| 1 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 2 |
* All rights reserved. |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 5 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 6 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 7 |
* |
| 8 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 9 |
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 10 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 11 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 12 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 13 |
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 16 |
* the code are not to be removed. |
| 17 |
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 18 |
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 19 |
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 20 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 23 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 24 |
* are met: |
| 25 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 26 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 27 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 28 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 29 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 30 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 31 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 32 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 33 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 34 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 35 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 36 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 37 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 38 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
| 39 |
* |
| 40 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 41 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 43 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 50 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 55 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
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|
| 57 |
#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
#include <assert.h> |
| 60 |
#include <string.h> |
| 61 |
|
| 62 |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 63 |
#include <openssl/err.h> |
| 64 |
#include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 65 |
#include <openssl/thread.h> |
| 66 |
|
| 67 |
#include "internal.h" |
| 68 |
#include "../internal.h" |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) { |
| 72 |
unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) { |
| 75 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
| 76 |
return 0; |
| 77 |
} |
| 78 |
|
| 79 |
/* Mitigate DoS attacks by limiting the exponent size. 33 bits was chosen as |
| 80 |
* the limit based on the recommendations in [1] and [2]. Windows CryptoAPI |
| 81 |
* doesn't support values larger than 32 bits [3], so it is unlikely that |
| 82 |
* exponents larger than 32 bits are being used for anything Windows commonly |
| 83 |
* does. |
| 84 |
* |
| 85 |
* [1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html |
| 86 |
* [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/17/rsados.html |
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* [3] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx */ |
| 88 |
static const unsigned kMaxExponentBits = 33; |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > kMaxExponentBits) { |
| 91 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| 92 |
return 0; |
| 93 |
} |
| 94 |
|
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/* Verify |n > e|. Comparing |rsa_bits| to |kMaxExponentBits| is a small |
| 96 |
* shortcut to comparing |n| and |e| directly. In reality, |kMaxExponentBits| |
| 97 |
* is much smaller than the minimum RSA key size that any application should |
| 98 |
* accept. */ |
| 99 |
if (rsa_bits <= kMaxExponentBits) { |
| 100 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 101 |
return 0; |
| 102 |
} |
| 103 |
assert(BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) > 0); |
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
return 1; |
| 106 |
} |
| 107 |
|
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size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) { |
| 109 |
return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| 110 |
} |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
int rsa_default_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
| 113 |
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
| 114 |
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 115 |
BIGNUM *f, *result; |
| 116 |
uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 117 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 118 |
int i, ret = 0; |
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
if (max_out < rsa_size) { |
| 121 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| 122 |
return 0; |
| 123 |
} |
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) { |
| 126 |
return 0; |
| 127 |
} |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 130 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 131 |
goto err; |
| 132 |
} |
| 133 |
|
| 134 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 135 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 136 |
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 137 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 138 |
if (!f || !result || !buf) { |
| 139 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 140 |
goto err; |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
switch (padding) { |
| 144 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 145 |
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); |
| 146 |
break; |
| 147 |
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| 148 |
/* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */ |
| 149 |
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len, |
| 150 |
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); |
| 151 |
break; |
| 152 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 153 |
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); |
| 154 |
break; |
| 155 |
default: |
| 156 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 157 |
