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|
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\layout Title |
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|
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Progeny Package Signing Policy |
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\layout Author |
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|
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John Goerzen <[email protected]> |
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\layout Date |
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|
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Draft 2; February, 2001 |
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\layout Section |
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|
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Introduction & Background |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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One weakness commonly associated with installing software off the Internet |
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-- or even a CD-ROM -- is verification of authenticity. |
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Can a system administrator really be sure that the packages he thinks he |
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is downloading from a Debian or Progeny mirror are really official packages? |
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Or that a CD-ROM contains the original packages? These days, it is not |
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impossibly difficult to intercept network traffic and insert trojan packages |
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in place of real ones, or to prepare a fake CD-ROM with a realistic-looking |
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label. |
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To thwart this, the ability to add GPG signatures to Debian packages is |
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being implemented. |
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These signatures add a cryptographic guarantee that the package is authentic |
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in a particular way. |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Each package may carry multiple signatures, and each signature may convey |
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unique information. |
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For instance, one signature might confirm that a legitimate Progeny developer |
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uploaded the package; another, that Progeny Quality Assurance has processed |
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the package; and a final one might confirm that a package is part of a |
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particular release. |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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On each customer's computer is a file containing rules for authentication |
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of these GPG signatures. |
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The rules file describes which signatures are required, which are optional, |
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and what keys constitute a valid signature for each signature type. |
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Therefore, Progeny can ship rules that might say something like this: |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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For each package to be installed, require the Progeny corporate signature, |
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a signature from the Quality Assurance team, and either a signature from |
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a Progeny developer that uploaded a Progeny package or an automated signature |
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indicating that the package came from Debian. |
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\layout Subsection |
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|
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Goals |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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There are several things that we would like to accomplish with this system. |
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Here is a list of many of them, an explanation of how we accomplish it, |
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and why it is valuable. |
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\layout Subsubsection |
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|
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Progeny Developer Verification |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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The first thing to check on a package is to verify that it was built by |
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an authorized Progeny developer. |
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To this end, we will have a maintainer ( |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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maint |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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) signature applied to each package at upload time by the person that built |
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it. |
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This key provides several benefits: |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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It provides a guarantee that the package was not modified by anyone else |
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within Progeny. |
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No malicious Progeny employee could modify the package on its way. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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Customers can know that a package was unmodified from the time it was built. |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Additionally, if Progeny ever discovers that a particular developer was |
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malicious or dangerously incompetent in the building of packages, the packages |
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built by that person can be easily identified and can be rendered uninstallable. |
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\layout Subsubsection |
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|
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Quality Assurance Verification |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Another useful point to check on a package is whether or not it has passed |
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through Progeny's Quality Assurance department. |
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By doing so, we can guarantee that no package bypassed the QA department |
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(either by accident or maliciously), and introduce an additional level |
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of verification. |
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By having this second signature present on the package, we reduce the damage |
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done if the key for an individual maintainer were to become compromised |
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in some way. |
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Because we have a maintainer signature already, we have already prevented |
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any malicious QA employee from modifying the package, but if Progeny does |
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at some time find cause to suspect a QA person of handling packages in |
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a dangerous way, the key can be removed and the packages rendered uninstallable |
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in the same manner as with the Debian maintainer signature. |
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\layout Subsubsection |
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|
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General Malicious Employee Protection |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Because Progeny's business is so highly dependent upon secure and stable |
