| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* WPA/RSN - Shared functions for supplicant and authenticator |
| 3 |
* Copyright (c) 2002-2018, Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| 6 |
* See README for more details. |
| 7 |
*/ |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
#include "includes.h" |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
#include "common.h" |
| 12 |
#include "crypto/md5.h" |
| 13 |
#include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| 14 |
#include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| 15 |
#include "crypto/sha384.h" |
| 16 |
#include "crypto/sha512.h" |
| 17 |
#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h" |
| 18 |
#include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| 19 |
#include "ieee802_11_defs.h" |
| 20 |
#include "defs.h" |
| 21 |
#include "wpa_common.h" |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
static unsigned int wpa_kck_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| 25 |
{ |
| 26 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 27 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| 28 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 29 |
return 24; |
| 30 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 31 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 32 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 33 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 34 |
return 0; |
| 35 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| 36 |
return pmk_len / 2; |
| 37 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| 38 |
return pmk_len / 2; |
| 39 |
default: |
| 40 |
return 16; |
| 41 |
} |
| 42 |
} |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 46 |
static unsigned int wpa_kck2_len(int akmp) |
| 47 |
{ |
| 48 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 49 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 50 |
return 16; |
| 51 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 52 |
return 24; |
| 53 |
default: |
| 54 |
return 0; |
| 55 |
} |
| 56 |
} |
| 57 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
|
| 60 |
static unsigned int wpa_kek_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| 61 |
{ |
| 62 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 63 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 64 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 65 |
return 64; |
| 66 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| 67 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 68 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 69 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 70 |
return 32; |
| 71 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| 72 |
return pmk_len <= 32 ? 16 : 32; |
| 73 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| 74 |
return pmk_len <= 32 ? 16 : 32; |
| 75 |
default: |
| 76 |
return 16; |
| 77 |
} |
| 78 |
} |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
|
| 81 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 82 |
static unsigned int wpa_kek2_len(int akmp) |
| 83 |
{ |
| 84 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 85 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 86 |
return 16; |
| 87 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 88 |
return 32; |
| 89 |
default: |
| 90 |
return 0; |
| 91 |
} |
| 92 |
} |
| 93 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
|
| 96 |
unsigned int wpa_mic_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| 97 |
{ |
| 98 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 99 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| 100 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 101 |
return 24; |
| 102 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 103 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 104 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 105 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 106 |
return 0; |
| 107 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| 108 |
return pmk_len / 2; |
| 109 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| 110 |
return pmk_len / 2; |
| 111 |
default: |
| 112 |
return 16; |
| 113 |
} |
| 114 |
} |
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
|
| 117 |
/** |
| 118 |
* wpa_use_akm_defined - Is AKM-defined Key Descriptor Version used |
| 119 |
* @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| 120 |
* Returns: 1 if AKM-defined Key Descriptor Version is used; 0 otherwise |
| 121 |
*/ |
| 122 |
int wpa_use_akm_defined(int akmp) |
| 123 |
{ |
| 124 |
return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| 125 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| 126 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| 127 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384 || |
| 128 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) || |
| 129 |
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp) || |
| 130 |
wpa_key_mgmt_fils(akmp); |
| 131 |
} |
| 132 |
|
| 133 |
|
| 134 |
/** |
| 135 |
* wpa_use_cmac - Is CMAC integrity algorithm used for EAPOL-Key MIC |
| 136 |
* @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| 137 |
* Returns: 1 if CMAC is used; 0 otherwise |
| 138 |
*/ |
| 139 |
int wpa_use_cmac(int akmp) |
| 140 |
{ |
| 141 |
return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| 142 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| 143 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| 144 |
wpa_key_mgmt_ft(akmp) || |
| 145 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp) || |
| 146 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) || |
| 147 |
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp); |
| 148 |
} |
| 149 |
|
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
/** |
| 152 |
* wpa_use_aes_key_wrap - Is AES Keywrap algorithm used for EAPOL-Key Key Data |
| 153 |
* @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| 154 |
* Returns: 1 if AES Keywrap is used; 0 otherwise |
| 155 |
* |
| 156 |
* Note: AKM 00-0F-AC:1 and 00-0F-AC:2 have special rules for selecting whether |
| 157 |
* to use AES Keywrap based on the negotiated pairwise cipher. This function |
| 158 |
* does not cover those special cases. |
| 159 |
*/ |
| 160 |
int wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(int akmp) |
| 161 |
{ |
| 162 |
return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| 163 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| 164 |
akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| 165 |
wpa_key_mgmt_ft(akmp) || |
| 166 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp) || |
| 167 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) || |
| 168 |
wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp); |
| 169 |
} |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
|
| 172 |
/** |
| 173 |
* wpa_eapol_key_mic - Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC |
| 174 |
* @key: EAPOL-Key Key Confirmation Key (KCK) |
| 175 |
* @key_len: KCK length in octets |
| 176 |
* @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| 177 |
* @ver: Key descriptor version (WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_*) |
| 178 |
* @buf: Pointer to the beginning of the EAPOL header (version field) |
| 179 |
* @len: Length of the EAPOL frame (from EAPOL header to the end of the frame) |
| 180 |
* @mic: Pointer to the buffer to which the EAPOL-Key MIC is written |
| 181 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 182 |
* |
| 183 |
* Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC for an EAPOL-Key packet. The EAPOL-Key MIC field has |
| 184 |
* to be cleared (all zeroes) when calling this function. |
| 185 |
* |
| 186 |
* Note: 'IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames' has an error in the |
| 187 |
* description of the Key MIC calculation. It includes packet data from the |
| 188 |
* beginning of the EAPOL-Key header, not EAPOL header. This incorrect change |
| 189 |
* happened during final editing of the standard and the correct behavior is |
| 190 |
* defined in the last draft (IEEE 802.11i/D10). |
| 191 |
*/ |
| 192 |
int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, int akmp, int ver, |
| 193 |
const u8 *buf, size_t len, u8 *mic) |
| 194 |
{ |
| 195 |
u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN]; |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
if (key_len == 0) { |
| 198 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 199 |
"WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC"); |
| 200 |
return -1; |
| 201 |
} |
| 202 |
|
| 203 |
switch (ver) { |
| 204 |
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS |
| 205 |
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4: |
| 206 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-MD5"); |
| 207 |
return hmac_md5(key, key_len, buf, len, mic); |
| 208 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */ |
| 209 |
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES: |
| 210 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA1"); |
| 211 |
if (hmac_sha1(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 212 |
return -1; |
| 213 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN); |
| 214 |
break; |
| 215 |
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC: |
| 216 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC"); |
| 217 |
return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| 218 |
case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED: |
| 219 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 220 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| 221 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| 222 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE: |
| 223 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 224 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC (AKM-defined - SAE)"); |
| 225 |
return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| 226 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| 227 |
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20 |
| 228 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN: |
| 229 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 230 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC (AKM-defined - OSEN)"); |
| 231 |
return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| 232 |
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */ |
| 233 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB |
| 234 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B: |
| 235 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 236 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA256 (AKM-defined - Suite B)"); |
| 237 |
if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 238 |
return -1; |
| 239 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN); |
| 240 |
break; |
| 241 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */ |
| 242 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192 |
| 243 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| 244 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 245 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA384 (AKM-defined - Suite B 192-bit)"); |
| 246 |
if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 247 |
return -1; |
| 248 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| 249 |
break; |
| 250 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ |
| 251 |
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| 252 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| 253 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 254 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA%u (AKM-defined - OWE)", |
| 255 |
(unsigned int) key_len * 8 * 2); |
| 256 |
if (key_len == 128 / 8) { |
| 257 |
if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 258 |
return -1; |
| 259 |
} else if (key_len == 192 / 8) { |
| 260 |
if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 261 |
return -1; |
| 262 |
} else if (key_len == 256 / 8) { |
| 263 |
if (hmac_sha512(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 264 |
return -1; |
| 265 |
} else { |
| 266 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, |
| 267 |
"OWE: Unsupported KCK length: %u", |
| 268 |
(unsigned int) key_len); |
| 269 |
return -1; |
| 270 |
} |
| 271 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, key_len); |
| 272 |
break; |
| 273 |
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| 274 |
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| 275 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| 276 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 277 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA%u (AKM-defined - DPP)", |
| 278 |
(unsigned int) key_len * 8 * 2); |
| 279 |
if (key_len == 128 / 8) { |
| 280 |
if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 281 |
return -1; |
| 282 |
} else if (key_len == 192 / 8) { |
| 283 |
if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 284 |
return -1; |
| 285 |
} else if (key_len == 256 / 8) { |
| 286 |
if (hmac_sha512(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 287 |
return -1; |
| 288 |
} else { |
| 289 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, |
| 290 |
"DPP: Unsupported KCK length: %u", |
| 291 |
(unsigned int) key_len); |
| 292 |
return -1; |
| 293 |
} |
| 294 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, key_len); |
| 295 |
break; |
| 296 |
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| 297 |
#if defined(CONFIG_IEEE80211R) && defined(CONFIG_SHA384) |
| 298 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 299 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 300 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA384 (AKM-defined - FT 802.1X SHA384)"); |
| 301 |
if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| 302 |
return -1; |
| 303 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| 304 |
break; |
| 305 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R && CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 306 |
default: |
| 307 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 308 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC algorithm not known (AKM-defined - akmp=0x%x)", |
| 309 |
akmp); |
| 310 |
return -1; |
| 311 |
} |
| 312 |
break; |
| 313 |
default: |
| 314 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 315 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC algorithm not known (ver=%d)", |
| 316 |
ver); |
| 317 |
return -1; |
| 318 |
} |
| 319 |
|
| 320 |
return 0; |
| 321 |
} |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
/** |
| 325 |
* wpa_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PTK from PMK, addresses, and nonces |
| 326 |
* @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| 327 |
* @pmk_len: Length of PMK |
| 328 |
* @label: Label to use in derivation |
| 329 |
* @addr1: AA or SA |
| 330 |
* @addr2: SA or AA |
| 331 |
* @nonce1: ANonce or SNonce |
| 332 |
* @nonce2: SNonce or ANonce |
| 333 |
* @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key |
| 334 |
* @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| 335 |
* @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| 336 |
* @kdk_len: The length in octets that should be derived for KDK |
| 337 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 338 |
* |
| 339 |
* IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| 340 |
* PTK = PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion", |
| 341 |
* Min(AA, SA) || Max(AA, SA) || |
| 342 |
* Min(ANonce, SNonce) || Max(ANonce, SNonce) |
| 343 |
* [ || Z.x ]) |
| 344 |
* |
| 345 |
* The optional Z.x component is used only with DPP and that part is not defined |
| 346 |
* in IEEE 802.11. |
| 347 |
*/ |
| 348 |
int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const char *label, |
| 349 |
const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| 350 |
const u8 *nonce1, const u8 *nonce2, |
| 351 |
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher, |
| 352 |
const u8 *z, size_t z_len, size_t kdk_len) |
| 353 |
{ |
| 354 |
#define MAX_Z_LEN 66 /* with NIST P-521 */ |
| 355 |
u8 data[2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + MAX_Z_LEN]; |
| 356 |
size_t data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| 357 |
u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| 358 |
WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| 359 |
size_t ptk_len; |
| 360 |
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| 361 |
int owe_ptk_workaround = 0; |
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
if (akmp == (WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE | WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256)) { |
| 364 |
owe_ptk_workaround = 1; |
| 365 |
akmp = WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| 366 |
} |
| 367 |
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
if (pmk_len == 0) { |
| 370 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PTK derivation"); |
| 371 |
return -1; |
| 372 |
} |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
if (z_len > MAX_Z_LEN) |
| 375 |
return -1; |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) { |
| 378 |
os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| 379 |
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| 380 |
} else { |
| 381 |
os_memcpy(data, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| 382 |
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| 383 |
} |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
if (os_memcmp(nonce1, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) { |
| 386 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 387 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce2, |
| 388 |
WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 389 |
} else { |
| 390 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 391 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce1, |
| 392 |
WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 393 |
} |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
if (z && z_len) { |
| 396 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN, z, z_len); |
| 397 |
data_len += z_len; |
| 398 |
} |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| 401 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 402 |
"WPA: KDK len=%zu exceeds max supported len", |
| 403 |
kdk_len); |
| 404 |
return -1; |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| 408 |
ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| 409 |
ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| 410 |
ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| 411 |
if (ptk->tk_len == 0) { |
| 412 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 413 |
"WPA: Unsupported cipher (0x%x) used in PTK derivation", |
| 414 |
cipher); |
| 415 |
return -1; |
| 416 |
} |
| 417 |
ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| 420 |
#if defined(CONFIG_SUITEB192) || defined(CONFIG_FILS) |
| 421 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| 422 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 423 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 424 |
return -1; |
| 425 |
#else /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 || CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 426 |
return -1; |
| 427 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 || CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 428 |
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| 429 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| 430 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 431 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 432 |
return -1; |
| 433 |
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| 434 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && (pmk_len == 32 || |
| 435 |
owe_ptk_workaround)) { |
| 436 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| 437 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 438 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 439 |
return -1; |
| 440 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len == 48) { |
| 441 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| 442 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 443 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 444 |
return -1; |
| 445 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len == 64) { |
| 446 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA512)"); |
| 447 |
if (sha512_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 448 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 449 |
return -1; |
| 450 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) { |
