044 |
* under a different hash. Otherwise, release the handshake buffer. */ |
| 1045 |
if (!ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request || |
| 1046 |
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1047 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1048 |
} |
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
/* we now have the following setup; |
| 1051 |
* client_random |
| 1052 |
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers |
| 1053 |
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers |
| 1054 |
* compression - basically ignored right now |
| 1055 |
* ssl version is set - sslv3 |
| 1056 |
* ssl->session - The ssl session has been setup. |
| 1057 |
* ssl->hit - session reuse flag |
| 1058 |
* ssl->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ |
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
ret = 1; |
| 1061 |
|
| 1062 |
if (0) { |
| 1063 |
f_err: |
| 1064 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1065 |
} |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
err: |
| 1068 |
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
| 1069 |
SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| 1070 |
return ret; |
| 1071 |
} |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1074 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B) { |
| 1075 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1076 |
} |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A); |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
/* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a |
| 1081 |
* known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */ |
| 1082 |
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid && |
| 1083 |
(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) { |
| 1084 |
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| 1085 |
} |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
/* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support |
| 1088 |
* ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the |
| 1089 |
* session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */ |
| 1090 |
if (ssl->hit && ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) { |
| 1091 |
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| 1092 |
} |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| 1095 |
1 /* server */)) { |
| 1096 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1097 |
return -1; |
| 1098 |
} |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
CBB cbb, session_id; |
| 1101 |
size_t length; |
| 1102 |
CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| 1103 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1104 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 1105 |
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->version) || |
| 1106 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| 1107 |
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id) || |
| 1108 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, |
| 1109 |
ssl->session->session_id_length) || |
| 1110 |
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl_cipher_get_value(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) || |
| 1111 |
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* no compression */) || |
| 1112 |
!ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb) || |
| 1113 |
!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 1114 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, length)) { |
| 1115 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1116 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 1117 |
return -1; |
| 1118 |
} |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; |
| 1121 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1122 |
} |
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 |
static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1125 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { |
| 1126 |
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { |
| 1127 |
return 0; |
| 1128 |
} |
| 1129 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; |
| 1130 |
} |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ |
| 1133 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1134 |
} |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1137 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { |
| 1138 |
CBB out, ocsp_response; |
| 1139 |
size_t length; |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
CBB_zero(&out); |
| 1142 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&out, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1143 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) || |
| 1144 |
!CBB_add_u8(&out, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || |
| 1145 |
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&out, &ocsp_response) || |
| 1146 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response, |
| 1147 |
ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) || |
| 1148 |
!CBB_finish(&out, NULL, &length) || |
| 1149 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, length)) { |
| 1150 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1151 |
CBB_cleanup(&out); |
| 1152 |
return -1; |
| 1153 |
} |
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; |
| 1156 |
} |
| 1157 |
|
| 1158 |
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ |
| 1159 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1160 |
} |
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1163 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C) { |
| 1164 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1165 |
} |
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
CBB cbb, child; |
| 1168 |
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl), |
| 1169 |
ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { |
| 1170 |
goto err; |
| 1171 |
} |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| 1174 |
/* This is the first iteration, so write parameters. */ |
| 1175 |
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1176 |
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1177 |
|
| 1178 |
/* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */ |
| 1179 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1180 |
size_t len = |
| 1181 |
(ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint); |
| 1182 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1183 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint, |
| 1184 |
len)) { |
| 1185 |
goto err; |
| 1186 |
} |
| 1187 |
} |
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 |
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { |
| 1190 |
/* Determine the group to use. */ |
| 1191 |
DH *params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp; |
| 1192 |
if (params == NULL && ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) { |
| 1193 |
params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb(ssl, 0, 1024); |
| 1194 |
} |
| 1195 |
if (params == NULL) { |
| 1196 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| 1197 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 1198 |
goto err; |
| 1199 |
} |
| 1200 |
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(params); |
| 1201 |
|
| 1202 |
/* Set up DH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */ |
| 1203 |
DH *dh = DHparams_dup(params); |
| 1204 |
if (dh == NULL) { |
| 1205 |
goto err; |
| 1206 |
} |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh); |
| 1209 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1210 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->p), params->p) || |
| 1211 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1212 |
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->g), params->g) || |
| 1213 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1214 |
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) { |
| 1215 |
goto err; |
| 1216 |
} |
| 1217 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { |
| 1218 |
/* Determine the group to use. */ |
| 1219 |
uint16_t group_id; |
| 1220 |
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id)) { |
| 1221 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
| 1222 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 1223 |
goto err; |
| 1224 |
} |
| 1225 |
ssl->session->key_exchange_info = group_id; |
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
/* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */ |
| 1228 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, group_id) || |
| 1229 |
!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || |
| 1230 |
!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, group_id) || |
| 1231 |
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1232 |
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) { |
| 1233 |
goto err; |
| 1234 |
} |
| 1235 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) { |
| 1236 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, SSL_GROUP_CECPQ1) || |
| 1237 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1238 |
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) { |
| 1239 |
goto err; |
| 1240 |
} |
| 1241 |
} else { |
| 1242 |
assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK); |
| 1243 |
} |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
/* Otherwise, restore |cbb| from the previous iteration. |
| 1246 |
* TODO(davidben): When |ssl->init_buf| is gone, come up with a simpler |
| 1247 |
* pattern. Probably keep the |CBB| around in the handshake state. */ |
| 1248 |
} else if (!CBB_did_write(&cbb, ssl->init_num - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) { |
| 1249 |
goto err; |
| 1250 |
} |
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
/* Add a signature. */ |
| 1253 |
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| 1254 |
if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) { |
| 1255 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1256 |
goto err; |
| 1257 |
} |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); |
| 1260 |
size_t sig_len; |
| 1261 |
enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; |
| 1262 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| 1263 |
/* This is the first iteration, so set up the signature. Sample the |
| 1264 |
* parameter length before adding a signature algorithm. */ |
| 1265 |
if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { |
| 1266 |
goto err; |
| 1267 |
} |
| 1268 |
size_t params_len = CBB_len(&cbb); |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
/* Determine signature algorithm. */ |
| 1271 |
const EVP_MD *md; |
| 1272 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1273 |
md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl); |
| 1274 |
if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) { |
| 1275 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1276 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1277 |
goto err; |
| 1278 |
} |
| 1279 |
} else if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| 1280 |
md = EVP_md5_sha1(); |
| 1281 |
} else { |
| 1282 |
md = EVP_sha1(); |
| 1283 |
} |
| 1284 |
|
| 1285 |
/* Compute the digest and sign it. */ |
| 1286 |
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1287 |
unsigned digest_len = 0; |
| 1288 |
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| 1289 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| 1290 |
int digest_ret = |
| 1291 |
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) && |
| 1292 |
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && |
| 1293 |
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && |
| 1294 |
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cbb), params_len) && |
| 1295 |
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, digest, &digest_len); |
| 1296 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 1297 |
uint8_t *ptr; |
| 1298 |
if (!digest_ret || |
| 1299 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1300 |
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { |
| 1301 |
goto err; |
| 1302 |
} |
| 1303 |
sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md, |
| 1304 |
digest, digest_len); |
| 1305 |
} else { |
| 1306 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B); |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
/* Retry the signature. */ |
