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3 Package Verification with dpkg: Implementation
4
5 John Goerzen <[email protected]>
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7 Version 5; January 4, 2001
8
9 1 Introduction
10
11 As part of a continuing effort to improve the security of
12 users of Debian and Debian-based systems, one step that
13 is important to take is to allow the users to verify for
14 themselves that .deb packages that they have are from an
15 authentic source. This mechanism is intended to prevent
16 various types of attacks. Some are:
17
18 * Preventing people from setting up a fake Debian archive,
19 containing potentially trojaned packages, and masquerading
20 as a real Debian archive. This attack can be thwarted
21 by checking an origin signature, checking archive signatures,
22 or checking maintainer signatures.
23
24 * Preventing altered .deb packages from being installed undetected.
25 Since all signatures are applied to the contents, any
26 signature that is checked will protect against this attack.
27
28 * Preventing people from separating or inserting forged data
29 or metadata into a package. Because all signatures are
30 applied to both the control and the data chunks together,
31 separating them will not be possible without causing a
32 signature failure.
33
34 * Helping to prevent old packages from being presented as
35 new. By checking the signature date, policy files can
36 be set to reject packages that contain old signatures.
37 Sites might re-sign their packages periodically with an
38 "archive" or a "timeliness"
39 signature that could be used specifically for this purpose.
40
41 * Allowing verification to ensure that a given package was
42 part of a particular archive site, distribution, made
43 by a particular developer, etc. Signatures could be applied
44 for various stages of development -- approval by QA managers,
45 release managers, etc. The multiple signature per .deb
46 architecture outlined in this proposal allows this.
47
48 * Allowing verification of an isolated .deb, even in the
49 absence of an Internet connection or access to an archive.
50 By including the signatures inside the .deb itself, it
51 is not necessary to download signed index files to verify
52 a signature.
53
54 1.1 Unaddressed Problems
55
56 The approach set forth in this document leaves one hole that
57 must be solved by other means. That problem is the task
58 of insuring the integrity of the keys, policy files, and
59 programs themselves used to carry out the verification.
60 One potential solution is to modify apt-get to support https
61 and use trusted third-party (e.g., Thawte) to shore up this
62 problem.
63
64 The mechanism used to ensure old packages are not presented
65 as new might be resource-intensive on the server in some
66 situations. One potential avenue to explore there might
67 be to provide signed Packages files on the server.
68
69 1.2 Rationale
70
71 Some thought has gone into the design of this particular
72 solution. For benefit of future discussions, here is some
73 information on how this mechanism was chosen and reasons
74 for it. Here are the main alternatives that have been considered:
75
76 GPG The additional complexity of doing so and the possibility
77 of separating the signature from the .deb makes this approach
78 undesirable.
79
80 GPG unusable without a current dpkg and GPG installed
81 on the system. Since it breaks backward compatibility
82 in such a severe way, this approach is also undesirable.
83
84 Sig-per-chunk A sig-per-chunk system would place separate
85 sigs in the ar file for the data and the control chunks.
86 Unfortunately, this would allow someone to mix and match
87 data and control data in making trojan .debs, which can
88 also be a security threat.
89
90 Sig-per-repository A sig-per-repository system would place
91 an md5sum of a .deb into the Packages files and sign those.
92 However, this omits fine-grained control and prevents
93 verification of a .deb in absence of the Packages file
94 from the Internet. It also requires solutions to problems
95 of determining which archive a package came from.
96
97 The policy files (see section [Policy Definitions])
98 are designed to be simple, straightforward, and easy to
99 both write and parse. By keeping them as simple as possible,
100 the potential for both human authoring errors and parsing
101 errors in software can be minimized.
102
103 2 Modifications to .deb
104
105 Currently, a .deb consists of an ar archive containing debian-binary,
106 control.tar.gz, and data.tar.gz files. These files represent
107 package meta-data and package contents, respectively. Each
108 signature will be applied to the debian-binary, control.tar.gz,
109 and data.tar.gz files concatenated together in that order.
110 The files should not be decompressed before applying the
111 signature.
112
113 Each signature file will be stored in the ar archive and
114 have a name of this form:
115
116 _gpgtype
117
118 Therefore, an origin signature would be named _gpgorigin.
119 The "type" string must not exceed 10 characters
120 in length nor be less than 1 character.