| 451 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OWE: Unknown PMK length %u", |
| 452 |
(unsigned int) pmk_len); |
| 453 |
return -1; |
| 454 |
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| 455 |
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| 456 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 32) { |
| 457 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| 458 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 459 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 460 |
return -1; |
| 461 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 48) { |
| 462 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| 463 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 464 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 465 |
return -1; |
| 466 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 64) { |
| 467 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA512)"); |
| 468 |
if (sha512_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 469 |
tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 470 |
return -1; |
| 471 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) { |
| 472 |
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "DPP: Unknown PMK length %u", |
| 473 |
(unsigned int) pmk_len); |
| 474 |
return -1; |
| 475 |
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| 476 |
} else { |
| 477 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA1)"); |
| 478 |
if (sha1_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| 479 |
ptk_len) < 0) |
| 480 |
return -1; |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation - A1=" MACSTR " A2=" MACSTR, |
| 484 |
MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2)); |
| 485 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce1", nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 486 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce2", nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 487 |
if (z && z_len) |
| 488 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Z.x", z, z_len); |
| 489 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| 490 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len); |
| 493 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len); |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + ptk->kck_len, ptk->kek_len); |
| 496 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len, ptk->tk_len); |
| 499 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| 500 |
|
| 501 |
if (kdk_len) { |
| 502 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + |
| 503 |
ptk->tk_len, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 504 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 505 |
} |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| 508 |
ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
| 511 |
os_memset(data, 0, data_len); |
| 512 |
return 0; |
| 513 |
} |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
int fils_rmsk_to_pmk(int akmp, const u8 *rmsk, size_t rmsk_len, |
| 518 |
const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, const u8 *dh_ss, |
| 519 |
size_t dh_ss_len, u8 *pmk, size_t *pmk_len) |
| 520 |
{ |
| 521 |
u8 nonces[2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN]; |
| 522 |
const u8 *addr[2]; |
| 523 |
size_t len[2]; |
| 524 |
size_t num_elem; |
| 525 |
int res; |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
/* PMK = HMAC-Hash(SNonce || ANonce, rMSK [ || DHss ]) */ |
| 528 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: rMSK to PMK derivation"); |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| 531 |
*pmk_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN; |
| 532 |
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| 533 |
*pmk_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| 534 |
else |
| 535 |
return -1; |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: rMSK", rmsk, rmsk_len); |
| 538 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 539 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 540 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: DHss", dh_ss, dh_ss_len); |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
os_memcpy(nonces, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 543 |
os_memcpy(&nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN], anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 544 |
addr[0] = rmsk; |
| 545 |
len[0] = rmsk_len; |
| 546 |
num_elem = 1; |
| 547 |
if (dh_ss) { |
| 548 |
addr[1] = dh_ss; |
| 549 |
len[1] = dh_ss_len; |
| 550 |
num_elem++; |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| 553 |
res = hmac_sha384_vector(nonces, 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN, num_elem, |
| 554 |
addr, len, pmk); |
| 555 |
else |
| 556 |
res = hmac_sha256_vector(nonces, 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN, num_elem, |
| 557 |
addr, len, pmk); |
| 558 |
if (res == 0) |
| 559 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMK", pmk, *pmk_len); |
| 560 |
else |
| 561 |
*pmk_len = 0; |
| 562 |
return res; |
| 563 |
} |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
int fils_pmkid_erp(int akmp, const u8 *reauth, size_t reauth_len, |
| 567 |
u8 *pmkid) |
| 568 |
{ |
| 569 |
const u8 *addr[1]; |
| 570 |
size_t len[1]; |
| 571 |
u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| 572 |
int res; |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
/* PMKID = Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate/Reauth)) */ |
| 575 |
addr[0] = reauth; |
| 576 |
len[0] = reauth_len; |
| 577 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| 578 |
res = sha384_vector(1, addr, len, hash); |
| 579 |
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| 580 |
res = sha256_vector(1, addr, len, hash); |
| 581 |
else |
| 582 |
return -1; |
| 583 |
if (res) |
| 584 |
return res; |
| 585 |
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| 586 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMKID", pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| 587 |
return 0; |
| 588 |
} |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
int fils_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *spa, const u8 *aa, |
| 592 |
const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, const u8 *dhss, |
| 593 |
size_t dhss_len, struct wpa_ptk *ptk, |
| 594 |
u8 *ick, size_t *ick_len, int akmp, int cipher, |
| 595 |
u8 *fils_ft, size_t *fils_ft_len, size_t kdk_len) |
| 596 |
{ |
| 597 |
u8 *data, *pos; |
| 598 |
size_t data_len; |
| 599 |
u8 tmp[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| 600 |
FILS_FT_MAX_LEN + WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| 601 |
size_t key_data_len; |
| 602 |
const char *label = "FILS PTK Derivation"; |
| 603 |
int ret = -1; |
| 604 |
size_t offset; |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
/* |
| 607 |
* FILS-Key-Data = PRF-X(PMK, "FILS PTK Derivation", |
| 608 |
* SPA || AA || SNonce || ANonce [ || DHss ]) |
| 609 |
* ICK = L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits) |
| 610 |
* KEK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits, KEK_bits) |
| 611 |
* TK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits, TK_bits) |
| 612 |
* If doing FT initial mobility domain association: |
| 613 |
* FILS-FT = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits + TK_bits, |
| 614 |
* FILS-FT_bits) |
| 615 |
* When a KDK is derived: |
| 616 |
* KDK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits + TK_bits + FILS-FT_bits, |
| 617 |
* KDK_bits) |
| 618 |
*/ |
| 619 |
data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN + dhss_len; |
| 620 |
data = os_malloc(data_len); |
| 621 |
if (!data) |
| 622 |
goto err; |
| 623 |
pos = data; |
| 624 |
os_memcpy(pos, spa, ETH_ALEN); |
| 625 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 626 |
os_memcpy(pos, aa, ETH_ALEN); |
| 627 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 628 |
os_memcpy(pos, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 629 |
pos += FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| 630 |
os_memcpy(pos, anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 631 |
pos += FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| 632 |
if (dhss) |
| 633 |
os_memcpy(pos, dhss, dhss_len); |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
ptk->kck_len = 0; |
| 636 |
ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| 637 |
ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| 638 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| 639 |
*ick_len = 48; |
| 640 |
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| 641 |
*ick_len = 32; |
| 642 |
else |
| 643 |
goto err; |
| 644 |
key_data_len = *ick_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len; |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
if (kdk_len) { |
| 647 |
if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| 648 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FILS: KDK len=%zu too big", |
| 649 |
kdk_len); |
| 650 |
goto err; |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| 654 |
key_data_len += kdk_len; |
| 655 |
} else { |
| 656 |
ptk->kdk_len = 0; |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
if (fils_ft && fils_ft_len) { |
| 660 |
if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) { |
| 661 |
*fils_ft_len = 32; |
| 662 |
} else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) { |
| 663 |
*fils_ft_len = 48; |
| 664 |
} else { |
| 665 |
*fils_ft_len = 0; |
| 666 |
fils_ft = NULL; |
| 667 |
} |
| 668 |
key_data_len += *fils_ft_len; |
| 669 |
} |
| 670 |
|
| 671 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| 672 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| 673 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 674 |
tmp, key_data_len) < 0) |
| 675 |
goto err; |
| 676 |
} else { |
| 677 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| 678 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| 679 |
tmp, key_data_len) < 0) |
| 680 |
goto err; |
| 681 |
} |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation - SPA=" MACSTR |
| 684 |
" AA=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(spa), MAC2STR(aa)); |
| 685 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 686 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 687 |
if (dhss) |
| 688 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: DHss", dhss, dhss_len); |
| 689 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| 690 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: FILS-Key-Data", tmp, key_data_len); |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
os_memcpy(ick, tmp, *ick_len); |
| 693 |
offset = *ick_len; |
| 694 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, *ick_len); |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + offset, ptk->kek_len); |
| 697 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| 698 |
offset += ptk->kek_len; |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + offset, ptk->tk_len); |
| 701 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| 702 |
offset += ptk->tk_len; |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
if (fils_ft && fils_ft_len) { |
| 705 |
os_memcpy(fils_ft, tmp + offset, *fils_ft_len); |
| 706 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: FILS-FT", |
| 707 |
fils_ft, *fils_ft_len); |
| 708 |
offset += *fils_ft_len; |
| 709 |
} |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
if (ptk->kdk_len) { |
| 712 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + offset, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 713 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 714 |
} |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| 717 |
ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
| 720 |
ret = 0; |
| 721 |
err: |
| 722 |
bin_clear_free(data, data_len); |
| 723 |
return ret; |
| 724 |
} |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
|
| 727 |
int fils_key_auth_sk(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_len, const u8 *snonce, |
| 728 |
const u8 *anonce, const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *bssid, |
| 729 |
const u8 *g_sta, size_t g_sta_len, |
| 730 |
const u8 *g_ap, size_t g_ap_len, |
| 731 |
int akmp, u8 *key_auth_sta, u8 *key_auth_ap, |
| 732 |
size_t *key_auth_len) |
| 733 |
{ |
| 734 |
const u8 *addr[6]; |
| 735 |
size_t len[6]; |
| 736 |
size_t num_elem = 4; |
| 737 |
int res; |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth derivation: STA-MAC=" MACSTR |
| 740 |
" AP-BSSID=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(sta_addr), MAC2STR(bssid)); |
| 741 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, ick_len); |
| 742 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 743 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| 744 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: gSTA", g_sta, g_sta_len); |
| 745 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: gAP", g_ap, g_ap_len); |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
/* |
| 748 |
* For (Re)Association Request frame (STA->AP): |
| 749 |
* Key-Auth = HMAC-Hash(ICK, SNonce || ANonce || STA-MAC || AP-BSSID |
| 750 |
* [ || gSTA || gAP ]) |
| 751 |
*/ |
| 752 |
addr[0] = snonce; |
| 753 |
len[0] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| 754 |
addr[1] = anonce; |
| 755 |
len[1] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| 756 |
addr[2] = sta_addr; |
| 757 |
len[2] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 758 |
addr[3] = bssid; |
| 759 |
len[3] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 760 |
if (g_sta && g_sta_len && g_ap && g_ap_len) { |
| 761 |
addr[4] = g_sta; |
| 762 |
len[4] = g_sta_len; |
| 763 |
addr[5] = g_ap; |
| 764 |
len[5] = g_ap_len; |
| 765 |
num_elem = 6; |
| 766 |
} |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| 769 |
*key_auth_len = 48; |
| 770 |
res = hmac_sha384_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| 771 |
key_auth_sta); |
| 772 |
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| 773 |
*key_auth_len = 32; |
| 774 |
res = hmac_sha256_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| 775 |
key_auth_sta); |
| 776 |
} else { |
| 777 |
return -1; |
| 778 |
} |
| 779 |
if (res < 0) |
| 780 |
return res; |
| 781 |
|
| 782 |
/* |
| 783 |
* For (Re)Association Response frame (AP->STA): |
| 784 |
* Key-Auth = HMAC-Hash(ICK, ANonce || SNonce || AP-BSSID || STA-MAC |
| 785 |
* [ || gAP || gSTA ]) |
| 786 |
*/ |
| 787 |
addr[0] = anonce; |
| 788 |
addr[1] = snonce; |
| 789 |
addr[2] = bssid; |
| 790 |
addr[3] = sta_addr; |
| 791 |
if (g_sta && g_sta_len && g_ap && g_ap_len) { |
| 792 |
addr[4] = g_ap; |
| 793 |
len[4] = g_ap_len; |
| 794 |
addr[5] = g_sta; |
| 795 |
len[5] = g_sta_len; |
| 796 |
} |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| 799 |
res = hmac_sha384_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| 800 |
key_auth_ap); |
| 801 |
else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| 802 |
res = hmac_sha256_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| 803 |
key_auth_ap); |
| 804 |
if (res < 0) |
| 805 |
return res; |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth (STA)", |
| 808 |
key_auth_sta, *key_auth_len); |
| 809 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth (AP)", |
| 810 |
key_auth_ap, *key_auth_len); |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
return 0; |
| 813 |
} |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 819 |
int wpa_ft_mic(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *sta_addr, |
| 820 |
const u8 *ap_addr, u8 transaction_seqnum, |
| 821 |
const u8 *mdie, size_t mdie_len, |
| 822 |
const u8 *ftie, size_t ftie_len, |
| 823 |
const u8 *rsnie, size_t rsnie_len, |
| 824 |
const u8 *ric, size_t ric_len, |
| 825 |
const u8 *rsnxe, size_t rsnxe_len, |
| 826 |
u8 *mic) |
| 827 |
{ |
| 828 |
const u8 *addr[10]; |
| 829 |
size_t len[10]; |
| 830 |
size_t i, num_elem = 0; |
| 831 |
u8 zero_mic[24]; |
| 832 |
size_t mic_len, fte_fixed_len; |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
if (kck_len == 16) { |
| 835 |
mic_len = 16; |
| 836 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 837 |
} else if (kck_len == 24) { |
| 838 |
mic_len = 24; |
| 839 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 840 |
} else { |
| 841 |
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "FT: Unsupported KCK length %u", |
| 842 |
(unsigned int) kck_len); |
| 843 |
return -1; |
| 844 |
} |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
fte_fixed_len = sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) - 16 + mic_len; |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
addr[num_elem] = sta_addr; |
| 849 |
len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 850 |
num_elem++; |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
addr[num_elem] = ap_addr; |
| 853 |
len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 854 |
num_elem++; |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
addr[num_elem] = &transaction_seqnum; |
| 857 |
len[num_elem] = 1; |
| 858 |
num_elem++; |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
if (rsnie) { |
| 861 |
addr[num_elem] = rsnie; |
| 862 |
len[num_elem] = rsnie_len; |
| 863 |
num_elem++; |
| 864 |
} |
| 865 |
if (mdie) { |
| 866 |
addr[num_elem] = mdie; |
| 867 |
len[num_elem] = mdie_len; |
| 868 |
num_elem++; |
| 869 |
} |
| 870 |
if (ftie) { |
| 871 |
if (ftie_len < 2 + fte_fixed_len) |
| 872 |
return -1; |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
/* IE hdr and mic_control */ |
| 875 |
addr[num_elem] = ftie; |
| 876 |
len[num_elem] = 2 + 2; |
| 877 |
num_elem++; |
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
/* MIC field with all zeros */ |
| 880 |
os_memset(zero_mic, 0, mic_len); |
| 881 |
addr[num_elem] = zero_mic; |
| 882 |
len[num_elem] = mic_len; |
| 883 |
num_elem++; |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
/* Rest of FTIE */ |
| 886 |
addr[num_elem] = ftie + 2 + 2 + mic_len; |
| 887 |
len[num_elem] = ftie_len - (2 + 2 + mic_len); |
| 888 |
num_elem++; |
| 889 |
} |
| 890 |
if (ric) { |
| 891 |
addr[num_elem] = ric; |
| 892 |
len[num_elem] = ric_len; |
| 893 |
num_elem++; |
| 894 |
} |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
if (rsnxe) { |
| 897 |
addr[num_elem] = rsnxe; |
| 898 |
len[num_elem] = rsnxe_len; |
| 899 |
num_elem++; |
| 900 |
} |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
for (i = 0; i < num_elem; i++) |
| 903 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "FT: MIC data", addr[i], len[i]); |
| 904 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 905 |
if (kck_len == 24) { |
| 906 |
u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
if (hmac_sha384_vector(kck, kck_len, num_elem, addr, len, hash)) |
| 909 |
return -1; |
| 910 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| 911 |
} |
| 912 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 913 |
if (kck_len == 16 && |
| 914 |
omac1_aes_128_vector(kck, num_elem, addr, len, mic)) |
| 915 |
return -1; |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
return 0; |
| 918 |
} |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
static int wpa_ft_parse_ftie(const u8 *ie, size_t ie_len, |
| 922 |
struct wpa_ft_ies *parse, int use_sha384) |
| 923 |
{ |
| 924 |
const u8 *end, *pos; |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
parse->ftie = ie; |
| 927 |
parse->ftie_len = ie_len; |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
pos = ie + (use_sha384 ? sizeof(struct rsn_ftie_sha384) : |
| 930 |
sizeof(struct rsn_ftie)); |
| 931 |
end = ie + ie_len; |
| 932 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Parse FTE subelements", pos, end - pos); |
| 933 |
|
| 934 |
while (end - pos >= 2) { |
| 935 |
u8 id, len; |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
id = *pos++; |
| 938 |
len = *pos++; |
| 939 |
if (len > end - pos) { |
| 940 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Truncated subelement"); |
| 941 |
break; |
| 942 |
} |
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
switch (id) { |
| 945 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_R1KH_ID: |
| 946 |
if (len != FT_R1KH_ID_LEN) { |
| 947 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 948 |
"FT: Invalid R1KH-ID length in FTIE: %d", |
| 949 |
len); |
| 950 |
return -1; |
| 951 |
} |
| 952 |
parse->r1kh_id = pos; |
| 953 |
break; |
| 954 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_GTK: |
| 955 |
parse->gtk = pos; |
| 956 |
parse->gtk_len = len; |
| 957 |
break; |
| 958 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_R0KH_ID: |
| 959 |
if (len < 1 || len > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN) { |
