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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson ([email protected]) for the OpenSSL |
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* project 2005. |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
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* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* [email protected]. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson ([email protected]). */ |
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|
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#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| 57 |
|
| 58 |
#include <assert.h> |
| 59 |
#include <limits.h> |
| 60 |
#include <string.h> |
| 61 |
|
| 62 |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 63 |
#include <openssl/digest.h> |
| 64 |
#include <openssl/err.h> |
| 65 |
#include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 66 |
#include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 67 |
#include <openssl/sha.h> |
| 68 |
|
| 69 |
#include "internal.h" |
| 70 |
#include "../internal.h" |
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|
| 72 |
/* TODO(fork): don't the check functions have to be constant time? */ |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 75 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) { |
| 76 |
unsigned j; |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
if (to_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 79 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 80 |
return 0; |
| 81 |
} |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
if (from_len > to_len - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 84 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 85 |
return 0; |
| 86 |
} |
| 87 |
|
| 88 |
uint8_t *p = to; |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
*(p++) = 0; |
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*(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */ |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
/* pad out with 0xff data */ |
| 94 |
j = to_len - 3 - from_len; |
| 95 |
memset(p, 0xff, j); |
| 96 |
p += j; |
| 97 |
*(p++) = 0; |
| 98 |
memcpy(p, from, from_len); |
| 99 |
return 1; |
| 100 |
} |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 103 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) { |
| 104 |
unsigned i, j; |
| 105 |
const uint8_t *p; |
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
if (from_len < 2) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); |
| 109 |
return -1; |
| 110 |
} |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
p = from; |
| 113 |
if ((*(p++) != 0) || (*(p++) != 1)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01); |
| 115 |
return -1; |
| 116 |
} |
| 117 |
|
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/* scan over padding data */ |
| 119 |
j = from_len - 2; /* one for leading 00, one for type. */ |
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for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { |
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/* should decrypt to 0xff */ |
| 122 |
if (*p != 0xff) { |
| 123 |
if (*p == 0) { |
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p++; |
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break; |
| 126 |
} else { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT); |
| 128 |
return -1; |
| 129 |
} |
| 130 |
} |
| 131 |
p++; |
| 132 |
} |
| 133 |
|
| 134 |
if (i == j) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); |
| 136 |
return -1; |
| 137 |
} |
| 138 |
|
| 139 |
if (i < 8) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT); |
| 141 |
return -1; |
| 142 |
} |
| 143 |
i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */ |
| 144 |
j -= i; |
| 145 |
if (j > to_len) { |
| 146 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); |
| 147 |
return -1; |
| 148 |
} |
| 149 |
memcpy(to, p, j); |
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
return j; |
| 152 |
} |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 155 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) { |
| 156 |
unsigned i, j; |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
if (to_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 159 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 160 |
return 0; |
| 161 |
} |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
if (from_len > to_len - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 164 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 165 |
return 0; |
| 166 |
} |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
uint8_t *p = to; |
| 169 |
|
| 170 |
*(p++) = 0; |
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*(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ |
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|
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/* pad out with non-zero random data */ |
| 174 |
j = to_len - 3 - from_len; |
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
if (!RAND_bytes(p, j)) { |
| 177 |
return 0; |
| 178 |
} |
| 179 |
|
| 180 |
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { |
| 181 |
while (*p == 0) { |
| 182 |
if (!RAND_bytes(p, 1)) { |
| 183 |
return 0; |
| 184 |
} |
| 185 |
} |
| 186 |
p++; |
| 187 |
} |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
*(p++) = 0; |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
memcpy(p, from, from_len); |
| 192 |
return 1; |
| 193 |
} |
| 194 |
|
| 195 |
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 196 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) { |
| 197 |
if (from_len == 0) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| 199 |
return -1; |
| 200 |
} |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
/* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography |
| 203 |
* Standard", section 7.2.2. */ |
| 204 |
if (from_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { |
| 205 |
/* |from| is zero-padded to the size of the RSA modulus, a public value, so |
| 206 |
* this can be rejected in non-constant time. */ |
| 207 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 208 |
return -1; |
| 209 |
} |
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
unsigned first_byte_is_zero = constant_time_eq(from[0], 0); |
