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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
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|
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#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
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|
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#include <limits.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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|
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#include <openssl/bn.h> |
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#include <openssl/engine.h> |
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#include <openssl/err.h> |
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h> |
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#include <openssl/mem.h> |
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#include <openssl/nid.h> |
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#include <openssl/thread.h> |
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|
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#include "internal.h" |
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#include "../internal.h" |
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|
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|
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; |
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|
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RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); } |
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|
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RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) { |
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RSA *rsa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA)); |
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if (rsa == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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|
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memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA)); |
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|
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if (engine) { |
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rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine); |
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} |
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|
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if (rsa->meth == NULL) { |
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rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD*) &RSA_default_method; |
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} |
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METHOD_ref(rsa->meth); |
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|
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rsa->references = 1; |
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rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags; |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock); |
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data); |
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|
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if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) { |
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, rsa, &rsa->ex_data); |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock); |
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METHOD_unref(rsa->meth); |
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OPENSSL_free(rsa); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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|
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return rsa; |
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} |
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|
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void RSA_additional_prime_free(RSA_additional_prime *ap) { |
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if (ap == NULL) { |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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BN_clear_free(ap->prime); |
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BN_clear_free(ap->exp); |
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BN_clear_free(ap->coeff); |
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BN_clear_free(ap->r); |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(ap->mont); |
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OPENSSL_free(ap); |
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} |
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|
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void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) { |
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unsigned u; |
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|
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if (rsa == NULL) { |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) { |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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if (rsa->meth->finish) { |
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rsa->meth->finish(rsa); |
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} |
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METHOD_unref(rsa->meth); |
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|
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, rsa, &rsa->ex_data); |
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|
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BN_clear_free(rsa->n); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->e); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->d); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->p); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->q); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1); |
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BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp); |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_n); |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_p); |
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_q); |
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for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) { |
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BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]); |
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} |
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OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings); |
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OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse); |
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if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) { |
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sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(rsa->additional_primes, |
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RSA_additional_prime_free); |
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} |
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock); |
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OPENSSL_free(rsa); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) { |
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references); |
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
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if (rsa->meth->keygen) { |
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return rsa->meth->keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); |
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} |
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|
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return rsa_default_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes, |