| 960 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 961 |
"FT: Invalid R0KH-ID length in FTIE: %d", |
| 962 |
len); |
| 963 |
return -1; |
| 964 |
} |
| 965 |
parse->r0kh_id = pos; |
| 966 |
parse->r0kh_id_len = len; |
| 967 |
break; |
| 968 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_IGTK: |
| 969 |
parse->igtk = pos; |
| 970 |
parse->igtk_len = len; |
| 971 |
break; |
| 972 |
#ifdef CONFIG_OCV |
| 973 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_OCI: |
| 974 |
parse->oci = pos; |
| 975 |
parse->oci_len = len; |
| 976 |
break; |
| 977 |
#endif /* CONFIG_OCV */ |
| 978 |
case FTIE_SUBELEM_BIGTK: |
| 979 |
parse->bigtk = pos; |
| 980 |
parse->bigtk_len = len; |
| 981 |
break; |
| 982 |
default: |
| 983 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Unknown subelem id %u", id); |
| 984 |
break; |
| 985 |
} |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
pos += len; |
| 988 |
} |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
return 0; |
| 991 |
} |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
int wpa_ft_parse_ies(const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len, |
| 995 |
struct wpa_ft_ies *parse, int use_sha384) |
| 996 |
{ |
| 997 |
const u8 *end, *pos; |
| 998 |
struct wpa_ie_data data; |
| 999 |
int ret; |
| 1000 |
const struct rsn_ftie *ftie; |
| 1001 |
int prot_ie_count = 0; |
| 1002 |
int update_use_sha384 = 0; |
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
if (use_sha384 < 0) { |
| 1005 |
use_sha384 = 0; |
| 1006 |
update_use_sha384 = 1; |
| 1007 |
} |
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
os_memset(parse, 0, sizeof(*parse)); |
| 1010 |
if (ies == NULL) |
| 1011 |
return 0; |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
pos = ies; |
| 1014 |
end = ies + ies_len; |
| 1015 |
while (end - pos >= 2) { |
| 1016 |
u8 id, len; |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
id = *pos++; |
| 1019 |
len = *pos++; |
| 1020 |
if (len > end - pos) |
| 1021 |
break; |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
switch (id) { |
| 1024 |
case WLAN_EID_RSN: |
| 1025 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSNE", pos, len); |
| 1026 |
parse->rsn = pos; |
| 1027 |
parse->rsn_len = len; |
| 1028 |
ret = wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(parse->rsn - 2, |
| 1029 |
parse->rsn_len + 2, |
| 1030 |
&data); |
| 1031 |
if (ret < 0) { |
| 1032 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse " |
| 1033 |
"RSN IE: %d", ret); |
| 1034 |
return -1; |
| 1035 |
} |
| 1036 |
parse->rsn_capab = data.capabilities; |
| 1037 |
if (data.num_pmkid == 1 && data.pmkid) |
| 1038 |
parse->rsn_pmkid = data.pmkid; |
| 1039 |
parse->key_mgmt = data.key_mgmt; |
| 1040 |
parse->pairwise_cipher = data.pairwise_cipher; |
| 1041 |
if (update_use_sha384) { |
| 1042 |
use_sha384 = |
| 1043 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(parse->key_mgmt); |
| 1044 |
update_use_sha384 = 0; |
| 1045 |
} |
| 1046 |
break; |
| 1047 |
case WLAN_EID_RSNX: |
| 1048 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSNXE", pos, len); |
| 1049 |
if (len < 1) |
| 1050 |
break; |
| 1051 |
parse->rsnxe = pos; |
| 1052 |
parse->rsnxe_len = len; |
| 1053 |
break; |
| 1054 |
case WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN: |
| 1055 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDE", pos, len); |
| 1056 |
if (len < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie)) |
| 1057 |
return -1; |
| 1058 |
parse->mdie = pos; |
| 1059 |
parse->mdie_len = len; |
| 1060 |
break; |
| 1061 |
case WLAN_EID_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION: |
| 1062 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE", pos, len); |
| 1063 |
if (use_sha384) { |
| 1064 |
const struct rsn_ftie_sha384 *ftie_sha384; |
| 1065 |
|
| 1066 |
if (len < sizeof(*ftie_sha384)) |
| 1067 |
return -1; |
| 1068 |
ftie_sha384 = |
| 1069 |
(const struct rsn_ftie_sha384 *) pos; |
| 1070 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC Control", |
| 1071 |
ftie_sha384->mic_control, 2); |
| 1072 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC", |
| 1073 |
ftie_sha384->mic, |
| 1074 |
sizeof(ftie_sha384->mic)); |
| 1075 |
parse->fte_anonce = ftie_sha384->anonce; |
| 1076 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-ANonce", |
| 1077 |
ftie_sha384->anonce, |
| 1078 |
WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 1079 |
parse->fte_snonce = ftie_sha384->snonce; |
| 1080 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-SNonce", |
| 1081 |
ftie_sha384->snonce, |
| 1082 |
WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 1083 |
prot_ie_count = ftie_sha384->mic_control[1]; |
| 1084 |
if (wpa_ft_parse_ftie(pos, len, parse, 1) < 0) |
| 1085 |
return -1; |
| 1086 |
break; |
| 1087 |
} |
| 1088 |
|
| 1089 |
if (len < sizeof(*ftie)) |
| 1090 |
return -1; |
| 1091 |
ftie = (const struct rsn_ftie *) pos; |
| 1092 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC Control", |
| 1093 |
ftie->mic_control, 2); |
| 1094 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC", |
| 1095 |
ftie->mic, sizeof(ftie->mic)); |
| 1096 |
parse->fte_anonce = ftie->anonce; |
| 1097 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-ANonce", |
| 1098 |
ftie->anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 1099 |
parse->fte_snonce = ftie->snonce; |
| 1100 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-SNonce", |
| 1101 |
ftie->snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 1102 |
prot_ie_count = ftie->mic_control[1]; |
| 1103 |
if (wpa_ft_parse_ftie(pos, len, parse, 0) < 0) |
| 1104 |
return -1; |
| 1105 |
break; |
| 1106 |
case WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL: |
| 1107 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Timeout Interval", |
| 1108 |
pos, len); |
| 1109 |
if (len != 5) |
| 1110 |
break; |
| 1111 |
parse->tie = pos; |
| 1112 |
parse->tie_len = len; |
| 1113 |
break; |
| 1114 |
case WLAN_EID_RIC_DATA: |
| 1115 |
if (parse->ric == NULL) |
| 1116 |
parse->ric = pos - 2; |
| 1117 |
break; |
| 1118 |
} |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
pos += len; |
| 1121 |
} |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
if (prot_ie_count == 0) |
| 1124 |
return 0; /* no MIC */ |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
/* |
| 1127 |
* Check that the protected IE count matches with IEs included in the |
| 1128 |
* frame. |
| 1129 |
*/ |
| 1130 |
if (parse->rsn) |
| 1131 |
prot_ie_count--; |
| 1132 |
if (parse->mdie) |
| 1133 |
prot_ie_count--; |
| 1134 |
if (parse->ftie) |
| 1135 |
prot_ie_count--; |
| 1136 |
if (parse->rsnxe) |
| 1137 |
prot_ie_count--; |
| 1138 |
if (prot_ie_count < 0) { |
| 1139 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Some required IEs not included in " |
| 1140 |
"the protected IE count"); |
| 1141 |
return -1; |
| 1142 |
} |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
if (prot_ie_count == 0 && parse->ric) { |
| 1145 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RIC IE(s) in the frame, but not " |
| 1146 |
"included in protected IE count"); |
| 1147 |
return -1; |
| 1148 |
} |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
/* Determine the end of the RIC IE(s) */ |
| 1151 |
if (parse->ric) { |
| 1152 |
pos = parse->ric; |
| 1153 |
while (end - pos >= 2 && 2 + pos[1] <= end - pos && |
| 1154 |
prot_ie_count) { |
| 1155 |
prot_ie_count--; |
| 1156 |
pos += 2 + pos[1]; |
| 1157 |
} |
| 1158 |
parse->ric_len = pos - parse->ric; |
| 1159 |
} |
| 1160 |
if (prot_ie_count) { |
| 1161 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: %d protected IEs missing from " |
| 1162 |
"frame", (int) prot_ie_count); |
| 1163 |
return -1; |
| 1164 |
} |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
return 0; |
| 1167 |
} |
| 1168 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
/* |
| 1174 |
* pasn_use_sha384 - Should SHA384 be used or SHA256 |
| 1175 |
* |
| 1176 |
* @akmp: Authentication and key management protocol |
| 1177 |
* @cipher: The cipher suite |
| 1178 |
* |
| 1179 |
* According to IEEE P802.11az/D2.7, 12.12.7, the hash algorithm to use is the |
| 1180 |
* hash algorithm defined for the Base AKM (see Table 9-151 (AKM suite |
| 1181 |
* selectors)). When there is no Base AKM, the hash algorithm is selected based |
| 1182 |
* on the pairwise cipher suite provided in the RSNE by the AP in the second |
| 1183 |
* PASN frame. SHA-256 is used as the hash algorithm, except for the ciphers |
| 1184 |
* 00-0F-AC:9 and 00-0F-AC:10 for which SHA-384 is used. |
| 1185 |
*/ |
| 1186 |
static bool pasn_use_sha384(int akmp, int cipher) |
| 1187 |
{ |
| 1188 |
return (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN && (cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| 1189 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)) || |
| 1190 |
wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp); |
| 1191 |
} |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
/** |
| 1195 |
* pasn_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PASN PTK from PMK, addresses, etc. |
| 1196 |
* @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| 1197 |
* @pmk_len: Length of PMK |
| 1198 |
* @spa: Suppplicant address |
| 1199 |
* @bssid: AP BSSID |
| 1200 |
* @dhss: Is the shared secret (DHss) derived from the PASN ephemeral key |
| 1201 |
* exchange encoded as an octet string |
| 1202 |
* @dhss_len: The length of dhss in octets |
| 1203 |
* @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key |
| 1204 |
* @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| 1205 |
* @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| 1206 |
* @kdk_len: the length in octets that should be derived for HTLK. Can be zero. |
| 1207 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 1208 |
*/ |
| 1209 |
int pasn_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, |
| 1210 |
const u8 *spa, const u8 *bssid, |
| 1211 |
const u8 *dhss, size_t dhss_len, |
| 1212 |
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher, |
| 1213 |
size_t kdk_len) |
| 1214 |
{ |
| 1215 |
u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| 1216 |
u8 *data; |
| 1217 |
size_t data_len, ptk_len; |
| 1218 |
int ret = -1; |
| 1219 |
const char *label = "PASN PTK Derivation"; |
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 |
if (!pmk || !pmk_len) { |
| 1222 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No PMK set for PTK derivation"); |
| 1223 |
return -1; |
| 1224 |
} |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
if (!dhss || !dhss_len) { |
| 1227 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No DHss set for PTK derivation"); |
| 1228 |
return -1; |
| 1229 |
} |
| 1230 |
|
| 1231 |
/* |
| 1232 |
* PASN-PTK = KDF(PMK, “PASN PTK Derivation”, SPA || BSSID || DHss) |
| 1233 |
* |
| 1234 |
* KCK = L(PASN-PTK, 0, 256) |
| 1235 |
* TK = L(PASN-PTK, 256, TK_bits) |
| 1236 |
* KDK = L(PASN-PTK, 256 + TK_bits, kdk_len * 8) |
| 1237 |
*/ |
| 1238 |
data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + dhss_len; |
| 1239 |
data = os_zalloc(data_len); |
| 1240 |
if (!data) |
| 1241 |
return -1; |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
os_memcpy(data, spa, ETH_ALEN); |
| 1244 |
os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| 1245 |
os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, dhss, dhss_len); |
| 1246 |
|
| 1247 |
ptk->kck_len = WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN; |
| 1248 |
ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| 1249 |
ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| 1250 |
ptk->kek_len = 0; |
| 1251 |
ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| 1252 |
ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
if (ptk->tk_len == 0) { |
| 1255 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 1256 |
"PASN: Unsupported cipher (0x%x) used in PTK derivation", |
| 1257 |
cipher); |
| 1258 |
goto err; |
| 1259 |
} |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->tk_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| 1262 |
if (ptk_len > sizeof(tmp)) |
| 1263 |
goto err; |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| 1266 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PTK derivation using SHA384"); |
| 1267 |
|
| 1268 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| 1269 |
ptk_len) < 0) |
| 1270 |
goto err; |
| 1271 |
} else { |
| 1272 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PTK derivation using SHA256"); |
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| 1275 |
ptk_len) < 0) |
| 1276 |
goto err; |
| 1277 |
} |
| 1278 |
|
| 1279 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 1280 |
"PASN: PTK derivation: SPA=" MACSTR " BSSID=" MACSTR, |
| 1281 |
MAC2STR(spa), MAC2STR(bssid)); |
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: DHss", dhss, dhss_len); |
| 1284 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| 1285 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PASN-PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| 1286 |
|
| 1287 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| 1288 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: KCK:", ptk->kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| 1289 |
|
| 1290 |
os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, ptk->tk_len); |
| 1291 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: TK:", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| 1292 |
|
| 1293 |
if (kdk_len) { |
| 1294 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN + ptk->tk_len, |
| 1295 |
ptk->kdk_len); |
| 1296 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: KDK:", |
| 1297 |
ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 1298 |
} |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
forced_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
| 1301 |
ret = 0; |
| 1302 |
err: |
| 1303 |
bin_clear_free(data, data_len); |
| 1304 |
return ret; |
| 1305 |
} |
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
/* |
| 1309 |
* pasn_mic_len - Returns the MIC length for PASN authentication |
| 1310 |
*/ |
| 1311 |
u8 pasn_mic_len(int akmp, int cipher) |
| 1312 |
{ |
| 1313 |
if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) |
| 1314 |
return 24; |
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
return 16; |
| 1317 |
} |
| 1318 |
|
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
/** |
| 1321 |
* pasn_mic - Calculate PASN MIC |
| 1322 |
* @kck: The key confirmation key for the PASN PTKSA |
| 1323 |
* @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| 1324 |
* @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| 1325 |
* @addr1: For the 2nd PASN frame supplicant address; for the 3rd frame the |
| 1326 |
* BSSID |
| 1327 |
* @addr2: For the 2nd PASN frame the BSSID; for the 3rd frame the supplicant |
| 1328 |
* address |
| 1329 |
* @data: For calculating the MIC for the 2nd PASN frame, this should hold the |
| 1330 |
* Beacon frame RSNE + RSNXE. For calculating the MIC for the 3rd PASN |
| 1331 |
* frame, this should hold the hash of the body of the PASN 1st frame. |
| 1332 |
* @data_len: The length of data |
| 1333 |
* @frame: The body of the PASN frame including the MIC element with the octets |
| 1334 |
* in the MIC field of the MIC element set to 0. |
| 1335 |
* @frame_len: The length of frame |
| 1336 |
* @mic: Buffer to hold the MIC on success. Should be big enough to handle the |
| 1337 |
* maximal MIC length |
| 1338 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 1339 |
*/ |
| 1340 |
int pasn_mic(const u8 *kck, int akmp, int cipher, |
| 1341 |
const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| 1342 |
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, |
| 1343 |
const u8 *frame, size_t frame_len, u8 *mic) |
| 1344 |
{ |
| 1345 |
u8 *buf; |
| 1346 |
u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| 1347 |
size_t buf_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + data_len + frame_len; |
| 1348 |
int ret = -1; |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
if (!kck) { |
| 1351 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No KCK for MIC calculation"); |
| 1352 |
return -1; |
| 1353 |
} |
| 1354 |
|
| 1355 |
if (!data || !data_len) { |
| 1356 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid data for MIC calculation"); |
| 1357 |
return -1; |
| 1358 |
} |
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 |
if (!frame || !frame_len) { |
| 1361 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid data for MIC calculation"); |
| 1362 |
return -1; |
| 1363 |
} |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
buf = os_zalloc(buf_len); |
| 1366 |
if (!buf) |
| 1367 |
return -1; |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
os_memcpy(buf, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| 1370 |
os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: data", data, data_len); |
| 1373 |
os_memcpy(buf + 2 * ETH_ALEN, data, data_len); |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: frame", frame, frame_len); |
| 1376 |
os_memcpy(buf + 2 * ETH_ALEN + data_len, frame, frame_len); |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: KCK", kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| 1379 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: buf", buf, buf_len); |
| 1380 |
|
| 1381 |
if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| 1382 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC using HMAC-SHA384"); |
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 |
if (hmac_sha384(kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, buf, buf_len, hash)) |
| 1385 |
goto err; |
| 1386 |
|
| 1387 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| 1388 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: mic: ", mic, 24); |
| 1389 |
} else { |
| 1390 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC using HMAC-SHA256"); |
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
if (hmac_sha256(kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, buf, buf_len, hash)) |
| 1393 |
goto err; |
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
os_memcpy(mic, hash, 16); |
| 1396 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: mic: ", mic, 16); |
| 1397 |
} |
| 1398 |
|
| 1399 |
ret = 0; |
| 1400 |
err: |
| 1401 |
bin_clear_free(buf, buf_len); |
| 1402 |
return ret; |
| 1403 |
} |
| 1404 |
|
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
/** |
| 1407 |
* pasn_auth_frame_hash - Computes a hash of an Authentication frame body |
| 1408 |
* @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| 1409 |
* @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| 1410 |
* @data: Pointer to the Authentication frame body |
| 1411 |
* @len: Length of the Authentication frame body |
| 1412 |
* @hash: On return would hold the computed hash. Should be big enough to handle |
| 1413 |
* SHA384. |
| 1414 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 1415 |
*/ |
| 1416 |
int pasn_auth_frame_hash(int akmp, int cipher, const u8 *data, size_t len, |
| 1417 |
u8 *hash) |
| 1418 |
{ |
| 1419 |
if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| 1420 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Frame hash using SHA-384"); |
| 1421 |
return sha384_vector(1, &data, &len, hash); |
| 1422 |
} else { |
| 1423 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Frame hash using SHA-256"); |
| 1424 |
return sha256_vector(1, &data, &len, hash); |
| 1425 |
} |
| 1426 |
} |
| 1427 |
|
| 1428 |
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 |
static int rsn_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| 1432 |
{ |
| 1433 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE) |
| 1434 |
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| 1435 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
| 1436 |
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 1437 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP) |
| 1438 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 1439 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC) |
| 1440 |
return WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| 1441 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP) |
| 1442 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 1443 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256) |
| 1444 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| 1445 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) |
| 1446 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| 1447 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128) |
| 1448 |