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software, if a malicious employee were to be ever hired, serious damage |
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could be done. |
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Package signatures and compartmentalization can be used together to provide |
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an effective weapon to significantly lessen the potential harm that could |
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be caused by such a person. |
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In general, the worst harm that could be inflicted upon Progeny by a malicious |
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employee would be the insertion of trojan or otherwise malicious code into |
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the packages that we distribute to customers and use ourselves. |
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The mechanisms outlined above can help to combat this threat in several |
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ways. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A malicious system administrator with full access to the machines on which |
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the archive is served from would ordinarily be able to modify the packages |
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on those machines and insert trojan code virtually undetected. |
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Since the packages had already gone through QA, and probably were already |
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installed on Progeny systems, the change would probably be noticed by customers |
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first. |
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With this system, the maintainer signature is applied before the package |
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is even uploaded to the archive in the first place, so any such change |
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would be immediately noticeable. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A malicious developer, often also with full access to the archive, could |
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bypass QA to get malicious code into the archive. |
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With this system, no package would be installable unless it bears a signature |
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from a valid QA employee. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A malicious QA employee could modify the package after it has been received |
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from the developers but before it is placed onto the archive. |
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With this proposal, such a change would be immediately noticed because |
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the maintainer signature check would fail. |
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\layout Subsubsection |
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|
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General Malicious Outsider Protection |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Another category of problems that we have to worry about concern malicious |
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outsiders. |
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There are several ways that such a person could cause Progeny customers |
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to unknowingly install and run code that poses a security risk to them. |
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We can deal with most of them. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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Someone could intercept the traffic between a customer's computer and the |
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Progeny archive, inserting data containing trojan code without the customer's |
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knowledge. |
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This is already possible and has been done. |
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By placing signatures on the packages, if they are modified any way during |
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download, the customer would immediately be aware. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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By |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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social engineering |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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, that is, convincing someone through non-technical means to install a package, |
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a malicious person could convince one of our customers to install a package |
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that contains a security problem. |
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However, with signature verification, such a package would fail to install. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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An outsider could replace the data in a current package with that from a |
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previous version of a package, perhaps one with known security vulnerabilities. |
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With our archive and release signatures, we can dramatically reduce the |
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potential pool of packages from which such a person could draw a signed |
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Progeny package containing a known security problem. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A cracker or someone else that gains unauthorized access to Progeny archives |
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could modify the .debs that customers download in-place, giving them code |
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that could pose a security risk. |
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With the mechanisms in this proposal, such a modification would cause multiple |
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signatures to fail, providing an instant way to know that the package had |
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been modified. |
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\layout Subsection |
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|
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Unaddressed Issues |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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While this proposal can deal with a great many potential problems that could |
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occur, there are still several problems that cannot be dealt with solely |
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within the scope of this system. |
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Here are some of them that we should be aware of. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A cracker obtaining root maliciously on a customer's machine could bypass |
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all of the checks that are in place here. |
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Such a person could install fake versions of the verifier that could report |
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false positives. |
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In general, if root is compromised, we can no longer make any assumptions |
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about the security of the customer's machine. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A cracker or internal person that has obtained root on a Progeny developer's |
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machine could alter files such that packages built by that developer would |
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contain trojan code that the developer may not be aware of. |
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Hopefully, this would be detected during the QA process, but there is no |
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guarantee of that. |
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Such a cracker could also replace GPG with a program that could surreptitiously |