goto err; |
| 158 |
} |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
if (i <= 0) { |
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goto err; |
| 162 |
} |
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) { |
| 165 |
goto err; |
| 166 |
} |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 169 |
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
| 170 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 171 |
goto err; |
| 172 |
} |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) || |
| 175 |
!BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) { |
| 176 |
goto err; |
| 177 |
} |
| 178 |
|
| 179 |
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the |
| 180 |
* modulus */ |
| 181 |
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) { |
| 182 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 183 |
goto err; |
| 184 |
} |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
*out_len = rsa_size; |
| 187 |
ret = 1; |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
err: |
| 190 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 191 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 192 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 193 |
} |
| 194 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 195 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size); |
| 196 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 197 |
} |
| 198 |
|
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return ret; |
| 200 |
} |
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|
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/* MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per |
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* RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and |
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* destroyed as needed. */ |
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#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024 |
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|
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/* rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by |
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* allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If |
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* none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new |
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* BN_BLINDING is returned. |
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* |
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* On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to |
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* |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished. */ |
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static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, unsigned *index_used, |
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BN_CTX *ctx) { |
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assert(ctx != NULL); |
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assert(rsa->mont_n != NULL); |
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|
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BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; |
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BN_BLINDING **new_blindings; |
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uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse; |
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char overflow = 0; |
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|
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock); |
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|
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unsigned i; |
| 227 |
for (i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) { |
| 228 |
if (rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0) { |
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rsa->blindings_inuse[i] = 1; |
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ret = rsa->blindings[i]; |
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*index_used = i; |
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break; |
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} |
| 234 |
} |
| 235 |
|
| 236 |
if (ret != NULL) { |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 238 |
return ret; |
| 239 |
} |
| 240 |
|
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overflow = rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA; |
| 242 |
|
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/* We didn't find a free BN_BLINDING to use so increase the length of |
| 244 |
* the arrays by one and use the newly created element. */ |
| 245 |
|
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 247 |
ret = BN_BLINDING_new(); |
| 248 |
if (ret == NULL) { |
| 249 |
return NULL; |
| 250 |
} |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
if (overflow) { |
| 253 |
/* We cannot add any more cached BN_BLINDINGs so we use |ret| |
| 254 |
* and mark it for destruction in |rsa_blinding_release|. */ |
| 255 |
*index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA; |
| 256 |
return ret; |
| 257 |
} |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 260 |
|
| 261 |
new_blindings = |
| 262 |
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * (rsa->num_blindings + 1)); |
| 263 |
if (new_blindings == NULL) { |
| 264 |
goto err1; |
| 265 |
} |
| 266 |
memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings, |
| 267 |
sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings); |
| 268 |
new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings] = ret; |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
new_blindings_inuse = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa->num_blindings + 1); |
| 271 |
if (new_blindings_inuse == NULL) { |
| 272 |
goto err2; |
| 273 |
} |
| 274 |
memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings); |
| 275 |
new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1; |
| 276 |
*index_used = rsa->num_blindings; |
| 277 |
|
| 278 |
OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings); |
| 279 |
rsa->blindings = new_blindings; |
| 280 |
OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse); |
| 281 |
rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse; |
| 282 |
rsa->num_blindings++; |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 285 |
return ret; |
| 286 |
|
| 287 |
err2: |
| 288 |
OPENSSL_free(new_blindings); |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
err1: |
| 291 |
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 292 |
BN_BLINDING_free(ret); |
| 293 |
return NULL; |
| 294 |
} |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
/* rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free |
| 297 |
* for other threads to use. */ |
| 298 |
static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding, |
| 299 |
unsigned blinding_index) { |
| 300 |
if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) { |
| 301 |
/* This blinding wasn't cached. */ |
| 302 |
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding); |
| 303 |
return; |
| 304 |
} |
| 305 |
|
| 306 |
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 307 |
rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0; |
| 308 |
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock); |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
|
| 311 |
/* signing */ |
| 312 |
int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, |
| 313 |
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
| 314 |
int padding) { |
| 315 |
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 316 |
uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 317 |
int i, ret = 0; |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
if (max_out < rsa_size) { |
| 320 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| 321 |
return 0; |
| 322 |
} |
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 325 |
if (buf == NULL) { |
| 326 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 327 |
goto err; |
| 328 |
} |
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
switch (padding) { |
| 331 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 332 |
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); |
| 333 |
break; |
| 334 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 335 |
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); |
| 336 |
break; |
| 337 |
default: |
| 338 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 339 |
goto err; |
| 340 |
} |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
if (i <= 0) { |
| 343 |
goto err; |
| 344 |
} |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, out, buf, rsa_size)) { |
| 347 |
goto err; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
*out_len = rsa_size; |
| 351 |
ret = 1; |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
err: |
| 354 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 355 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size); |
| 356 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 357 |
} |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
return ret; |
| 360 |
} |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
int rsa_default_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
| 363 |
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
| 364 |
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 365 |
int r = -1; |
| 366 |
uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 367 |
int ret = 0; |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
if (max_out < rsa_size) { |
| 370 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| 371 |
return 0; |
| 372 |
} |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { |
| 375 |
buf = out; |
| 376 |
} else { |
| 377 |
/* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */ |
| 378 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 379 |
if (buf == NULL) { |
| 380 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 381 |
goto err; |
| 382 |
} |
| 383 |
} |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
if (in_len != rsa_size) { |
| 386 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN); |
| 387 |
goto err; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, buf, in, rsa_size)) { |
| 391 |
goto err; |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
switch (padding) { |
| 395 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 396 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size); |
| 397 |
break; |
| 398 |
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| 399 |
/* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */ |
| 400 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size, |
| 401 |
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); |
| 402 |
break; |
| 403 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 404 |
r = rsa_size; |
| 405 |
break; |
| 406 |
default: |
| 407 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 408 |
goto err; |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 412 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 413 |
} else { |
| 414 |
*out_len = r; |
| 415 |
ret = 1; |
| 416 |
} |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
err: |
| 419 |
if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) { |
| 420 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size); |
| 421 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 422 |
} |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
return ret; |
| 425 |
} |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
| 430 |
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
| 431 |
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) { |
| 432 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
| 433 |
return 0; |
| 434 |
} |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 437 |
BIGNUM *f, *result; |
| 438 |
int r = -1; |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
if (max_out < rsa_size) { |
| 441 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
| 442 |
return 0; |
| 443 |
} |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
if (in_len != rsa_size) { |
| 446 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN); |
| 447 |
return 0; |
| 448 |
} |
| 449 |
|
| 450 |
if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) { |
| 451 |
return 0; |
| 452 |
} |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 455 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 456 |
return 0; |
| 457 |