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| 1449 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256) |
| 1450 |
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| 1451 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256) |
| 1452 |
return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| 1453 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED) |
| 1454 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| 1455 |
return 0; |
| 1456 |
} |
| 1457 |
|
| 1458 |
|
| 1459 |
static int rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| 1460 |
{ |
| 1461 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X) |
| 1462 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| 1463 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X) |
| 1464 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; |
| 1465 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 1466 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X) |
| 1467 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X; |
| 1468 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK) |
| 1469 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK; |
| 1470 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 1471 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384) |
| 1472 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384; |
| 1473 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 1474 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 1475 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256) |
| 1476 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256; |
| 1477 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256) |
| 1478 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256; |
| 1479 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| 1480 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE) |
| 1481 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE; |
| 1482 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE) |
| 1483 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE; |
| 1484 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| 1485 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B) |
| 1486 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B; |
| 1487 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B_192) |
| 1488 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192; |
| 1489 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256) |
| 1490 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256; |
| 1491 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384) |
| 1492 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384; |
| 1493 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) |
| 1494 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256; |
| 1495 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) |
| 1496 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384; |
| 1497 |
#ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| 1498 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OWE) |
| 1499 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| 1500 |
#endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| 1501 |
#ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| 1502 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_DPP) |
| 1503 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP; |
| 1504 |
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| 1505 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) |
| 1506 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| 1507 |
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| 1508 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PASN) |
| 1509 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN; |
| 1510 |
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |
| 1511 |
return 0; |
| 1512 |
} |
| 1513 |
|
| 1514 |
|
| 1515 |
int wpa_cipher_valid_group(int cipher) |
| 1516 |
{ |
| 1517 |
return wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(cipher) || |
| 1518 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| 1519 |
} |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
|
| 1522 |
int wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(int cipher) |
| 1523 |
{ |
| 1524 |
return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED || |
| 1525 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC || |
| 1526 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128 || |
| 1527 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256 || |
| 1528 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| 1529 |
} |
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 |
|
| 1532 |
/** |
| 1533 |
* wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn - Parse RSN IE |
| 1534 |
* @rsn_ie: Buffer containing RSN IE |
| 1535 |
* @rsn_ie_len: RSN IE buffer length (including IE number and length octets) |
| 1536 |
* @data: Pointer to structure that will be filled in with parsed data |
| 1537 |
* Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure |
| 1538 |
*/ |
| 1539 |
int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_ie_len, |
| 1540 |
struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| 1541 |
{ |
| 1542 |
const u8 *pos; |
| 1543 |
int left; |
| 1544 |
int i, count; |
| 1545 |
|
| 1546 |
os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); |
| 1547 |
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_RSN; |
| 1548 |
data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 1549 |
data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 1550 |
data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| 1551 |
data->capabilities = 0; |
| 1552 |
data->pmkid = NULL; |
| 1553 |
data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| 1554 |
data->mgmt_group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| 1555 |
|
| 1556 |
if (rsn_ie_len == 0) { |
| 1557 |
/* No RSN IE - fail silently */ |
| 1558 |
return -1; |
| 1559 |
} |
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
if (rsn_ie_len < sizeof(struct rsn_ie_hdr)) { |
| 1562 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu", |
| 1563 |
__func__, (unsigned long) rsn_ie_len); |
| 1564 |
return -1; |
| 1565 |
} |
| 1566 |
|
| 1567 |
if (rsn_ie_len >= 6 && rsn_ie[1] >= 4 && |
| 1568 |
rsn_ie[1] == rsn_ie_len - 2 && |
| 1569 |
WPA_GET_BE32(&rsn_ie[2]) == OSEN_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) { |
| 1570 |
pos = rsn_ie + 6; |
| 1571 |
left = rsn_ie_len - 6; |
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| 1574 |
data->has_group = 1; |
| 1575 |
data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| 1576 |
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_OSEN; |
| 1577 |
} else { |
| 1578 |
const struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| 1579 |
|
| 1580 |
hdr = (const struct rsn_ie_hdr *) rsn_ie; |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_RSN || |
| 1583 |
hdr->len != rsn_ie_len - 2 || |
| 1584 |
WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != RSN_VERSION) { |
| 1585 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version", |
| 1586 |
__func__); |
| 1587 |
return -2; |
| 1588 |
} |
| 1589 |
|
| 1590 |
pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| 1591 |
left = rsn_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr); |
| 1592 |
} |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
if (left >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1595 |
data->group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1596 |
data->has_group = 1; |
| 1597 |
if (!wpa_cipher_valid_group(data->group_cipher)) { |
| 1598 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 1599 |
"%s: invalid group cipher 0x%x (%08x)", |
| 1600 |
__func__, data->group_cipher, |
| 1601 |
WPA_GET_BE32(pos)); |
| 1602 |
return -1; |
| 1603 |
} |
| 1604 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1605 |
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1606 |
} else if (left > 0) { |
| 1607 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much", |
| 1608 |
__func__, left); |
| 1609 |
return -3; |
| 1610 |
} |
| 1611 |
|
| 1612 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1613 |
data->pairwise_cipher = 0; |
| 1614 |
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1615 |
pos += 2; |
| 1616 |
left -= 2; |
| 1617 |
if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1618 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), " |
| 1619 |
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| 1620 |
return -4; |
| 1621 |
} |
| 1622 |
if (count) |
| 1623 |
data->has_pairwise = 1; |
| 1624 |
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| 1625 |
data->pairwise_cipher |= rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1626 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1627 |
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1628 |
} |
| 1629 |
if (data->pairwise_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| 1630 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: AES-128-CMAC used as " |
| 1631 |
"pairwise cipher", __func__); |
| 1632 |
return -1; |
| 1633 |
} |
| 1634 |
} else if (left == 1) { |
| 1635 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)", |
| 1636 |
__func__); |
| 1637 |
return -5; |
| 1638 |
} |
| 1639 |
|
| 1640 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1641 |
data->key_mgmt = 0; |
| 1642 |
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1643 |
pos += 2; |
| 1644 |
left -= 2; |
| 1645 |
if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1646 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), " |
| 1647 |
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| 1648 |
return -6; |
| 1649 |
} |
| 1650 |
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| 1651 |
data->key_mgmt |= rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1652 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1653 |
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1654 |
} |
| 1655 |
} else if (left == 1) { |
| 1656 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)", |
| 1657 |
__func__); |
| 1658 |
return -7; |
| 1659 |
} |
| 1660 |
|
| 1661 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1662 |
data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1663 |
pos += 2; |
| 1664 |
left -= 2; |
| 1665 |
} |
| 1666 |
|
| 1667 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1668 |
u16 num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1669 |
pos += 2; |
| 1670 |
left -= 2; |
| 1671 |
if (num_pmkid > (unsigned int) left / PMKID_LEN) { |
| 1672 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: PMKID underflow " |
| 1673 |
"(num_pmkid=%u left=%d)", |
| 1674 |
__func__, num_pmkid, left); |
| 1675 |
data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| 1676 |
return -9; |
| 1677 |
} else { |
| 1678 |
data->num_pmkid = num_pmkid; |
| 1679 |
data->pmkid = pos; |
| 1680 |
pos += data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| 1681 |
left -= data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| 1682 |
} |
| 1683 |
} |
| 1684 |
|
| 1685 |
if (left >= 4) { |
| 1686 |
data->mgmt_group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1687 |
if (!wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(data->mgmt_group_cipher)) { |
| 1688 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 1689 |
"%s: Unsupported management group cipher 0x%x (%08x)", |
| 1690 |
__func__, data->mgmt_group_cipher, |
| 1691 |
WPA_GET_BE32(pos)); |
| 1692 |
return -10; |
| 1693 |
} |
| 1694 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1695 |
left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1696 |
} |
| 1697 |
|
| 1698 |
if (left > 0) { |
| 1699 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 1700 |
"wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn: ignore trailing bytes", |
| 1701 |
pos, left); |
| 1702 |
} |
| 1703 |
|
| 1704 |
return 0; |
| 1705 |
} |
| 1706 |
|
| 1707 |
|
| 1708 |
static int wpa_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| 1709 |
{ |
| 1710 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE) |
| 1711 |
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| 1712 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
| 1713 |
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 1714 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP) |
| 1715 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 1716 |
return 0; |
| 1717 |
} |
| 1718 |
|
| 1719 |
|
| 1720 |
static int wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| 1721 |
{ |
| 1722 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X) |
| 1723 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| 1724 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X) |
| 1725 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; |
| 1726 |
if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_NONE) |
| 1727 |
return WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE; |
| 1728 |
return 0; |
| 1729 |
} |
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa(const u8 *wpa_ie, size_t wpa_ie_len, |
| 1733 |
struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| 1734 |
{ |
| 1735 |
const struct wpa_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| 1736 |
const u8 *pos; |
| 1737 |
int left; |
| 1738 |
int i, count; |
| 1739 |
|
| 1740 |
os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); |
| 1741 |
data->proto = WPA_PROTO_WPA; |
| 1742 |
data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 1743 |
data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 1744 |
data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| 1745 |
data->capabilities = 0; |
| 1746 |
data->pmkid = NULL; |
| 1747 |
data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| 1748 |
data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0; |
| 1749 |
|
| 1750 |
if (wpa_ie_len < sizeof(struct wpa_ie_hdr)) { |
| 1751 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu", |
| 1752 |
__func__, (unsigned long) wpa_ie_len); |
| 1753 |
return -1; |
| 1754 |
} |
| 1755 |
|
| 1756 |
hdr = (const struct wpa_ie_hdr *) wpa_ie; |
| 1757 |
|
| 1758 |
if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC || |
| 1759 |
hdr->len != wpa_ie_len - 2 || |
| 1760 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(hdr->oui) != WPA_OUI_TYPE || |
| 1761 |
WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != WPA_VERSION) { |
| 1762 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version", |
| 1763 |
__func__); |
| 1764 |
return -2; |
| 1765 |
} |
| 1766 |
|
| 1767 |
pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| 1768 |
left = wpa_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr); |
| 1769 |
|
| 1770 |
if (left >= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1771 |
data->group_cipher = wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1772 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1773 |
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1774 |
} else if (left > 0) { |
| 1775 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much", |
| 1776 |
__func__, left); |
| 1777 |
return -3; |
| 1778 |
} |
| 1779 |
|
| 1780 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1781 |
data->pairwise_cipher = 0; |
| 1782 |
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1783 |
pos += 2; |
| 1784 |
left -= 2; |
| 1785 |
if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1786 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), " |
| 1787 |
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| 1788 |
return -4; |
| 1789 |
} |
| 1790 |
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| 1791 |
data->pairwise_cipher |= wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1792 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1793 |
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1794 |
} |
| 1795 |
} else if (left == 1) { |
| 1796 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)", |
| 1797 |
__func__); |
| 1798 |
return -5; |
| 1799 |
} |
| 1800 |
|
| 1801 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1802 |
data->key_mgmt = 0; |
| 1803 |
count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1804 |
pos += 2; |
| 1805 |
left -= 2; |
| 1806 |
if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| 1807 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), " |
| 1808 |
"count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| 1809 |
return -6; |
| 1810 |
} |
| 1811 |
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| 1812 |
data->key_mgmt |= wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos); |
| 1813 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1814 |
left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 1815 |
} |
| 1816 |
} else if (left == 1) { |
| 1817 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)", |
| 1818 |
__func__); |
| 1819 |
return -7; |
| 1820 |
} |
| 1821 |
|
| 1822 |
if (left >= 2) { |
| 1823 |
data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 1824 |
pos += 2; |
| 1825 |
left -= 2; |
| 1826 |
} |
| 1827 |
|
| 1828 |
if (left > 0) { |
| 1829 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 1830 |
"wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa: ignore trailing bytes", |
| 1831 |
pos, left); |
| 1832 |
} |
| 1833 |
|
| 1834 |
return 0; |
| 1835 |
} |
| 1836 |
|
| 1837 |
|
| 1838 |
int wpa_default_rsn_cipher(int freq) |
| 1839 |
{ |
| 1840 |
if (freq > 56160) |
| 1841 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; /* DMG */ |
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 1844 |
} |
| 1845 |
|
| 1846 |
|
| 1847 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
/** |
| 1850 |
* wpa_derive_pmk_r0 - Derive PMK-R0 and PMKR0Name |
| 1851 |
* |
| 1852 |
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.3 |
| 1853 |
*/ |
| 1854 |
int wpa_derive_pmk_r0(const u8 *xxkey, size_t xxkey_len, |
| 1855 |
const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| 1856 |
const u8 *mdid, const u8 *r0kh_id, size_t r0kh_id_len, |
| 1857 |
const u8 *s0kh_id, u8 *pmk_r0, u8 *pmk_r0_name, |
| 1858 |
int use_sha384) |
| 1859 |
{ |
| 1860 |
u8 buf[1 + SSID_MAX_LEN + MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN + 1 + |
| 1861 |
FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN + ETH_ALEN]; |
| 1862 |
u8 *pos, r0_key_data[64], hash[48]; |
| 1863 |
const u8 *addr[2]; |
| 1864 |
size_t len[2]; |
| 1865 |
size_t q = use_sha384 ? 48 : 32; |
| 1866 |
size_t r0_key_data_len = q + 16; |
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 |
/* |
| 1869 |
* R0-Key-Data = KDF-384(XXKey, "FT-R0", |
| 1870 |
* SSIDlength || SSID || MDID || R0KHlength || |
| 1871 |
* R0KH-ID || S0KH-ID) |
| 1872 |
* XXKey is either the second 256 bits of MSK or PSK; or the first |
| 1873 |
* 384 bits of MSK for FT-EAP-SHA384. |
| 1874 |
* PMK-R0 = L(R0-Key-Data, 0, Q) |
| 1875 |
* PMK-R0Name-Salt = L(R0-Key-Data, Q, 128) |
| 1876 |
* Q = 384 for FT-EAP-SHA384; otherwise, 256 |
| 1877 |
*/ |
| 1878 |
if (ssid_len > SSID_MAX_LEN || r0kh_id_len > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN) |
| 1879 |
return -1; |
| 1880 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PMK-R0 using KDF-%s", |
| 1881 |
use_sha384 ? "SHA384" : "SHA256"); |
| 1882 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: XXKey", xxkey, xxkey_len); |
| 1883 |
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: SSID", ssid, ssid_len); |
| 1884 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDID", mdid, MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN); |
| 1885 |
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R0KH-ID", r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len); |
| 1886 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: S0KH-ID: " MACSTR, MAC2STR(s0kh_id)); |
| 1887 |
pos = buf; |
| 1888 |
*pos++ = ssid_len; |
| 1889 |
os_memcpy(pos, ssid, ssid_len); |
| 1890 |
pos += ssid_len; |
| 1891 |
os_memcpy(pos, mdid, MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN); |
| 1892 |
pos += MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN; |
| 1893 |
*pos++ = r0kh_id_len; |
| 1894 |
os_memcpy(pos, r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len); |
| 1895 |
pos += r0kh_id_len; |
| 1896 |
os_memcpy(pos, s0kh_id, ETH_ALEN); |
| 1897 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 1900 |
if (use_sha384) { |
| 1901 |
if (xxkey_len != SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| 1902 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 1903 |
"FT: Unexpected XXKey length %d (expected %d)", |
| 1904 |
(int) xxkey_len, SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| 1905 |
return -1; |
| 1906 |
} |
| 1907 |
if (sha384_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf, |
| 1908 |
r0_key_data, r0_key_data_len) < 0) |
