| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines |
| 3 |
* Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| 6 |
* See README for more details. |
| 7 |
*/ |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
#include "includes.h" |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
#include "common.h" |
| 12 |
#include "crypto/aes.h" |
| 13 |
#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h" |
| 14 |
#include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| 15 |
#include "crypto/dh_groups.h" |
| 16 |
#include "crypto/random.h" |
| 17 |
#include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| 18 |
#include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| 19 |
#include "eap_common/eap_defs.h" |
| 20 |
#include "eap_eke_common.h" |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group) |
| 24 |
{ |
| 25 |
switch (group) { |
| 26 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2: |
| 27 |
return 128; |
| 28 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5: |
| 29 |
return 192; |
| 30 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14: |
| 31 |
return 256; |
| 32 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15: |
| 33 |
return 384; |
| 34 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16: |
| 35 |
return 512; |
| 36 |
} |
| 37 |
|
| 38 |
return -1; |
| 39 |
} |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
|
| 42 |
static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr) |
| 43 |
{ |
| 44 |
int dhlen; |
| 45 |
|
| 46 |
dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup); |
| 47 |
if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC) |
| 48 |
return -1; |
| 49 |
return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen; |
| 50 |
} |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
|
| 53 |
static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group) |
| 54 |
{ |
| 55 |
switch (group) { |
| 56 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2: |
| 57 |
return dh_groups_get(2); |
| 58 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5: |
| 59 |
return dh_groups_get(5); |
| 60 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14: |
| 61 |
return dh_groups_get(14); |
| 62 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15: |
| 63 |
return dh_groups_get(15); |
| 64 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16: |
| 65 |
return dh_groups_get(16); |
| 66 |
} |
| 67 |
|
| 68 |
return NULL; |
| 69 |
} |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group) |
| 73 |
{ |
| 74 |
switch (group) { |
| 75 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2: |
| 76 |
return 5; |
| 77 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5: |
| 78 |
return 31; |
| 79 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14: |
| 80 |
return 11; |
| 81 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15: |
| 82 |
return 5; |
| 83 |
case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16: |
| 84 |
return 5; |
| 85 |
} |
| 86 |
|
| 87 |
return -1; |
| 88 |
} |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
|
| 91 |
static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac) |
| 92 |
{ |
| 93 |
int mac_len; |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 96 |
mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 97 |
else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 98 |
mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 99 |
else |
| 100 |
return -1; |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len; |
| 103 |
} |
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac) |
| 107 |
{ |
| 108 |
int mac_len; |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 111 |
mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 112 |
else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 113 |
mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 114 |
else |
| 115 |
return -1; |
| 116 |
|
| 117 |
return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len; |
| 118 |
} |
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf) |
| 122 |
{ |
| 123 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 124 |
return 20; |
| 125 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 126 |
return 32; |
| 127 |
return -1; |
| 128 |
} |
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
|
| 131 |
static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf) |
| 132 |
{ |
| 133 |
int prf_len; |
| 134 |
|
| 135 |
prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf); |
| 136 |
if (prf_len < 0) |
| 137 |
return -1; |
| 138 |
|
| 139 |
if (prf_len > 2 * 16) |
| 140 |
return (prf_len + 1) / 2; |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
return 16; |
| 143 |
} |
| 144 |
|
| 145 |
|
| 146 |
static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf) |
| 147 |
{ |
| 148 |
switch (prf) { |
| 149 |
case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1: |
| 150 |
return SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 151 |
case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256: |
| 152 |
return SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 153 |
} |
| 154 |
|
| 155 |
return -1; |
| 156 |
} |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub) |
| 160 |
{ |
| 161 |
int generator; |
| 162 |
u8 gen; |
| 163 |
const struct dh_group *dh; |
| 164 |
|
| 165 |
generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group); |
| 166 |
dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group); |
| 167 |
if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh) |
| 168 |
return -1; |
| 169 |
gen = generator; |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
if (crypto_dh_init(gen, dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_priv, |
| 172 |
ret_pub) < 0) |
| 173 |
return -1; |
| 174 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value", |
| 175 |
ret_priv, dh->prime_len); |
| 176 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value", |
| 177 |
ret_pub, dh->prime_len); |
| 178 |
|
| 179 |
return 0; |
| 180 |
} |
| 181 |
|
| 182 |
|
| 183 |
static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data, |
| 184 |
size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len, |
| 185 |
u8 *res) |
| 186 |
{ |
| 187 |
const u8 *addr[2]; |
| 188 |
size_t len[2]; |
| 189 |
size_t num_elem = 1; |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
addr[0] = data; |
| 192 |
len[0] = data_len; |
| 193 |
if (data2) { |
| 194 |
num_elem++; |
| 195 |
addr[1] = data2; |
| 196 |
len[1] = data2_len; |
| 197 |
} |
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 200 |
return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res); |
| 201 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 202 |