| 212 |
unsigned second_byte_is_two = constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
unsigned i, zero_index = 0, looking_for_index = ~0u; |
| 215 |
for (i = 2; i < from_len; i++) { |
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unsigned equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); |
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zero_index = constant_time_select(looking_for_index & equals0, (unsigned)i, |
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zero_index); |
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looking_for_index = constant_time_select(equals0, 0, looking_for_index); |
| 220 |
} |
| 221 |
|
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/* The input must begin with 00 02. */ |
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unsigned valid_index = first_byte_is_zero; |
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valid_index &= second_byte_is_two; |
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|
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/* We must have found the end of PS. */ |
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valid_index &= ~looking_for_index; |
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|
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/* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. */ |
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valid_index &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8); |
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|
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/* Skip the zero byte. */ |
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zero_index++; |
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|
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/* NOTE: Although this logic attempts to be constant time, the API contracts |
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* of this function and |RSA_decrypt| with |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| make it |
| 237 |
* impossible to completely avoid Bleichenbacher's attack. Consumers should |
| 238 |
* use |RSA_unpad_key_pkcs1|. */ |
| 239 |
if (!valid_index) { |
| 240 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); |
| 241 |
return -1; |
| 242 |
} |
| 243 |
|
| 244 |
const unsigned msg_len = from_len - zero_index; |
| 245 |
if (msg_len > to_len) { |
| 246 |
/* This shouldn't happen because this function is always called with |
| 247 |
* |to_len| as the key size and |from_len| is bounded by the key size. */ |
| 248 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); |
| 249 |
return -1; |
| 250 |
} |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
if (msg_len > INT_MAX) { |
| 253 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| 254 |
return -1; |
| 255 |
} |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
memcpy(to, &from[zero_index], msg_len); |
| 258 |
return (int)msg_len; |
| 259 |
} |
| 260 |
|
| 261 |
int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, const uint8_t *from, |
| 262 |
unsigned from_len) { |
| 263 |
if (from_len > to_len) { |
| 264 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 265 |
return 0; |
| 266 |
} |
| 267 |
|
| 268 |
if (from_len < to_len) { |
| 269 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 270 |
return 0; |
| 271 |
} |
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
memcpy(to, from, from_len); |
| 274 |
return 1; |
| 275 |
} |
| 276 |
|
| 277 |
static int PKCS1_MGF1(uint8_t *mask, unsigned len, const uint8_t *seed, |
| 278 |
unsigned seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) { |
| 279 |
unsigned outlen = 0; |
| 280 |
uint32_t i; |
| 281 |
uint8_t cnt[4]; |
| 282 |
EVP_MD_CTX c; |
| 283 |
uint8_t md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 284 |
unsigned mdlen; |
| 285 |
int ret = -1; |
| 286 |
|
| 287 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); |
| 288 |
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { |
| 291 |
cnt[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 255); |
| 292 |
cnt[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 255); |
| 293 |
cnt[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8)) & 255; |
| 294 |
cnt[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 255); |
| 295 |
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL) || |
| 296 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen) || |
| 297 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4)) { |
| 298 |
goto err; |
| 299 |
} |
| 300 |
|
| 301 |
if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { |
| 302 |
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL)) { |
| 303 |
goto err; |
| 304 |
} |
| 305 |
outlen += mdlen; |
| 306 |
} else { |
| 307 |
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL)) { |
| 308 |
goto err; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); |
| 311 |
outlen = len; |
| 312 |
} |
| 313 |
} |
| 314 |
ret = 0; |
| 315 |
|
| 316 |
err: |
| 317 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); |
| 318 |
return ret; |
| 319 |
} |
| 320 |
|
| 321 |
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 322 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len, |
| 323 |
const uint8_t *param, unsigned param_len, |
| 324 |
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { |
| 325 |
unsigned i, emlen, mdlen; |
| 326 |
uint8_t *db, *seed; |
| 327 |
uint8_t *dbmask = NULL, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 328 |
int ret = 0; |
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
if (md == NULL) { |
| 331 |
md = EVP_sha1(); |
| 332 |
} |
| 333 |
if (mgf1md == NULL) { |
| 334 |
mgf1md = md; |
| 335 |
} |
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
if (to_len < 2 * mdlen + 2) { |
| 340 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 341 |
return 0; |
| 342 |
} |
| 343 |
|
| 344 |
emlen = to_len - 1; |
| 345 |
if (from_len > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { |
| 346 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 347 |
return 0; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) { |
| 351 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| 352 |
return 0; |
| 353 |
} |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
to[0] = 0; |
| 356 |
seed = to + 1; |
| 357 |