| 1909 |
return -1; |
| 1910 |
} |
| 1911 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 1912 |
if (!use_sha384) { |
| 1913 |
if (xxkey_len != PMK_LEN) { |
| 1914 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 1915 |
"FT: Unexpected XXKey length %d (expected %d)", |
| 1916 |
(int) xxkey_len, PMK_LEN); |
| 1917 |
return -1; |
| 1918 |
} |
| 1919 |
if (sha256_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf, |
| 1920 |
r0_key_data, r0_key_data_len) < 0) |
| 1921 |
return -1; |
| 1922 |
} |
| 1923 |
os_memcpy(pmk_r0, r0_key_data, q); |
| 1924 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0", pmk_r0, q); |
| 1925 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0Name-Salt", &r0_key_data[q], 16); |
| 1926 |
|
| 1927 |
/* |
| 1928 |
* PMKR0Name = Truncate-128(Hash("FT-R0N" || PMK-R0Name-Salt) |
| 1929 |
*/ |
| 1930 |
addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R0N"; |
| 1931 |
len[0] = 6; |
| 1932 |
addr[1] = &r0_key_data[q]; |
| 1933 |
len[1] = 16; |
| 1934 |
|
| 1935 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 1936 |
if (use_sha384 && sha384_vector(2, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 1937 |
return -1; |
| 1938 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 1939 |
if (!use_sha384 && sha256_vector(2, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 1940 |
return -1; |
| 1941 |
os_memcpy(pmk_r0_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 1942 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR0Name", pmk_r0_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 1943 |
forced_memzero(r0_key_data, sizeof(r0_key_data)); |
| 1944 |
return 0; |
| 1945 |
} |
| 1946 |
|
| 1947 |
|
| 1948 |
/** |
| 1949 |
* wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name - Derive PMKR1Name |
| 1950 |
* |
| 1951 |
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4 |
| 1952 |
*/ |
| 1953 |
int wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(const u8 *pmk_r0_name, const u8 *r1kh_id, |
| 1954 |
const u8 *s1kh_id, u8 *pmk_r1_name, int use_sha384) |
| 1955 |
{ |
| 1956 |
u8 hash[48]; |
| 1957 |
const u8 *addr[4]; |
| 1958 |
size_t len[4]; |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
/* |
| 1961 |
* PMKR1Name = Truncate-128(Hash("FT-R1N" || PMKR0Name || |
| 1962 |
* R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID)) |
| 1963 |
*/ |
| 1964 |
addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R1N"; |
| 1965 |
len[0] = 6; |
| 1966 |
addr[1] = pmk_r0_name; |
| 1967 |
len[1] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN; |
| 1968 |
addr[2] = r1kh_id; |
| 1969 |
len[2] = FT_R1KH_ID_LEN; |
| 1970 |
addr[3] = s1kh_id; |
| 1971 |
len[3] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 1972 |
|
| 1973 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 1974 |
if (use_sha384 && sha384_vector(4, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 1975 |
return -1; |
| 1976 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 1977 |
if (!use_sha384 && sha256_vector(4, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 1978 |
return -1; |
| 1979 |
os_memcpy(pmk_r1_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 1980 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name", pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 1981 |
return 0; |
| 1982 |
} |
| 1983 |
|
| 1984 |
|
| 1985 |
/** |
| 1986 |
* wpa_derive_pmk_r1 - Derive PMK-R1 and PMKR1Name from PMK-R0 |
| 1987 |
* |
| 1988 |
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4 |
| 1989 |
*/ |
| 1990 |
int wpa_derive_pmk_r1(const u8 *pmk_r0, size_t pmk_r0_len, |
| 1991 |
const u8 *pmk_r0_name, |
| 1992 |
const u8 *r1kh_id, const u8 *s1kh_id, |
| 1993 |
u8 *pmk_r1, u8 *pmk_r1_name) |
| 1994 |
{ |
| 1995 |
u8 buf[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN + ETH_ALEN]; |
| 1996 |
u8 *pos; |
| 1997 |
|
| 1998 |
/* PMK-R1 = KDF-256(PMK-R0, "FT-R1", R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID) */ |
| 1999 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PMK-R1 using KDF-%s", |
| 2000 |
pmk_r0_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN ? "SHA384" : "SHA256"); |
| 2001 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0", pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len); |
| 2002 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R1KH-ID", r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN); |
| 2003 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: S1KH-ID: " MACSTR, MAC2STR(s1kh_id)); |
| 2004 |
pos = buf; |
| 2005 |
os_memcpy(pos, r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN); |
| 2006 |
pos += FT_R1KH_ID_LEN; |
| 2007 |
os_memcpy(pos, s1kh_id, ETH_ALEN); |
| 2008 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 2011 |
if (pmk_r0_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN && |
| 2012 |
sha384_prf(pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len, "FT-R1", |
| 2013 |
buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len) < 0) |
| 2014 |
return -1; |
| 2015 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 2016 |
if (pmk_r0_len == PMK_LEN && |
| 2017 |
sha256_prf(pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len, "FT-R1", |
| 2018 |
buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len) < 0) |
| 2019 |
return -1; |
| 2020 |
if (pmk_r0_len != SHA384_MAC_LEN && pmk_r0_len != PMK_LEN) { |
| 2021 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Unexpected PMK-R0 length %d", |
| 2022 |
(int) pmk_r0_len); |
| 2023 |
return -1; |
| 2024 |
} |
| 2025 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R1", pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len); |
| 2026 |
|
| 2027 |
return wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name, r1kh_id, s1kh_id, |
| 2028 |
pmk_r1_name, |
| 2029 |
pmk_r0_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| 2030 |
} |
| 2031 |
|
| 2032 |
|
| 2033 |
/** |
| 2034 |
* wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk - Derive PTK and PTKName from PMK-R1 |
| 2035 |
* |
| 2036 |
* IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.5 |
| 2037 |
*/ |
| 2038 |
int wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk_r1, size_t pmk_r1_len, |
| 2039 |
const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, |
| 2040 |
const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *bssid, |
| 2041 |
const u8 *pmk_r1_name, |
| 2042 |
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, u8 *ptk_name, int akmp, int cipher, |
| 2043 |
size_t kdk_len) |
| 2044 |
{ |
| 2045 |
u8 buf[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN]; |
| 2046 |
u8 *pos, hash[32]; |
| 2047 |
const u8 *addr[6]; |
| 2048 |
size_t len[6]; |
| 2049 |
u8 tmp[2 * WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + 2 * WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| 2050 |
WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| 2051 |
size_t ptk_len, offset; |
| 2052 |
int use_sha384 = wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp); |
| 2053 |
|
| 2054 |
if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| 2055 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 2056 |
"FT: KDK len=%zu exceeds max supported len", |
| 2057 |
kdk_len); |
| 2058 |
return -1; |
| 2059 |
} |
| 2060 |
|
| 2061 |
/* |
| 2062 |
* PTK = KDF-PTKLen(PMK-R1, "FT-PTK", SNonce || ANonce || |
| 2063 |
* BSSID || STA-ADDR) |
| 2064 |
*/ |
| 2065 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PTK using KDF-%s", |
| 2066 |
use_sha384 ? "SHA384" : "SHA256"); |
| 2067 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R1", pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len); |
| 2068 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: SNonce", snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 2069 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: ANonce", anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 2070 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: BSSID=" MACSTR " STA-ADDR=" MACSTR, |
| 2071 |
MAC2STR(bssid), MAC2STR(sta_addr)); |
| 2072 |
pos = buf; |
| 2073 |
os_memcpy(pos, snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 2074 |
pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| 2075 |
os_memcpy(pos, anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| 2076 |
pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| 2077 |
os_memcpy(pos, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| 2078 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 2079 |
os_memcpy(pos, sta_addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| 2080 |
pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| 2081 |
|
| 2082 |
ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp, PMK_LEN); |
| 2083 |
ptk->kck2_len = wpa_kck2_len(akmp); |
| 2084 |
ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, PMK_LEN); |
| 2085 |
ptk->kek2_len = wpa_kek2_len(akmp); |
| 2086 |
ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| 2087 |
ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| 2088 |
ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len + |
| 2089 |
ptk->kck2_len + ptk->kek2_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| 2090 |
|
| 2091 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| 2092 |
if (use_sha384) { |
| 2093 |
if (pmk_r1_len != SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| 2094 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 2095 |
"FT: Unexpected PMK-R1 length %d (expected %d)", |
| 2096 |
(int) pmk_r1_len, SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| 2097 |
return -1; |
| 2098 |
} |
| 2099 |
if (sha384_prf(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, "FT-PTK", |
| 2100 |
buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 2101 |
return -1; |
| 2102 |
} |
| 2103 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 2104 |
if (!use_sha384) { |
| 2105 |
if (pmk_r1_len != PMK_LEN) { |
| 2106 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 2107 |
"FT: Unexpected PMK-R1 length %d (expected %d)", |
| 2108 |
(int) pmk_r1_len, PMK_LEN); |
| 2109 |
return -1; |
| 2110 |
} |
| 2111 |
if (sha256_prf(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, "FT-PTK", |
| 2112 |
buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| 2113 |
return -1; |
| 2114 |
} |
| 2115 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 |
/* |
| 2118 |
* PTKName = Truncate-128(SHA-256(PMKR1Name || "FT-PTKN" || SNonce || |
| 2119 |
* ANonce || BSSID || STA-ADDR)) |
| 2120 |
*/ |
| 2121 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name", pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 2122 |
addr[0] = pmk_r1_name; |
| 2123 |
len[0] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN; |
| 2124 |
addr[1] = (const u8 *) "FT-PTKN"; |
| 2125 |
len[1] = 7; |
| 2126 |
addr[2] = snonce; |
| 2127 |
len[2] = WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| 2128 |
addr[3] = anonce; |
| 2129 |
len[3] = WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| 2130 |
addr[4] = bssid; |
| 2131 |
len[4] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 2132 |
addr[5] = sta_addr; |
| 2133 |
len[5] = ETH_ALEN; |
| 2134 |
|
| 2135 |
if (sha256_vector(6, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 2136 |
return -1; |
| 2137 |
os_memcpy(ptk_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 2138 |
|
| 2139 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len); |
| 2140 |
offset = ptk->kck_len; |
| 2141 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + offset, ptk->kek_len); |
| 2142 |
offset += ptk->kek_len; |
| 2143 |
os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + offset, ptk->tk_len); |
| 2144 |
offset += ptk->tk_len; |
| 2145 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kck2, tmp + offset, ptk->kck2_len); |
| 2146 |
offset += ptk->kck2_len; |
| 2147 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kek2, tmp + offset, ptk->kek2_len); |
| 2148 |
offset += ptk->kek2_len; |
| 2149 |
os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + offset, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 2150 |
|
| 2151 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len); |
| 2152 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| 2153 |
if (ptk->kck2_len) |
| 2154 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KCK2", |
| 2155 |
ptk->kck2, ptk->kck2_len); |
| 2156 |
if (ptk->kek2_len) |
| 2157 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KEK2", |
| 2158 |
ptk->kek2, ptk->kek2_len); |
| 2159 |
if (ptk->kdk_len) |
| 2160 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| 2161 |
|
| 2162 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| 2163 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTKName", ptk_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| 2164 |
|
| 2165 |
forced_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
| 2166 |
|
| 2167 |
return 0; |
| 2168 |
} |
| 2169 |
|
| 2170 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 2171 |
|
| 2172 |
|
| 2173 |
/** |
| 2174 |
* rsn_pmkid - Calculate PMK identifier |
| 2175 |
* @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| 2176 |
* @pmk_len: Length of pmk in bytes |
| 2177 |
* @aa: Authenticator address |
| 2178 |
* @spa: Supplicant address |
| 2179 |
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| 2180 |
* @akmp: Negotiated key management protocol |
| 2181 |
* |
| 2182 |
* IEEE Std 802.11-2016 - 12.7.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| 2183 |
* AKM: 00-0F-AC:5, 00-0F-AC:6, 00-0F-AC:14, 00-0F-AC:16 |
| 2184 |
* PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-256(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| 2185 |
* AKM: 00-0F-AC:11 |
| 2186 |
* See rsn_pmkid_suite_b() |
| 2187 |
* AKM: 00-0F-AC:12 |
| 2188 |
* See rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192() |
| 2189 |
* AKM: 00-0F-AC:13, 00-0F-AC:15, 00-0F-AC:17 |
| 2190 |
* PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-384(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| 2191 |
* Otherwise: |
| 2192 |
* PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-1(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| 2193 |
*/ |
| 2194 |
void rsn_pmkid(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa, |
| 2195 |
u8 *pmkid, int akmp) |
| 2196 |
{ |
| 2197 |
char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| 2198 |
const u8 *addr[3]; |
| 2199 |
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| 2200 |
unsigned char hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| 2201 |
|
| 2202 |
addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| 2203 |
addr[1] = aa; |
| 2204 |
addr[2] = spa; |
| 2205 |
|
| 2206 |
if (0) { |
| 2207 |
#if defined(CONFIG_FILS) || defined(CONFIG_SHA384) |
| 2208 |
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| 2209 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-384"); |
| 2210 |
hmac_sha384_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| 2211 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS || CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| 2212 |
} else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| 2213 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-256"); |
| 2214 |
hmac_sha256_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| 2215 |
} else { |
| 2216 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-1"); |
| 2217 |
hmac_sha1_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| 2218 |
} |
| 2219 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derived PMKID", hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2220 |
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2221 |
} |
| 2222 |
|
| 2223 |
|
| 2224 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB |
| 2225 |
/** |
| 2226 |
* rsn_pmkid_suite_b - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM |
| 2227 |
* @kck: Key confirmation key |
| 2228 |
* @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes |
| 2229 |
* @aa: Authenticator address |
| 2230 |
* @spa: Supplicant address |
| 2231 |
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| 2232 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 2233 |
* |
| 2234 |
* IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| 2235 |
* PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-256(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| 2236 |
*/ |
| 2237 |
int rsn_pmkid_suite_b(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa, |
| 2238 |
const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid) |
| 2239 |
{ |
| 2240 |
char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| 2241 |
const u8 *addr[3]; |
| 2242 |
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| 2243 |
unsigned char hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| 2244 |
|
| 2245 |
addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| 2246 |
addr[1] = aa; |
| 2247 |
addr[2] = spa; |
| 2248 |
|
| 2249 |
if (hmac_sha256_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 2250 |
return -1; |
| 2251 |
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2252 |
return 0; |
| 2253 |
} |
| 2254 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */ |
| 2255 |
|
| 2256 |
|
| 2257 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192 |
| 2258 |
/** |
| 2259 |
* rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192 - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM |
| 2260 |
* @kck: Key confirmation key |
| 2261 |
* @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes |
| 2262 |
* @aa: Authenticator address |
| 2263 |
* @spa: Supplicant address |
| 2264 |
* @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| 2265 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 2266 |
* |
| 2267 |
* IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| 2268 |
* PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-384(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| 2269 |
*/ |
| 2270 |
int rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa, |
| 2271 |
const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid) |
| 2272 |
{ |
| 2273 |
char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| 2274 |
const u8 *addr[3]; |
| 2275 |
const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| 2276 |
unsigned char hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| 2277 |
|
| 2278 |
addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| 2279 |
addr[1] = aa; |
| 2280 |
addr[2] = spa; |
| 2281 |
|
| 2282 |
if (hmac_sha384_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| 2283 |
return -1; |
| 2284 |
os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2285 |
return 0; |
| 2286 |
} |
| 2287 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ |
| 2288 |
|
| 2289 |
|
| 2290 |
/** |
| 2291 |
* wpa_cipher_txt - Convert cipher suite to a text string |
| 2292 |
* @cipher: Cipher suite (WPA_CIPHER_* enum) |
| 2293 |
* Returns: Pointer to a text string of the cipher suite name |
| 2294 |
*/ |
| 2295 |
const char * wpa_cipher_txt(int cipher) |
| 2296 |
{ |
| 2297 |
switch (cipher) { |
| 2298 |
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE: |
| 2299 |
return "NONE"; |
| 2300 |
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP |
| 2301 |
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40: |
| 2302 |
return "WEP-40"; |
| 2303 |
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104: |
| 2304 |
return "WEP-104"; |
| 2305 |
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */ |
| 2306 |
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| 2307 |
return "TKIP"; |
| 2308 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| 2309 |
return "CCMP"; |
| 2310 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| 2311 |
return "CCMP+TKIP"; |
| 2312 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| 2313 |
return "GCMP"; |
| 2314 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| 2315 |
return "GCMP-256"; |
| 2316 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| 2317 |
return "CCMP-256"; |
| 2318 |
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| 2319 |
return "BIP"; |
| 2320 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| 2321 |
return "BIP-GMAC-128"; |
| 2322 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| 2323 |
return "BIP-GMAC-256"; |
| 2324 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| 2325 |
return "BIP-CMAC-256"; |
| 2326 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED: |
| 2327 |
return "GTK_NOT_USED"; |
| 2328 |
default: |
| 2329 |
return "UNKNOWN"; |
| 2330 |
} |
| 2331 |
} |
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 |
|
| 2334 |
/** |
| 2335 |
* wpa_key_mgmt_txt - Convert key management suite to a text string |
| 2336 |
