Debian Codegraph @

perl/debsigs.lyx

raw
1 #LyX 1.1 created this file. For more info see http://www.lyx.org/
2 \lyxformat 2.15
3 \textclass article
4 \language default
5 \inputencoding latin1
6 \fontscheme default
7 \graphics default
8 \paperfontsize default
9 \spacing single
10 \papersize Default
11 \paperpackage a4
12 \use_geometry 0
13 \use_amsmath 0
14 \paperorientation portrait
15 \secnumdepth 3
16 \tocdepth 3
17 \paragraph_separation indent
18 \defskip medskip
19 \quotes_language english
20 \quotes_times 2
21 \papercolumns 1
22 \papersides 1
23 \paperpagestyle default
24
25 \layout Title
26
27 Package Verification with dpkg: Implementation
28 \layout Author
29
30 John Goerzen <[email protected]>
31 \layout Date
32
33 Version 5; January 4, 2001
34 \layout Section
35
36 Introduction
37 \layout Standard
38
39 As part of a continuing effort to improve the security of users of Debian
40 and Debian-based systems, one step that is important to take is to allow
41 the users to verify for themselves that .deb packages that they have are
42 from an authentic source.
43 This mechanism is intended to prevent various types of attacks.
44 Some are:
45 \layout Itemize
46
47 Preventing people from setting up a fake Debian archive, containing potentially
48 trojaned packages, and masquerading as a real Debian archive.
49 This attack can be thwarted by checking an origin signature, checking archive
50 signatures, or checking maintainer signatures.
51 \layout Itemize
52
53 Preventing altered .deb packages from being installed undetected.
54 Since all signatures are applied to the contents, any signature that is
55 checked will protect against this attack.
56 \layout Itemize
57
58 Preventing people from separating or inserting forged data or metadata into
59 a package.
60 Because all signatures are applied to both the control and the data chunks
61 together, separating them will not be possible without causing a signature
62 failure.
63 \layout Itemize
64
65 Helping to prevent old packages from being presented as new.
66 By checking the signature date, policy files can be set to reject packages
67 that contain old signatures.
68 Sites might re-sign their packages periodically with an
69 \begin_inset Quotes eld
70 \end_inset
71
72 archive
73 \begin_inset Quotes erd
74 \end_inset
75
76 or a
77 \begin_inset Quotes eld
78 \end_inset
79
80 timeliness
81 \begin_inset Quotes erd
82 \end_inset
83
84 signature that could be used specifically for this purpose.
85 \layout Itemize
86
87 Allowing verification to ensure that a given package was part of a particular
88 archive site, distribution, made by a particular developer, etc.
89 Signatures could be applied for various stages of development -- approval
90 by QA managers, release managers, etc.
91 The multiple signature per .deb architecture outlined in this proposal allows
92 this.
93 \layout Itemize
94
95 Allowing verification of an isolated .deb, even in the absence of an Internet
96 connection or access to an archive.
97 By including the signatures inside the .deb itself, it is not necessary
98 to download signed index files to verify a signature.
99 \layout Subsection
100
101 Unaddressed Problems
102 \layout Standard
103
104 The approach set forth in this document leaves one hole that must be solved
105 by other means.
106 That problem is the task of insuring the integrity of the keys, policy
107 files, and programs themselves used to carry out the verification.
108 One potential solution is to modify apt-get to support https and use trusted
109 third-party (e.g., Thawte) to shore up this problem.
110 \layout Standard
111
112 The mechanism used to ensure old packages are not presented as new might
113 be resource-intensive on the server in some situations.
114 One potential avenue to explore there might be to provide signed Packages
115 files on the server.
116 \layout Subsection
117
118 Rationale
119 \layout Standard
120
121 Some thought has gone into the design of this particular solution.
122 For benefit of future discussions, here is some information on how this
123 mechanism was chosen and reasons for it.
124 Here are the main alternatives that have been considered:
125 \layout Description
126
127 GPG\SpecialChar
128 apt, genchanges, and various other utilities.