121
122 Therefore, an origin signature in GnuPG format would be named
123 _sig-origin.gpg. At this time, all signatures must be in
124 GnuPG format.
125
126 3 Signatures and Types
127
128 Each .deb file that is signed must have at least an origin
129 signature. This signature should be unique per entity. For
130 instance, Debian, Helix, and Progeny would each provide
131 an origin signature. The origin signature is used as a key
132 into the policy database such that the proper policy description
133 can be loaded to describe the file.
134
135 Beyond the origin signature, the signature types that are
136 present or required are defined by the site policy. Examples
137 of other signatures might be a maintainer signature from
138 the person that built the package, a signature from quality
139 assurance certifying that the package has passed QA tests,
140 a signature from a release manager certifying that a package
141 was part of a given distribution release, and a signature
142 from an archive maintainer certifying that the package went
143 into an archive.
144
145 4 A Runthrough
146
147 To make sure the entire process is entirely clear, here is
148 what will occur when a package is processed:
149
150 1. The Key ID of the origin signature will be obtained. This
151 will be used to determine the directory in which to look
152 for policy files and keyrings as specified in section
153 [locations].
154
155 2. The checker will iterate over each policy file in that
156 directory in an arbitrary order, doing the following:
157
158 (a) Compare the Origin: line in the policy file (see section
159 [Origin line]) with the Key ID of the origin signature.
160 If there is a difference, immediately die because of
161 suspected corrupted policy files.
162
163 (b) Evaluate the selection clauses, if any, in the policy
164 file. If there are any that do not pass, skip to the
165 next policy file. If all of them pass, or there are
166 no selection clauses, adopt the current policy file
167 as authoritative for the package.
168
169 (c) If no appropriate policy files are found, reject the
170 package as having a bad (unverifyable) signature.
171
172 3. Given the appropriate policy file, the checker will iterate
173 over every verification clause in that file. If all of
174 them pass, the package is considered to pass the test.
175 If any of them fail, the package is considered to have
176 failed the test and processing immediately exits. No other
177 policy files will ever be tested after this point. If
178 the policy file contains no verification clauses, it will
179 be rejected as invalid.
180
181 It is possible that other package verifiers that use the
182 same .deb architecture but different verification procedures
183 may be introduced in the future. This section is not intended
184 to imply a prohibition against such.
185
186 5 File Locations
187
188 The following locations are defined for files that comprise
189 this system:<locations>
190
191 * /etc/debsigs/policy/Origin-ID/* contains one or more policy
192 files that are to be applied for .debs whose Origin key
193 was signed by the Key ID as listed in the path. The policies
194 are tried in a non-deterministic order until one matches
195 the selection criteria. Once one matches the selection
196 criteria, the success or failure of the entire check is
197 entirely contingent upon the success or failure of the
198 verification clauses. If no policy file matches the selection
199 criteria, then the entire operation is determined to fail.
200
201 * /usr/share/debsigs/keyrings/Origin-ID/* contains one or
202 more keyrings that are used by the policy files for the
203 given origin. They may be symlinks to keyrings located
204 elsewhere if desired. This is used as the directory for
205 the keyrings in the RequiredSig and OptionalSig lines
206 unless an absolute path is specified there.
207
208 The policy files are located in /etc because sites may opt
209 to alter the criteria for installing files on their site.
210 The keyrings are located in /usr/share because they should
211 not be altered locally. Because of the multi-file and multi-directory
212 nature, it is easy for organizations to provide packages
213 providing information for verification of certain things.
214 For instance, Debian could provide a debian-debsigs-potato
215 package which contains a policy file and a potato release
216 file. It could depend on debian-debsigs-main package, which
217 contains the keyring for the origin field, a symlink to
218 the main Debian keyring for the maintainers field, and a
219 dependency on debian-keyring.
220
221 6 Related Documents
222
223 References
224
225 de Winter, Brenno. Gnu Privacy Guard Mini Howto at http://www.dewinter.com/gnupg_howto/english/.
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227 References
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229 Free Software Foundation. The GNU Privacy Handbook at http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html.
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231 References
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233 Free Software Foundation. gpg manpage available on local
234 systems with gpg or at http://www.gnupg.org/gpgman.html.
235
236 References
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238 Braakman, Dorman, et al. Debian Packaging Manual at http://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/packaging.html/.
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240 References
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242 Quinlan, Daniel. Filesystem Hierarchy Standard at http://www.pathname.com/fhs/.