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gather the developer's secret key and passphrase, causing a compromise |
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of the developer's secret key. |
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Again, once someone has obtained root, we can no longer make any assumptions |
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about the security of the machine. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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We must have a secure way to get the initial keyring and software to the |
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customer. |
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This is a question of how far we go to make the guarantee. |
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Some options include placing the software behind a HTTPS site that bears |
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a signature from a well-known certifying authority. |
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However, if someone's web browser has already been modified by a malicious |
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person, even this would not guarantee success. |
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Another option is to distribute the initial software and keys via CD-ROM |
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shipped directly from our office, though once again, a malicious person |
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could prepare a fake CD-ROM bearing a realistic-looking label and ship |
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it to a customer. |
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These are questions that we have to deal with outside the framework of |
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the package signing software itself, and basically rely upon striking an |
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acceptable balance between paranoia and ease of use. |
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\layout Section |
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|
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Criteria For Verification |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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The verification process is that which is performed on a customer's machine |
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when a package is to be installed. |
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Verification software has configurable criteria to indicate what signatures |
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are necessary to consider a package to be valid. |
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While the verification policy is up to each individual system administrator, |
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we must supply a default. |
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A package from Progeny will consider to pass the tests if all of these |
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criteria are met: |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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The package must bear an |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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origin |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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signature made by a designated origin key. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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The package must bear a quality assurance ( |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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qa |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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) signature made by a member of the Progeny QA team. |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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The package must have a maintainer ( |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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maint |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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) signature from either: |
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\begin_deeper |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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A member of the Progeny development team; or |
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\layout Itemize |
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|
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An automated signature applied to packages imported unmodified from Debian. |
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\end_deeper |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Possible modifications that we could consider making would be to change |
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some of the logic from |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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and |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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to |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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or |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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, thus permitting installation even if one signature is missing or somehow |
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invalid. |
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This could make dealing with situations involving lost keys, changing employees |
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, and upgrades easier, but comes at the expense of opening up some potential |
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malicious employee attacks. |
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\layout Section |
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|
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Procedures For Signing |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Keys can be added to packages during the development cycle. |
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At each step, we should ensure that all existing keys on the package are |
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valid. |
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The first signature on a package will be added by either the Progeny developer |
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responsible for it or the system that is installing the package from Debian. |
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The next signature will be added by the person in QA that approves the |
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package. |
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After that, the origin signature should be added, and finally, when the |
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package is placed into the archive, an archive signature should be added. |
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All signatures except automated ones are to be made by personal keys. |
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Progeny will maintain keyrings of valid developer and QA keys. |
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Below, the meaning and procedures for each Progeny signature are described. |
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\layout Subsection |
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|
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Maintainer Signature |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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The maintainer signature is named |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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maint |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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. |
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It is to be applied to any package uploaded into the archive by a Progeny |
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developer. |
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The maintainer signature is made with that developer's own GPG key. |
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Its purpose is to let the customer verify that the package was indeed worked |