| 1309 |
uint8_t *ptr; |
| 1310 |
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| 1311 |
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { |
| 1312 |
goto err; |
| 1313 |
} |
| 1314 |
sign_result = |
| 1315 |
ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); |
| 1316 |
} |
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
switch (sign_result) { |
| 1319 |
case ssl_private_key_success: |
| 1320 |
if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) { |
| 1321 |
goto err; |
| 1322 |
} |
| 1323 |
break; |
| 1324 |
case ssl_private_key_failure: |
| 1325 |
goto err; |
| 1326 |
case ssl_private_key_retry: |
| 1327 |
/* Discard the unfinished signature and save the state of |cbb| for the |
| 1328 |
* next iteration. */ |
| 1329 |
CBB_discard_child(&cbb); |
| 1330 |
ssl->init_num = SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + CBB_len(&cbb); |
| 1331 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| 1332 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| 1333 |
goto err; |
| 1334 |
} |
| 1335 |
} |
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
size_t length; |
| 1338 |
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) || |
| 1339 |
!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) { |
| 1340 |
goto err; |
| 1341 |
} |
| 1342 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C; |
| 1343 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
err: |
| 1346 |
CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| 1347 |
return -1; |
| 1348 |
} |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1351 |
uint8_t *p, *d; |
| 1352 |
size_t i; |
| 1353 |
int j, nl, off, n; |
| 1354 |
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
| 1355 |
X509_NAME *name; |
| 1356 |
BUF_MEM *buf; |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { |
| 1359 |
buf = ssl->init_buf; |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
| 1364 |
p++; |
| 1365 |
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(ssl, p); |
| 1366 |
d[0] = n; |
| 1367 |
p += n; |
| 1368 |
n++; |
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1371 |
const uint8_t *psigs; |
| 1372 |
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &psigs); |
| 1373 |
s2n(nl, p); |
| 1374 |
memcpy(p, psigs, nl); |
| 1375 |
p += nl; |
| 1376 |
n += nl + 2; |
| 1377 |
} |
| 1378 |
|
| 1379 |
off = n; |
| 1380 |
p += 2; |
| 1381 |
n += 2; |
| 1382 |
|
| 1383 |
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
| 1384 |
nl = 0; |
| 1385 |
if (sk != NULL) { |
| 1386 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { |
| 1387 |
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); |
| 1388 |
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); |
| 1389 |
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + n + j + 2)) { |
| 1390 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| 1391 |
goto err; |
| 1392 |
} |
| 1393 |
p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + n; |
| 1394 |
s2n(j, p); |
| 1395 |
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); |
| 1396 |
n += 2 + j; |
| 1397 |
nl += 2 + j; |
| 1398 |
} |
| 1399 |
} |
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
/* else no CA names */ |
| 1402 |
p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + off; |
| 1403 |
s2n(nl, p); |
| 1404 |
|
| 1405 |
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { |
| 1406 |
goto err; |
| 1407 |
} |
| 1408 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; |
| 1409 |
} |
| 1410 |
|
| 1411 |
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ |
| 1412 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 |
err: |
| 1415 |
return -1; |
| 1416 |
} |
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1419 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { |
| 1420 |
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, 0)) { |
| 1421 |
return -1; |
| 1422 |
} |
| 1423 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; |
| 1424 |
} |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ |
| 1427 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 1428 |
} |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1431 |
int ok, al, ret = -1; |
| 1432 |
X509 *x = NULL; |
| 1433 |
unsigned long n; |
| 1434 |
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
| 1435 |
SHA256_CTX sha256; |
| 1436 |
CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list; |
| 1437 |
int is_first_certificate = 1; |
| 1438 |
|
| 1439 |
assert(ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request); |
| 1440 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1443 |
return n; |
| 1444 |
} |
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 |
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
| 1447 |
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION && |
| 1448 |
ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
| 1449 |
/* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no certificate. */ |
| 1450 |
if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| 1451 |
(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { |
| 1452 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| 1453 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1454 |
goto f_err; |
| 1455 |
} |
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 1458 |
return 1; |
| 1459 |
} |
| 1460 |
|
| 1461 |
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1462 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| 1463 |
goto f_err; |
| 1464 |
} |
| 1465 |
|
| 1466 |
CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1467 |
|
| 1468 |
sk = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| 1469 |
if (sk == NULL) { |
| 1470 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1471 |
goto err; |
| 1472 |
} |
| 1473 |
|
| 1474 |
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) || |
| 1475 |
CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) { |
| 1476 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1477 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1478 |
goto f_err; |
| 1479 |
} |
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| 1482 |
CBS certificate; |
| 1483 |
const uint8_t *data; |