129 The additional complexity of doing so and the possibility of separating
130 the signature from the .deb makes this approach undesirable.
131 \layout Description
132
133 GPG\SpecialChar
134 However, this would change the basic format of the .deb and render it
135 unusable without a current dpkg and GPG installed on the system.
136 Since it breaks backward compatibility in such a severe way, this approach
137 is also undesirable.
138 \layout Description
139
140 Sig-per-chunk A sig-per-chunk system would place separate sigs in the ar
141 file for the data and the control chunks.
142 Unfortunately, this would allow someone to mix and match data and control
143 data in making trojan .debs, which can also be a security threat.
144 \layout Description
145
146 Sig-per-repository A sig-per-repository system would place an md5sum of
147 a .deb into the Packages files and sign those.
148 However, this omits fine-grained control and prevents verification of a
149 .deb in absence of the Packages file from the Internet.
150 It also requires solutions to problems of determining which archive a package
151 came from.
152 \layout Standard
153
154 The policy files (see section
155 \begin_inset LatexCommand \ref{Policy Definitions}
156
157 \end_inset
158
159 ) are designed to be simple, straightforward, and easy to both write and
160 parse.
161 By keeping them as simple as possible, the potential for both human authoring
162 errors and parsing errors in software can be minimized.
163 \layout Section
164
165 Modifications to .deb
166 \layout Standard
167
168 Currently, a .deb consists of an ar archive containing debian-binary, control.tar.g
169 z, and data.tar.gz files.
170 These files represent package meta-data and package contents, respectively.
171 Each signature will be applied to the debian-binary, control.tar.gz, and
172 data.tar.gz files concatenated together in that order.
173 The files should not be decompressed before applying the signature.
174 \layout Standard
175
176 Each signature file will be stored in the ar archive and have a name of
177 this form:
178 \layout Standard
179
180 _gpg
181 \emph on
182 type
183 \layout Standard
184
185 Therefore, an origin signature would be named _gpgorigin.
186 The
187 \begin_inset Quotes eld
188 \end_inset
189
190 type
191 \begin_inset Quotes erd
192 \end_inset
193
194 string must not exceed 10 characters in length nor be less than 1 character.
195 \layout Standard
196
197 Therefore, an origin signature in GnuPG format would be named _sig-origin.gpg.
198 At this time, all signatures must be in GnuPG format.
199 \layout Section
200
201 Signatures and Types
202 \layout Standard
203
204 Each .deb file that is signed must have at least an origin signature.
205 This signature should be unique per entity.
206 For instance, Debian, Helix, and Progeny would each provide an origin signature.
207 The origin signature is used as a key into the policy database such that
208 the proper policy description can be loaded to describe the file.
209 \layout Standard
210
211 Beyond the origin signature, the signature types that are present or required
212 are defined by the site policy.
213 Examples of other signatures might be a maintainer signature from the person
214 that built the package, a signature from quality assurance certifying that
215 the package has passed QA tests, a signature from a release manager certifying
216 that a package was part of a given distribution release, and a signature
217 from an archive maintainer certifying that the package went into an archive.
218 \layout Section
219
220 A Runthrough
221 \layout Standard
222
223 To make sure the entire process is entirely clear, here is what will occur
224 when a package is processed:
225 \layout Enumerate
226
227 The Key ID of the origin signature will be obtained.
228 This will be used to determine the directory in which to look for policy
229 files and keyrings as specified in section
230 \begin_inset LatexCommand \ref{locations}
231
232 \end_inset
233
234 .
235 \layout Enumerate
236
237 The checker will iterate over each policy file in that directory in an arbitrary
238 order, doing the following:
239 \begin_deeper
240 \layout Enumerate
241
242 Compare the Origin: line in the policy file (see section
243 \begin_inset LatexCommand \ref{Origin line}
244
245 \end_inset
246
247 ) with the Key ID of the origin signature.
248 If there is a difference, immediately die because of suspected corrupted
249 policy files.