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on by an authorized Progeny employee. |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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Many packages (a majority, in fact) appear in the Progeny distribution directly |
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from Debian with no modification or intervention from Progeny employees. |
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There is no real Progeny developer or uploader in charge of these packages. |
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For these situations, a special key should be generated. |
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A signature from that key should be automatically added to packages that |
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come through from Debian. |
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The username and description for that key should make clear that it does |
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not originate from a particular Progeny developer. |
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\layout Subsection |
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|
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Quality Assurance |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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As packages move into the distribution, we anticipate that they will be |
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screened by QA. |
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To that end, a |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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qa |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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signature will be made for the package. |
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It will be made using the GPG key of the specific QA employee that approves |
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the package. |
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Any package bearing a valid QA signature can thus be assumed to have passed |
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their testing for the distribution. |
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There should be no case in which this key is added automatically. |
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An exception may need to be made for initial bootstrapping; that is, dealing |
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with the thousands of packages already in the distribution prior to QA |
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procedures. |
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\layout Subsection |
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|
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Origin |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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The only key that must be present in the debsigs system is |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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origin |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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. |
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This key certifies the originator of the package (in this case, Progeny |
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Linux Systems) and lets the signature verifier load the appropriate ruleset |
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for the verification of signatures. |
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This key will probably be added automatically, using our corporate key |
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or some designated origin key that bears its signature. |
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\layout Section |
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|
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Safeguarding Keys |
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\layout Standard |
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|
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The task of safeguarding individual keys is already well-known, understood, |
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and easily manageable. |
| 435 |
However, safeguarding keys that are used by many people or to apply automated |
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signatures gets more difficult. |
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In some cases, the security of these is not as important -- for instance, |
| 438 |
an archive key will not inflict much damange if compromised. |
| 439 |
However, in other cases, the security is still quite important. |
| 440 |
\layout Standard |
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|
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Safeguarding of individual keys is a well-known problem with well-documented |
| 443 |
answers. |
| 444 |
To provide a comprehensive system, there are also other cases that we need |
| 445 |
to consider, which are spelled out below. |
| 446 |
\layout Section |
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|
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Special Cases & Procedures |
| 449 |
\layout Standard |
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|
| 451 |
While the policy laid out here will work smoothly for day-to-day operation, |
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things can go wrong or get confused and planning for them is a must. |
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In this section, I describe some special cases that can face us, what they |
| 454 |
mean for the package signing system, and how we can prepare for them ahead |
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of time and deal with them when they occur. |
| 456 |
\layout Subsection |
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|
| 458 |
Employee Leaves |
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\layout Standard |
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|
| 461 |
If a Progeny employee leaves the company for some reason, and this person |
| 462 |
was someone whose key was used to create signatures for packages that are |
| 463 |
used by customers, then Progeny will need to decide, on a case-by-case |
| 464 |
basis, several things: |
| 465 |
\layout Itemize |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
Do we have any reason to believe that the packages in the archive now bearing |
| 468 |
this person's signature are in any way damaged or tampered with? |
| 469 |
\layout Itemize |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
Do we have any reason to believe that this person may, in the future, intend |
| 472 |
to inflict harm on Progeny through the use of the key used to apply those |
| 473 |
signatures? |
| 474 |
\layout Standard |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
If the answer to the first question is |
| 477 |
\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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yes |
| 481 |
\begin_inset Quotes erd |
| 482 |
\end_inset |
| 483 |
|
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, then we would immediately need to remove the key of this employee from |
| 485 |
all keyrings and rebuild the effected packages. |
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If the answer to the second question is |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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yes |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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, then we would need to immediately remove this person's key from all internal |
| 495 |
keyrings (such that the maintainer signature check made by QA would fail |
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if somehow the person uploads a package after leaving the company), but |
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removing the key from the external keyrings is not a priority and can be |
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done at a more leisurely pace. |
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If both answers are |
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\begin_inset Quotes eld |
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\end_inset |
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|
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no |
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\begin_inset Quotes erd |