| 1484 |
|
| 1485 |
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { |
| 1486 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1487 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1488 |
goto f_err; |
| 1489 |
} |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
if (is_first_certificate && ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { |
| 1492 |
/* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer |
| 1493 |
* certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */ |
| 1494 |
SHA256_Init(&sha256); |
| 1495 |
SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| 1496 |
SHA256_Final(ssl->session->peer_sha256, &sha256); |
| 1497 |
ssl->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1; |
| 1498 |
} |
| 1499 |
is_first_certificate = 0; |
| 1500 |
|
| 1501 |
/* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ |
| 1502 |
data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| 1503 |
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| 1504 |
if (x == NULL) { |
| 1505 |
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| 1506 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| 1507 |
goto f_err; |
| 1508 |
} |
| 1509 |
if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { |
| 1510 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1511 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1512 |
goto f_err; |
| 1513 |
} |
| 1514 |
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
| 1515 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1516 |
goto err; |
| 1517 |
} |
| 1518 |
x = NULL; |
| 1519 |
} |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { |
| 1522 |
/* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */ |
| 1523 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 |
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ |
| 1526 |
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| 1527 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1528 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
| 1529 |
goto f_err; |
| 1530 |
} else if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| 1531 |
(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { |
| 1532 |
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ |
| 1533 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| 1534 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1535 |
goto f_err; |
| 1536 |
} |
| 1537 |
} else { |
| 1538 |
if (ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, sk) <= 0) { |
| 1539 |
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result); |
| 1540 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| 1541 |
goto f_err; |
| 1542 |
} |
| 1543 |
} |
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 |
X509_free(ssl->session->peer); |
| 1546 |
ssl->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
| 1547 |
ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result; |
| 1548 |
|
| 1549 |
sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| 1550 |
ssl->session->cert_chain = sk; |
| 1551 |
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own |
| 1552 |
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ |
| 1553 |
|
| 1554 |
sk = NULL; |
| 1555 |
|
| 1556 |
ret = 1; |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
if (0) { |
| 1559 |
f_err: |
| 1560 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1561 |
} |
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
err: |
| 1564 |
X509_free(x); |
| 1565 |
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); |
| 1566 |
return ret; |
| 1567 |
} |
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1570 |
int al; |
| 1571 |
CBS client_key_exchange; |
| 1572 |
uint32_t alg_k; |
| 1573 |
uint32_t alg_a; |
| 1574 |
uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL; |
| 1575 |
size_t premaster_secret_len = 0; |
| 1576 |
uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL; |
| 1577 |
|
| 1578 |
unsigned psk_len = 0; |
| 1579 |
uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| 1580 |
|
| 1581 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| 1582 |
int ok; |
| 1583 |
const long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message( |
| 1584 |
ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1585 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1586 |
return n; |
| 1587 |
} |
| 1588 |
} |
| 1589 |
|
| 1590 |
CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| 1591 |
alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1592 |
alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
/* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ |
| 1595 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1596 |
CBS psk_identity; |
| 1597 |
|
| 1598 |
/* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK, |
| 1599 |
* then this is the only field in the message. */ |
| 1600 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) || |
| 1601 |
((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) { |
| 1602 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1603 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1604 |
goto f_err; |
| 1605 |
} |
| 1606 |
|
| 1607 |
if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) { |
| 1608 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
| 1609 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1610 |
goto f_err; |
| 1611 |
} |
| 1612 |
|
| 1613 |
if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| 1614 |
CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) { |
| 1615 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 1616 |
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1617 |
goto f_err; |
| 1618 |
} |
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &ssl->session->psk_identity)) { |
| 1621 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1622 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1623 |
goto f_err; |
| 1624 |
} |
| 1625 |
|
| 1626 |
/* Look up the key for the identity. */ |
| 1627 |
psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, ssl->session->psk_identity, psk, |
| 1628 |
sizeof(psk)); |
| 1629 |
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
| 1630 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1631 |
