| 1 |
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
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|
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#include "sd-event.h" |
| 4 |
#include "sd-messages.h" |
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
#include "af-list.h" |
| 7 |
#include "alloc-util.h" |
| 8 |
#include "dns-answer.h" |
| 9 |
#include "dns-domain.h" |
| 10 |
#include "dns-packet.h" |
| 11 |
#include "dns-question.h" |
| 12 |
#include "dns-rr.h" |
| 13 |
#include "errno-list.h" |
| 14 |
#include "errno-util.h" |
| 15 |
#include "fd-util.h" |
| 16 |
#include "glyph-util.h" |
| 17 |
#include "log.h" |
| 18 |
#include "random-util.h" |
| 19 |
#include "resolved-dns-cache.h" |
| 20 |
#include "resolved-dns-query.h" |
| 21 |
#include "resolved-dns-scope.h" |
| 22 |
#include "resolved-dns-server.h" |
| 23 |
#include "resolved-dns-stream.h" |
| 24 |
#include "resolved-dns-transaction.h" |
| 25 |
#include "resolved-dnstls.h" |
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#include "resolved-link.h" |
| 27 |
#include "resolved-llmnr.h" |
| 28 |
#include "resolved-manager.h" |
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#include "resolved-socket-graveyard.h" |
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#include "resolved-timeouts.h" |
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#include "set.h" |
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#include "string-table.h" |
| 33 |
#include "string-util.h" |
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|
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#define TRANSACTIONS_MAX 4096 |
| 36 |
|
| 37 |
static void dns_transaction_reset_answer(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 38 |
assert(t); |
| 39 |
|
| 40 |
t->received = dns_packet_unref(t->received); |
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t->answer = dns_answer_unref(t->answer); |
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t->answer_rcode = 0; |
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t->answer_ede_rcode = _DNS_EDE_RCODE_INVALID; |
| 44 |
t->answer_ede_msg = mfree(t->answer_ede_msg); |
| 45 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID; |
| 46 |
t->answer_source = _DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_INVALID; |
| 47 |
t->answer_query_flags = 0; |
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t->answer_nsec_ttl = UINT32_MAX; |
| 49 |
t->answer_errno = 0; |
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} |
| 51 |
|
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static void dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(DnsTransaction *t) { |
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DnsTransaction *z; |
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|
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assert(t); |
| 56 |
|
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while ((z = set_steal_first(t->dnssec_transactions))) { |
| 58 |
set_remove(z->notify_transactions, t); |
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set_remove(z->notify_transactions_done, t); |
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dns_transaction_gc(z); |
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} |
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} |
| 63 |
|
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static void dns_transaction_close_connection( |
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DnsTransaction *t, |
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bool use_graveyard) { /* Set use_graveyard = false when you know the connection is already |
| 67 |
* dead, for example because you got a connection error back from the |
| 68 |
* kernel. In that case there's no point in keeping the fd around, |
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* hence don't. */ |
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int r; |
| 71 |
|
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assert(t); |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
if (t->stream) { |
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/* Let's detach the stream from our transaction, in case something else keeps a reference to it. */ |
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LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_stream, t->stream->transactions, t); |
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|
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/* Remove packet in case it's still in the queue */ |
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dns_packet_unref(ordered_set_remove(t->stream->write_queue, t->sent)); |
| 80 |
|
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t->stream = dns_stream_unref(t->stream); |
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} |
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
t->dns_udp_event_source = sd_event_source_disable_unref(t->dns_udp_event_source); |
| 85 |
|
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/* If we have a UDP socket where we sent a packet, but never received one, then add it to the socket |
| 87 |
* graveyard, instead of closing it right away. That way it will stick around for a moment longer, |
| 88 |
* and the reply we might still get from the server will be eaten up instead of resulting in an ICMP |
| 89 |
* port unreachable error message. */ |
| 90 |
|
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/* Skip the graveyard stuff when we're shutting down, since that requires running event loop. |
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* Note that this is also called from dns_transaction_free(). In that case, scope may be NULL. */ |
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if (!t->scope || |
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!t->scope->manager || |
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!t->scope->manager->event || |
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sd_event_get_state(t->scope->manager->event) == SD_EVENT_FINISHED) |
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use_graveyard = false; |
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|
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if (use_graveyard && t->dns_udp_fd >= 0 && t->sent && !t->received) { |
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r = manager_add_socket_to_graveyard(t->scope->manager, t->dns_udp_fd); |
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if (r < 0) |
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log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add UDP socket to graveyard, closing immediately: %m"); |
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else |
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TAKE_FD(t->dns_udp_fd); |
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} |
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|
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t->dns_udp_fd = safe_close(t->dns_udp_fd); |
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} |
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|
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static void dns_transaction_stop_timeout(DnsTransaction *t) { |
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assert(t); |
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|
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t->timeout_event_source = sd_event_source_disable_unref(t->timeout_event_source); |
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} |
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|
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DnsTransaction* dns_transaction_free(DnsTransaction *t) { |
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DnsQueryCandidate *c; |
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DnsZoneItem *i; |
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DnsTransaction *z; |
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|
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if (!t) |
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return NULL; |
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|
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log_debug("Freeing transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id); |
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|
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dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
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dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t); |
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|
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dns_packet_unref(t->sent); |
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dns_transaction_reset_answer(t); |
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|
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dns_server_unref(t->server); |
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|
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if (t->scope) { |
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if (t->key) { |
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DnsTransaction *first; |
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|
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first = hashmap_get(t->scope->transactions_by_key, t->key); |
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LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_key, first, t); |
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if (first) |
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hashmap_replace(t->scope->transactions_by_key, first->key, first); |
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else |
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hashmap_remove(t->scope->transactions_by_key, t->key); |
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} |
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|
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LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_scope, t->scope->transactions, t); |
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|
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if (t->id != 0) |
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hashmap_remove(t->scope->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id)); |
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} |
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|
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while ((c = set_steal_first(t->notify_query_candidates))) |
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set_remove(c->transactions, t); |
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set_free(t->notify_query_candidates); |
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|
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while ((c = set_steal_first(t->notify_query_candidates_done))) |
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set_remove(c->transactions, t); |
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set_free(t->notify_query_candidates_done); |
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|
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while ((i = set_steal_first(t->notify_zone_items))) |
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i->probe_transaction = NULL; |
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set_free(t->notify_zone_items); |
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|
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while ((i = set_steal_first(t->notify_zone_items_done))) |
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i->probe_transaction = NULL; |
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set_free(t->notify_zone_items_done); |
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|
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while ((z = set_steal_first(t->notify_transactions))) |
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set_remove(z->dnssec_transactions, t); |
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set_free(t->notify_transactions); |
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|
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while ((z = set_steal_first(t->notify_transactions_done))) |
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set_remove(z->dnssec_transactions, t); |
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set_free(t->notify_transactions_done); |
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|
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dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(t); |
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set_free(t->dnssec_transactions); |
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|
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dns_answer_unref(t->validated_keys); |
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dns_resource_key_unref(t->key); |
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dns_packet_unref(t->bypass); |
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|
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return mfree(t); |
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} |
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|
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DnsTransaction*, dns_transaction_free); |
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|
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DnsTransaction* dns_transaction_gc(DnsTransaction *t) { |
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assert(t); |
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|
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/* Returns !NULL if we can't gc yet. */ |
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|
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if (t->block_gc > 0) |
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return t; |
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|
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if (t->wait_for_answer && IN_SET(t->state, DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING, DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING)) |
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return t; |
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|
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if (set_isempty(t->notify_query_candidates) && |
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set_isempty(t->notify_query_candidates_done) && |
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set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items) && |
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set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items_done) && |
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set_isempty(t->notify_transactions) && |
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set_isempty(t->notify_transactions_done)) |
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return dns_transaction_free(t); |
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|
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return t; |
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} |
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|
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static uint16_t pick_new_id(Manager *m) { |
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uint16_t new_id; |
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|
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/* Find a fresh, unused transaction id. Note that this loop is bounded because there's a limit on the |
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* number of transactions, and it's much lower than the space of IDs. */ |
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|
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assert_cc(TRANSACTIONS_MAX < 0xFFFF); |
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|
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do |
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random_bytes(&new_id, sizeof(new_id)); |
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while (new_id == 0 || |
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hashmap_get(m->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(new_id))); |
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|
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return new_id; |
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} |
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|
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static int key_ok( |
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DnsScope *scope, |
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DnsResourceKey *key) { |
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|
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/* Don't allow looking up invalid or pseudo RRs */ |
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if (!dns_type_is_valid_query(key->type)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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if (dns_type_is_obsolete(key->type)) |
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return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
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|
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/* We only support the IN class */ |
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if (!IN_SET(key->class, DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_CLASS_ANY)) |
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return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
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|
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/* Don't allows DNSSEC RRs to be looked up via LLMNR/mDNS. They don't really make sense |
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* there, and it speeds up our queries if we refuse this early */ |
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if (scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && |
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dns_type_is_dnssec(key->type)) |
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return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 245 |
|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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int dns_transaction_new( |
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DnsTransaction **ret, |
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DnsScope *s, |
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DnsResourceKey *key, |
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DnsPacket *bypass, |
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uint64_t query_flags) { |
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|
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_cleanup_(dns_transaction_freep) DnsTransaction *t = NULL; |
| 257 |
int r; |
| 258 |
|
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assert(ret); |
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assert(s); |
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|
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if (key) { |
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assert(!bypass); |
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|
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r = key_ok(s, key); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 268 |
} else { |
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DnsResourceKey *qk; |
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assert(bypass); |
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|
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r = dns_packet_validate_query(bypass); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 275 |
|
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DNS_QUESTION_FOREACH(qk, bypass->question) { |
| 277 |
r = key_ok(s, qk); |
| 278 |
if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 280 |
} |
| 281 |
} |
| 282 |
|
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if (hashmap_size(s->manager->dns_transactions) >= TRANSACTIONS_MAX) |
| 284 |
return -EBUSY; |
| 285 |
|
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r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&s->manager->dns_transactions, NULL); |
| 287 |
if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 289 |
|
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if (key) { |
| 291 |
r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&s->transactions_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops); |
| 292 |
if (r < 0) |
| 293 |
return r; |
| 294 |
} |
| 295 |
|
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t = new(DnsTransaction, 1); |
| 297 |
if (!t) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
| 299 |
|
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*t = (DnsTransaction) { |
| 301 |
.dns_udp_fd = -EBADF, |
| 302 |
.answer_source = _DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_INVALID, |
| 303 |
.answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID, |
| 304 |
.answer_ede_rcode = _DNS_EDE_RCODE_INVALID, |
| 305 |
.answer_nsec_ttl = UINT32_MAX, |
| 306 |
.key = dns_resource_key_ref(key), |
| 307 |
.query_flags = query_flags, |
| 308 |
.bypass = dns_packet_ref(bypass), |
| 309 |
.current_feature_level = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID, |
| 310 |
.clamp_feature_level_servfail = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID, |
| 311 |
.id = pick_new_id(s->manager), |
| 312 |
}; |
| 313 |
|
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r = hashmap_put(s->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id), t); |
| 315 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 316 |
t->id = 0; |
| 317 |
return r; |
| 318 |
} |
| 319 |
|
| 320 |
if (t->key) { |
| 321 |
DnsTransaction *first; |
| 322 |
|
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first = hashmap_get(s->transactions_by_key, t->key); |
| 324 |
LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_key, first, t); |
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
r = hashmap_replace(s->transactions_by_key, first->key, first); |
| 327 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 328 |
LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_key, first, t); |
| 329 |
return r; |
| 330 |
} |
| 331 |
} |
| 332 |
|
| 333 |
LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_scope, s->transactions, t); |
| 334 |
t->scope = s; |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
s->manager->n_transactions_total++; |
| 337 |
|
| 338 |
if (ret) |
| 339 |
*ret = t; |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
TAKE_PTR(t); |
| 342 |
return 0; |
| 343 |
} |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
static void dns_transaction_shuffle_id(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 346 |
uint16_t new_id; |
| 347 |
assert(t); |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
/* Pick a new ID for this transaction. */ |
| 350 |
|
| 351 |
new_id = pick_new_id(t->scope->manager); |
| 352 |
assert_se(hashmap_remove_and_put(t->scope->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id), UINT_TO_PTR(new_id), t) >= 0); |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
log_debug("Transaction %" PRIu16 " is now %" PRIu16 ".", t->id, new_id); |
| 355 |
t->id = new_id; |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
/* Make sure we generate a new packet with the new ID */ |
| 358 |
t->sent = dns_packet_unref(t->sent); |
| 359 |
} |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
static void dns_transaction_tentative(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket *p) { |
| 362 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 363 |
DnsZoneItem *z; |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
assert(t); |
| 366 |
assert(p); |
| 367 |
assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR); |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
if (manager_packet_from_local_address(t->scope->manager, p) != 0) |
| 370 |
return; |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
log_debug("Transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> on scope %s on %s/%s got tentative packet from %s.", |
| 373 |
t->id, |
| 374 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str), |
| 375 |
dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol), |
| 376 |
t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*", |
| 377 |
af_to_name_short(t->scope->family), |
| 378 |
IN_ADDR_TO_STRING(p->family, &p->sender)); |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
/* RFC 4795, Section 4.1 says that the peer with the |
| 381 |
* lexicographically smaller IP address loses */ |
| 382 |
if (memcmp(&p->sender, &p->destination, FAMILY_ADDRESS_SIZE(p->family)) >= 0) { |
| 383 |
log_debug("Peer has lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict."); |
| 384 |
return; |
| 385 |
} |
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
log_debug("We have the lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict."); |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
t->block_gc++; |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
while ((z = set_first(t->notify_zone_items))) { |
| 392 |
/* First, make sure the zone item drops the reference |
| 393 |
* to us */ |
| 394 |
dns_zone_item_probe_stop(z); |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
/* Secondly, report this as conflict, so that we might |
| 397 |
* look for a different hostname */ |
| 398 |
dns_zone_item_conflict(z); |
| 399 |
} |
| 400 |
t->block_gc--; |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
dns_transaction_gc(t); |
| 403 |
} |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
void dns_transaction_complete(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransactionState state) { |
| 406 |
DnsQueryCandidate *c; |
| 407 |
DnsZoneItem *z; |
| 408 |
DnsTransaction *d; |
| 409 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
assert(t); |
| 412 |
assert(!DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(state)); |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
if (state == DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED) { |
| 415 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str); |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
log_struct(LOG_NOTICE, |
| 418 |
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_DNSSEC_FAILURE_STR), |
| 419 |
LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC validation failed for question %s: %s", |
| 420 |
key_str, dnssec_result_to_string(t->answer_dnssec_result)), |
| 421 |
LOG_ITEM("DNS_TRANSACTION=%" PRIu16, t->id), |
| 422 |
LOG_ITEM("DNS_QUESTION=%s", key_str), |
| 423 |
LOG_ITEM("DNSSEC_RESULT=%s", dnssec_result_to_string(t->answer_dnssec_result)), |
| 424 |
LOG_ITEM("DNS_SERVER=%s", strna(dns_server_string_full(t->server))), |
| 425 |
LOG_ITEM("DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL=%s", dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->server->possible_feature_level))); |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
/* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers |
| 429 |
* should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction |
| 430 |
* after calling this function. */ |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
log_debug("%s transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> on scope %s on %s/%s now complete with <%s> from %s (%s; %s).", |
| 433 |
t->bypass ? "Bypass" : "Regular", |
| 434 |
t->id, |
| 435 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str), |
| 436 |
dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol), |
| 437 |
t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*", |
| 438 |
af_to_name_short(t->scope->family), |
| 439 |
state == DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO ? ERRNO_NAME(t->answer_errno) : dns_transaction_state_to_string(state), |
| 440 |
t->answer_source < 0 ? "none" : dns_transaction_source_to_string(t->answer_source), |
| 441 |
FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) ? "not validated" : |
| 442 |
(FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED) ? "authenticated" : "unsigned"), |
| 443 |
FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL) ? "confidential" : "non-confidential"); |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
t->state = state; |
| 446 |
|
| 447 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 448 |
dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t); |
| 449 |
|
| 450 |
/* Notify all queries that are interested, but make sure the |
| 451 |
* transaction isn't freed while we are still looking at it */ |
| 452 |
t->block_gc++; |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
SET_FOREACH_MOVE(c, t->notify_query_candidates_done, t->notify_query_candidates) |
| 455 |
dns_query_candidate_notify(c); |
| 456 |
SWAP_TWO(t->notify_query_candidates, t->notify_query_candidates_done); |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
SET_FOREACH_MOVE(z, t->notify_zone_items_done, t->notify_zone_items) |
| 459 |
dns_zone_item_notify(z); |
| 460 |
SWAP_TWO(t->notify_zone_items, t->notify_zone_items_done); |
| 461 |
if (t->probing && t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED) |
| 462 |
(void) dns_scope_announce(t->scope, false); |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
SET_FOREACH_MOVE(d, t->notify_transactions_done, t->notify_transactions) |
| 465 |
dns_transaction_notify(d, t); |
| 466 |
SWAP_TWO(t->notify_transactions, t->notify_transactions_done); |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
t->block_gc--; |
| 469 |
dns_transaction_gc(t); |
| 470 |
} |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
static void dns_transaction_complete_errno(DnsTransaction *t, int error) { |
| 473 |
assert(t); |
| 474 |
assert(error != 0); |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
t->answer_errno = ABS(error); |
| 477 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO); |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
static int dns_transaction_pick_server(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 481 |
DnsServer *server; |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
assert(t); |
| 484 |
assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS); |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
/* Pick a DNS server and a feature level for it. */ |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
server = dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope); |
| 489 |
if (!server) |
| 490 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
/* If we changed the server invalidate the feature level clamping, as the new server might have completely |
| 493 |
* different properties. */ |
| 494 |
if (server != t->server) |
| 495 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID; |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
t->current_feature_level = dns_server_possible_feature_level(server); |
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
/* Clamp the feature level if that is requested. */ |
| 500 |
if (t->clamp_feature_level_servfail != _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID && |
| 501 |
t->current_feature_level > t->clamp_feature_level_servfail) |
| 502 |
t->current_feature_level = t->clamp_feature_level_servfail; |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
log_debug("Using feature level %s for transaction %u.", dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->current_feature_level), t->id); |
| 505 |
|
| 506 |
if (server == t->server) |
| 507 |
return 0; |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
dns_server_unref(t->server); |
| 510 |
t->server = dns_server_ref(server); |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
t->n_picked_servers++; |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
log_debug("Using DNS server %s for transaction %u.", strna(dns_server_string_full(t->server)), t->id); |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
return 1; |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
static void dns_transaction_retry(DnsTransaction *t, bool next_server) { |
| 520 |
int r; |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
assert(t); |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
/* Retries the transaction as it is, possibly on a different server */ |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
if (next_server && t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 527 |
log_debug("Retrying transaction %" PRIu16 ", after switching servers.", t->id); |
| 528 |
else |
| 529 |
log_debug("Retrying transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id); |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
/* Before we try again, switch to a new server. */ |
| 532 |
if (next_server) |
| 533 |
dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server); |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
r = dns_transaction_go(t); |
| 536 |
if (r < 0) |
| 537 |
dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r); |
| 538 |
} |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
static bool dns_transaction_limited_retry(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 541 |
assert(t); |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
/* If we haven't tried all different servers yet, let's try again with a different server */ |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
if (t->n_picked_servers >= dns_scope_get_n_dns_servers(t->scope)) |
| 546 |
return false; |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
dns_transaction_retry(t, /* next_server= */ true); |
| 549 |
return true; |
| 550 |
} |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
static int dns_transaction_maybe_restart(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 553 |
int r; |
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
assert(t); |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
/* Restarts the transaction, under a new ID if the feature level of the server changed since we first |
| 558 |
* tried, without changing DNS server. Returns > 0 if the transaction was restarted, 0 if not. */ |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
if (!t->server) |
| 561 |
return 0; |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
if (t->current_feature_level <= dns_server_possible_feature_level(t->server)) |
| 564 |
return 0; |
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
/* The server's current feature level is lower than when we sent the original query. We learnt something from |
| 567 |
the response or possibly an auxiliary DNSSEC response that we didn't know before. We take that as reason to |
| 568 |
restart the whole transaction. This is a good idea to deal with servers that respond rubbish if we include |
| 569 |
OPT RR or DO bit. One of these cases is documented here, for example: |
| 570 |
https://open.nlnetlabs.nl/pipermail/dnssec-trigger/2014-November/000376.html */ |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
log_debug("Server feature level is now lower than when we began our transaction. Restarting with new ID."); |
| 573 |
dns_transaction_shuffle_id(t); |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
r = dns_transaction_go(t); |
| 576 |
if (r < 0) |
| 577 |
return r; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
return 1; |
| 580 |
} |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
static void on_transaction_stream_error(DnsTransaction *t, int error) { |
| 583 |
assert(t); |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(error)) { |
| 588 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR) { |
| 589 |
/* If the LLMNR/TCP connection failed, the host doesn't support LLMNR, and we cannot answer the |
| 590 |
* question on this scope. */ |
| 591 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND); |
| 592 |
return; |
| 593 |
} |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
dns_transaction_retry(t, true); |
| 596 |
return; |
| 597 |
} |
| 598 |
if (error != 0) |
| 599 |
dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, error); |
| 600 |
} |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
static int dns_transaction_on_stream_packet(DnsTransaction *t, DnsStream *s, DnsPacket *p) { |
| 603 |
bool encrypted; |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
assert(t); |
| 606 |
assert(s); |
| 607 |
assert(p); |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
encrypted = s->encrypted; |
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 612 |
|
| 613 |
if (dns_packet_validate_reply(p) <= 0) { |
| 614 |
log_debug("Invalid TCP reply packet."); |
| 615 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 616 |
return 0; |
| 617 |
} |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
dns_scope_check_conflicts(t->scope, p); |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
t->block_gc++; |
| 622 |
dns_transaction_process_reply(t, p, encrypted); |
| 623 |
t->block_gc--; |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
/* If the response wasn't useful, then complete the transition |
| 626 |
* now. After all, we are the worst feature set now with TCP |
| 627 |
* sockets, and there's really no point in retrying. */ |
| 628 |
if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING) |
| 629 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 630 |
else |
| 631 |
dns_transaction_gc(t); |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
return 0; |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
static int on_stream_complete(DnsStream *s, int error) { |
| 637 |
assert(s); |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(error) && s->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR) { |
| 640 |
log_debug_errno(error, "Connection failure for DNS TCP stream: %m"); |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
if (error != ECONNRESET && s->transactions) { |
| 643 |
DnsTransaction *t; |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
t = s->transactions; |
| 646 |
dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, IPPROTO_TCP, t->current_feature_level); |
| 647 |
} |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
if (error != 0) { |
| 651 |
/* First, detach the stream from the server. Otherwise, transactions attached to this stream |
| 652 |
* may be restarted by on_transaction_stream_error() below with this stream. */ |
| 653 |
dns_stream_detach(s); |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
/* Do not use LIST_FOREACH() here, as |
| 656 |
* on_transaction_stream_error() |
| 657 |
* -> dns_transaction_complete_errno() |
| 658 |
* -> dns_transaction_free() |
| 659 |
* may free multiple transactions in the list. */ |
| 660 |
DnsTransaction *t; |
| 661 |
while ((t = s->transactions)) |
| 662 |
on_transaction_stream_error(t, error); |
| 663 |
} |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
return 0; |
| 666 |
} |
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
static int on_stream_packet(DnsStream *s, DnsPacket *p) { |
| 669 |
DnsTransaction *t; |
| 670 |
|
| 671 |
assert(s); |
| 672 |
assert(s->manager); |
| 673 |
assert(p); |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
t = hashmap_get(s->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(DNS_PACKET_ID(p))); |
| 676 |
if (t && t->stream == s) /* Validate that the stream we got this on actually is the stream the |
| 677 |
* transaction was using. */ |
| 678 |
return dns_transaction_on_stream_packet(t, s, p); |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
/* Ignore incorrect transaction id as an old transaction can have been canceled. */ |
| 681 |
log_debug("Received unexpected TCP reply packet with id %" PRIu16 ", ignoring.", DNS_PACKET_ID(p)); |
| 682 |
return 0; |
| 683 |
} |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
static uint16_t dns_transaction_port(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 686 |
assert(t); |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
if (t->server->port > 0) |
| 689 |
return t->server->port; |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
return DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) ? 853 : 53; |
| 692 |
} |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
static int dns_transaction_emit_tcp(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 695 |
usec_t stream_timeout_usec = DNS_STREAM_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USEC; |
| 696 |
_cleanup_(dns_stream_unrefp) DnsStream *s = NULL; |
| 697 |
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| 698 |
union sockaddr_union sa; |
| 699 |
DnsStreamType type; |
| 700 |
int r; |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
assert(t); |
| 703 |
assert(t->sent); |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS: |
| 710 |
r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t); |
| 711 |
if (r < 0) |
| 712 |
return r; |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
if (manager_server_is_stub(t->scope->manager, t->server)) |
| 715 |
return -ELOOP; |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
if (!t->bypass) { |
| 718 |
if (!dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server) && dns_type_is_dnssec(dns_transaction_key(t)->type)) |
| 719 |
return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
r = dns_server_adjust_opt(t->server, t->sent, t->current_feature_level); |
| 722 |
if (r < 0) |
| 723 |
return r; |
| 724 |
} |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
if (t->server->stream && (DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) == t->server->stream->encrypted)) |
| 727 |
s = dns_stream_ref(t->server->stream); |
| 728 |
else |
| 729 |
fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, AF_UNSPEC, NULL, t->server, dns_transaction_port(t), &sa); |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
/* Lower timeout in DNS-over-TLS opportunistic mode. In environments where DoT is blocked |
| 732 |
* without ICMP response overly long delays when contacting DoT servers are nasty, in |
| 733 |
* particular if multiple DNS servers are defined which we try in turn and all are |
| 734 |
* blocked. Hence, substantially lower the timeout in that case. */ |
| 735 |
if (DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) && |
| 736 |
dns_server_get_dns_over_tls_mode(t->server) == DNS_OVER_TLS_OPPORTUNISTIC) |
| 737 |
stream_timeout_usec = DNS_STREAM_OPPORTUNISTIC_TLS_TIMEOUT_USEC; |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
type = DNS_STREAM_LOOKUP; |
| 740 |
break; |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 743 |
/* When we already received a reply to this (but it was truncated), send to its sender address */ |
| 744 |
if (t->received) |
| 745 |
fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, t->received->family, &t->received->sender, NULL, t->received->sender_port, &sa); |
| 746 |
else { |
| 747 |
union in_addr_union address; |
| 748 |
int family = AF_UNSPEC; |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
/* Otherwise, try to talk to the owner of a |
| 751 |
* the IP address, in case this is a reverse |
| 752 |
* PTR lookup */ |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
r = dns_name_address(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), &family, &address); |
| 755 |
if (r < 0) |
| 756 |
return r; |
| 757 |
if (r == 0) |
| 758 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 759 |
if (family != t->scope->family) |
| 760 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, family, &address, NULL, LLMNR_PORT, &sa); |
| 763 |
} |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
type = DNS_STREAM_LLMNR_SEND; |
| 766 |
break; |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
default: |
| 769 |
return -EAFNOSUPPORT; |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
if (!s) { |
| 773 |
if (fd < 0) |
| 774 |
return fd; |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
r = dns_stream_new(t->scope->manager, &s, type, t->scope->protocol, fd, &sa, |
| 777 |
on_stream_packet, on_stream_complete, stream_timeout_usec); |
| 778 |
if (r < 0) |
| 779 |
return r; |
| 780 |
|
| 781 |
fd = -EBADF; |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
#if ENABLE_DNS_OVER_TLS |
| 784 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && |
| 785 |
DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level)) { |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
assert(t->server); |
| 788 |
r = dnstls_stream_connect_tls(s, t->server); |
| 789 |
if (r < 0) |
| 790 |
return r; |
| 791 |
} |
| 792 |
#endif |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
if (t->server) { |
| 795 |
dns_server_unref_stream(t->server); |
| 796 |
s->server = dns_server_ref(t->server); |
| 797 |
t->server->stream = dns_stream_ref(s); |
| 798 |
} |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
/* The interface index is difficult to determine if we are |
| 801 |
* connecting to the local host, hence fill this in right away |
| 802 |
* instead of determining it from the socket */ |
| 803 |
s->ifindex = dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope); |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
t->stream = TAKE_PTR(s); |
| 807 |
LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_stream, t->stream->transactions, t); |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
r = dns_stream_write_packet(t->stream, t->sent); |
| 810 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 811 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, /* use_graveyard= */ false); |
| 812 |
return r; |
| 813 |
} |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
dns_transaction_reset_answer(t); |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
t->tried_stream = true; |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
return 0; |
| 820 |
} |
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
static void dns_transaction_cache_answer(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 823 |
assert(t); |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
/* For mDNS we cache whenever we get the packet, rather than |
| 826 |
* in each transaction. */ |
| 827 |
if (!IN_SET(t->scope->protocol, DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS, DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR)) |
| 828 |
return; |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
/* Caching disabled? */ |
| 831 |
if (t->scope->manager->enable_cache == DNS_CACHE_MODE_NO) |
| 832 |
return; |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
/* If validation is turned off for this transaction, but DNSSEC is on, then let's not cache this */ |
| 835 |
if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) && t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_NO) |
| 836 |
return; |
| 837 |
|
| 838 |
/* Packet from localhost? */ |
| 839 |
if (!t->scope->manager->cache_from_localhost && |
| 840 |
in_addr_is_localhost(t->received->family, &t->received->sender) != 0) |
| 841 |
return; |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
dns_cache_put(&t->scope->cache, |
| 844 |
t->scope->manager->enable_cache, |
| 845 |
t->scope->protocol, |
| 846 |
dns_transaction_key(t), |
| 847 |
t->answer_rcode, |
| 848 |
t->answer, |
| 849 |
/* If neither DO nor EDE is set, the full packet isn't useful to cache */ |
| 850 |
dns_packet_do(t->received) || t->answer_ede_rcode > 0 || t->answer_ede_msg ? t->received : NULL, |
| 851 |
t->answer_query_flags, |
| 852 |
t->answer_dnssec_result, |
| 853 |
t->answer_nsec_ttl, |
| 854 |
t->received->family, |
| 855 |
&t->received->sender, |
| 856 |
t->scope->manager->stale_retention_usec); |
| 857 |
} |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_is_live(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 860 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
assert(t); |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) |
| 865 |
if (DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(dt->state)) |
| 866 |
return true; |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
return false; |
| 869 |
} |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
static int dns_transaction_dnssec_ready(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 872 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 873 |
int r; |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
assert(t); |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
/* Checks whether the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions of our transaction have completed, or are still |
| 878 |
* ongoing. Returns 0, if we aren't ready for the DNSSEC validation, positive if we are. */ |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
switch (dt->state) { |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL: |
| 885 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING: |
| 886 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING: |
| 887 |
/* Still ongoing */ |
| 888 |
return 0; |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE: |
| 891 |
if (!IN_SET(dt->answer_rcode, DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN, DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL)) { |
| 892 |
log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed with rcode=%s.", FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dt->answer_rcode)); |
| 893 |
goto fail; |
| 894 |
} |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