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\end_inset |
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|
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, then Progeny should, as a precaution, rebuild packages signed by that |
| 508 |
user eventually, but there is no need to do so before the next release. |
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\layout Subsection |
| 510 |
|
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People Join Progeny |
| 512 |
\layout Standard |
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|
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When a new person is hired for a development or QA position, this person |
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will need to generate a personal key and have it inserted onto the keyring. |
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Customers will not be able to verify a signature made by this new person |
| 517 |
until they have upgraded their Progeny keyring package. |
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Once that is done, packages will be able to verify with no difficulty. |
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We may need to ensure that the new keyring package gets installed early |
| 520 |
in any upgrade procedure, but beyond that, there is little that we must |
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do specially in this case. |
| 522 |
Note, though, that an existing employee must be the one to sign the new |
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keyring package. |
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\layout Subsection |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
Many Employees Leave |
| 527 |
\layout Standard |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
In the event that enough employees from a particular department leave the |
| 530 |
company such that there no longer exists anyone with a key that can make |
| 531 |
a valid signature for a particular category, we need to have a way to allow |
| 532 |
customers to continue receiving updates in a secure fashion. |
| 533 |
For this purpose, I suggest that Progeny create a generic key for both |
| 534 |
the QA and maintainer categories, store it in some physically secure area |
| 535 |
(such as a safe or deposit box) on removable media in a fashion that only |
| 536 |
authorized company officers could get the key in an emergency. |
| 537 |
The public key would be inserted on the distributed keyring files, but |
| 538 |
would never be used unless absolutely necessary. |
| 539 |
\layout Subsection |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
Key Compromises |
| 542 |
\layout Standard |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
If a key becomes compromised (that is, an intruder obtains the secret key |
| 545 |
and passphrase, enabling unauthorized signatures), then we must take steps |
| 546 |
to rectify the problem immediately. |
| 547 |
Depending on the type of key that was compromised and the circumstances, |
| 548 |
we might opt to immediately remove the compromised key from all keyrings |
| 549 |
and rebuild any effected packages. |
| 550 |
In all cases, the victim of the compromise should issue a revocation |
| 551 |
certificate, discard the old key, and generate a new one for future use. |
| 552 |
\layout Subsection |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
Compartmentalization |
| 555 |
\layout Standard |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
One of the benefits of having multiple signatures on a package is to reduce |
| 558 |
the damage that can be inflicted if one of those keys becomes untrusted |
| 559 |
in some fashion. |
| 560 |
For this reason, we should make sure that we do not have overlap between |
| 561 |
those that make signatures for different parts of the operation. |
| 562 |
Specifically, nobody should be both on the maintainer and the QA keyring. |
| 563 |
\layout Section |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
Future Options |
| 566 |
\layout Standard |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
In the course of preparing this policy, some ideas were discussed but discarded |
| 569 |
for the moment. |
| 570 |
This section will explain them as possible options for future use. |
| 571 |
\layout Subsection |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
Goal: Release & Dating of Packages |
| 574 |
\layout Standard |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
One potential problem that could arise for a customer is that a malicious |
| 577 |
person could present an old package as if it were current. |
| 578 |
If this old package contains problems, such as known security vulnerabilities, |
| 579 |
doing so could be an avenue for attack. |
| 580 |
Preventing this problem entirely is not really feasible; however, we can |
| 581 |
significantly lessen the potential vulnerability by providing a limited |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
\begin_inset Quotes eld |
| 584 |
\end_inset |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
window |
| 587 |
\begin_inset Quotes erd |
| 588 |
\end_inset |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
of time for which we consider a particular package valid. |
| 591 |
\layout Standard |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
For this situation, we must consider CD-ROM and online distribution separately. |
| 594 |
For online distribution, we can apply an |
| 595 |
\begin_inset Quotes eld |
| 596 |
\end_inset |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
archive |
| 599 |
\begin_inset Quotes erd |
| 600 |
\end_inset |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
signature, automatically, to each package in the archive. |
| 603 |
Because all signatures contain a timestamp indicating when they were made, |
| 604 |
the signature verifier on the customer's machine can ensure that the signature |
| 605 |
was placed on the package within a certain timeframe -- for example, two |
| 606 |
weeks. |
| 607 |
On our side, we would automatically re-sign all packages with the archive |
| 608 |
key periodically -- in this example, perhaps once a week. |
| 609 |
In this way, a customer installing a package knows that it is no more than |
| 610 |
two weeks out of date. |
| 611 |
Packages distributed via CD-ROM will either not have the archive signature |
| 612 |
or will have it ignored. |
| 613 |
\layout Standard |
| 614 |
|
| 615 |
This solution won't work for a CD-ROM because they are frequently used more |
| 616 |
than two weeks from the release and because there is no way to propagate |
| 617 |
signature updates to people using them. |
| 618 |
Therefore, the best we can do is guarantee the customer that a given package |
| 619 |
is indeed part of the release that is expected -- that is, if Progeny 2.1 |
| 620 |
is current, that a given package was released as part of Progeny 2.1 and |
| 621 |
does not date back to version 1.1. |
| 622 |
Another benefit of the release signature is that it can be virtually uncompromi |
| 623 |
sable. |
| 624 |
The release signature can be applied to the packages at release time, and |
| 625 |
then the key behind it can be destroyed. |
| 626 |
However, as a practical matter, we will need to publish at least one future |
| 627 |
release key in the current keyring so that people upgrading will be able |
| 628 |
to do so in a secure fashion. |
| 629 |
\layout Subsubsection |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
Archive |
| 632 |
\layout Standard |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
The |
| 635 |
\begin_inset Quotes eld |
| 636 |
\end_inset |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
archive |
| 639 |
\begin_inset Quotes erd |
| 640 |
\end_inset |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
signature is to be automatically applied by dinstall when a package is |
| 643 |
installed into Progeny's publically-accessible archive, regardless of the |
| 644 |
particular area that it is installed into. |
| 645 |
A valid signature can be used to assure that a package was indeed posted |
| 646 |
by Progeny on a specific date. |
| 647 |
\layout Subsubsection |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
Release |
| 650 |
\layout Standard |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
The release key should be kept in a secure, safe place accessible only by |
| 653 |
authorized company officers prior to use. |
| 654 |
After it has been used, it should be permanently destroyed. |
| 655 |
Release keys will need to be generated at least one release ahead of use |
| 656 |
to provide a suitable upgrade path for users. |
| 657 |
\the_end |