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1632 |
goto f_err; |
| 1633 |
} else if (psk_len == 0) { |
| 1634 |
/* PSK related to the given identity not found */ |
| 1635 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| 1636 |
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; |
| 1637 |
goto f_err; |
| 1638 |
} |
| 1639 |
} |
| 1640 |
|
| 1641 |
/* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and |
| 1642 |
* |premaster_secret_len|. */ |
| 1643 |
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { |
| 1644 |
/* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */ |
| 1645 |
const size_t rsa_size = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); |
| 1646 |
decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 1647 |
if (decrypt_buf == NULL) { |
| 1648 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1649 |
goto err; |
| 1650 |
} |
| 1651 |
|
| 1652 |
enum ssl_private_key_result_t decrypt_result; |
| 1653 |
size_t decrypt_len; |
| 1654 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| 1655 |
if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) || |
| 1656 |
ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| 1657 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1658 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
| 1659 |
goto f_err; |
| 1660 |
} |
| 1661 |
CBS encrypted_premaster_secret; |
| 1662 |
if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { |
| 1663 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, |
| 1664 |
&encrypted_premaster_secret) || |
| 1665 |
CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) { |
| 1666 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1667 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, |
| 1668 |
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
| 1669 |
goto f_err; |
| 1670 |
} |
| 1671 |
} else { |
| 1672 |
encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange; |
| 1673 |
} |
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
/* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the |
| 1676 |
* timing-sensitive code below. */ |
| 1677 |
decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt( |
| 1678 |
ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size, |
| 1679 |
CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret), |
| 1680 |
CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret)); |
| 1681 |
} else { |
| 1682 |
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B); |
| 1683 |
/* Complete async decrypt. */ |
| 1684 |
decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt_complete( |
| 1685 |
ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size); |
| 1686 |
} |
| 1687 |
|
| 1688 |
switch (decrypt_result) { |
| 1689 |
case ssl_private_key_success: |
| 1690 |
break; |
| 1691 |
case ssl_private_key_failure: |
| 1692 |
goto err; |
| 1693 |
case ssl_private_key_retry: |
| 1694 |
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| 1695 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| 1696 |
goto err; |
| 1697 |
} |
| 1698 |
|
| 1699 |
if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) { |
| 1700 |
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 1701 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 1702 |
goto f_err; |
| 1703 |
} |
| 1704 |
|
| 1705 |
/* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246, |
| 1706 |
* section 7.4.7.1. */ |
| 1707 |
premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| 1708 |
premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len); |
| 1709 |
if (premaster_secret == NULL) { |
| 1710 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1711 |
goto err; |
| 1712 |
} |
| 1713 |
if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) { |
| 1714 |
goto err; |
| 1715 |
} |
| 1716 |
|
| 1717 |
/* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are |
| 1718 |
* publicly invalid. */ |
| 1719 |
if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) { |
| 1720 |
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 1721 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 1722 |
goto f_err; |
| 1723 |
} |
| 1724 |
|
| 1725 |
/* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
| 1726 |
size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len; |
| 1727 |
uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) & |
| 1728 |
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2); |
| 1729 |
size_t i; |
| 1730 |
for (i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) { |
| 1731 |
good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]); |
| 1732 |
} |
| 1733 |
good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]); |
| 1734 |
|
| 1735 |
/* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be |
| 1736 |
* checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */ |
| 1737 |
good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len], |
| 1738 |
(unsigned)(ssl->client_version >> 8)); |
| 1739 |
good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1], |
| 1740 |
(unsigned)(ssl->client_version & 0xff)); |
| 1741 |
|
| 1742 |
/* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random |
| 1743 |
* premaster based on |good|. */ |
| 1744 |
for (i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) { |
| 1745 |
premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8( |
| 1746 |
good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]); |
| 1747 |
} |
| 1748 |
|
| 1749 |
OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); |
| 1750 |
decrypt_buf = NULL; |
| 1751 |
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE|SSL_kCECPQ1)) { |
| 1752 |
/* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. */ |
| 1753 |
CBS peer_key; |
| 1754 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_key(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &client_key_exchange, |
| 1755 |
&peer_key) || |
| 1756 |
CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) { |
| 1757 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1758 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1759 |
goto f_err; |
| 1760 |
} |
| 1761 |
|
| 1762 |
/* Compute the premaster. */ |
| 1763 |