* @key_mgmt: Key management suite (WPA_KEY_MGMT_* enum) |
| 2337 |
* @proto: WPA/WPA2 version (WPA_PROTO_*) |
| 2338 |
* Returns: Pointer to a text string of the key management suite name |
| 2339 |
*/ |
| 2340 |
const char * wpa_key_mgmt_txt(int key_mgmt, int proto) |
| 2341 |
{ |
| 2342 |
switch (key_mgmt) { |
| 2343 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X: |
| 2344 |
if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA)) |
| 2345 |
return "WPA2+WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP"; |
| 2346 |
return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| 2347 |
"WPA2/IEEE 802.1X/EAP" : "WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP"; |
| 2348 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK: |
| 2349 |
if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA)) |
| 2350 |
return "WPA2-PSK+WPA-PSK"; |
| 2351 |
return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| 2352 |
"WPA2-PSK" : "WPA-PSK"; |
| 2353 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_NONE: |
| 2354 |
return "NONE"; |
| 2355 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE: |
| 2356 |
return "WPA-NONE"; |
| 2357 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_NO_WPA: |
| 2358 |
return "IEEE 802.1X (no WPA)"; |
| 2359 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 2360 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| 2361 |
return "FT-EAP"; |
| 2362 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 2363 |
return "FT-EAP-SHA384"; |
| 2364 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| 2365 |
return "FT-PSK"; |
| 2366 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 2367 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256: |
| 2368 |
return "WPA2-EAP-SHA256"; |
| 2369 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256: |
| 2370 |
return "WPA2-PSK-SHA256"; |
| 2371 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPS: |
| 2372 |
return "WPS"; |
| 2373 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| 2374 |
return "SAE"; |
| 2375 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE: |
| 2376 |
return "FT-SAE"; |
| 2377 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN: |
| 2378 |
return "OSEN"; |
| 2379 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B: |
| 2380 |
return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B"; |
| 2381 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| 2382 |
return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B-192"; |
| 2383 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 2384 |
return "FILS-SHA256"; |
| 2385 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 2386 |
return "FILS-SHA384"; |
| 2387 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 2388 |
return "FT-FILS-SHA256"; |
| 2389 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 2390 |
return "FT-FILS-SHA384"; |
| 2391 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| 2392 |
return "OWE"; |
| 2393 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| 2394 |
return "DPP"; |
| 2395 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| 2396 |
return "PASN"; |
| 2397 |
default: |
| 2398 |
return "UNKNOWN"; |
| 2399 |
} |
| 2400 |
} |
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
|
| 2403 |
u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm) |
| 2404 |
{ |
| 2405 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384) |
| 2406 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384; |
| 2407 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X) |
| 2408 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X; |
| 2409 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK) |
| 2410 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK; |
| 2411 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256) |
| 2412 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256; |
| 2413 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X) |
| 2414 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X; |
| 2415 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256) |
| 2416 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256; |
| 2417 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK) |
| 2418 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X; |
| 2419 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_CCKM) |
| 2420 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_CCKM; |
| 2421 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) |
| 2422 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| 2423 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B) |
| 2424 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B; |
| 2425 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192) |
| 2426 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B_192; |
| 2427 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256) |
| 2428 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256; |
| 2429 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384) |
| 2430 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384; |
| 2431 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) |
| 2432 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256; |
| 2433 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) |
| 2434 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384; |
| 2435 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE) |
| 2436 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE; |
| 2437 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE) |
| 2438 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE; |
| 2439 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) |
| 2440 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| 2441 |
if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) |
| 2442 |
return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_DPP; |
| 2443 |
return 0; |
| 2444 |
} |
| 2445 |
|
| 2446 |
|
| 2447 |
int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc, |
| 2448 |
const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len, |
| 2449 |
const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len) |
| 2450 |
{ |
| 2451 |
if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL) |
| 2452 |
return -1; |
| 2453 |
|
| 2454 |
if (ie1len == ie2len && os_memcmp(ie1, ie2, ie1len) == 0) |
| 2455 |
return 0; /* identical IEs */ |
| 2456 |
|
| 2457 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 2458 |
if (ft_initial_assoc) { |
| 2459 |
struct wpa_ie_data ie1d, ie2d; |
| 2460 |
/* |
| 2461 |
* The PMKID-List in RSN IE is different between Beacon/Probe |
| 2462 |
* Response/(Re)Association Request frames and EAPOL-Key |
| 2463 |
* messages in FT initial mobility domain association. Allow |
| 2464 |
* for this, but verify that other parts of the RSN IEs are |
| 2465 |
* identical. |
| 2466 |
*/ |
| 2467 |
if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie1, ie1len, &ie1d) < 0 || |
| 2468 |
wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie2, ie2len, &ie2d) < 0) |
| 2469 |
return -1; |
| 2470 |
if (ie1d.proto == ie2d.proto && |
| 2471 |
ie1d.pairwise_cipher == ie2d.pairwise_cipher && |
| 2472 |
ie1d.group_cipher == ie2d.group_cipher && |
| 2473 |
ie1d.key_mgmt == ie2d.key_mgmt && |
| 2474 |
ie1d.capabilities == ie2d.capabilities && |
| 2475 |
ie1d.mgmt_group_cipher == ie2d.mgmt_group_cipher) |
| 2476 |
return 0; |
| 2477 |
} |
| 2478 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 2479 |
|
| 2480 |
return -1; |
| 2481 |
} |
| 2482 |
|
| 2483 |
|
| 2484 |
int wpa_insert_pmkid(u8 *ies, size_t *ies_len, const u8 *pmkid) |
| 2485 |
{ |
| 2486 |
u8 *start, *end, *rpos, *rend; |
| 2487 |
int added = 0; |
| 2488 |
|
| 2489 |
start = ies; |
| 2490 |
end = ies + *ies_len; |
| 2491 |
|
| 2492 |
while (start < end) { |
| 2493 |
if (*start == WLAN_EID_RSN) |
| 2494 |
break; |
| 2495 |
start += 2 + start[1]; |
| 2496 |
} |
| 2497 |
if (start >= end) { |
| 2498 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "RSN: Could not find RSNE in IEs data"); |
| 2499 |
return -1; |
| 2500 |
} |
| 2501 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: RSNE before modification", |
| 2502 |
start, 2 + start[1]); |
| 2503 |
|
| 2504 |
/* Find start of PMKID-Count */ |
| 2505 |
rpos = start + 2; |
| 2506 |
rend = rpos + start[1]; |
| 2507 |
|
| 2508 |
/* Skip Version and Group Data Cipher Suite */ |
| 2509 |
rpos += 2 + 4; |
| 2510 |
/* Skip Pairwise Cipher Suite Count and List */ |
| 2511 |
rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2512 |
/* Skip AKM Suite Count and List */ |
| 2513 |
rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2514 |
|
| 2515 |
if (rpos == rend) { |
| 2516 |
/* Add RSN Capabilities */ |
| 2517 |
os_memmove(rpos + 2, rpos, end - rpos); |
| 2518 |
*rpos++ = 0; |
| 2519 |
*rpos++ = 0; |
| 2520 |
added += 2; |
| 2521 |
start[1] += 2; |
| 2522 |
rend = rpos; |
| 2523 |
} else { |
| 2524 |
/* Skip RSN Capabilities */ |
| 2525 |
rpos += 2; |
| 2526 |
if (rpos > rend) { |
| 2527 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| 2528 |
"RSN: Could not parse RSNE in IEs data"); |
| 2529 |
return -1; |
| 2530 |
} |
| 2531 |
} |
| 2532 |
|
| 2533 |
if (rpos == rend) { |
| 2534 |
/* No PMKID-Count field included; add it */ |
| 2535 |
os_memmove(rpos + 2 + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos); |
| 2536 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1); |
| 2537 |
rpos += 2; |
| 2538 |
os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2539 |
added += 2 + PMKID_LEN; |
| 2540 |
start[1] += 2 + PMKID_LEN; |
| 2541 |
} else { |
| 2542 |
u16 num_pmkid; |
| 2543 |
|
| 2544 |
if (rend - rpos < 2) |
| 2545 |
return -1; |
| 2546 |
num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(rpos); |
| 2547 |
/* PMKID-Count was included; use it */ |
| 2548 |
if (num_pmkid != 0) { |
| 2549 |
u8 *after; |
| 2550 |
|
| 2551 |
if (num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN > rend - rpos - 2) |
| 2552 |
return -1; |
| 2553 |
/* |
| 2554 |
* PMKID may have been included in RSN IE in |
| 2555 |
* (Re)Association Request frame, so remove the old |
| 2556 |
* PMKID(s) first before adding the new one. |
| 2557 |
*/ |
| 2558 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 2559 |
"RSN: Remove %u old PMKID(s) from RSNE", |
| 2560 |
num_pmkid); |
| 2561 |
after = rpos + 2 + num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| 2562 |
os_memmove(rpos + 2, after, end - after); |
| 2563 |
start[1] -= num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| 2564 |
added -= num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| 2565 |
} |
| 2566 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1); |
| 2567 |
rpos += 2; |
| 2568 |
os_memmove(rpos + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos); |
| 2569 |
os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| 2570 |
added += PMKID_LEN; |
| 2571 |
start[1] += PMKID_LEN; |
| 2572 |
} |
| 2573 |
|
| 2574 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: RSNE after modification (PMKID inserted)", |
| 2575 |
start, 2 + start[1]); |
| 2576 |
|
| 2577 |
*ies_len += added; |
| 2578 |
|
| 2579 |
return 0; |
| 2580 |
} |
| 2581 |
|
| 2582 |
|
| 2583 |
int wpa_cipher_key_len(int cipher) |
| 2584 |
{ |
| 2585 |
switch (cipher) { |
| 2586 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| 2587 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| 2588 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| 2589 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| 2590 |
return 32; |
| 2591 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| 2592 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| 2593 |
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| 2594 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| 2595 |
return 16; |
| 2596 |
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| 2597 |
return 32; |
| 2598 |
} |
| 2599 |
|
| 2600 |
return 0; |
| 2601 |
} |
| 2602 |
|
| 2603 |
|
| 2604 |
int wpa_cipher_rsc_len(int cipher) |
| 2605 |
{ |
| 2606 |
switch (cipher) { |
| 2607 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| 2608 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| 2609 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| 2610 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| 2611 |
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| 2612 |
return 6; |
| 2613 |
} |
| 2614 |
|
| 2615 |
return 0; |
| 2616 |
} |
| 2617 |
|
| 2618 |
|
| 2619 |
enum wpa_alg wpa_cipher_to_alg(int cipher) |
| 2620 |
{ |
| 2621 |
switch (cipher) { |
| 2622 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| 2623 |
return WPA_ALG_CCMP_256; |
| 2624 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| 2625 |
return WPA_ALG_GCMP_256; |
| 2626 |
case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| 2627 |
return WPA_ALG_CCMP; |
| 2628 |
case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| 2629 |
return WPA_ALG_GCMP; |
| 2630 |
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| 2631 |
return WPA_ALG_TKIP; |
| 2632 |
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| 2633 |
return WPA_ALG_BIP_CMAC_128; |
| 2634 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| 2635 |
return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| 2636 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| 2637 |
return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| 2638 |
case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| 2639 |
return WPA_ALG_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| 2640 |
} |
| 2641 |
return WPA_ALG_NONE; |
| 2642 |
} |
| 2643 |
|
| 2644 |
|
| 2645 |
int wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(int cipher) |
| 2646 |
{ |
| 2647 |
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_TKIP |
| 2648 |
return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| 2649 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 || |
| 2650 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP || |
| 2651 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 2652 |
#else /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| 2653 |
return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| 2654 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 || |
| 2655 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP || |
| 2656 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP || |
| 2657 |
cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 2658 |
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| 2659 |
} |
| 2660 |
|
| 2661 |
|
| 2662 |
u32 wpa_cipher_to_suite(int proto, int cipher) |
| 2663 |
{ |
| 2664 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| 2665 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256; |
| 2666 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| 2667 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256; |
| 2668 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| 2669 |
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| 2670 |
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| 2671 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| 2672 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP; |
| 2673 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| 2674 |
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| 2675 |
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| 2676 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) |
| 2677 |
return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| 2678 |
RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| 2679 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) |
| 2680 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED; |
| 2681 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) |
| 2682 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC; |
| 2683 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128) |
| 2684 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| 2685 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256) |
| 2686 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| 2687 |
if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256) |
| 2688 |
return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| 2689 |
return 0; |
| 2690 |
} |
| 2691 |
|
| 2692 |
|
| 2693 |
int rsn_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers) |
| 2694 |
{ |
| 2695 |
u8 *pos = start; |
| 2696 |
|
| 2697 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) { |
| 2698 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256); |
| 2699 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2700 |
} |
| 2701 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) { |
| 2702 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256); |
| 2703 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2704 |
} |
| 2705 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| 2706 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| 2707 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2708 |
} |
| 2709 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) { |
| 2710 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP); |
| 2711 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2712 |
} |
| 2713 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| 2714 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| 2715 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2716 |
} |
| 2717 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| 2718 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| 2719 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2720 |
} |
| 2721 |
|
| 2722 |
return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2723 |
} |
| 2724 |
|
| 2725 |
|
| 2726 |
int wpa_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers) |
| 2727 |
{ |
| 2728 |
u8 *pos = start; |
| 2729 |
|
| 2730 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| 2731 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| 2732 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2733 |
} |
| 2734 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| 2735 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| 2736 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2737 |
} |
| 2738 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| 2739 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| 2740 |
pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2741 |
} |
| 2742 |
|
| 2743 |
return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 2744 |
} |
| 2745 |
|
| 2746 |
|
| 2747 |
int wpa_pick_pairwise_cipher(int ciphers, int none_allowed) |
| 2748 |
{ |
| 2749 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| 2750 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| 2751 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| 2752 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| 2753 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| 2754 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 2755 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| 2756 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 2757 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| 2758 |
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 2759 |
if (none_allowed && (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE)) |
| 2760 |
return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| 2761 |
return -1; |
| 2762 |
} |
| 2763 |
|
| 2764 |
|
| 2765 |
int wpa_pick_group_cipher(int ciphers) |
| 2766 |
{ |
| 2767 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| 2768 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| 2769 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| 2770 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| 2771 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| 2772 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 2773 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| 2774 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 2775 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) |
| 2776 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| 2777 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| 2778 |
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 2779 |
return -1; |
| 2780 |
} |
| 2781 |
|
| 2782 |
|
| 2783 |
int wpa_parse_cipher(const char *value) |
| 2784 |
{ |
| 2785 |
int val = 0, last; |
| 2786 |
char *start, *end, *buf; |
| 2787 |
|
| 2788 |
buf = os_strdup(value); |
| 2789 |
if (buf == NULL) |
| 2790 |
return -1; |
| 2791 |
start = buf; |
| 2792 |
|
| 2793 |
while (*start != '\0') { |
| 2794 |
while (*start == ' ' || *start == '\t') |
| 2795 |
start++; |
| 2796 |
if (*start == '\0') |
| 2797 |
break; |
| 2798 |
end = start; |
| 2799 |
while (*end != ' ' && *end != '\t' && *end != '\0') |
| 2800 |