return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| 203 |
res); |
| 204 |
return -1; |
| 205 |
} |
| 206 |
|
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data, |
| 209 |
size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len) |
| 210 |
{ |
| 211 |
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN]; |
| 212 |
u8 idx; |
| 213 |
const u8 *addr[3]; |
| 214 |
size_t vlen[3]; |
| 215 |
int ret; |
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
idx = 0; |
| 218 |
addr[0] = hash; |
| 219 |
vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 220 |
addr[1] = data; |
| 221 |
vlen[1] = data_len; |
| 222 |
addr[2] = &idx; |
| 223 |
vlen[2] = 1; |
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
while (len > 0) { |
| 226 |
idx++; |
| 227 |
if (idx == 1) |
| 228 |
ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1], |
| 229 |
&vlen[1], hash); |
| 230 |
else |
| 231 |
ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen, |
| 232 |
hash); |
| 233 |
if (ret < 0) |
| 234 |
return -1; |
| 235 |
if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) { |
| 236 |
os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN); |
| 237 |
res += SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 238 |
len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 239 |
} else { |
| 240 |
os_memcpy(res, hash, len); |
| 241 |
len = 0; |
| 242 |
} |
| 243 |
} |
| 244 |
|
| 245 |
return 0; |
| 246 |
} |
| 247 |
|
| 248 |
|
| 249 |
static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data, |
| 250 |
size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len) |
| 251 |
{ |
| 252 |
u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| 253 |
u8 idx; |
| 254 |
const u8 *addr[3]; |
| 255 |
size_t vlen[3]; |
| 256 |
int ret; |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
idx = 0; |
| 259 |
addr[0] = hash; |
| 260 |
vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 261 |
addr[1] = data; |
| 262 |
vlen[1] = data_len; |
| 263 |
addr[2] = &idx; |
| 264 |
vlen[2] = 1; |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
while (len > 0) { |
| 267 |
idx++; |
| 268 |
if (idx == 1) |
| 269 |
ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1], |
| 270 |
&vlen[1], hash); |
| 271 |
else |
| 272 |
ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen, |
| 273 |
hash); |
| 274 |
if (ret < 0) |
| 275 |
return -1; |
| 276 |
if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) { |
| 277 |
os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN); |
| 278 |
res += SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 279 |
len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 280 |
} else { |
| 281 |
os_memcpy(res, hash, len); |
| 282 |
len = 0; |
| 283 |
} |
| 284 |
} |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
return 0; |
| 287 |
} |
| 288 |
|
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, |
| 291 |
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len) |
| 292 |
{ |
| 293 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 294 |
return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res, |
| 295 |
len); |
| 296 |
if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 297 |
return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len, |
| 298 |
res, len); |
| 299 |
return -1; |
| 300 |
} |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
|
| 303 |
int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 304 |
const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| 305 |
const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p, |
| 306 |
size_t id_p_len, u8 *key) |
| 307 |
{ |
| 308 |
u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| 309 |
u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| 310 |
size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */ |
| 311 |
u8 *id; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
/* temp = prf(0+, password) */ |
| 314 |
os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len); |
| 315 |
if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len, |
| 316 |
password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0) |
| 317 |
return -1; |
| 318 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)", |
| 319 |
temp, sess->prf_len); |
| 320 |
|
| 321 |
/* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */ |
| 322 |
id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len); |
| 323 |
if (id == NULL) |
| 324 |
return -1; |
| 325 |
os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len); |
| 326 |
os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len); |
| 327 |
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P", |
| 328 |
id, id_s_len + id_p_len); |
| 329 |
if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len, |
| 330 |
id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) { |
| 331 |
os_free(id); |
| 332 |
return -1; |
| 333 |
} |
| 334 |
os_free(id); |
| 335 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)", |
| 336 |
key, key_len); |
| 337 |
|
| 338 |
return 0; |
| 339 |
} |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub, |
| 343 |
u8 *ret_dhcomp) |
| 344 |
{ |
| 345 |
u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN]; |
| 346 |
int dh_len; |
| 347 |
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup); |
| 350 |
if (dh_len < 0) |
| 351 |
return -1; |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
/* |
| 354 |
* DHComponent = Encr(key, y) |
| 355 |
* |
| 356 |
* All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so |
| 357 |
* no need to do extra padding for y (= pub). |
| 358 |
*/ |
| 359 |
if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC) |
| 360 |
return -1; |
| 361 |
if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| 362 |
return -1; |
| 363 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)", |
| 364 |
iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); |
| 365 |
os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len); |
| 366 |
if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0) |
| 367 |
return -1; |
| 368 |
os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); |
| 369 |
os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len); |
| 370 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)", |
| 371 |
ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len); |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
return 0; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, |
| 378 |
const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp) |
| 379 |
{ |
| 380 |
u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| 381 |
u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN]; |
| 382 |