uint8_t alert; |
| 1764 |
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret, |
| 1765 |
&premaster_secret_len, &alert, CBS_data(&peer_key), |
| 1766 |
CBS_len(&peer_key))) { |
| 1767 |
al = alert; |
| 1768 |
goto f_err; |
| 1769 |
} |
| 1770 |
|
| 1771 |
/* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ |
| 1772 |
SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx); |
| 1773 |
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { |
| 1774 |
/* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the |
| 1775 |
* pre-shared key. */ |
| 1776 |
premaster_secret_len = psk_len; |
| 1777 |
premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len); |
| 1778 |
if (premaster_secret == NULL) { |
| 1779 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1780 |
goto err; |
| 1781 |
} |
| 1782 |
memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len); |
| 1783 |
} else { |
| 1784 |
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1785 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); |
| 1786 |
goto f_err; |
| 1787 |
} |
| 1788 |
|
| 1789 |
/* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the |
| 1790 |
* pre-shared key. */ |
| 1791 |
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| 1792 |
CBB new_premaster, child; |
| 1793 |
uint8_t *new_data; |
| 1794 |
size_t new_len; |
| 1795 |
|
| 1796 |
CBB_zero(&new_premaster); |
| 1797 |
if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) || |
| 1798 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || |
| 1799 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) || |
| 1800 |
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || |
| 1801 |
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || |
| 1802 |
!CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) { |
| 1803 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1804 |
CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster); |
| 1805 |
goto err; |
| 1806 |
} |
| 1807 |
|
| 1808 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| 1809 |
OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| 1810 |
premaster_secret = new_data; |
| 1811 |
premaster_secret_len = new_len; |
| 1812 |
} |
| 1813 |
|
| 1814 |
/* Compute the master secret */ |
| 1815 |
ssl->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret( |
| 1816 |
ssl, ssl->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| 1817 |
if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) { |
| 1818 |
goto err; |
| 1819 |
} |
| 1820 |
ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; |
| 1821 |
|
| 1822 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| 1823 |
OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| 1824 |
return 1; |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
f_err: |
| 1827 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1828 |
err: |
| 1829 |
if (premaster_secret != NULL) { |
| 1830 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| 1831 |
OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| 1832 |
} |
| 1833 |
OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); |
| 1834 |
|
| 1835 |
return -1; |
| 1836 |
} |
| 1837 |
|
| 1838 |
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1839 |
int al, ok, ret = 0; |
| 1840 |
long n; |
| 1841 |
CBS certificate_verify, signature; |
| 1842 |
X509 *peer = ssl->session->peer; |
| 1843 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| 1844 |
const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| 1845 |
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1846 |
size_t digest_length; |
| 1847 |
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
/* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a |
| 1850 |
* CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate. |
| 1851 |
* */ |
| 1852 |
if (peer == NULL) { |
| 1853 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1854 |
return 1; |
| 1855 |
} |
| 1856 |
|
| 1857 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, |
| 1858 |
ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok); |
| 1859 |
|
| 1860 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1861 |
return n; |
| 1862 |
} |
| 1863 |
|
| 1864 |
/* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */ |
| 1865 |
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); |
| 1866 |
if (pkey == NULL) { |
| 1867 |
goto err; |
| 1868 |
} |
| 1869 |
if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) || |
| 1870 |
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { |
| 1871 |
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| 1872 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| 1873 |
goto f_err; |
| 1874 |
} |
| 1875 |
|
| 1876 |
CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1877 |
|
| 1878 |
/* Determine the digest type if needbe. */ |
| 1879 |
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| 1880 |
uint8_t hash, signature_type; |
| 1881 |
if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &hash) || |
| 1882 |
!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &signature_type)) { |
| 1883 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1884 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1885 |
goto f_err; |
| 1886 |
} |
| 1887 |
if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature_type, pkey)) { |
| 1888 |
goto f_err; |
| 1889 |
} |
| 1890 |
} |
| 1891 |
|
| 1892 |
/* Compute the digest. */ |
| 1893 |
if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey->type)) { |
| 1894 |
goto err; |
| 1895 |
} |
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
/* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current |
| 1898 |
* message.*/ |
| 1899 |
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| 1900 |
if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { |
| 1901 |
goto err; |
| 1902 |
} |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
/* Parse and verify the signature. */ |
| 1905 |
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) || |
| 1906 |
CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) { |
| 1907 |
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1908 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 1909 |
