| 1 |
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| 2 |
|
| 3 |
#include "sd-messages.h" |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
#include "alloc-util.h" |
| 6 |
#include "conf-files.h" |
| 7 |
#include "constants.h" |
| 8 |
#include "dns-answer.h" |
| 9 |
#include "dns-domain.h" |
| 10 |
#include "dns-rr.h" |
| 11 |
#include "extract-word.h" |
| 12 |
#include "fd-util.h" |
| 13 |
#include "fileio.h" |
| 14 |
#include "hexdecoct.h" |
| 15 |
#include "log.h" |
| 16 |
#include "nulstr-util.h" |
| 17 |
#include "parse-util.h" |
| 18 |
#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" |
| 19 |
#include "resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h" |
| 20 |
#include "set.h" |
| 21 |
#include "string-util.h" |
| 22 |
#include "strv.h" |
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
DEFINE_PRIVATE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR( |
| 25 |
dns_answer_hash_ops_by_key, |
| 26 |
DnsResourceKey, |
| 27 |
dns_resource_key_hash_func, |
| 28 |
dns_resource_key_compare_func, |
| 29 |
DnsAnswer, |
| 30 |
dns_answer_unref); |
| 31 |
|
| 32 |
static const char trust_anchor_dirs[] = CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("dnssec-trust-anchors.d"); |
| 33 |
|
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/* The second DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml, retrieved February 2017 */ |
| 35 |
static const uint8_t root_digest2[] = |
| 36 |
{ 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x8F, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0x0B, 0x0D, 0x7C, 0x65, 0xD0, 0x84, |
| 37 |
0x58, 0xE8, 0x80, 0x40, 0x9B, 0xBC, 0x68, 0x34, 0x57, 0x10, 0x42, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0xEC, 0x8D }; |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
static const uint8_t root_digest3[] = |
| 40 |
{ 0x68, 0x3D, 0x2D, 0x0A, 0xCB, 0x8C, 0x9B, 0x71, 0x2A, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x12, 0x19, |
| 41 |
0x29, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0x45, 0x0D, 0x61, 0x2C, 0x48, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0x44, 0xA4, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x2B, 0x16 }; |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
static bool dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) { |
| 44 |
assert(d); |
| 45 |
|
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/* Returns true if there's an entry for the specified domain |
| 47 |
* name in our trust anchor */ |
| 48 |
|
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return |
| 50 |
hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, name)) || |
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hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name)); |
| 52 |
} |
| 53 |
|
| 54 |
static int add_root_ksk( |
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DnsAnswer *answer, |
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DnsResourceKey *key, |
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uint16_t key_tag, |
| 58 |
uint8_t algorithm, |
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uint8_t digest_type, |
| 60 |
const void *digest, |
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size_t digest_size) { |
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|
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL; |
| 64 |
int r; |
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|
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rr = dns_resource_record_new(key); |
| 67 |
if (!rr) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
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|
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rr->ds.key_tag = key_tag; |
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rr->ds.algorithm = algorithm; |
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rr->ds.digest_type = digest_type; |
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rr->ds.digest_size = digest_size; |
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rr->ds.digest = memdup(digest, rr->ds.digest_size); |
| 75 |
if (!rr->ds.digest) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
| 77 |
|
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r = dns_answer_add(answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, NULL); |
| 79 |
if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 81 |
|
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return 0; |
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} |
| 84 |
|
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static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { |
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_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; |
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_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *key = NULL; |
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int r; |
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|
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assert(d); |
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|
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/* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's neither a DS nor a DNSKEY defined for the root domain. That |
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* way users have an easy way to override the root domain DS/DNSKEY data. */ |
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if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, ".")) |
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return 0; |
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|
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key = dns_resource_key_new(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, ""); |
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if (!key) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
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|
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answer = dns_answer_new(2); |
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if (!answer) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
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|
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/* Add the currently valid RRs from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml */ |
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r = add_root_ksk(answer, key, 20326, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256, root_digest2, sizeof(root_digest2)); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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r = add_root_ksk(answer, key, 38696, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256, root_digest3, sizeof(root_digest3)); |
| 110 |
if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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|
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r = hashmap_ensure_put(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_answer_hash_ops_by_key, key, answer); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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|
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TAKE_PTR(answer); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { |
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|
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static const char private_domains[] = |
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/* RFC 6761 says that .test is a special domain for |
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* testing and not to be installed in the root zone */ |
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"test\0" |
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|
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/* RFC 6761 says that these reverse IP lookup ranges |
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* are for private addresses, and hence should not |
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* show up in the root zone */ |
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"10.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"16.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"17.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"18.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"19.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"20.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"21.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"22.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"23.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"24.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"25.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"26.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"27.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"28.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"29.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"30.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"31.172.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"168.192.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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|
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/* The same, but for IPv6. */ |
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"d.f.ip6.arpa\0" |
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|
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/* RFC 6762 reserves the .local domain for Multicast |
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* DNS, it hence cannot appear in the root zone. (Note |
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* that we by default do not route .local traffic to |
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* DNS anyway, except when a configured search domain |
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* suggests so.) */ |
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"local\0" |
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|
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/* These two are well known, popular private zone |
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* TLDs, that are blocked from delegation, according |
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* to: |
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* http://icannwiki.com/Name_Collision#NGPC_Resolution |
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* |
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* There's also ongoing work on making this official |
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* in an RRC: |
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* https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-chapin-additional-reserved-tlds-02.txt */ |
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"home\0" |
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"corp\0" |
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|
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/* The following four TLDs are suggested for private |
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* zones in RFC 6762, Appendix G, and are hence very |
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* unlikely to be made official TLDs any day soon */ |
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"lan\0" |
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"intranet\0" |
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"internal\0" |
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"private\0" |
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|
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/* Defined by RFC 8375. The most official choice. */ |
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"home.arpa\0" |
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|
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/* RFC 9462 doesn't mention DNSSEC, but this domain |
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* can't really be signed and clients need to validate |
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* the answer before using it anyway. */ |
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"resolver.arpa\0" |
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|
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/* RFC 8880 says because the 'ipv4only.arpa' zone has to |
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* be an insecure delegation, DNSSEC cannot be used to |
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* protect these answers from tampering by malicious |
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* devices on the path */ |
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"ipv4only.arpa\0" |
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"170.0.0.192.in-addr.arpa\0" |
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"171.0.0.192.in-addr.arpa\0"; |
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|
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int r; |