end++; |
| 2801 |
last = *end == '\0'; |
| 2802 |
*end = '\0'; |
| 2803 |
if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP-256") == 0) |
| 2804 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| 2805 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP-256") == 0) |
| 2806 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| 2807 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP") == 0) |
| 2808 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 2809 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP") == 0) |
| 2810 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 2811 |
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_TKIP |
| 2812 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "TKIP") == 0) |
| 2813 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 2814 |
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| 2815 |
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP |
| 2816 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP104") == 0) |
| 2817 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP104; |
| 2818 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP40") == 0) |
| 2819 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP40; |
| 2820 |
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */ |
| 2821 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "NONE") == 0) |
| 2822 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| 2823 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "GTK_NOT_USED") == 0) |
| 2824 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| 2825 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "AES-128-CMAC") == 0) |
| 2826 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| 2827 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-GMAC-128") == 0) |
| 2828 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| 2829 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-GMAC-256") == 0) |
| 2830 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| 2831 |
else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-CMAC-256") == 0) |
| 2832 |
val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| 2833 |
else { |
| 2834 |
os_free(buf); |
| 2835 |
return -1; |
| 2836 |
} |
| 2837 |
|
| 2838 |
if (last) |
| 2839 |
break; |
| 2840 |
start = end + 1; |
| 2841 |
} |
| 2842 |
os_free(buf); |
| 2843 |
|
| 2844 |
return val; |
| 2845 |
} |
| 2846 |
|
| 2847 |
|
| 2848 |
int wpa_write_ciphers(char *start, char *end, int ciphers, const char *delim) |
| 2849 |
{ |
| 2850 |
char *pos = start; |
| 2851 |
int ret; |
| 2852 |
|
| 2853 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) { |
| 2854 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP-256", |
| 2855 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2856 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2857 |
return -1; |
| 2858 |
pos += ret; |
| 2859 |
} |
| 2860 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) { |
| 2861 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP-256", |
| 2862 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2863 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2864 |
return -1; |
| 2865 |
pos += ret; |
| 2866 |
} |
| 2867 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| 2868 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP", |
| 2869 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2870 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2871 |
return -1; |
| 2872 |
pos += ret; |
| 2873 |
} |
| 2874 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) { |
| 2875 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP", |
| 2876 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2877 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2878 |
return -1; |
| 2879 |
pos += ret; |
| 2880 |
} |
| 2881 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| 2882 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sTKIP", |
| 2883 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2884 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2885 |
return -1; |
| 2886 |
pos += ret; |
| 2887 |
} |
| 2888 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| 2889 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sAES-128-CMAC", |
| 2890 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2891 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2892 |
return -1; |
| 2893 |
pos += ret; |
| 2894 |
} |
| 2895 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128) { |
| 2896 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-GMAC-128", |
| 2897 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2898 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2899 |
return -1; |
| 2900 |
pos += ret; |
| 2901 |
} |
| 2902 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256) { |
| 2903 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-GMAC-256", |
| 2904 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2905 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2906 |
return -1; |
| 2907 |
pos += ret; |
| 2908 |
} |
| 2909 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256) { |
| 2910 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-CMAC-256", |
| 2911 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2912 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2913 |
return -1; |
| 2914 |
pos += ret; |
| 2915 |
} |
| 2916 |
if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| 2917 |
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sNONE", |
| 2918 |
pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| 2919 |
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| 2920 |
return -1; |
| 2921 |
pos += ret; |
| 2922 |
} |
| 2923 |
|
| 2924 |
return pos - start; |
| 2925 |
} |
| 2926 |
|
| 2927 |
|
| 2928 |
int wpa_select_ap_group_cipher(int wpa, int wpa_pairwise, int rsn_pairwise) |
| 2929 |
{ |
| 2930 |
int pairwise = 0; |
| 2931 |
|
| 2932 |
/* Select group cipher based on the enabled pairwise cipher suites */ |
| 2933 |
if (wpa & 1) |
| 2934 |
pairwise |= wpa_pairwise; |
| 2935 |
if (wpa & 2) |
| 2936 |
pairwise |= rsn_pairwise; |
| 2937 |
|
| 2938 |
if (pairwise & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| 2939 |
return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| 2940 |
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| 2941 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| 2942 |
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | |
| 2943 |
WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| 2944 |
return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| 2945 |
if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | |
| 2946 |
WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| 2947 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| 2948 |
return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| 2949 |
} |
| 2950 |
|
| 2951 |
|
| 2952 |
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| 2953 |
int fils_domain_name_hash(const char *domain, u8 *hash) |
| 2954 |
{ |
| 2955 |
char buf[255], *wpos = buf; |
| 2956 |
const char *pos = domain; |
| 2957 |
size_t len; |
| 2958 |
const u8 *addr[1]; |
| 2959 |
u8 mac[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| 2960 |
|
| 2961 |
for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf) && *pos; len++) { |
| 2962 |
if (isalpha(*pos) && isupper(*pos)) |
| 2963 |
*wpos++ = tolower(*pos); |
| 2964 |
else |
| 2965 |
*wpos++ = *pos; |
| 2966 |
pos++; |
| 2967 |
} |
| 2968 |
|
| 2969 |
addr[0] = (const u8 *) buf; |
| 2970 |
if (sha256_vector(1, addr, &len, mac) < 0) |
| 2971 |
return -1; |
| 2972 |
os_memcpy(hash, mac, 2); |
| 2973 |
return 0; |
| 2974 |
} |
| 2975 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 2976 |
|
| 2977 |
|
| 2978 |
/** |
| 2979 |
* wpa_parse_vendor_specific - Parse Vendor Specific IEs |
| 2980 |
* @pos: Pointer to the IE header |
| 2981 |
* @end: Pointer to the end of the Key Data buffer |
| 2982 |
* @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| 2983 |
*/ |
| 2984 |
static void wpa_parse_vendor_specific(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end, |
| 2985 |
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| 2986 |
{ |
| 2987 |
unsigned int oui; |
| 2988 |
|
| 2989 |
if (pos[1] < 4) { |
| 2990 |
wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, |
| 2991 |
"Too short vendor specific IE ignored (len=%u)", |
| 2992 |
pos[1]); |
| 2993 |
return; |
| 2994 |
} |
| 2995 |
|
| 2996 |
oui = WPA_GET_BE24(&pos[2]); |
| 2997 |
if (oui == OUI_MICROSOFT && pos[5] == WMM_OUI_TYPE && pos[1] > 4) { |
| 2998 |
if (pos[6] == WMM_OUI_SUBTYPE_INFORMATION_ELEMENT) { |
| 2999 |
ie->wmm = &pos[2]; |
| 3000 |
ie->wmm_len = pos[1]; |
| 3001 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WMM IE", |
| 3002 |
ie->wmm, ie->wmm_len); |
| 3003 |
} else if (pos[6] == WMM_OUI_SUBTYPE_PARAMETER_ELEMENT) { |
| 3004 |
ie->wmm = &pos[2]; |
| 3005 |
ie->wmm_len = pos[1]; |
| 3006 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WMM Parameter Element", |
| 3007 |
ie->wmm, ie->wmm_len); |
| 3008 |
} |
| 3009 |
} |
| 3010 |
} |
| 3011 |
|
| 3012 |
|
| 3013 |
/** |
| 3014 |
* wpa_parse_generic - Parse EAPOL-Key Key Data Generic IEs |
| 3015 |
* @pos: Pointer to the IE header |
| 3016 |
* @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| 3017 |
* Returns: 0 on success, 1 if end mark is found, 2 if KDE is not recognized |
| 3018 |
*/ |
| 3019 |
static int wpa_parse_generic(const u8 *pos, struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| 3020 |
{ |
| 3021 |
if (pos[1] == 0) |
| 3022 |
return 1; |
| 3023 |
|
| 3024 |
if (pos[1] >= 6 && |
| 3025 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == WPA_OUI_TYPE && |
| 3026 |
pos[2 + WPA_SELECTOR_LEN] == 1 && |
| 3027 |
pos[2 + WPA_SELECTOR_LEN + 1] == 0) { |
| 3028 |
ie->wpa_ie = pos; |
| 3029 |
ie->wpa_ie_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3030 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WPA IE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3031 |
ie->wpa_ie, ie->wpa_ie_len); |
| 3032 |
return 0; |
| 3033 |
} |
| 3034 |
|
| 3035 |
if (pos[1] >= 4 && WPA_GET_BE32(pos + 2) == OSEN_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) { |
| 3036 |
ie->osen = pos; |
| 3037 |
ie->osen_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3038 |
return 0; |
| 3039 |
} |
| 3040 |
|
| 3041 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN && |
| 3042 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID) { |
| 3043 |
ie->pmkid = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3044 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMKID in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3045 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3046 |
return 0; |
| 3047 |
} |
| 3048 |
|
| 3049 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3050 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID) { |
| 3051 |
ie->key_id = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3052 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KeyID in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3053 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3054 |
return 0; |
| 3055 |
} |
| 3056 |
|
| 3057 |
if (pos[1] > RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3058 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY) { |
| 3059 |
ie->gtk = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3060 |
ie->gtk_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3061 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: GTK in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3062 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3063 |
return 0; |
| 3064 |
} |
| 3065 |
|
| 3066 |
if (pos[1] > RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3067 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_MAC_ADDR) { |
| 3068 |
ie->mac_addr = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3069 |
ie->mac_addr_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3070 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: MAC Address in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3071 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3072 |
return 0; |
| 3073 |
} |
| 3074 |
|
| 3075 |
if (pos[1] > RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3076 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK) { |
| 3077 |
ie->igtk = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3078 |
ie->igtk_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3079 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3080 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3081 |
return 0; |
| 3082 |
} |
| 3083 |
|
| 3084 |
if (pos[1] > RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3085 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_BIGTK) { |
| 3086 |
ie->bigtk = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3087 |
ie->bigtk_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3088 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: BIGTK in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3089 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3090 |
return 0; |
| 3091 |
} |
| 3092 |
|
| 3093 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 && |
| 3094 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_REQ) { |
| 3095 |
ie->ip_addr_req = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3096 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IP Address Request in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3097 |
ie->ip_addr_req, pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN); |
| 3098 |
return 0; |
| 3099 |
} |
| 3100 |
|
| 3101 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 3 * 4 && |
| 3102 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC) { |
| 3103 |
ie->ip_addr_alloc = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3104 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3105 |
"WPA: IP Address Allocation in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3106 |
ie->ip_addr_alloc, pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN); |
| 3107 |
return 0; |
| 3108 |
} |
| 3109 |
|
| 3110 |
if (pos[1] > RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3111 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == RSN_KEY_DATA_OCI) { |
| 3112 |
ie->oci = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3113 |
ie->oci_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3114 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: OCI KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3115 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3116 |
return 0; |
| 3117 |
} |
| 3118 |
|
| 3119 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 1 && |
| 3120 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE) { |
| 3121 |
ie->transition_disable = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3122 |
ie->transition_disable_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3123 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3124 |
"WPA: Transition Disable KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3125 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3126 |
return 0; |
| 3127 |
} |
| 3128 |
|
| 3129 |
if (pos[1] >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 && |
| 3130 |
RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos + 2) == WFA_KEY_DATA_DPP) { |
| 3131 |
ie->dpp_kde = pos + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3132 |
ie->dpp_kde_len = pos[1] - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3133 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: DPP KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3134 |
pos, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3135 |
return 0; |
| 3136 |
} |
| 3137 |
|
| 3138 |
return 2; |
| 3139 |
} |
| 3140 |
|
| 3141 |
|
| 3142 |
/** |
| 3143 |
* wpa_parse_kde_ies - Parse EAPOL-Key Key Data IEs |
| 3144 |
* @buf: Pointer to the Key Data buffer |
| 3145 |
* @len: Key Data Length |
| 3146 |
* @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| 3147 |
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| 3148 |
*/ |
| 3149 |
int wpa_parse_kde_ies(const u8 *buf, size_t len, struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| 3150 |
{ |
| 3151 |
const u8 *pos, *end; |
| 3152 |
int ret = 0; |
| 3153 |
|
| 3154 |
os_memset(ie, 0, sizeof(*ie)); |
| 3155 |
for (pos = buf, end = pos + len; end - pos > 1; pos += 2 + pos[1]) { |
| 3156 |
if (pos[0] == 0xdd && |
| 3157 |
((pos == buf + len - 1) || pos[1] == 0)) { |
| 3158 |
/* Ignore padding */ |
| 3159 |
break; |
| 3160 |
} |
| 3161 |
if (2 + pos[1] > end - pos) { |
| 3162 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3163 |
"WPA: EAPOL-Key Key Data underflow (ie=%d len=%d pos=%d)", |
| 3164 |
pos[0], pos[1], (int) (pos - buf)); |
| 3165 |
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Key Data", buf, len); |
| 3166 |
ret = -1; |
| 3167 |
break; |
| 3168 |
} |
| 3169 |
if (*pos == WLAN_EID_RSN) { |
| 3170 |
ie->rsn_ie = pos; |
| 3171 |
ie->rsn_ie_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3172 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: RSN IE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3173 |
ie->rsn_ie, ie->rsn_ie_len); |
| 3174 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_RSNX) { |
| 3175 |
ie->rsnxe = pos; |
| 3176 |
ie->rsnxe_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3177 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: RSNXE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3178 |
ie->rsnxe, ie->rsnxe_len); |
| 3179 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN) { |
| 3180 |
ie->mdie = pos; |
| 3181 |
ie->mdie_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3182 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: MDIE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3183 |
ie->mdie, ie->mdie_len); |
| 3184 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION) { |
| 3185 |
ie->ftie = pos; |
| 3186 |
ie->ftie_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3187 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: FTIE in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3188 |
ie->ftie, ie->ftie_len); |
| 3189 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL && pos[1] >= 5) { |
| 3190 |
if (pos[2] == WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE) { |
| 3191 |
ie->reassoc_deadline = pos; |
| 3192 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reassoc Deadline " |
| 3193 |
"in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3194 |
ie->reassoc_deadline, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3195 |
} else if (pos[2] == WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME) { |
| 3196 |
ie->key_lifetime = pos; |
| 3197 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KeyLifetime " |
| 3198 |
"in EAPOL-Key", |
| 3199 |
ie->key_lifetime, pos[1] + 2); |
| 3200 |
} else { |
| 3201 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Unrecognized " |
| 3202 |
"EAPOL-Key Key Data IE", |
| 3203 |
pos, 2 + pos[1]); |
| 3204 |
} |
| 3205 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_LINK_ID) { |
| 3206 |
if (pos[1] >= 18) { |
| 3207 |
ie->lnkid = pos; |
| 3208 |
ie->lnkid_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3209 |
} |
| 3210 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXT_CAPAB) { |
| 3211 |
ie->ext_capab = pos; |
| 3212 |
ie->ext_capab_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3213 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES) { |
| 3214 |
ie->supp_rates = pos; |
| 3215 |
ie->supp_rates_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3216 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES) { |
| 3217 |
ie->ext_supp_rates = pos; |
| 3218 |
ie->ext_supp_rates_len = pos[1] + 2; |
| 3219 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_HT_CAP && |
| 3220 |
pos[1] >= sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities)) { |
| 3221 |
ie->ht_capabilities = pos + 2; |
| 3222 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_VHT_AID) { |
| 3223 |
if (pos[1] >= 2) |
| 3224 |
ie->aid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos + 2) & 0x3fff; |
| 3225 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_VHT_CAP && |
| 3226 |
pos[1] >= sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities)) |
| 3227 |
{ |
| 3228 |
ie->vht_capabilities = pos + 2; |
| 3229 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| 3230 |
pos[1] >= 1 + IEEE80211_HE_CAPAB_MIN_LEN && |
| 3231 |
pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_CAPABILITIES) { |
| 3232 |
ie->he_capabilities = pos + 3; |
| 3233 |
ie->he_capab_len = pos[1] - 1; |
| 3234 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| 3235 |