} |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
int ret = 0; |
| 460 |
uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 463 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 464 |
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 465 |
if (f == NULL || result == NULL) { |
| 466 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 467 |
goto err; |
| 468 |
} |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { |
| 471 |
buf = out; |
| 472 |
} else { |
| 473 |
/* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */ |
| 474 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 475 |
if (buf == NULL) { |
| 476 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 477 |
goto err; |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
} |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) { |
| 482 |
goto err; |
| 483 |
} |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 486 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 487 |
goto err; |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) || |
| 491 |
!BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) { |
| 492 |
goto err; |
| 493 |
} |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) { |
| 496 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 497 |
goto err; |
| 498 |
} |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
switch (padding) { |
| 501 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 502 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size); |
| 503 |
break; |
| 504 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 505 |
r = rsa_size; |
| 506 |
break; |
| 507 |
default: |
| 508 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 509 |
goto err; |
| 510 |
} |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 513 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 514 |
} else { |
| 515 |
*out_len = r; |
| 516 |
ret = 1; |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
err: |
| 520 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 521 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 522 |
if (buf != out) { |
| 523 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 524 |
} |
| 525 |
return ret; |
| 526 |
} |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, |
| 529 |
size_t len) { |
| 530 |
BIGNUM *f, *result; |
| 531 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 532 |
unsigned blinding_index = 0; |
| 533 |
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
| 534 |
int ret = 0; |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 537 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 538 |
goto err; |
| 539 |
} |
| 540 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 541 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 542 |
result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
if (f == NULL || result == NULL) { |
| 545 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 546 |
goto err; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) { |
| 550 |
goto err; |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 554 |
/* Usually the padding functions would catch this. */ |
| 555 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 556 |
goto err; |
| 557 |
} |
| 558 |
|
| 559 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { |
| 560 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 561 |
goto err; |
| 562 |
} |
| 563 |
|
| 564 |
/* We cannot do blinding or verification without |e|, and continuing without |
| 565 |
* those countermeasures is dangerous. However, the Java/Android RSA API |
| 566 |
* requires support for keys where only |d| and |n| (and not |e|) are known. |
| 567 |
* The callers that require that bad behavior set |RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING|. */ |
| 568 |
int disable_security = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) && rsa->e == NULL; |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
if (!disable_security) { |
| 571 |
/* Keys without public exponents must have blinding explicitly disabled to |
| 572 |
* be used. */ |
| 573 |
if (rsa->e == NULL) { |
| 574 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); |
| 575 |
goto err; |
| 576 |
} |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx); |
| 579 |
if (blinding == NULL) { |
| 580 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 581 |
goto err; |
| 582 |
} |
| 583 |
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, rsa->e, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) { |
| 584 |
goto err; |
| 585 |
} |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->e != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL && |
| 589 |
rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL) { |
| 590 |
if (!mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) { |
| 591 |
goto err; |
| 592 |
} |
| 593 |
} else { |
| 594 |
BIGNUM local_d; |
| 595 |
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
BN_init(&local_d); |
| 598 |
d = &local_d; |
| 599 |
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) { |
| 602 |
goto err; |
| 603 |
} |
| 604 |
} |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
/* Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described in the |
| 607 |
* 1997 paper "On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for |
| 608 |
* Faults" by Dan Boneh, Richard A. DeMillo, and Richard J. Lipton. Some |
| 609 |
* implementations do this only when the CRT is used, but we do it in all |
| 610 |
* cases. Section 6 of the aforementioned paper describes an attack that |
| 611 |
* works when the CRT isn't used. That attack is much less likely to succeed |
| 612 |
* than the CRT attack, but there have likely been improvements since 1997. |
| 613 |
* |
| 614 |
* This check is cheap assuming |e| is small; it almost always is. */ |
| 615 |
if (!disable_security) { |
| 616 |
BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 617 |
if (vrfy == NULL || |
| 618 |
!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n) || |
| 619 |
!BN_equal_consttime(vrfy, f)) { |
| 620 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 621 |
goto err; |
| 622 |
} |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(result, blinding, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) { |
| 625 |
goto err; |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
} |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) { |
| 630 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 631 |
goto err; |
| 632 |
} |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
ret = 1; |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
err: |
| 637 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 638 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 639 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 640 |
} |
| 641 |
if (blinding != NULL) { |
| 642 |
rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index); |
| 643 |
} |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
return ret; |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
| 649 |
assert(ctx != NULL); |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
assert(rsa->n != NULL); |
| 652 |
assert(rsa->e != NULL); |
| 653 |
assert(rsa->d != NULL); |
| 654 |
assert(rsa->p != NULL); |
| 655 |
assert(rsa->q != NULL); |
| 656 |
assert(rsa->dmp1 != NULL); |
| 657 |
assert(rsa->dmq1 != NULL); |
| 658 |
assert(rsa->iqmp != NULL); |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; |
| 661 |
BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; |
| 662 |
BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; |
| 663 |
int ret = 0; |
| 664 |
size_t i, num_additional_primes = 0; |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) { |
| 667 |
num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes); |
| 668 |
} |
| 669 |
|
| 670 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 671 |
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 672 |
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 673 |
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 674 |
if (r1 == NULL || |
| 675 |
m1 == NULL || |
| 676 |
vrfy == NULL) { |
| 677 |
goto err; |
| 678 |
} |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
{ |
| 681 |
BIGNUM local_p, local_q; |
| 682 |
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the |
| 685 |
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag. */ |
| 686 |
BN_init(&local_p); |
| 687 |
p = &local_p; |
| 688 |
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
BN_init(&local_q); |
| 691 |
q = &local_q; |
| 692 |
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_p, &rsa->lock, p, ctx) || |
| 695 |
!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_q, &rsa->lock, q, ctx)) { |
| 696 |
goto err; |
| 697 |
} |
| 698 |
} |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { |
| 701 |
goto err; |
| 702 |
} |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
/* compute I mod q */ |
| 705 |
c = &local_c; |
| 706 |
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 707 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) { |
| 708 |
goto err; |
| 709 |
} |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ |
| 712 |
dmq1 = &local_dmq1; |
| 713 |
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 714 |
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q)) { |
| 715 |
goto err; |
| 716 |
} |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
/* compute I mod p */ |
| 719 |
c = &local_c; |
| 720 |
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 721 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) { |
| 722 |
goto err; |
| 723 |
} |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ |
| 726 |
dmp1 = &local_dmp1; |
| 727 |
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 728 |
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->mont_p)) { |
| 729 |
goto err; |
| 730 |
} |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) { |
| 733 |
goto err; |
| 734 |
} |
| 735 |
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does |
| 736 |
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ |
| 737 |
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) { |
| 738 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) { |
| 739 |
goto err; |
| 740 |
} |
| 741 |
} |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) { |
| 744 |
goto err; |
| 745 |
} |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ |
| 748 |
pr1 = &local_r1; |
| 749 |
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) { |
| 752 |
goto err; |
| 753 |
} |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of |
| 756 |
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still |
| 757 |
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following |
| 758 |
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. |
| 759 |
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because |
| 760 |
* they ensure p > q [steve] */ |
| 761 |
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) { |
| 762 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) { |
| 763 |
goto err; |
| 764 |
} |
| 765 |
} |
| 766 |
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) { |
| 767 |
goto err; |
| 768 |
} |
| 769 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) { |
| 770 |
goto err; |
| 771 |
} |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) { |
| 774 |
/* multi-prime RSA. */ |
| 775 |
BIGNUM local_exp, local_prime; |
| 776 |
BIGNUM *exp = &local_exp, *prime = &local_prime; |
| 777 |
RSA_additional_prime *ap = |
| 778 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i); |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
BN_with_flags(exp, ap->exp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 781 |
BN_with_flags(prime, ap->prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
/* c will already point to a BIGNUM with the correct flags. */ |
| 784 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, prime, ctx)) { |
| 785 |
goto err; |
| 786 |
} |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&ap->mont, &rsa->lock, prime, ctx) || |
| 789 |
!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, exp, prime, ctx, ap->mont)) { |
| 790 |
goto err; |
| 791 |
} |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
BN_set_flags(m1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 794 |
|
| 795 |
if (!BN_sub(m1, m1, r0) || |
| 796 |
!BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->coeff, ctx) || |
| 797 |
!BN_mod(m1, m1, prime, ctx) || |
| 798 |
(BN_is_negative(m1) && !BN_add(m1, m1, prime)) || |
| 799 |
!BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->r, ctx) || |