goto f_err; |
| 1910 |
} |
| 1911 |
|
| 1912 |
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); |
| 1913 |
if (pctx == NULL) { |
| 1914 |
goto err; |
| 1915 |
} |
| 1916 |
int sig_ok = EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) && |
| 1917 |
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) && |
| 1918 |
EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), |
| 1919 |
digest, digest_length); |
| 1920 |
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| 1921 |
sig_ok = 1; |
| 1922 |
ERR_clear_error(); |
| 1923 |
#endif |
| 1924 |
if (!sig_ok) { |
| 1925 |
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 1926 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| 1927 |
goto f_err; |
| 1928 |
} |
| 1929 |
|
| 1930 |
ret = 1; |
| 1931 |
|
| 1932 |
if (0) { |
| 1933 |
f_err: |
| 1934 |
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| 1935 |
} |
| 1936 |
|
| 1937 |
err: |
| 1938 |
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| 1939 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1940 |
|
| 1941 |
return ret; |
| 1942 |
} |
| 1943 |
|
| 1944 |
/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It |
| 1945 |
* sets the next_proto member in s if found */ |
| 1946 |
static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1947 |
int ok; |
| 1948 |
long n; |
| 1949 |
CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding; |
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 |
/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension |
| 1952 |
* in their ClientHello */ |
| 1953 |
if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { |
| 1954 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); |
| 1955 |
return -1; |
| 1956 |
} |
| 1957 |
|
| 1958 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, ssl_hash_message, |
| 1959 |
&ok); |
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1962 |
return n; |
| 1963 |
} |
| 1964 |
|
| 1965 |
CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 1966 |
|
| 1967 |
/* The payload looks like: |
| 1968 |
* uint8 proto_len; |
| 1969 |
* uint8 proto[proto_len]; |
| 1970 |
* uint8 padding_len; |
| 1971 |
* uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ |
| 1972 |
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) || |
| 1973 |
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) || |
| 1974 |
CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 || |
| 1975 |
!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, |
| 1976 |
&ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) { |
| 1977 |
return 0; |
| 1978 |
} |
| 1979 |
|
| 1980 |
return 1; |
| 1981 |
} |
| 1982 |
|
| 1983 |
/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ |
| 1984 |
static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { |
| 1985 |
int ret = -1, ok; |
| 1986 |
long n; |
| 1987 |
uint8_t channel_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 1988 |
size_t channel_id_hash_len; |
| 1989 |
const uint8_t *p; |
| 1990 |
uint16_t extension_type; |
| 1991 |
EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL; |
| 1992 |
EC_KEY *key = NULL; |
| 1993 |
EC_POINT *point = NULL; |
| 1994 |
ECDSA_SIG sig; |
| 1995 |
BIGNUM x, y; |
| 1996 |
CBS encrypted_extensions, extension; |
| 1997 |
|
| 1998 |
n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| 1999 |
ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok); |
| 2000 |
|
| 2001 |
if (!ok) { |
| 2002 |
return n; |
| 2003 |
} |
| 2004 |
|
| 2005 |
/* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake |
| 2006 |
* hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */ |
| 2007 |
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) { |
| 2008 |
return -1; |
| 2009 |
} |
| 2010 |
assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { |
| 2013 |
return -1; |
| 2014 |
} |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, ssl->init_msg, n); |
| 2017 |
|
| 2018 |
/* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only |
| 2019 |
* extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one |
| 2020 |
* entry. |
| 2021 |
* |
| 2022 |
* The payload looks like: |
| 2023 |
* uint16 extension_type |
| 2024 |
* uint16 extension_len; |
| 2025 |
* uint8 x[32]; |
| 2026 |
* uint8 y[32]; |
| 2027 |
* uint8 r[32]; |
| 2028 |
* uint8 s[32]; */ |
| 2029 |
|
| 2030 |
if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) || |
| 2031 |
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) || |
| 2032 |
CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 || |
| 2033 |
extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id || |
| 2034 |
CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) { |
| 2035 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); |
| 2036 |
return -1; |
| 2037 |
} |
| 2038 |
|
| 2039 |
p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); |
| 2040 |
if (!p256) { |
| 2041 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); |
| 2042 |
return -1; |
| 2043 |
} |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
BN_init(&x); |
| 2046 |
BN_init(&y); |
| 2047 |
sig.r = BN_new(); |
| 2048 |
sig.s = BN_new(); |
| 2049 |
if (sig.r == NULL || sig.s == NULL) { |
| 2050 |
goto err; |
| 2051 |
} |
| 2052 |
|
| 2053 |
p = CBS_data(&extension); |
| 2054 |
if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || |
| 2055 |
BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || |
| 2056 |
BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || |
| 2057 |
BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) { |
| 2058 |
goto err; |
| 2059 |
} |
| 2060 |
|
| 2061 |
point = EC_POINT_new(p256); |
| 2062 |
if (!point || |
| 2063 |
!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) { |
| 2064 |
goto err; |
| 2065 |
} |
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
key = EC_KEY_new(); |
| 2068 |
if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || |
| 2069 |
!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) { |
| 2070 |
goto err; |
| 2071 |
} |
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
/* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we |
| 2074 |
* were called. */ |
| 2075 |
if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) { |
| 2076 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); |
| 2077 |
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| 2078 |
goto err; |
| 2079 |
} |
| 2080 |
|
| 2081 |
memcpy(ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); |
| 2082 |
ret = 1; |
| 2083 |
|
| 2084 |
err: |
| 2085 |
BN_free(&x); |
| 2086 |
BN_free(&y); |
| 2087 |
BN_free(sig.r); |
| 2088 |
BN_free(sig.s); |
| 2089 |
EC_KEY_free(key); |
| 2090 |
EC_POINT_free(point); |
| 2091 |
EC_GROUP_free(p256); |
| 2092 |
return ret; |
| 2093 |
} |
| 2094 |
|
| 2095 |
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ |
| 2096 |
static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) { |
| 2097 |
int ret = -1; |
| 2098 |
uint8_t *session = NULL; |
| 2099 |
size_t session_len; |
| 2100 |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| 2101 |
HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| 2102 |
|
| 2103 |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 2104 |
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| 2105 |
|
| 2106 |
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { |
| 2107 |
uint8_t *p, *macstart; |
| 2108 |
int len; |
| 2109 |
unsigned int hlen; |
| 2110 |
SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->initial_ctx; |
| 2111 |
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| 2112 |
uint8_t key_name[16]; |
| 2113 |
/* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV + |
| 2114 |
* one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */ |
| 2115 |
const size_t max_ticket_overhead = |
| 2116 |
16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; |
| 2117 |
|
| 2118 |
/* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */ |
| 2119 |
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &session, |
| 2120 |
&session_len)) { |
| 2121 |
goto err; |
| 2122 |
} |
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
/* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the |
| 2125 |
* connection. */ |
| 2126 |
if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) { |
| 2127 |
static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE"; |
| 2128 |
const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder); |
| 2129 |
|
| 2130 |
OPENSSL_free(session); |
| 2131 |
session = NULL; |
| 2132 |
|
| 2133 |
p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 2134 |
/* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */ |
| 2135 |
l2n(0, p); |
| 2136 |
/* Emit ticket. */ |
| 2137 |
s2n(placeholder_len, p); |
| 2138 |
memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len); |
| 2139 |
p += placeholder_len; |
| 2140 |
|
| 2141 |
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 2142 |
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, len)) { |
| 2143 |
goto err; |
| 2144 |
} |
| 2145 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; |
| 2146 |
return ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 2147 |
} |
| 2148 |
|
| 2149 |
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows: |
| 2150 |
* handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + |
| 2151 |
* max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */ |
| 2152 |
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(ssl->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + 6 + |
| 2153 |
max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) { |
| 2154 |
goto err; |
| 2155 |
} |
| 2156 |
p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 2157 |
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the |
| 2158 |
* work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ |
| 2159 |
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { |
| 2160 |
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, |
| 2161 |
1 /* encrypt */) < 0) { |
| 2162 |
goto err; |
| 2163 |
} |
| 2164 |
} else { |
| 2165 |
if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) || |
| 2166 |
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| 2167 |
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) || |
| 2168 |
!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), |
| 2169 |
NULL)) { |
| 2170 |
goto err; |
| 2171 |
} |
| 2172 |
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); |
| 2173 |
} |
| 2174 |
|
| 2175 |
/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for |
| 2176 |
* resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new |
| 2177 |
* sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ |
| 2178 |
l2n(ssl->hit ? 0 : ssl->session->timeout, p); |
| 2179 |
|
| 2180 |
/* Skip ticket length for now */ |
| 2181 |
p += 2; |
| 2182 |
/* Output key name */ |
| 2183 |
macstart = p; |
| 2184 |
memcpy(p, key_name, 16); |
| 2185 |
p += 16; |
| 2186 |
/* output IV */ |
| 2187 |
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); |
| 2188 |
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 2189 |
/* Encrypt session data */ |
| 2190 |
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len)) { |
| 2191 |
goto err; |
| 2192 |
} |
| 2193 |
p += len; |
| 2194 |
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len)) { |
| 2195 |
goto err; |
| 2196 |
} |
| 2197 |
p += len; |
| 2198 |
|
| 2199 |
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart) || |
| 2200 |
!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) { |
| 2201 |
goto err; |
| 2202 |
} |
| 2203 |
|
| 2204 |
p += hlen; |
| 2205 |
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ |
| 2206 |
/* Total length */ |
| 2207 |
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl); |
| 2208 |
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ |
| 2209 |
p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + 4; |
| 2210 |
s2n(len - 6, p); |
| 2211 |
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, len)) { |
| 2212 |
goto err; |
| 2213 |
} |
| 2214 |
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; |
| 2215 |
} |
| 2216 |
|
| 2217 |
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ |
| 2218 |
ret = ssl_do_write(ssl); |
| 2219 |
|
| 2220 |
err: |
| 2221 |
OPENSSL_free(session); |
| 2222 |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 2223 |
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| 2224 |
return ret; |
| 2225 |
} |