pos[1] >= 1 + |
| 3236 |
sizeof(struct ieee80211_he_6ghz_band_cap) && |
| 3237 |
pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_6GHZ_BAND_CAP) { |
| 3238 |
ie->he_6ghz_capabilities = pos + 3; |
| 3239 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_QOS && pos[1] >= 1) { |
| 3240 |
ie->qosinfo = pos[2]; |
| 3241 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPPORTED_CHANNELS) { |
| 3242 |
ie->supp_channels = pos + 2; |
| 3243 |
ie->supp_channels_len = pos[1]; |
| 3244 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPPORTED_OPERATING_CLASSES) { |
| 3245 |
/* |
| 3246 |
* The value of the Length field of the Supported |
| 3247 |
* Operating Classes element is between 2 and 253. |
| 3248 |
* Silently skip invalid elements to avoid interop |
| 3249 |
* issues when trying to use the value. |
| 3250 |
*/ |
| 3251 |
if (pos[1] >= 2 && pos[1] <= 253) { |
| 3252 |
ie->supp_oper_classes = pos + 2; |
| 3253 |
ie->supp_oper_classes_len = pos[1]; |
| 3254 |
} |
| 3255 |
} else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) { |
| 3256 |
ret = wpa_parse_generic(pos, ie); |
| 3257 |
if (ret == 1) { |
| 3258 |
/* end mark found */ |
| 3259 |
ret = 0; |
| 3260 |
break; |
| 3261 |
} |
| 3262 |
|
| 3263 |
if (ret == 2) { |
| 3264 |
/* not a known KDE */ |
| 3265 |
wpa_parse_vendor_specific(pos, end, ie); |
| 3266 |
} |
| 3267 |
|
| 3268 |
ret = 0; |
| 3269 |
} else { |
| 3270 |
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3271 |
"WPA: Unrecognized EAPOL-Key Key Data IE", |
| 3272 |
pos, 2 + pos[1]); |
| 3273 |
} |
| 3274 |
} |
| 3275 |
|
| 3276 |
return ret; |
| 3277 |
} |
| 3278 |
|
| 3279 |
|
| 3280 |
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| 3281 |
|
| 3282 |
/* |
| 3283 |
* wpa_pasn_build_auth_header - Add the MAC header and initialize Authentication |
| 3284 |
* frame for PASN |
| 3285 |
* |
| 3286 |
* @buf: Buffer in which the header will be added |
| 3287 |
* @bssid: The BSSID of the AP |
| 3288 |
* @src: Source address |
| 3289 |
* @dst: Destination address |
| 3290 |
* @trans_seq: Authentication transaction sequence number |
| 3291 |
* @status: Authentication status |
| 3292 |
*/ |
| 3293 |
void wpa_pasn_build_auth_header(struct wpabuf *buf, const u8 *bssid, |
| 3294 |
const u8 *src, const u8 *dst, |
| 3295 |
u8 trans_seq, u16 status) |
| 3296 |
{ |
| 3297 |
struct ieee80211_mgmt *auth; |
| 3298 |
|
| 3299 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add authentication header. trans_seq=%u", |
| 3300 |
trans_seq); |
| 3301 |
|
| 3302 |
auth = wpabuf_put(buf, offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, |
| 3303 |
u.auth.variable)); |
| 3304 |
|
| 3305 |
auth->frame_control = host_to_le16((WLAN_FC_TYPE_MGMT << 2) | |
| 3306 |
(WLAN_FC_STYPE_AUTH << 4)); |
| 3307 |
|
| 3308 |
os_memcpy(auth->da, dst, ETH_ALEN); |
| 3309 |
os_memcpy(auth->sa, src, ETH_ALEN); |
| 3310 |
os_memcpy(auth->bssid, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| 3311 |
auth->seq_ctrl = 0; |
| 3312 |
|
| 3313 |
auth->u.auth.auth_alg = host_to_le16(WLAN_AUTH_PASN); |
| 3314 |
auth->u.auth.auth_transaction = host_to_le16(trans_seq); |
| 3315 |
auth->u.auth.status_code = host_to_le16(status); |
| 3316 |
} |
| 3317 |
|
| 3318 |
|
| 3319 |
/* |
| 3320 |
* wpa_pasn_add_rsne - Add an RSNE for PASN authentication |
| 3321 |
* @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| 3322 |
* @pmkid: Optional PMKID. Can be NULL. |
| 3323 |
* @akmp: Authentication and key management protocol |
| 3324 |
* @cipher: The cipher suite |
| 3325 |
*/ |
| 3326 |
int wpa_pasn_add_rsne(struct wpabuf *buf, const u8 *pmkid, int akmp, int cipher) |
| 3327 |
{ |
| 3328 |
struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| 3329 |
u32 suite; |
| 3330 |
u16 capab; |
| 3331 |
u8 *pos; |
| 3332 |
u8 rsne_len; |
| 3333 |
|
| 3334 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add RSNE"); |
| 3335 |
|
| 3336 |
rsne_len = sizeof(*hdr) + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + |
| 3337 |
2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + |
| 3338 |
2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + (pmkid ? PMKID_LEN : 0); |
| 3339 |
|
| 3340 |
if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < rsne_len) |
| 3341 |
return -1; |
| 3342 |
hdr = wpabuf_put(buf, rsne_len); |
| 3343 |
hdr->elem_id = WLAN_EID_RSN; |
| 3344 |
hdr->len = rsne_len - 2; |
| 3345 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(hdr->version, RSN_VERSION); |
| 3346 |
pos = (u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| 3347 |
|
| 3348 |
/* Group addressed data is not allowed */ |
| 3349 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED); |
| 3350 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3351 |
|
| 3352 |
/* Add the pairwise cipher */ |
| 3353 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| 3354 |
pos += 2; |
| 3355 |
suite = wpa_cipher_to_suite(WPA_PROTO_RSN, cipher); |
| 3356 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, suite); |
| 3357 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3358 |
|
| 3359 |
/* Add the AKM suite */ |
| 3360 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| 3361 |
pos += 2; |
| 3362 |
|
| 3363 |
switch (akmp) { |
| 3364 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| 3365 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PASN); |
| 3366 |
break; |
| 3367 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| 3368 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| 3369 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE); |
| 3370 |
break; |
| 3371 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| 3372 |
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| 3373 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 3374 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256); |
| 3375 |
break; |
| 3376 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 3377 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384); |
| 3378 |
break; |
| 3379 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 3380 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 3381 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| 3382 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK); |
| 3383 |
break; |
| 3384 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| 3385 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X); |
| 3386 |
break; |
| 3387 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 3388 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384); |
| 3389 |
break; |
| 3390 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 3391 |
default: |
| 3392 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: Invalid AKMP=0x%x", akmp); |
| 3393 |
return -1; |
| 3394 |
} |
| 3395 |
pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| 3396 |
|
| 3397 |
/* RSN Capabilities: PASN mandates both MFP capable and required */ |
| 3398 |
capab = WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPC | WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPR; |
| 3399 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, capab); |
| 3400 |
pos += 2; |
| 3401 |
|
| 3402 |
if (pmkid) { |
| 3403 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Adding PMKID"); |
| 3404 |
|
| 3405 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| 3406 |
pos += 2; |
| 3407 |
os_memcpy(pos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| 3408 |
pos += PMKID_LEN; |
| 3409 |
} else { |
| 3410 |
WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 0); |
| 3411 |
pos += 2; |
| 3412 |
} |
| 3413 |
|
| 3414 |
/* Group addressed management is not allowed */ |
| 3415 |
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED); |
| 3416 |
|
| 3417 |
return 0; |
| 3418 |
} |
| 3419 |
|
| 3420 |
|
| 3421 |
/* |
| 3422 |
* wpa_pasn_add_parameter_ie - Add PASN Parameters IE for PASN authentication |
| 3423 |
* @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| 3424 |
* @pasn_group: Finite Cyclic Group ID for PASN authentication |
| 3425 |
* @wrapped_data_format: Format of the data in the Wrapped Data IE |
| 3426 |
* @pubkey: A buffer holding the local public key. Can be NULL |
| 3427 |
* @compressed: In case pubkey is included, indicates if the public key is |
| 3428 |
* compressed (only x coordinate is included) or not (both x and y |
| 3429 |
* coordinates are included) |
| 3430 |
* @comeback: A buffer holding the comeback token. Can be NULL |
| 3431 |
* @after: If comeback is set, defined the comeback time in seconds. -1 to not |
| 3432 |
* include the Comeback After field (frames from non-AP STA). |
| 3433 |
*/ |
| 3434 |
void wpa_pasn_add_parameter_ie(struct wpabuf *buf, u16 pasn_group, |
| 3435 |
u8 wrapped_data_format, |
| 3436 |
const struct wpabuf *pubkey, bool compressed, |
| 3437 |
const struct wpabuf *comeback, int after) |
| 3438 |
{ |
| 3439 |
struct pasn_parameter_ie *params; |
| 3440 |
|
| 3441 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add PASN Parameters element"); |
| 3442 |
|
| 3443 |
params = wpabuf_put(buf, sizeof(*params)); |
| 3444 |
|
| 3445 |
params->id = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION; |
| 3446 |
params->len = sizeof(*params) - 2; |
| 3447 |
params->id_ext = WLAN_EID_EXT_PASN_PARAMS; |
| 3448 |
params->control = 0; |
| 3449 |
params->wrapped_data_format = wrapped_data_format; |
| 3450 |
|
| 3451 |
if (comeback) { |
| 3452 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Adding comeback data"); |
| 3453 |
|
| 3454 |
/* |
| 3455 |
* 2 octets for the 'after' field + 1 octet for the length + |
| 3456 |
* actual cookie data |
| 3457 |
*/ |
| 3458 |
if (after >= 0) |
| 3459 |
params->len += 2; |
| 3460 |
params->len += 1 + wpabuf_len(comeback); |
| 3461 |
params->control |= WPA_PASN_CTRL_COMEBACK_INFO_PRESENT; |
| 3462 |
|
| 3463 |
if (after >= 0) |
| 3464 |
wpabuf_put_le16(buf, after); |
| 3465 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, wpabuf_len(comeback)); |
| 3466 |
wpabuf_put_buf(buf, comeback); |
| 3467 |
} |
| 3468 |
|
| 3469 |
if (pubkey) { |
| 3470 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3471 |
"PASN: Adding public key and group ID %u", |
| 3472 |
pasn_group); |
| 3473 |
|
| 3474 |
/* |
| 3475 |
* 2 octets for the finite cyclic group + 2 octets public key |
| 3476 |
* length + 1 octet for the compressed/uncompressed indication + |
| 3477 |
* the actual key. |
| 3478 |
*/ |
| 3479 |
params->len += 2 + 1 + 1 + wpabuf_len(pubkey); |
| 3480 |
params->control |= WPA_PASN_CTRL_GROUP_AND_KEY_PRESENT; |
| 3481 |
|
| 3482 |
wpabuf_put_le16(buf, pasn_group); |
| 3483 |
|
| 3484 |
/* |
| 3485 |
* The first octet indicates whether the public key is |
| 3486 |
* compressed, as defined in RFC 5480 section 2.2. |
| 3487 |
*/ |
| 3488 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, wpabuf_len(pubkey) + 1); |
| 3489 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, compressed ? WPA_PASN_PUBKEY_COMPRESSED_0 : |
| 3490 |
WPA_PASN_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED); |
| 3491 |
|
| 3492 |
wpabuf_put_buf(buf, pubkey); |
| 3493 |
} |
| 3494 |
} |
| 3495 |
|
| 3496 |
/* |
| 3497 |
* wpa_pasn_add_wrapped_data - Add a Wrapped Data IE to PASN Authentication |
| 3498 |
* frame. If needed, the Wrapped Data IE would be fragmented. |
| 3499 |
* |
| 3500 |
* @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| 3501 |
* @wrapped_data_buf: Buffer holding the wrapped data |
| 3502 |
*/ |
| 3503 |
int wpa_pasn_add_wrapped_data(struct wpabuf *buf, |
| 3504 |
struct wpabuf *wrapped_data_buf) |
| 3505 |
{ |
| 3506 |
const u8 *data; |
| 3507 |
size_t data_len; |
| 3508 |
u8 len; |
| 3509 |
|
| 3510 |
if (!wrapped_data_buf) |
| 3511 |
return 0; |
| 3512 |
|
| 3513 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add wrapped data"); |
| 3514 |
|
| 3515 |
data = wpabuf_head_u8(wrapped_data_buf); |
| 3516 |
data_len = wpabuf_len(wrapped_data_buf); |
| 3517 |
|
| 3518 |
/* nothing to add */ |
| 3519 |
if (!data_len) |
| 3520 |
return 0; |
| 3521 |
|
| 3522 |
if (data_len <= 254) |
| 3523 |
len = 1 + data_len; |
| 3524 |
else |
| 3525 |
len = 255; |
| 3526 |
|
| 3527 |
if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 3 + data_len) |
| 3528 |
return -1; |
| 3529 |
|
| 3530 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| 3531 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, len); |
| 3532 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_WRAPPED_DATA); |
| 3533 |
wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len - 1); |
| 3534 |
|
| 3535 |
data += len - 1; |
| 3536 |
data_len -= len - 1; |
| 3537 |
|
| 3538 |
while (data_len) { |
| 3539 |
if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 1 + data_len) |
| 3540 |
return -1; |
| 3541 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_FRAGMENT); |
| 3542 |
len = data_len > 255 ? 255 : data_len; |
| 3543 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, len); |
| 3544 |
wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len); |
| 3545 |
data += len; |
| 3546 |
data_len -= len; |
| 3547 |
} |
| 3548 |
|
| 3549 |
return 0; |
| 3550 |
} |
| 3551 |
|
| 3552 |
|
| 3553 |
/* |
| 3554 |
* wpa_pasn_validate_rsne - Validate PSAN specific data of RSNE |
| 3555 |
* @data: Parsed representation of an RSNE |
| 3556 |
* Returns -1 for invalid data; otherwise 0 |
| 3557 |
*/ |
| 3558 |
int wpa_pasn_validate_rsne(const struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| 3559 |
{ |
| 3560 |
u16 capab = WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPC | WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPR; |
| 3561 |
|
| 3562 |
if (data->proto != WPA_PROTO_RSN) |
| 3563 |
return -1; |
| 3564 |
|
| 3565 |
if ((data->capabilities & capab) != capab) { |
| 3566 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid RSNE capabilities"); |
| 3567 |
return -1; |
| 3568 |
} |
| 3569 |
|
| 3570 |
if (!data->has_group || data->group_cipher != WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) { |
| 3571 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid group data cipher"); |
| 3572 |
return -1; |
| 3573 |
} |
| 3574 |
|
| 3575 |
if (!data->has_pairwise || !data->pairwise_cipher || |
| 3576 |
(data->pairwise_cipher & (data->pairwise_cipher - 1))) { |
| 3577 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: No valid pairwise suite"); |
| 3578 |
return -1; |
| 3579 |
} |
| 3580 |
|
| 3581 |
switch (data->key_mgmt) { |
| 3582 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| 3583 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| 3584 |
/* fall through */ |
| 3585 |
#endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| 3586 |
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| 3587 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| 3588 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| 3589 |
/* fall through */ |
| 3590 |
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| 3591 |
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| 3592 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| 3593 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| 3594 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| 3595 |
/* fall through */ |
| 3596 |
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| 3597 |
case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| 3598 |
break; |
| 3599 |
default: |
| 3600 |
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid key_mgmt: 0x%0x", |
| 3601 |
data->key_mgmt); |
| 3602 |
return -1; |
| 3603 |
} |
| 3604 |
|
| 3605 |
if (data->mgmt_group_cipher != WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) { |
| 3606 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid group mgmt cipher"); |
| 3607 |
return -1; |
| 3608 |
} |
| 3609 |
|
| 3610 |
if (data->num_pmkid > 1) { |
| 3611 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid number of PMKIDs"); |
| 3612 |
return -1; |
| 3613 |
} |
| 3614 |
|
| 3615 |
return 0; |
| 3616 |
} |
| 3617 |
|
| 3618 |
|
| 3619 |
/* |
| 3620 |
* wpa_pasn_parse_parameter_ie - Validates PASN Parameters IE |
| 3621 |
* @data: Pointer to the PASN Parameters IE (starting with the EID). |
| 3622 |
* @len: Length of the data in the PASN Parameters IE |
| 3623 |
* @from_ap: Whether this was received from an AP |
| 3624 |
* @pasn_params: On successful return would hold the parsed PASN parameters. |
| 3625 |
* Returns: -1 for invalid data; otherwise 0 |
| 3626 |
* |
| 3627 |
* Note: On successful return, the pointers in &pasn_params point to the data in |
| 3628 |
* the IE and are not locally allocated (so they should not be freed etc.). |
| 3629 |
*/ |
| 3630 |
int wpa_pasn_parse_parameter_ie(const u8 *data, u8 len, bool from_ap, |
| 3631 |
struct wpa_pasn_params_data *pasn_params) |
| 3632 |
{ |
| 3633 |
struct pasn_parameter_ie *params = (struct pasn_parameter_ie *) data; |
| 3634 |
const u8 *pos = (const u8 *) (params + 1); |
| 3635 |
|
| 3636 |
if (!pasn_params) { |
| 3637 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid params"); |
| 3638 |
return -1; |
| 3639 |
} |
| 3640 |
|
| 3641 |
if (!params || ((size_t) (params->len + 2) < sizeof(*params)) || |
| 3642 |
len < sizeof(*params) || params->len + 2 != len) { |
| 3643 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3644 |
"PASN: Invalid parameters IE. len=(%u, %u)", |
| 3645 |
params ? params->len : 0, len); |
| 3646 |
return -1; |
| 3647 |
} |
| 3648 |
|
| 3649 |
os_memset(pasn_params, 0, sizeof(*pasn_params)); |
| 3650 |
|
| 3651 |
switch (params->wrapped_data_format) { |
| 3652 |
case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_NO: |
| 3653 |
case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_SAE: |
| 3654 |
case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_FILS_SK: |
| 3655 |
case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_FT: |
| 3656 |
break; |
| 3657 |
default: |
| 3658 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid wrapped data format"); |
| 3659 |
return -1; |
| 3660 |
} |
| 3661 |
|
| 3662 |
pasn_params->wrapped_data_format = params->wrapped_data_format; |
| 3663 |
|
| 3664 |
len -= sizeof(*params); |
| 3665 |
|
| 3666 |
if (params->control & WPA_PASN_CTRL_COMEBACK_INFO_PRESENT) { |
| 3667 |
if (from_ap) { |
| 3668 |
if (len < 2) { |
| 3669 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3670 |
"PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: Truncated Comeback After"); |
| 3671 |
return -1; |
| 3672 |
} |
| 3673 |
pasn_params->after = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 3674 |
pos += 2; |
| 3675 |
len -= 2; |
| 3676 |
} |
| 3677 |
|
| 3678 |
if (len < 1 || len < 1 + *pos) { |
| 3679 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3680 |
"PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: comeback len"); |
| 3681 |
return -1; |
| 3682 |
} |
| 3683 |
|
| 3684 |
pasn_params->comeback_len = *pos++; |
| 3685 |
len--; |
| 3686 |
pasn_params->comeback = pos; |
| 3687 |
len -= pasn_params->comeback_len; |
| 3688 |
pos += pasn_params->comeback_len; |
| 3689 |
} |
| 3690 |
|
| 3691 |
if (params->control & WPA_PASN_CTRL_GROUP_AND_KEY_PRESENT) { |
| 3692 |
if (len < 3 || len < 3 + pos[2]) { |
| 3693 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3694 |
"PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: group and key"); |
| 3695 |
return -1; |
| 3696 |
} |
| 3697 |
|
| 3698 |
pasn_params->group = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| 3699 |
pos += 2; |
| 3700 |
len -= 2; |
| 3701 |
pasn_params->pubkey_len = *pos++; |
| 3702 |
len--; |
| 3703 |
pasn_params->pubkey = pos; |
| 3704 |
len -= pasn_params->pubkey_len; |
| 3705 |
pos += pasn_params->pubkey_len; |
| 3706 |
} |
| 3707 |
|
| 3708 |
if (len) { |
| 3709 |
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| 3710 |
"PASN: Invalid Parameters IE. Bytes left=%u", len); |
| 3711 |
return -1; |
| 3712 |
} |
| 3713 |
|
| 3714 |
return 0; |
| 3715 |
} |
| 3716 |
|
| 3717 |
|
| 3718 |
void wpa_pasn_add_rsnxe(struct wpabuf *buf, u16 capab) |
| 3719 |
{ |
| 3720 |
size_t flen; |
| 3721 |
|
| 3722 |
flen = (capab & 0xff00) ? 2 : 1; |
| 3723 |
if (!capab) |
| 3724 |
return; /* no supported extended RSN capabilities */ |
| 3725 |
if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 2 + flen) |
| 3726 |
return; |
| 3727 |
capab |= flen - 1; /* bit 0-3 = Field length (n - 1) */ |
| 3728 |
|
| 3729 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_RSNX); |
| 3730 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, flen); |
| 3731 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, capab & 0x00ff); |
| 3732 |
capab >>= 8; |
| 3733 |
if (capab) |
| 3734 |
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, capab); |
| 3735 |
} |
| 3736 |
|
| 3737 |
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |