| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* EAP server/peer: EAP-SAKE shared routines |
| 3 |
* Copyright (c) 2006-2019, Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
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* See README for more details. |
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*/ |
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|
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#include "includes.h" |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
#include "common.h" |
| 12 |
#include "wpabuf.h" |
| 13 |
#include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| 14 |
#include "eap_defs.h" |
| 15 |
#include "eap_sake_common.h" |
| 16 |
|
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
static int eap_sake_parse_add_attr(struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr, |
| 19 |
u8 attr_id, u8 len, const u8 *data) |
| 20 |
{ |
| 21 |
size_t i; |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
switch (attr_id) { |
| 24 |
case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_S: |
| 25 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_S"); |
| 26 |
if (len != EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) { |
| 27 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_S with " |
| 28 |
"invalid payload length %d", len); |
| 29 |
return -1; |
| 30 |
} |
| 31 |
attr->rand_s = data; |
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break; |
| 33 |
case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_P: |
| 34 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_P"); |
| 35 |
if (len != EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_P with " |
| 37 |
"invalid payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
| 39 |
} |
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attr->rand_p = data; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_S: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_S"); |
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if (len != EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_S with " |
| 46 |
"invalid payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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attr->mic_s = data; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_P: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_P"); |
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if (len != EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_P with " |
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"invalid payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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attr->mic_p = data; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_SERVERID: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SERVERID"); |
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attr->serverid = data; |
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attr->serverid_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_PEERID: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PEERID"); |
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attr->peerid = data; |
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attr->peerid_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_S: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_S"); |
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attr->spi_s = data; |
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attr->spi_s_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_P: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_P"); |
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attr->spi_p = data; |
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attr->spi_p_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_ANY_ID_REQ: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ANY_ID_REQ"); |
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if (len != 2) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid AT_ANY_ID_REQ" |
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" payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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attr->any_id_req = data; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_PERM_ID_REQ: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PERM_ID_REQ"); |
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if (len != 2) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid " |
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"AT_PERM_ID_REQ payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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attr->perm_id_req = data; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_ENCR_DATA: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
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attr->encr_data = data; |
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attr->encr_data_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_IV: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_IV"); |
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attr->iv = data; |
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attr->iv_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_PADDING: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PADDING"); |
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { |
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if (data[i]) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_PADDING " |
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"with non-zero pad byte"); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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} |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_NEXT_TMPID: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_NEXT_TMPID"); |
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attr->next_tmpid = data; |
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attr->next_tmpid_len = len; |
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break; |
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case EAP_SAKE_AT_MSK_LIFE: |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MSK_LIFE"); |
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if (len != 4) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid " |
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"AT_MSK_LIFE payload length %d", len); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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attr->msk_life = data; |
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break; |
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default: |
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if (attr_id < 128) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Unknown non-skippable" |
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" attribute %d", attr_id); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Ignoring unknown skippable " |
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"attribute %d", attr_id); |
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break; |
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} |
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|
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if (attr->iv && !attr->encr_data) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_IV included without " |
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"AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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|
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/** |
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* eap_sake_parse_attributes - Parse EAP-SAKE attributes |
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* @buf: Packet payload (starting with the first attribute) |
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* @len: Payload length |
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* @attr: Structure to be filled with found attributes |
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* Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure |
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*/ |
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int eap_sake_parse_attributes(const u8 *buf, size_t len, |
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struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr) |
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{ |
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const u8 *pos = buf, *end = buf + len; |
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|
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os_memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr)); |
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while (pos < end) { |
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if (end - pos < 2) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Too short attribute"); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (pos[1] < 2) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid attribute " |
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"length (%d)", pos[1]); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (pos + pos[1] > end) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Attribute underflow"); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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if (eap_sake_parse_add_attr(attr, pos[0], pos[1] - 2, pos + 2)) |
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return -1; |
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|
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pos += pos[1]; |
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} |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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|
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/** |
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* eap_sake_kdf - EAP-SAKE Key Derivation Function (KDF) |
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* @key: Key for KDF |
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* @key_len: Length of the key in bytes |
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* @label: A unique label for each purpose of the KDF |
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* @data: Extra data (start) to bind into the key |
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* @data_len: Length of the data |
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* @data2: Extra data (end) to bind into the key |
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* @data2_len: Length of the data2 |
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* @buf: Buffer for the generated pseudo-random key |
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* @buf_len: Number of bytes of key to generate |
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* Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure |
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* |
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* This function is used to derive new, cryptographically separate keys from a |
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* given key (e.g., SMS). This is identical to the PRF used in IEEE 802.11i. |
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*/ |
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static int eap_sake_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const char *label, |
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const u8 *data, size_t data_len, |
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const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len, |
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u8 *buf, size_t buf_len) |
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{ |
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u8 counter = 0; |
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size_t pos, plen; |
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u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN]; |
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size_t label_len = os_strlen(label) + 1; |
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const unsigned char *addr[4]; |
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size_t len[4]; |
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|
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addr[0] = (u8 *) label; /* Label | Y */ |
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len[0] = label_len; |
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addr[1] = data; /* Msg[start] */ |
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len[1] = data_len; |
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addr[2] = data2; /* Msg[end] */ |
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len[2] = data2_len; |
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addr[3] = &counter; /* Length */ |
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len[3] = 1; |
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|
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pos = 0; |
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while (pos < buf_len) { |
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plen = buf_len - pos; |
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if (plen >= SHA1_MAC_LEN) { |
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if (hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len, |
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&buf[pos]) < 0) |
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return -1; |
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pos += SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
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} else { |
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if (hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len, |
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hash) < 0) |
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return -1; |
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os_memcpy(&buf[pos], hash, plen); |
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break; |
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} |
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counter++; |
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} |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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|
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/** |
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* eap_sake_derive_keys - Derive EAP-SAKE keys |
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* @root_secret_a: 16-byte Root-Secret-A |
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* @root_secret_b: 16-byte Root-Secret-B |
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* @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S |
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* @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P |
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* @tek: Buffer for Temporary EAK Keys (TEK-Auth[16] | TEK-Cipher[16]) |
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* @msk: Buffer for 64-byte MSK |
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* @emsk: Buffer for 64-byte EMSK |
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* Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure |
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* |
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* This function derives EAP-SAKE keys as defined in RFC 4763, section 3.2.6. |
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*/ |
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int eap_sake_derive_keys(const u8 *root_secret_a, const u8 *root_secret_b, |
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const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p, u8 *tek, u8 *msk, |
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u8 *emsk) |
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{ |
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u8 sms_a[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN]; |
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u8 sms_b[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN]; |
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u8 key_buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN]; |
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|
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Deriving keys"); |
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|
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-A", |
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root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN); |
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if (eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN, |
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"SAKE Master Secret A", |
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rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, |
| 280 |
sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN) < 0) |
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return -1; |
| 282 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-A", sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN); |
| 283 |
if (eap_sake_kdf(sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Transient EAP Key", |
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rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, |
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tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_LEN) < 0) |
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return -1; |
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Auth", |
| 288 |
tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN); |
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Cipher", |
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tek + EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN, EAP_SAKE_TEK_CIPHER_LEN); |
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|
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-B", |
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root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN); |
| 294 |
if (eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN, |
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"SAKE Master Secret B", |
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rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, |
| 297 |
sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN) < 0) |
| 298 |
return -1; |
| 299 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-B", sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN); |
| 300 |
if (eap_sake_kdf(sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Master Session Key", |
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rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, |
| 302 |
key_buf, sizeof(key_buf)) < 0) |
| 303 |
return -1; |
| 304 |
os_memcpy(msk, key_buf, EAP_MSK_LEN); |
| 305 |
os_memcpy(emsk, key_buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| 306 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN); |
| 307 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| 308 |
return 0; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
|
| 311 |
|
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/** |
| 313 |
* eap_sake_compute_mic - Compute EAP-SAKE MIC for an EAP packet |
| 314 |
* @tek_auth: 16-byte TEK-Auth |
| 315 |
* @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S |
| 316 |
* @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P |
| 317 |
* @serverid: SERVERID |
| 318 |
* @serverid_len: SERVERID length |
| 319 |
* @peerid: PEERID |
| 320 |
* @peerid_len: PEERID length |
| 321 |
* @peer: MIC calculation for 0 = Server, 1 = Peer message |
| 322 |
* @eap: EAP packet |
| 323 |
* @eap_len: EAP packet length |
| 324 |
* @mic_pos: MIC position in the EAP packet (must be [eap .. eap + eap_len]) |
| 325 |
* @mic: Buffer for the computed 16-byte MIC |
| 326 |
* Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure |
| 327 |
*/ |
| 328 |
int eap_sake_compute_mic(const u8 *tek_auth, |
| 329 |
const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p, |
| 330 |
const u8 *serverid, size_t serverid_len, |
| 331 |
const u8 *peerid, size_t peerid_len, |
| 332 |
int peer, const u8 *eap, size_t eap_len, |
| 333 |
const u8 *mic_pos, u8 *mic) |
| 334 |
{ |
| 335 |
u8 _rand[2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN]; |
| 336 |
u8 *tmp, *pos; |
| 337 |
size_t tmplen; |
| 338 |
int ret; |
| 339 |
|
| 340 |
tmplen = serverid_len + 1 + peerid_len + 1 + eap_len; |
| 341 |
tmp = os_malloc(tmplen); |
| 342 |
if (tmp == NULL) |
| 343 |
return -1; |
| 344 |
pos = tmp; |
| 345 |
if (peer) { |
| 346 |
if (peerid) { |
| 347 |
os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len); |
| 348 |
pos += peerid_len; |
| 349 |
} |
| 350 |
*pos++ = 0x00; |
| 351 |
if (serverid) { |
| 352 |
os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len); |
| 353 |
pos += serverid_len; |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
*pos++ = 0x00; |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
os_memcpy(_rand, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN); |
| 358 |
os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, |
| 359 |
EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN); |
| 360 |
} else { |
| 361 |
if (serverid) { |
| 362 |
os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len); |
| 363 |
pos += serverid_len; |
| 364 |
} |
| 365 |
*pos++ = 0x00; |
| 366 |
if (peerid) { |
| 367 |
os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len); |
| 368 |
pos += peerid_len; |
| 369 |
} |
| 370 |
*pos++ = 0x00; |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
os_memcpy(_rand, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN); |
| 373 |
os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, |
| 374 |
EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN); |
| 375 |
} |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
os_memcpy(pos, eap, eap_len); |
| 378 |
os_memset(pos + (mic_pos - eap), 0, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN); |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
ret = eap_sake_kdf(tek_auth, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN, |
| 381 |
peer ? "Peer MIC" : "Server MIC", |
| 382 |
_rand, 2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, tmp, tmplen, |
| 383 |
mic, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN); |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
os_free(tmp); |
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
return ret; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
void eap_sake_add_attr(struct wpabuf *buf, u8 type, const u8 *data, |
| 392 |
size_t len) |
| 393 |
{ |
| 394 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, type); |
| 395 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 2 + len); /* Length; including attr header */ |
| 396 |
if (data) |
| 397 |
wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len); |
| 398 |
else |
| 399 |
os_memset(wpabuf_put(buf, len), 0, len); |
| 400 |
} |