db = to + mdlen + 1; |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
if (!EVP_Digest(param, param_len, db, NULL, md, NULL)) { |
| 360 |
return 0; |
| 361 |
} |
| 362 |
memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - from_len - 2 * mdlen - 1); |
| 363 |
db[emlen - from_len - mdlen - 1] = 0x01; |
| 364 |
memcpy(db + emlen - from_len - mdlen, from, from_len); |
| 365 |
if (!RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen)) { |
| 366 |
return 0; |
| 367 |
} |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen); |
| 370 |
if (dbmask == NULL) { |
| 371 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 372 |
return 0; |
| 373 |
} |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) { |
| 376 |
goto out; |
| 377 |
} |
| 378 |
for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++) { |
| 379 |
db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; |
| 380 |
} |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) { |
| 383 |
goto out; |
| 384 |
} |
| 385 |
for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) { |
| 386 |
seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; |
| 387 |
} |
| 388 |
ret = 1; |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
out: |
| 391 |
OPENSSL_free(dbmask); |
| 392 |
return ret; |
| 393 |
} |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, |
| 396 |
const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len, |
| 397 |
const uint8_t *param, unsigned param_len, |
| 398 |
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { |
| 399 |
unsigned i, dblen, mlen = -1, mdlen, bad, looking_for_one_byte, one_index = 0; |
| 400 |
const uint8_t *maskeddb, *maskedseed; |
| 401 |
uint8_t *db = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
if (md == NULL) { |
| 404 |
md = EVP_sha1(); |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
if (mgf1md == NULL) { |
| 407 |
mgf1md = md; |
| 408 |
} |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
/* The encoded message is one byte smaller than the modulus to ensure that it |
| 413 |
* doesn't end up greater than the modulus. Thus there's an extra "+1" here |
| 414 |
* compared to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2437#section-9.1.1.2. */ |
| 415 |
if (from_len < 1 + 2*mdlen + 1) { |
| 416 |
/* 'from_len' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the |
| 417 |
* particular ciphertext. */ |
| 418 |
goto decoding_err; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
dblen = from_len - mdlen - 1; |
| 422 |
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); |
| 423 |
if (db == NULL) { |
| 424 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 425 |
goto err; |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
maskedseed = from + 1; |
| 429 |
maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen; |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) { |
| 432 |
goto err; |
| 433 |
} |
| 434 |
for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) { |
| 435 |
seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; |
| 436 |
} |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) { |
| 439 |
goto err; |
| 440 |
} |
| 441 |
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) { |
| 442 |
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; |
| 443 |
} |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
if (!EVP_Digest(param, param_len, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) { |
| 446 |
goto err; |
| 447 |
} |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
bad = ~constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen)); |
| 450 |
bad |= ~constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
looking_for_one_byte = ~0u; |
| 453 |
for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) { |
| 454 |
unsigned equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); |
| 455 |
unsigned equals0 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 0); |
| 456 |
one_index = constant_time_select(looking_for_one_byte & equals1, i, |
| 457 |
one_index); |
| 458 |
looking_for_one_byte = |
| 459 |
constant_time_select(equals1, 0, looking_for_one_byte); |
| 460 |
bad |= looking_for_one_byte & ~equals0; |
| 461 |
} |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
bad |= looking_for_one_byte; |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
if (bad) { |
| 466 |
goto decoding_err; |
| 467 |
} |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
one_index++; |
| 470 |
mlen = dblen - one_index; |
| 471 |
if (to_len < mlen) { |
| 472 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); |
| 473 |
mlen = -1; |
| 474 |
} else { |
| 475 |
memcpy(to, db + one_index, mlen); |
| 476 |
} |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
OPENSSL_free(db); |
| 479 |
return mlen; |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
decoding_err: |
| 482 |
/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal |
| 483 |
* which kind of decoding error happened */ |
| 484 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); |
| 485 |
err: |
| 486 |
OPENSSL_free(db); |
| 487 |
return -1; |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
static const unsigned char zeroes[] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *mHash, |
| 493 |
const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, |
| 494 |
const uint8_t *EM, int sLen) { |
| 495 |
int i; |
| 496 |
int ret = 0; |
| 497 |
int maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen; |
| 498 |
size_t hLen; |
| 499 |
const uint8_t *H; |
| 500 |
uint8_t *DB = NULL; |
| 501 |
EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| 502 |
uint8_t H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 503 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
if (mgf1Hash == NULL) { |
| 506 |
mgf1Hash = Hash; |
| 507 |
} |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
/* Negative sLen has special meanings: |
| 512 |
* -1 sLen == hLen |
| 513 |
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature |
| 514 |
* -N reserved */ |
| 515 |
if (sLen == -1) { |
| 516 |
sLen = hLen; |
| 517 |
} else if (sLen == -2) { |
| 518 |
sLen = -2; |
| 519 |
} else if (sLen < -2) { |
| 520 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 521 |
goto err; |
| 522 |
} |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7; |
| 525 |
emLen = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 526 |