u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN]; |
| 383 |
size_t len; |
| 384 |
const struct dh_group *dh; |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup); |
| 387 |
if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh) |
| 388 |
return -1; |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
/* Decrypt peer DHComponent */ |
| 391 |
os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len); |
| 392 |
if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) { |
| 393 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent"); |
| 394 |
return -1; |
| 395 |
} |
| 396 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey", |
| 397 |
peer_pub, dh->prime_len); |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
/* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */ |
| 400 |
len = dh->prime_len; |
| 401 |
if (crypto_dh_derive_secret(*dh->generator, dh->prime, dh->prime_len, |
| 402 |
NULL, 0, dhpriv, dh->prime_len, peer_pub, |
| 403 |
dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0) |
| 404 |
return -1; |
| 405 |
if (len < dh->prime_len) { |
| 406 |
size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len; |
| 407 |
os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len); |
| 408 |
os_memset(modexp, 0, pad); |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len); |
| 412 |
if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len, |
| 413 |
NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0) |
| 414 |
return -1; |
| 415 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret", |
| 416 |
sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len); |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
return 0; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 423 |
const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, |
| 424 |
const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len) |
| 425 |
{ |
| 426 |
u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN]; |
| 427 |
size_t ke_len, ki_len; |
| 428 |
u8 *data; |
| 429 |
size_t data_len; |
| 430 |
const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys"; |
| 431 |
size_t label_len; |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
/* |
| 434 |
* Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P) |
| 435 |
* Ke = encryption key |
| 436 |
* Ki = integrity protection key |
| 437 |
* Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms. |
| 438 |
*/ |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC) |
| 441 |
ke_len = 16; |
| 442 |
else |
| 443 |
return -1; |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 446 |
ki_len = 20; |
| 447 |
else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 448 |
ki_len = 32; |
| 449 |
else |
| 450 |
return -1; |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
label_len = os_strlen(label); |
| 453 |
data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len; |
| 454 |
data = os_malloc(data_len); |
| 455 |
if (data == NULL) |
| 456 |
return -1; |
| 457 |
os_memcpy(data, label, label_len); |
| 458 |
os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len); |
| 459 |
os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len); |
| 460 |
if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len, |
| 461 |
data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) { |
| 462 |
os_free(data); |
| 463 |
return -1; |
| 464 |
} |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len); |
| 467 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len); |
| 468 |
os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len); |
| 469 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len); |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
os_free(data); |
| 472 |
return 0; |
| 473 |
} |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 477 |
const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, |
| 478 |
const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len, |
| 479 |
const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s) |
| 480 |
{ |
| 481 |
u8 *data, *pos; |
| 482 |
size_t data_len; |
| 483 |
const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka"; |
| 484 |
size_t label_len; |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
/* |
| 487 |
* Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P | |
| 488 |
* Nonce_S) |
| 489 |
* Ka = authentication key |
| 490 |
* Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms. |
| 491 |
*/ |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
label_len = os_strlen(label); |
| 494 |
data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len; |
| 495 |
data = os_malloc(data_len); |
| 496 |
if (data == NULL) |
| 497 |
return -1; |
| 498 |
pos = data; |
| 499 |
os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len); |
| 500 |
pos += label_len; |
| 501 |
os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len); |
| 502 |
pos += id_s_len; |
| 503 |
os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len); |
| 504 |
pos += id_p_len; |
| 505 |
os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len); |
| 506 |
pos += sess->nonce_len; |
| 507 |
os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len); |
| 508 |
if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len, |
| 509 |
data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) { |
| 510 |
os_free(data); |
| 511 |
return -1; |
| 512 |
} |
| 513 |
os_free(data); |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len); |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
return 0; |
| 518 |
} |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 522 |
const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, |
| 523 |
const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len, |
| 524 |
const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s, |
| 525 |
u8 *msk, u8 *emsk) |
| 526 |
{ |
| 527 |
u8 *data, *pos; |
| 528 |
size_t data_len; |
| 529 |
const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys"; |
| 530 |
size_t label_len; |
| 531 |
u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN]; |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
/* |
| 534 |
* MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S | |
| 535 |
* ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S) |
| 536 |
*/ |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
label_len = os_strlen(label); |
| 539 |
data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len; |
| 540 |
data = os_malloc(data_len); |
| 541 |
if (data == NULL) |
| 542 |
return -1; |
| 543 |
pos = data; |
| 544 |
os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len); |
| 545 |
pos += label_len; |
| 546 |
os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len); |