250 \layout Enumerate
251
252 Evaluate the selection clauses, if any, in the policy file.
253 If there are any that do not pass, skip to the next policy file.
254 If all of them pass, or there are no selection clauses, adopt the current
255 policy file as authoritative for the package.
256 \layout Enumerate
257
258 If no appropriate policy files are found, reject the package as having a
259 bad (unverifyable) signature.
260 \end_deeper
261 \layout Enumerate
262
263 Given the appropriate policy file, the checker will iterate over every verificat
264 ion clause in that file.
265 If all of them pass, the package is considered to pass the test.
266 If any of them fail, the package is considered to have failed the test
267 and processing immediately exits.
268 No other policy files will ever be tested after this point.
269 If the policy file contains no verification clauses, it will be rejected
270 as invalid.
271 \layout Standard
272
273 It is possible that other package verifiers that use the same .deb architecture
274 but different verification procedures may be introduced in the future.
275 This section is not intended to imply a prohibition against such.
276 \layout Section
277
278 File Locations
279 \layout Standard
280
281 The following locations are defined for files that comprise this system:
282 \begin_inset LatexCommand \label{locations}
283
284 \end_inset
285
286
287 \layout Itemize
288
289 /etc/debsigs/policy/
290 \emph on
291 Origin-ID
292 \emph default
293 /* contains one or more policy files that are to be applied for .debs whose
294 Origin key was signed by the Key ID as listed in the path.
295 The policies are tried in a non-deterministic order until one matches the
296 selection criteria.
297 Once one matches the selection criteria, the success or failure of the
298 entire check is entirely contingent upon the success or failure of the
299 verification clauses.
300 If no policy file matches the selection criteria, then the entire operation
301 is determined to fail.
302 \layout Itemize
303
304 /usr/share/debsigs/keyrings/
305 \emph on
306 Origin-ID
307 \emph default
308 /* contains one or more keyrings that are used by the policy files for the
309 given origin.
310 They may be symlinks to keyrings located elsewhere if desired.
311 This is used as the directory for the keyrings in the RequiredSig and OptionalS
312 ig lines unless an absolute path is specified there.
313 \layout Standard
314
315 The policy files are located in /etc because sites may opt to alter the
316 criteria for installing files on their site.
317 The keyrings are located in /usr/share because they should not be altered
318 locally.
319 Because of the multi-file and multi-directory nature, it is easy for organizati
320 ons to provide packages providing information for verification of certain
321 things.
322 For instance, Debian could provide a debian-debsigs-potato package which
323 contains a policy file and a potato release file.
324 It could depend on debian-debsigs-main package, which contains the keyring
325 for the origin field, a symlink to the main Debian keyring for the maintainers
326 field, and a dependency on debian-keyring.
327 \layout Section
328
329 Related Documents
330 \layout Bibliography
331 \bibitem {1}
332
333 de Winter, Brenno.
334
335 \emph on
336 Gnu Privacy Guard Mini Howto
337 \emph default
338 at http://www.dewinter.com/gnupg_howto/english/.
339 \layout Bibliography
340 \bibitem {2}
341
342 Free Software Foundation.
343
344 \emph on
345 The GNU Privacy Handbook
346 \emph default
347 at http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html.
348 \layout Bibliography
349 \bibitem {3}
350
351 Free Software Foundation.
352
353 \emph on
354 gpg manpage
355 \emph default
356 available on local systems with gpg or at http://www.gnupg.org/gpgman.html.
357 \layout Bibliography
358 \bibitem {4}
359
360 Braakman, Dorman, et al.
361
362 \emph on
363 Debian Packaging Manual
364 \emph default
365 at http://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/packaging.html/.
366 \layout Bibliography
367 \bibitem {5}
368
369 Quinlan, Daniel.
370
371 \emph on
372 Filesystem Hierarchy Standard
373 \emph default
374 at http://www.pathname.com/fhs/.
375 \layout LyX-Code
376
377 \the_end