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BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { |
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if (rsa->meth->multi_prime_keygen) { |
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return rsa->meth->multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, num_primes, e_value, cb); |
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} |
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|
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return rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, num_primes, e_value, cb); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
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if (rsa->meth->encrypt) { |
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return rsa->meth->encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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return rsa_default_encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_public_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, |
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int padding) { |
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size_t out_len; |
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|
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if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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return out_len; |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
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if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) { |
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return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_private_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, |
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int padding) { |
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size_t out_len; |
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|
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if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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return out_len; |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, |
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { |
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if (rsa->meth->decrypt) { |
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return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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return rsa_default_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_private_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, |
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int padding) { |
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size_t out_len; |
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|
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if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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return out_len; |
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} |
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|
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int RSA_public_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, |
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int padding) { |
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size_t out_len; |
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|
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if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (out_len > INT_MAX) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
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return -1; |
| 272 |
} |
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return out_len; |
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} |
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) { |
| 277 |
if (rsa->meth->size) { |
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return rsa->meth->size(rsa); |
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} |
| 280 |
|
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return rsa_default_size(rsa); |
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} |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) { |
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return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE); |
| 286 |
} |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
int RSA_supports_digest(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD *md) { |
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if (rsa->meth && rsa->meth->supports_digest) { |
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return rsa->meth->supports_digest(rsa, md); |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
| 294 |
|
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int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
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int index; |
| 298 |
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func, |
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free_func)) { |
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return -1; |
| 301 |
} |
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return index; |
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} |
| 304 |
|
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int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *d, int idx, void *arg) { |
| 306 |
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| 307 |
} |
| 308 |
|
| 309 |
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *d, int idx) { |
| 310 |
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx); |
| 311 |
} |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
/* SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's |
| 314 |
* the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. */ |
| 315 |
static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36; |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
/* pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is |
| 318 |
* to be signed with PKCS#1. */ |
| 319 |
struct pkcs1_sig_prefix { |
| 320 |
/* nid identifies the hash function. */ |
| 321 |
int nid; |
| 322 |
/* len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid. */ |
| 323 |
uint8_t len; |
| 324 |
/* bytes contains the DER bytes. */ |
| 325 |
uint8_t bytes[19]; |
| 326 |
}; |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
/* kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with |
| 329 |
* different hash functions. */ |
| 330 |
static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = { |
| 331 |
{ |
| 332 |
NID_md5, |
| 333 |
18, |
| 334 |
{0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, |
| 335 |
0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10}, |
| 336 |
}, |
| 337 |
{ |
| 338 |
NID_sha1, |
| 339 |
15, |
| 340 |
{0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, |
| 341 |
0x00, 0x04, 0x14}, |
| 342 |
}, |
| 343 |
{ |
| 344 |
NID_sha224, |
| 345 |
19, |
| 346 |
{0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, |
| 347 |
0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c}, |
| 348 |
}, |
| 349 |
{ |
| 350 |
NID_sha256, |
| 351 |
19, |
| 352 |
{0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, |
| 353 |
0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20}, |
| 354 |
}, |
| 355 |
{ |
| 356 |
NID_sha384, |
| 357 |
19, |
| 358 |
{0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, |
| 359 |
0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30}, |
| 360 |
}, |
| 361 |
{ |
| 362 |
NID_sha512, |
| 363 |
19, |
| 364 |
{0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, |
| 365 |
0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40}, |
| 366 |
}, |
| 367 |
{ |
| 368 |
NID_undef, 0, {0}, |
| 369 |
}, |
| 370 |
}; |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len, |
| 373 |
int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, |
| 374 |
size_t msg_len) { |
| 375 |
unsigned i; |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) { |