| 547 |
pos += id_s_len; |
| 548 |
os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len); |
| 549 |
pos += id_p_len; |
| 550 |
os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len); |
| 551 |
pos += sess->nonce_len; |
| 552 |
os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len); |
| 553 |
if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len, |
| 554 |
data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) < |
| 555 |
0) { |
| 556 |
os_free(data); |
| 557 |
return -1; |
| 558 |
} |
| 559 |
os_free(data); |
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN); |
| 562 |
os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| 563 |
os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN); |
| 566 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
return 0; |
| 569 |
} |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, |
| 573 |
u8 *res) |
| 574 |
{ |
| 575 |
if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 576 |
return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res); |
| 577 |
if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 578 |
return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res); |
| 579 |
return -1; |
| 580 |
} |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 584 |
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, |
| 585 |
u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len) |
| 586 |
{ |
| 587 |
size_t block_size, icv_len, pad; |
| 588 |
u8 *pos, *iv, *e; |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC) |
| 591 |
block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
| 592 |
else |
| 593 |
return -1; |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 596 |
icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 597 |
else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 598 |
icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 599 |
else |
| 600 |
return -1; |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
pad = data_len % block_size; |
| 603 |
if (pad) |
| 604 |
pad = block_size - pad; |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) { |
| 607 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data"); |
| 608 |
return -1; |
| 609 |
} |
| 610 |
pos = prot; |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size)) |
| 613 |
return -1; |
| 614 |
iv = pos; |
| 615 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size); |
| 616 |
pos += block_size; |
| 617 |
|
| 618 |
e = pos; |
| 619 |
os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len); |
| 620 |
pos += data_len; |
| 621 |
if (pad) { |
| 622 |
if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad)) |
| 623 |
return -1; |
| 624 |
pos += pad; |
| 625 |
} |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 || |
| 628 |
eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0) |
| 629 |
return -1; |
| 630 |
pos += icv_len; |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
*prot_len = pos - prot; |
| 633 |
return 0; |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess, |
| 638 |
const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len, |
| 639 |
u8 *data, size_t *data_len) |
| 640 |
{ |
| 641 |
size_t block_size, icv_len; |
| 642 |
u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC) |
| 645 |
block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
| 646 |
else |
| 647 |
return -1; |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1) |
| 650 |
icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN; |
| 651 |
else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256) |
| 652 |
icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 653 |
else |
| 654 |
return -1; |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len || |
| 657 |
(prot_len - icv_len) % block_size) |
| 658 |
return -1; |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size, |
| 661 |
prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0) |
| 662 |
return -1; |
| 663 |
if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) { |
| 664 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data"); |
| 665 |
return -1; |
| 666 |
} |
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) { |
| 669 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data"); |
| 670 |
return -1; |
| 671 |
} |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
*data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len; |
| 674 |
os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len); |
| 675 |
if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) { |
| 676 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data"); |
| 677 |
return -1; |
| 678 |
} |
| 679 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data", |
| 680 |
data, *data_len); |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
return 0; |
| 683 |
} |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label, |
| 687 |
const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth) |
| 688 |
{ |
| 689 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label); |
| 690 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth", |
| 691 |
sess->ka, sess->auth_len); |
| 692 |
wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs); |
| 693 |
return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len, |
| 694 |
(const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label), |
| 695 |
wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth); |
| 696 |
} |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr, |
| 700 |
u8 prf, u8 mac) |
| 701 |
{ |
| 702 |
sess->dhgroup = dhgroup; |
| 703 |
sess->encr = encr; |
| 704 |
sess->prf = prf; |
| 705 |
sess->mac = mac; |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf); |
| 708 |
sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf); |
| 709 |
sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf); |
| 710 |
sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr); |
| 711 |
sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac); |
| 712 |
sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac); |
| 713 |
if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 || |
| 714 |
sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 || |
| 715 |
sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0) |
| 716 |
return -1; |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
return 0; |
| 719 |
} |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess) |
| 723 |
{ |
| 724 |
os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN); |
| 725 |
os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN); |
| 726 |
os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN); |
| 727 |
os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN); |
| 728 |
} |