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|
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assert(d); |
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|
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/* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's no negative |
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* trust anchor defined at all. This enables easy overriding |
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* of negative trust anchors. */ |
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|
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if (!set_isempty(d->negative_by_name)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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/* We add a couple of domains as default negative trust |
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* anchors, where it's very unlikely they will be installed in |
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* the root zone. If they exist they must be private, and thus |
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* unsigned. */ |
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|
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NULSTR_FOREACH(name, private_domains) { |
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if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, name)) |
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continue; |
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|
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r = set_put_strdup_full(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops_free, name); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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} |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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static int dns_trust_anchor_load_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) { |
| 224 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL; |
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_cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL, *class = NULL, *type = NULL; |
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_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; |
| 227 |
DnsAnswer *old_answer = NULL; |
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const char *p = s; |
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int r; |
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|
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assert(d); |
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assert(line); |
| 233 |
|
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r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse domain in line %s:%u: %m", path, line); |
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|
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r = dns_name_is_valid(domain); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to check validity of domain name '%s', at line %s:%u, ignoring line: %m", domain, path, line); |
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if (r == 0) { |
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log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line); |
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return -EINVAL; |
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} |
| 245 |
|
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r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &class, &type); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse class and type in line %s:%u: %m", path, line); |
| 249 |
if (r != 2) { |
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log_warning("Missing class or type in line %s:%u", path, line); |
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return -EINVAL; |
| 252 |
} |
| 253 |
|
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if (!strcaseeq(class, "IN")) { |
| 255 |
log_warning("RR class %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", class, path, line); |
| 256 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 257 |
} |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
if (strcaseeq(type, "DS")) { |
| 260 |
_cleanup_free_ char *key_tag = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *digest_type = NULL; |
| 261 |
_cleanup_free_ void *dd = NULL; |
| 262 |
uint16_t kt; |
| 263 |
int a, dt; |
| 264 |
size_t l; |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &key_tag, &algorithm, &digest_type); |
| 267 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 268 |
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line); |
| 269 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 270 |
} |
| 271 |
if (r != 3) { |
| 272 |
log_warning("Missing DS parameters on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 273 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 274 |
} |
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
r = safe_atou16(key_tag, &kt); |
| 277 |
if (r < 0) |
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return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS key tag %s on line %s:%u: %m", key_tag, path, line); |
| 279 |
|
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a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm); |
| 281 |
if (a < 0) { |
| 282 |
log_warning("Failed to parse DS algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line); |
| 283 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 284 |
} |
| 285 |
|
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dt = dnssec_digest_from_string(digest_type); |
| 287 |
if (dt < 0) { |
| 288 |
log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest type %s on line %s:%u", digest_type, path, line); |
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return -EINVAL; |
| 290 |
} |
| 291 |
|
| 292 |
if (isempty(p)) { |
| 293 |
log_warning("Missing DS digest on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 294 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 295 |
} |
| 296 |
|
| 297 |
r = unhexmem(p, &dd, &l); |
| 298 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 299 |
log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest %s on line %s:%u", p, path, line); |
| 300 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
|
| 303 |
rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, domain); |
| 304 |
if (!rr) |
| 305 |
return log_oom(); |
| 306 |
|
| 307 |
rr->ds.key_tag = kt; |
| 308 |
rr->ds.algorithm = a; |
| 309 |
rr->ds.digest_type = dt; |
| 310 |
rr->ds.digest_size = l; |