if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) { |
| 527 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID); |
| 528 |
goto err; |
| 529 |
} |
| 530 |
if (MSBits == 0) { |
| 531 |
EM++; |
| 532 |
emLen--; |
| 533 |
} |
| 534 |
if (emLen < ((int)hLen + sLen + 2)) { |
| 535 |
/* sLen can be small negative */ |
| 536 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); |
| 537 |
goto err; |
| 538 |
} |
| 539 |
if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) { |
| 540 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID); |
| 541 |
goto err; |
| 542 |
} |
| 543 |
maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1; |
| 544 |
H = EM + maskedDBLen; |
| 545 |
DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen); |
| 546 |
if (!DB) { |
| 547 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 548 |
goto err; |
| 549 |
} |
| 550 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0) { |
| 551 |
goto err; |
| 552 |
} |
| 553 |
for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++) { |
| 554 |
DB[i] ^= EM[i]; |
| 555 |
} |
| 556 |
if (MSBits) { |
| 557 |
DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits); |
| 558 |
} |
| 559 |
for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) { |
| 560 |
; |
| 561 |
} |
| 562 |
if (DB[i++] != 0x1) { |
| 563 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED); |
| 564 |
goto err; |
| 565 |
} |
| 566 |
if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) { |
| 567 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 568 |
goto err; |
| 569 |
} |
| 570 |
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL) || |
| 571 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) || |
| 572 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen)) { |
| 573 |
goto err; |
| 574 |
} |
| 575 |
if (maskedDBLen - i) { |
| 576 |
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i)) { |
| 577 |
goto err; |
| 578 |
} |
| 579 |
} |
| 580 |
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H_, NULL)) { |
| 581 |
goto err; |
| 582 |
} |
| 583 |
if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) { |
| 584 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| 585 |
ret = 0; |
| 586 |
} else { |
| 587 |
ret = 1; |
| 588 |
} |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
err: |
| 591 |
OPENSSL_free(DB); |
| 592 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
return ret; |
| 595 |
} |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, |
| 598 |
const unsigned char *mHash, |
| 599 |
const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, |
| 600 |
int sLen) { |
| 601 |
int i; |
| 602 |
int ret = 0; |
| 603 |
size_t maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen; |
| 604 |
size_t hLen; |
| 605 |
unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p; |
| 606 |
EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
if (mgf1Hash == NULL) { |
| 609 |
mgf1Hash = Hash; |
| 610 |
} |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
/* Negative sLen has special meanings: |
| 615 |
* -1 sLen == hLen |
| 616 |
* -2 salt length is maximized |
| 617 |
* -N reserved */ |
| 618 |
if (sLen == -1) { |
| 619 |
sLen = hLen; |
| 620 |
} else if (sLen == -2) { |
| 621 |
sLen = -2; |
| 622 |
} else if (sLen < -2) { |
| 623 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 624 |
goto err; |
| 625 |
} |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
if (BN_is_zero(rsa->n)) { |
| 628 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| 629 |
goto err; |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7; |
| 633 |
emLen = RSA_size(rsa); |
| 634 |
if (MSBits == 0) { |
| 635 |
assert(emLen >= 1); |
| 636 |
*EM++ = 0; |
| 637 |
emLen--; |
| 638 |
} |
| 639 |
if (sLen == -2) { |
| 640 |
if (emLen < hLen + 2) { |
| 641 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 642 |
goto err; |
| 643 |
} |
| 644 |
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2; |
| 645 |
} else if (emLen < hLen + sLen + 2) { |
| 646 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); |
| 647 |
goto err; |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
if (sLen > 0) { |
| 650 |
salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen); |
| 651 |
if (!salt) { |
| 652 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 653 |
goto err; |
| 654 |
} |
| 655 |
if (!RAND_bytes(salt, sLen)) { |
| 656 |
goto err; |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
} |
| 659 |
maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1; |
| 660 |
H = EM + maskedDBLen; |
| 661 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 662 |
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL) || |
| 663 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) || |
| 664 |
!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen)) { |
| 665 |
goto err; |
| 666 |
} |
| 667 |
if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen)) { |
| 668 |
goto err; |
| 669 |
} |
| 670 |
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H, NULL)) { |
| 671 |
goto err; |
| 672 |
} |
| 673 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
/* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */ |
| 676 |
if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash)) { |
| 677 |
goto err; |
| 678 |
} |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
p = EM; |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
/* Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update |
| 683 |
* pointer. Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to |
| 684 |
* be non-negative. */ |
| 685 |
p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2; |
| 686 |
*p++ ^= 0x1; |
| 687 |
if (sLen > 0) { |
| 688 |
for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++) { |
| 689 |
*p++ ^= salt[i]; |
| 690 |
} |
| 691 |
} |
| 692 |
if (MSBits) { |
| 693 |
EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits); |
| 694 |
} |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
/* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */ |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc; |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
ret = 1; |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
err: |
| 703 |
OPENSSL_free(salt); |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
return ret; |
| 706 |
} |