| 378 |
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length. */ |
| 379 |
if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { |
| 380 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); |
| 381 |
return 0; |
| 382 |
} |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
*out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg; |
| 385 |
*out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; |
| 386 |
*is_alloced = 0; |
| 387 |
return 1; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) { |
| 391 |
const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i]; |
| 392 |
if (sig_prefix->nid != hash_nid) { |
| 393 |
continue; |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
const uint8_t* prefix = sig_prefix->bytes; |
| 397 |
unsigned prefix_len = sig_prefix->len; |
| 398 |
unsigned signed_msg_len; |
| 399 |
uint8_t *signed_msg; |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len; |
| 402 |
if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) { |
| 403 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_LONG); |
| 404 |
return 0; |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len); |
| 408 |
if (!signed_msg) { |
| 409 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 410 |
return 0; |
| 411 |
} |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len); |
| 414 |
memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len); |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
*out_msg = signed_msg; |
| 417 |
*out_msg_len = signed_msg_len; |
| 418 |
*is_alloced = 1; |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
return 1; |
| 421 |
} |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); |
| 424 |
return 0; |
| 425 |
} |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out, |
| 428 |
unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) { |
| 429 |
const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 430 |
int ret = 0; |
| 431 |
uint8_t *signed_msg; |
| 432 |
size_t signed_msg_len; |
| 433 |
int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0; |
| 434 |
size_t size_t_out_len; |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
if (rsa->meth->sign) { |
| 437 |
return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa); |
| 438 |
} |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, |
| 441 |
&signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, in, in_len)) { |
| 442 |
return 0; |
| 443 |
} |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE || |
| 446 |
signed_msg_len > rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 447 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); |
| 448 |
goto finish; |
| 449 |
} |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
if (RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg, |
| 452 |
signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { |
| 453 |
*out_len = size_t_out_len; |
| 454 |
ret = 1; |
| 455 |
} |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
finish: |
| 458 |
if (signed_msg_is_alloced) { |
| 459 |
OPENSSL_free(signed_msg); |
| 460 |
} |
| 461 |
return ret; |
| 462 |
} |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, |
| 465 |
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) { |
| 466 |
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) { |
| 467 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
| 468 |
return 0; |
| 469 |
} |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 472 |
uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 473 |
int ret = 0; |
| 474 |
uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL; |
| 475 |
size_t signed_msg_len, len; |
| 476 |
int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0; |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { |
| 479 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); |
| 480 |
return 0; |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| 484 |
if (!buf) { |
| 485 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 486 |
return 0; |
| 487 |
} |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len, |
| 490 |
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { |
| 491 |
goto out; |
| 492 |
} |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, |
| 495 |
&signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) { |
| 496 |
goto out; |
| 497 |
} |
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
if (len != signed_msg_len || memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) { |
| 500 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| 501 |
goto out; |
| 502 |
} |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
ret = 1; |
| 505 |
|
| 506 |
out: |
| 507 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 508 |
if (signed_msg_is_alloced) { |
| 509 |
OPENSSL_free(signed_msg); |
| 510 |
} |
| 511 |
return ret; |
| 512 |
} |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
static void bn_free_and_null(BIGNUM **bn) { |
| 515 |
BN_free(*bn); |
| 516 |
*bn = NULL; |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) { |
| 520 |
BIGNUM n, pm1, qm1, lcm, gcd, de, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp; |
| 521 |
BN_CTX *ctx; |
| 522 |
int ok = 0, has_crt_values; |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) { |
| 525 |
/* Opaque keys can't be checked. */ |
| 526 |
return 1; |
| 527 |
} |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) { |
| 530 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN); |
| 531 |
return 0; |
| 532 |
} |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
if (!key->n || !key->e) { |
| 535 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
| 536 |
return 0; |
| 537 |
} |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
if (!key->d || !key->p) { |
| 540 |
/* For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be |
| 541 |
* checked. */ |
| 542 |
return 1; |
| 543 |
} |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 546 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 547 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 548 |
return 0; |
| 549 |
} |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
BN_init(&n); |
| 552 |
BN_init(&pm1); |
| 553 |
BN_init(&qm1); |
| 554 |
BN_init(&lcm); |
| 555 |
BN_init(&gcd); |
| 556 |
BN_init(&de); |
| 557 |
BN_init(&dmp1); |
| 558 |
BN_init(&dmq1); |
| 559 |
BN_init(&iqmp); |
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
if (!BN_mul(&n, key->p, key->q, ctx) || |
| 562 |
/* lcm = lcm(prime-1, for all primes) */ |
| 563 |
!BN_sub(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) || |
| 564 |
!BN_sub(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) || |
| 565 |
!BN_mul(&lcm, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) || |
| 566 |
!BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx)) { |
| 567 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); |
| 568 |
goto out; |
| 569 |
} |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
size_t num_additional_primes = 0; |
| 572 |
if (key->additional_primes != NULL) { |
| 573 |
num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(key->additional_primes); |
| 574 |
} |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
size_t i; |
| 577 |
for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) { |
| 578 |
const RSA_additional_prime *ap = |
| 579 |
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(key->additional_primes, i); |
| 580 |
if (!BN_mul(&n, &n, ap->prime, ctx) || |
| 581 |
!BN_sub(&pm1, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || |
| 582 |
!BN_mul(&lcm, &lcm, &pm1, ctx) || |
| 583 |
!BN_gcd(&gcd, &gcd, &pm1, ctx)) { |
| 584 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); |
| 585 |
goto out; |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
} |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
if (!BN_div(&lcm, NULL, &lcm, &gcd, ctx) || |
| 590 |
!BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) || |
| 591 |
/* de = d*e mod lcm(prime-1, for all primes). */ |
| 592 |
!BN_mod_mul(&de, key->d, key->e, &lcm, ctx)) { |