| 311 |
rr->ds.digest = TAKE_PTR(dd); |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
} else if (strcaseeq(type, "DNSKEY")) { |
| 314 |
_cleanup_free_ char *flags = NULL, *protocol = NULL, *algorithm = NULL; |
| 315 |
_cleanup_free_ void *k = NULL; |
| 316 |
uint16_t f; |
| 317 |
size_t l; |
| 318 |
int a; |
| 319 |
|
| 320 |
r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &flags, &protocol, &algorithm); |
| 321 |
if (r < 0) |
| 322 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line); |
| 323 |
if (r != 3) { |
| 324 |
log_warning("Missing DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 325 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 326 |
} |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
if (!streq(protocol, "3")) { |
| 329 |
log_warning("DNSKEY Protocol is not 3 on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 330 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 331 |
} |
| 332 |
|
| 333 |
r = safe_atou16(flags, &f); |
| 334 |
if (r < 0) |
| 335 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY flags field %s on line %s:%u", flags, path, line); |
| 336 |
if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) { |
| 337 |
log_warning("DNSKEY lacks zone key bit set on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 338 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 339 |
} |
| 340 |
if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) { |
| 341 |
log_warning("DNSKEY is already revoked on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 342 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 343 |
} |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm); |
| 346 |
if (a < 0) { |
| 347 |
log_warning("Failed to parse DNSKEY algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line); |
| 348 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 349 |
} |
| 350 |
|
| 351 |
if (isempty(p)) { |
| 352 |
log_warning("Missing DNSKEY key on line %s:%u", path, line); |
| 353 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
r = unbase64mem(p, &k, &l); |
| 357 |
if (r < 0) |
| 358 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY key data %s on line %s:%u", p, path, line); |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, domain); |
| 361 |
if (!rr) |
| 362 |
return log_oom(); |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
rr->dnskey.flags = f; |
| 365 |
rr->dnskey.protocol = 3; |
| 366 |
rr->dnskey.algorithm = a; |
| 367 |
rr->dnskey.key_size = l; |
| 368 |
rr->dnskey.key = TAKE_PTR(k); |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
} else { |
| 371 |
log_warning("RR type %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", type, path, line); |
| 372 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 373 |
} |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_answer_hash_ops_by_key); |
| 376 |
if (r < 0) |
| 377 |
return log_oom(); |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key); |
| 380 |
answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer); |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
r = dns_answer_add_extend(&answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, NULL); |
| 383 |
if (r < 0) |
| 384 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add trust anchor RR: %m"); |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, rr->key, answer); |
| 387 |
if (r < 0) |
| 388 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add answer to trust anchor: %m"); |
| 389 |
|
| 390 |
old_answer = dns_answer_unref(old_answer); |
| 391 |
TAKE_PTR(answer); |
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
return 0; |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_load_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) { |
| 397 |
_cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL; |
| 398 |
const char *p = s; |
| 399 |
int r; |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
assert(d); |
| 402 |
assert(line); |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); |
| 405 |
if (r < 0) |
| 406 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse line %s:%u: %m", path, line); |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
r = dns_name_is_valid(domain); |
| 409 |
if (r < 0) |
| 410 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to check validity of domain name '%s', at line %s:%u, ignoring line: %m", domain, path, line); |
| 411 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 412 |
log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line); |
| 413 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 414 |
} |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
if (!isempty(p)) { |
| 417 |
log_warning("Trailing garbage at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line); |
| 418 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
r = set_ensure_consume(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops_free, TAKE_PTR(domain)); |
| 422 |
if (r < 0) |
| 423 |
return log_oom(); |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
return 0; |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_load_files( |
| 429 |
DnsTrustAnchor *d, |
| 430 |
const char *suffix, |
| 431 |
int (*loader)(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned n, const char *line)) { |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL; |
| 434 |
int r; |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
assert(d); |
| 437 |
assert(suffix); |
| 438 |
assert(loader); |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
r = conf_files_list_nulstr(&files, suffix, /* root= */ NULL, CONF_FILES_WARN, trust_anchor_dirs); |
| 441 |
if (r < 0) |
| 442 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate %s trust anchor files: %m", suffix); |
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
STRV_FOREACH(f, files) { |
| 445 |
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *g = NULL; |
| 446 |
unsigned n = 0; |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
g = fopen(*f, "re"); |
| 449 |
if (!g) { |
| 450 |
if (errno == ENOENT) |
| 451 |
continue; |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '%s', ignoring: %m", *f); |
| 454 |
continue; |
| 455 |
} |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
for (;;) { |
| 458 |
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
r = read_stripped_line(g, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line); |
| 461 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 462 |
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read '%s', ignoring: %m", *f); |
| 463 |
break; |
| 464 |
} |
| 465 |
if (r == 0) |
| 466 |
break; |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
n++; |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
if (isempty(line)) |
| 471 |
continue; |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
if (*line == ';') |
| 474 |
continue; |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
(void) loader(d, *f, n, line); |
| 477 |
} |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
return 0; |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_dump(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { |
| 484 |
DnsAnswer *a; |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
assert(d); |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
if (hashmap_isempty(d->positive_by_key)) |
| 489 |
log_info("No positive trust anchors defined."); |
| 490 |
else { |
| 491 |
log_info("Positive Trust Anchors:"); |
| 492 |
HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, d->positive_by_key) { |
| 493 |
DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) |
| 496 |
log_info("%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)); |
| 497 |
} |
| 498 |
} |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
if (set_isempty(d->negative_by_name)) |
| 501 |
log_info("No negative trust anchors defined."); |
| 502 |
else { |
| 503 |
_cleanup_free_ char **l = NULL, *j = NULL; |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
if (set_dump_sorted(d->negative_by_name, (void***) &l, /* ret_n= */ NULL) < 0) |
| 506 |
return log_oom(); |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
j = strv_join(l, " "); |
| 509 |
if (!j) |
| 510 |
return log_oom(); |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
log_info("Negative trust anchors: %s", j); |
| 513 |
} |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
return 0; |
| 516 |
} |
| 517 |
|
| 518 |
int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { |
| 519 |
int r; |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
assert(d); |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
/* If loading things from disk fails, we don't consider this fatal */ |
| 524 |
(void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".positive", dns_trust_anchor_load_positive); |
| 525 |
(void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".negative", dns_trust_anchor_load_negative); |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
/* However, if the built-in DS fails, then we have a problem. */ |
| 528 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(d); |
| 529 |
if (r < 0) |
| 530 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in positive trust anchor: %m"); |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(d); |
| 533 |
if (r < 0) |
| 534 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in negative trust anchor: %m"); |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
dns_trust_anchor_dump(d); |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
return 0; |
| 539 |
} |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
void dns_trust_anchor_flush(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { |
| 542 |
assert(d); |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
d->positive_by_key = hashmap_free(d->positive_by_key); |
| 545 |
d->revoked_by_rr = set_free(d->revoked_by_rr); |
| 546 |
d->negative_by_name = set_free(d->negative_by_name); |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **ret) { |
| 550 |
DnsAnswer *a; |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
assert(d); |
| 553 |
assert(key); |
| 554 |
assert(ret); |
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
/* We only serve DS and DNSKEY RRs. */ |
| 557 |
if (!IN_SET(key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY)) |
| 558 |
return 0; |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, key); |
| 561 |
if (!a) |
| 562 |
return 0; |
| 563 |
|
| 564 |
*ret = dns_answer_ref(a); |
| 565 |
return 1; |
| 566 |
} |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) { |
| 569 |
int r; |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
assert(d); |
| 572 |
assert(name); |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
for (;;) { |
| 575 |
/* If the domain is listed as-is in the NTA database, then that counts */ |
| 576 |
if (set_contains(d->negative_by_name, name)) |
| 577 |
return true; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
/* If the domain isn't listed as NTA, but is listed as positive trust anchor, then that counts. See RFC |
| 580 |
* 7646, section 1.1 */ |
| 581 |
if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name))) |
| 582 |
return false; |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, name))) |
| 585 |
return false; |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
/* And now, let's look at the parent, and check that too */ |
| 588 |
r = dns_name_parent(&name); |
| 589 |
if (r < 0) |
| 590 |
return r; |
| 591 |
if (r == 0) |
| 592 |
break; |
| 593 |
} |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
return false; |
| 596 |
} |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 599 |
int r; |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
assert(d); |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
r = set_ensure_put(&d->revoked_by_rr, &dns_resource_record_hash_ops, rr); |
| 604 |
if (r < 0) |
| 605 |
return r; |
| 606 |
if (r > 0) |
| 607 |
dns_resource_record_ref(rr); |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
return r; |
| 610 |
} |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 613 |
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *new_answer = NULL; |
| 614 |
DnsAnswer *old_answer; |
| 615 |
DnsAnswerItem *item; |
| 616 |
int r; |
| 617 |
|
| 618 |
/* Remember that this is a revoked trust anchor RR */ |
| 619 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(d, rr); |
| 620 |
if (r < 0) |
| 621 |
return r; |
| 622 |
|
| 623 |
/* Remove this from the positive trust anchor */ |
| 624 |
old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key); |
| 625 |
if (!old_answer) |
| 626 |
return 0; |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
new_answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer); |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
r = dns_answer_remove_by_rr(&new_answer, rr); |
| 631 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 632 |
return r; |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
/* We found the key! Warn the user */ |
| 635 |
log_struct(LOG_WARNING, |
| 636 |
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_DNSSEC_TRUST_ANCHOR_REVOKED_STR), |
| 637 |
LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC trust anchor %s has been revoked.\n" |
| 638 |
"Please update the trust anchor, or upgrade your operating system.", |
| 639 |
strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr))), |
| 640 |
LOG_ITEM("TRUST_ANCHOR=%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr))); |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
if (dns_answer_size(new_answer) <= 0) { |
| 643 |
assert_se(hashmap_remove(d->positive_by_key, rr->key) == old_answer); |
| 644 |
dns_answer_unref(old_answer); |
| 645 |
return 1; |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
item = ordered_set_first(new_answer->items); |
| 649 |
r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, item->rr->key, new_answer); |
| 650 |
if (r < 0) |
| 651 |
return r; |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
TAKE_PTR(new_answer); |
| 654 |
dns_answer_unref(old_answer); |
| 655 |
return 1; |
| 656 |
} |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
static int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *revoked_dnskey) { |
| 659 |
DnsAnswer *a; |
| 660 |
int r; |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
assert(d); |
| 663 |
assert(revoked_dnskey); |
| 664 |
assert(revoked_dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); |
| 665 |
assert(revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); |
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, revoked_dnskey->key); |
| 668 |
if (a) { |
| 669 |
DnsResourceRecord *anchor; |
| 670 |
|
| 671 |
/* First, look for the precise DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */ |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) { |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
if (anchor->dnskey.protocol != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.protocol) |
| 676 |
continue; |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
if (anchor->dnskey.algorithm != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.algorithm) |
| 679 |
continue; |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
if (anchor->dnskey.key_size != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key_size) |
| 682 |
continue; |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
/* Note that we allow the REVOKE bit to be |
| 685 |
* different! It will be set in the revoked |
| 686 |
* key, but unset in our version of it */ |
| 687 |
if (((anchor->dnskey.flags ^ revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags) | DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) != DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) |
| 688 |
continue; |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
if (memcmp(anchor->dnskey.key, revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key, anchor->dnskey.key_size) != 0) |
| 691 |
continue; |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor); |
| 694 |
break; |
| 695 |
} |
| 696 |
} |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(revoked_dnskey->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(revoked_dnskey->key))); |
| 699 |
if (a) { |
| 700 |
DnsResourceRecord *anchor; |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
/* Second, look for DS RRs matching this DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */ |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) { |
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
/* We set mask_revoke to true here, since our |
| 707 |
* DS fingerprint will be the one of the |
| 708 |
* unrevoked DNSKEY, but the one we got passed |
| 709 |
* here has the bit set. */ |
| 710 |
r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(revoked_dnskey, anchor, true); |
| 711 |
if (r < 0) |
| 712 |
return r; |
| 713 |
if (r == 0) |
| 714 |
continue; |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor); |
| 717 |
break; |
| 718 |
} |
| 719 |
} |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
return 0; |
| 722 |
} |
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *rrs) { |
| 725 |
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
| 726 |
int r; |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
assert(d); |
| 729 |
assert(dnskey); |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
/* Looks if "dnskey" is a self-signed RR that has been revoked |
| 732 |
* and matches one of our trust anchor entries. If so, removes |
| 733 |
* it from the trust anchor and returns > 0. */ |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) |
| 736 |
return 0; |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
/* Is this DNSKEY revoked? */ |
| 739 |
if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) == 0) |
| 740 |
return 0; |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
/* Could this be interesting to us at all? If not, |
| 743 |
* there's no point in looking for and verifying a |
| 744 |
* self-signed RRSIG. */ |
| 745 |
if (!dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key))) |
| 746 |
return 0; |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
/* Look for a self-signed RRSIG in the other rrs belonging to this DNSKEY */ |
| 749 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, rrs) { |
| 750 |
DnssecResult result; |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) |
| 753 |
continue; |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, true); |
| 756 |
if (r < 0) |
| 757 |
return r; |
| 758 |
if (r == 0) |
| 759 |
continue; |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
r = dnssec_verify_rrset(rrs, dnskey->key, rrsig, dnskey, USEC_INFINITY, &result); |
| 762 |
if (r < 0) |
| 763 |
return r; |
| 764 |
if (result != DNSSEC_VALIDATED) |
| 765 |
continue; |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
/* Bingo! This is a revoked self-signed DNSKEY. Let's |
| 768 |
* see if this precise one exists in our trust anchor |
| 769 |
* database, too. */ |
| 770 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(d, dnskey); |
| 771 |
if (r < 0) |
| 772 |
return r; |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
return 1; |
| 775 |
} |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
return 0; |
| 778 |
} |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
int dns_trust_anchor_is_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 781 |
assert(d); |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
if (!IN_SET(rr->key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY)) |
| 784 |
return 0; |
| 785 |
|
| 786 |
return set_contains(d->revoked_by_rr, rr); |
| 787 |
} |