| 800 |
!BN_add(r0, r0, m1)) { |
| 801 |
goto err; |
| 802 |
} |
| 803 |
} |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
ret = 1; |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
err: |
| 808 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 809 |
return ret; |
| 810 |
} |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
int rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes, |
| 813 |
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
| 814 |
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; |
| 815 |
BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p; |
| 816 |
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p; |
| 817 |
int prime_bits, ok = -1, n = 0, i, j; |
| 818 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 819 |
STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL; |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
if (num_primes < 2) { |
| 822 |
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ |
| 823 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES); |
| 824 |
goto err; |
| 825 |
} |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 828 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 829 |
goto err; |
| 830 |
} |
| 831 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 832 |
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 833 |
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 834 |
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 835 |
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 836 |
if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) { |
| 837 |
goto err; |
| 838 |
} |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
if (num_primes > 2) { |
| 841 |
additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null(); |
| 842 |
if (additional_primes == NULL) { |
| 843 |
goto err; |
| 844 |
} |
| 845 |
} |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { |
| 848 |
RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime)); |
| 849 |
if (ap == NULL) { |
| 850 |
goto err; |
| 851 |
} |
| 852 |
memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime)); |
| 853 |
ap->prime = BN_new(); |
| 854 |
ap->exp = BN_new(); |
| 855 |
ap->coeff = BN_new(); |
| 856 |
ap->r = BN_new(); |
| 857 |
if (ap->prime == NULL || |
| 858 |
ap->exp == NULL || |
| 859 |
ap->coeff == NULL || |
| 860 |
ap->r == NULL || |
| 861 |
!sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap)) { |
| 862 |
RSA_additional_prime_free(ap); |
| 863 |
goto err; |
| 864 |
} |
| 865 |
} |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ |
| 868 |
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 869 |
goto err; |
| 870 |
} |
| 871 |
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 872 |
goto err; |
| 873 |
} |
| 874 |
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 875 |
goto err; |
| 876 |
} |
| 877 |
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 878 |
goto err; |
| 879 |
} |
| 880 |
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 881 |
goto err; |
| 882 |
} |
| 883 |
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 884 |
goto err; |
| 885 |
} |
| 886 |
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 887 |
goto err; |
| 888 |
} |
| 889 |
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) { |
| 890 |
goto err; |
| 891 |
} |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) { |
| 894 |
goto err; |
| 895 |
} |
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
/* generate p and q */ |
| 898 |
prime_bits = (bits + (num_primes - 1)) / num_primes; |
| 899 |
for (;;) { |
| 900 |
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) || |
| 901 |
!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) || |
| 902 |
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { |
| 903 |
goto err; |
| 904 |
} |
| 905 |
if (BN_is_one(r1)) { |
| 906 |
break; |
| 907 |
} |
| 908 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { |
| 909 |
goto err; |
| 910 |
} |
| 911 |
} |
| 912 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) { |
| 913 |
goto err; |
| 914 |
} |
| 915 |
prime_bits = ((bits - prime_bits) + (num_primes - 2)) / (num_primes - 1); |
| 916 |
for (;;) { |
| 917 |
/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck |
| 918 |
* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for |
| 919 |
* this and bail if it happens 3 times. */ |
| 920 |
unsigned int degenerate = 0; |
| 921 |
do { |
| 922 |
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { |
| 923 |
goto err; |
| 924 |
} |
| 925 |
} while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3)); |
| 926 |
if (degenerate == 3) { |
| 927 |
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ |
| 928 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 929 |
goto err; |
| 930 |
} |
| 931 |
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) || |
| 932 |
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { |
| 933 |
goto err; |
| 934 |
} |
| 935 |
if (BN_is_one(r1)) { |
| 936 |
break; |
| 937 |
} |
| 938 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { |
| 939 |
goto err; |
| 940 |
} |
| 941 |
} |
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1) || |
| 944 |
!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) { |
| 945 |
goto err; |
| 946 |
} |
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { |
| 949 |
RSA_additional_prime *ap = |
| 950 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); |
| 951 |
prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) + (num_primes - (i + 1))) / |
| 952 |
(num_primes - i); |
| 953 |
|
| 954 |
for (;;) { |
| 955 |
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { |
| 956 |
goto err; |
| 957 |
} |
| 958 |
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0 || |
| 959 |
BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0) { |
| 960 |
continue; |
| 961 |
} |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++) { |
| 964 |
if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime, |
| 965 |
ap->prime) == 0) { |
| 966 |
break; |
| 967 |
} |
| 968 |
} |
| 969 |
if (j != i - 2) { |
| 970 |
continue; |
| 971 |
} |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || |
| 974 |
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { |
| 975 |
goto err; |
| 976 |
} |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
if (!BN_is_one(r1)) { |
| 979 |
continue; |
| 980 |
} |
| 981 |
if (i != num_primes - 1) { |
| 982 |
break; |
| 983 |
} |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
/* For the last prime we'll check that it makes n large enough. In the |
| 986 |
* two prime case this isn't a problem because we generate primes with |
| 987 |
* the top two bits set and so the product is always of the expected |
| 988 |
* size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't follow. */ |
| 989 |
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) { |
| 990 |
goto err; |
| 991 |
} |
| 992 |
if (BN_num_bits(r1) == (unsigned) bits) { |
| 993 |
break; |
| 994 |
} |
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { |
| 997 |
goto err; |
| 998 |
} |
| 999 |
} |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
/* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the current one |
| 1002 |
* (including p and q). */ |
| 1003 |
if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n)) { |
| 1004 |
goto err; |
| 1005 |
} |
| 1006 |
if (i == num_primes - 1) { |
| 1007 |
/* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n as |r1| in the loop |
| 1008 |
* above. */ |
| 1009 |
if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1)) { |
| 1010 |
goto err; |
| 1011 |
} |
| 1012 |
} else if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) { |
| 1013 |
goto err; |
| 1014 |
} |
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 |
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) { |
| 1017 |
goto err; |
| 1018 |
} |
| 1019 |
} |
| 1020 |
|
| 1021 |
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { |
| 1022 |
tmp = rsa->p; |
| 1023 |
rsa->p = rsa->q; |
| 1024 |
rsa->q = tmp; |
| 1025 |
} |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
/* calculate d */ |
| 1028 |
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) { |
| 1029 |
goto err; /* p-1 */ |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) { |
| 1032 |
goto err; /* q-1 */ |
| 1033 |
} |
| 1034 |
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) { |
| 1035 |
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ |
| 1036 |
} |
| 1037 |
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { |
| 1038 |
RSA_additional_prime *ap = |
| 1039 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); |
| 1040 |
if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || |
| 1041 |
!BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx)) { |
| 1042 |
goto err; |
| 1043 |
} |
| 1044 |
} |
| 1045 |
pr0 = &local_r0; |
| 1046 |
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 1047 |
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { |
| 1048 |
goto err; /* d */ |
| 1049 |
} |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ |
| 1052 |
d = &local_d; |
| 1053 |
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */ |
| 1056 |
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) { |
| 1057 |
goto err; |
| 1058 |
} |
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */ |
| 1061 |
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { |
| 1062 |
goto err; |
| 1063 |
} |
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */ |
| 1066 |
p = &local_p; |
| 1067 |
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) { |
| 1070 |
goto err; |
| 1071 |
} |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { |
| 1074 |
RSA_additional_prime *ap = |
| 1075 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); |
| 1076 |
if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || |
| 1077 |
!BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx) || |
| 1078 |
!BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx)) { |
| 1079 |
goto err; |
| 1080 |
} |
| 1081 |
} |
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 |
ok = 1; |
| 1084 |
rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes; |
| 1085 |
additional_primes = NULL; |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
err: |
| 1088 |
if (ok == -1) { |
| 1089 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); |
| 1090 |
ok = 0; |
| 1091 |
} |
| 1092 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 1093 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 1094 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 1095 |
} |
| 1096 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes, |
| 1097 |
RSA_additional_prime_free); |
| 1098 |
return ok; |
| 1099 |
} |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
int rsa_default_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
| 1102 |
return rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, 2 /* num primes */, e_value, |
| 1103 |
cb); |
| 1104 |
} |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
/* All of the methods are NULL to make it easier for the compiler/linker to drop |
| 1107 |
* unused functions. The wrapper functions will select the appropriate |
| 1108 |
* |rsa_default_*| implementation. */ |
| 1109 |
const RSA_METHOD RSA_default_method = { |
| 1110 |
{ |
| 1111 |
0 /* references */, |
| 1112 |
1 /* is_static */, |
| 1113 |
}, |
| 1114 |
NULL /* app_data */, |
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
NULL /* init */, |
| 1117 |
NULL /* finish (defaults to rsa_default_finish) */, |
| 1118 |
|
| 1119 |
NULL /* size (defaults to rsa_default_size) */, |
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
NULL /* sign */, |
| 1122 |
NULL /* verify */, |
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 |
NULL /* encrypt (defaults to rsa_default_encrypt) */, |
| 1125 |
NULL /* sign_raw (defaults to rsa_default_sign_raw) */, |
| 1126 |
NULL /* decrypt (defaults to rsa_default_decrypt) */, |
| 1127 |
NULL /* verify_raw (defaults to rsa_default_verify_raw) */, |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
NULL /* private_transform (defaults to rsa_default_private_transform) */, |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
NULL /* mod_exp (ignored) */, |
| 1132 |
NULL /* bn_mod_exp (ignored) */, |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
NULL /* keygen (defaults to rsa_default_keygen) */, |
| 1137 |
NULL /* multi_prime_keygen (defaults to rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen) */, |
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
NULL /* supports_digest */, |
| 1140 |
}; |