| 593 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); |
| 594 |
goto out; |
| 595 |
} |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
if (BN_cmp(&n, key->n) != 0) { |
| 598 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q); |
| 599 |
goto out; |
| 600 |
} |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
if (!BN_is_one(&de)) { |
| 603 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1); |
| 604 |
goto out; |
| 605 |
} |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL; |
| 608 |
if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) || |
| 609 |
has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) { |
| 610 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES); |
| 611 |
goto out; |
| 612 |
} |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
if (has_crt_values && num_additional_primes == 0) { |
| 615 |
if (/* dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */ |
| 616 |
!BN_mod(&dmp1, key->d, &pm1, ctx) || |
| 617 |
/* dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */ |
| 618 |
!BN_mod(&dmq1, key->d, &qm1, ctx) || |
| 619 |
/* iqmp = q^-1 mod p */ |
| 620 |
!BN_mod_inverse(&iqmp, key->q, key->p, ctx)) { |
| 621 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); |
| 622 |
goto out; |
| 623 |
} |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
if (BN_cmp(&dmp1, key->dmp1) != 0 || |
| 626 |
BN_cmp(&dmq1, key->dmq1) != 0 || |
| 627 |
BN_cmp(&iqmp, key->iqmp) != 0) { |
| 628 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT); |
| 629 |
goto out; |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
} |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
ok = 1; |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
out: |
| 636 |
BN_free(&n); |
| 637 |
BN_free(&pm1); |
| 638 |
BN_free(&qm1); |
| 639 |
BN_free(&lcm); |
| 640 |
BN_free(&gcd); |
| 641 |
BN_free(&de); |
| 642 |
BN_free(&dmp1); |
| 643 |
BN_free(&dmq1); |
| 644 |
BN_free(&iqmp); |
| 645 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
return ok; |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
int RSA_recover_crt_params(RSA *rsa) { |
| 651 |
BN_CTX *ctx; |
| 652 |
BIGNUM *totient, *rem, *multiple, *p_plus_q, *p_minus_q; |
| 653 |
int ok = 0; |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) { |
| 656 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| 657 |
return 0; |
| 658 |
} |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
if (rsa->p || rsa->q || rsa->dmp1 || rsa->dmq1 || rsa->iqmp) { |
| 661 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN); |
| 662 |
return 0; |
| 663 |
} |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) { |
| 666 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CANNOT_RECOVER_MULTI_PRIME_KEY); |
| 667 |
return 0; |
| 668 |
} |
| 669 |
|
| 670 |
/* This uses the algorithm from section 9B of the RSA paper: |
| 671 |
* http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf */ |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 674 |
if (ctx == NULL) { |
| 675 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 676 |
return 0; |
| 677 |
} |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 680 |
totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 681 |
rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 682 |
multiple = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 683 |
p_plus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 684 |
p_minus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
if (totient == NULL || rem == NULL || multiple == NULL || p_plus_q == NULL || |
| 687 |
p_minus_q == NULL) { |
| 688 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 689 |
goto err; |
| 690 |
} |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
/* ed-1 is a small multiple of φ(n). */ |
| 693 |
if (!BN_mul(totient, rsa->e, rsa->d, ctx) || |
| 694 |
!BN_sub_word(totient, 1) || |
| 695 |
/* φ(n) = |
| 696 |
* pq - p - q + 1 = |
| 697 |
* n - (p + q) + 1 |
| 698 |
* |
| 699 |
* Thus n is a reasonable estimate for φ(n). So, (ed-1)/n will be very |
| 700 |
* close. But, when we calculate the quotient, we'll be truncating it |
| 701 |
* because we discard the remainder. Thus (ed-1)/multiple will be >= n, |
| 702 |
* which the totient cannot be. So we add one to the estimate. |
| 703 |
* |
| 704 |
* Consider ed-1 as: |
| 705 |
* |
| 706 |
* multiple * (n - (p+q) + 1) = |
| 707 |
* multiple*n - multiple*(p+q) + multiple |
| 708 |
* |
| 709 |
* When we divide by n, the first term becomes multiple and, since |
| 710 |
* multiple and p+q is tiny compared to n, the second and third terms can |
| 711 |
* be ignored. Thus I claim that subtracting one from the estimate is |
| 712 |
* sufficient. */ |
| 713 |
!BN_div(multiple, NULL, totient, rsa->n, ctx) || |
| 714 |
!BN_add_word(multiple, 1) || |
| 715 |
!BN_div(totient, rem, totient, multiple, ctx)) { |
| 716 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| 717 |
goto err; |
| 718 |
} |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) { |
| 721 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS); |
| 722 |
goto err; |
| 723 |
} |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
rsa->p = BN_new(); |
| 726 |
rsa->q = BN_new(); |
| 727 |
rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); |
| 728 |
rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); |
| 729 |
rsa->iqmp = BN_new(); |
| 730 |
if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL || rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 == |
| 731 |
NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) { |
| 732 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 733 |
goto err; |
| 734 |
} |
| 735 |
|
| 736 |
/* φ(n) = n - (p + q) + 1 => |
| 737 |
* n - totient + 1 = p + q */ |
| 738 |
if (!BN_sub(p_plus_q, rsa->n, totient) || |
| 739 |
!BN_add_word(p_plus_q, 1) || |
| 740 |
/* p - q = sqrt((p+q)^2 - 4n) */ |
| 741 |
!BN_sqr(rem, p_plus_q, ctx) || |
| 742 |
!BN_lshift(multiple, rsa->n, 2) || |
| 743 |
!BN_sub(rem, rem, multiple) || |
| 744 |
!BN_sqrt(p_minus_q, rem, ctx) || |
| 745 |
/* q is 1/2 (p+q)-(p-q) */ |
| 746 |
!BN_sub(rsa->q, p_plus_q, p_minus_q) || |
| 747 |
!BN_rshift1(rsa->q, rsa->q) || |
| 748 |
!BN_div(rsa->p, NULL, rsa->n, rsa->q, ctx) || |
| 749 |
!BN_mul(multiple, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) { |
| 750 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| 751 |
goto err; |
| 752 |
} |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
if (BN_cmp(multiple, rsa->n) != 0) { |
| 755 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 756 |
goto err; |
| 757 |
} |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
if (!BN_sub(rem, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) || |
| 760 |
!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || |
| 761 |
!BN_sub(rem, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) || |
| 762 |
!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || |
| 763 |
!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) { |
| 764 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| 765 |
goto err; |
| 766 |
} |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
ok = 1; |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
err: |
| 771 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 772 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 773 |
if (!ok) { |
| 774 |
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->p); |
| 775 |
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->q); |
| 776 |
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmp1); |
| 777 |
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmq1); |
| 778 |
bn_free_and_null(&rsa->iqmp); |
| 779 |
} |
| 780 |
return ok; |
| 781 |
} |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, |
| 784 |
size_t len) { |
| 785 |
if (rsa->meth->private_transform) { |
| 786 |
return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len); |
| 787 |
} |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len); |
| 790 |
} |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
| 793 |
return 1; |
| 794 |
} |