/* Fall-through: NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL is good enough for us. This is because some DNS servers |
| 897 |
* erroneously return NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL for empty non-terminals (Akamai...) or missing DS |
| 898 |
* records (Facebook), and we need to handle that nicely, when asking for parent SOA or similar |
| 899 |
* RRs to make unsigned proofs. */ |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS: |
| 902 |
/* All good. */ |
| 903 |
break; |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
case DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED: |
| 906 |
/* We handle DNSSEC failures different from other errors, as we care about the DNSSEC |
| 907 |
* validation result */ |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed validation: %s%s%s%s%s%s", |
| 910 |
dnssec_result_to_string(dt->answer_dnssec_result), |
| 911 |
dt->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 ? " (" : "", |
| 912 |
dt->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 ? FORMAT_DNS_EDE_RCODE(dt->answer_ede_rcode) : "", |
| 913 |
(dt->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 && !isempty(dt->answer_ede_msg)) ? ": " : "", |
| 914 |
dt->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 ? strempty(dt->answer_ede_msg) : "", |
| 915 |
dt->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 ? ")" : ""); |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
/* Copy error code over */ |
| 918 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = dt->answer_dnssec_result; |
| 919 |
t->answer_ede_rcode = dt->answer_ede_rcode; |
| 920 |
r = free_and_strdup(&t->answer_ede_msg, dt->answer_ede_msg); |
| 921 |
if (r < 0) |
| 922 |
log_oom_debug(); |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
/* The answer would normally be replaced by the validated subset, but at this point |
| 925 |
* we aren't going to bother validating the rest, so just drop it. */ |
| 926 |
t->answer = dns_answer_unref(t->answer); |
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED); |
| 929 |
return 0; |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
default: |
| 932 |
log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed with %s", dns_transaction_state_to_string(dt->state)); |
| 933 |
goto fail; |
| 934 |
} |
| 935 |
} |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
/* All is ready, we can go and validate */ |
| 938 |
return 1; |
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
fail: |
| 941 |
/* Some auxiliary DNSSEC transaction failed for some reason. Maybe we learned something about the |
| 942 |
* server due to this failure, and the feature level is now different? Let's see and restart the |
| 943 |
* transaction if so. If not, let's propagate the auxiliary failure. |
| 944 |
* |
| 945 |
* This is particularly relevant if an auxiliary request figured out that DNSSEC doesn't work, and we |
| 946 |
* are in permissive DNSSEC mode, and thus should restart things without DNSSEC magic. */ |
| 947 |
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t); |
| 948 |
if (r < 0) |
| 949 |
return r; |
| 950 |
if (r > 0) |
| 951 |
return 0; /* don't validate just yet, we restarted things */ |
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY; |
| 954 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED); |
| 955 |
return 0; |
| 956 |
} |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
static void dns_transaction_process_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 959 |
int r; |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
assert(t); |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
/* Are there ongoing DNSSEC transactions? If so, let's wait for them. */ |
| 964 |
r = dns_transaction_dnssec_ready(t); |
| 965 |
if (r < 0) |
| 966 |
goto fail; |
| 967 |
if (r == 0) /* We aren't ready yet (or one of our auxiliary transactions failed, and we shouldn't validate now */ |
| 968 |
return; |
| 969 |
|
| 970 |
/* See if we learnt things from the additional DNSSEC transactions, that we didn't know before, and better |
| 971 |
* restart the lookup immediately. */ |
| 972 |
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t); |
| 973 |
if (r < 0) |
| 974 |
goto fail; |
| 975 |
if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */ |
| 976 |
return; |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
/* All our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions are complete now. Try |
| 979 |
* to validate our RRset now. */ |
| 980 |
r = dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(t); |
| 981 |
if (r == -EBADMSG) { |
| 982 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 983 |
return; |
| 984 |
} |
| 985 |
if (r < 0) |
| 986 |
goto fail; |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER && |
| 989 |
t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_YES) { |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
/* We are not in automatic downgrade mode, and the server is bad. Let's try a different server, maybe |
| 992 |
* that works. */ |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) |
| 995 |
return; |
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
/* OK, let's give up, apparently all servers we tried didn't work. */ |
| 998 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED); |
| 999 |
return; |
| 1000 |
} |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
if (!IN_SET(t->answer_dnssec_result, |
| 1003 |
_DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID, /* No DNSSEC validation enabled */ |
| 1004 |
DNSSEC_VALIDATED, /* Answer is signed and validated successfully */ |
| 1005 |
DNSSEC_UNSIGNED, /* Answer is right-fully unsigned */ |
| 1006 |
DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER)) { /* Server does not do DNSSEC (Yay, we are downgrade attack vulnerable!) */ |
| 1007 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED); |
| 1008 |
return; |
| 1009 |
} |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER) |
| 1012 |
dns_server_warn_downgrade(t->server); |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
dns_transaction_cache_answer(t); |
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 |
if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS) |
| 1017 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS); |
| 1018 |
else |
| 1019 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE); |
| 1020 |
|
| 1021 |
return; |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
fail: |
| 1024 |
dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r); |
| 1025 |
} |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
static int dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(DnsTransaction *t, DnsAnswerFlags *flags) { |
| 1028 |
int r; |
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 |
assert(t); |
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 |
/* Checks whether the answer is positive, i.e. either a direct |
| 1033 |
* answer to the question, or a CNAME/DNAME for it */ |
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 |
r = dns_answer_match_key(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), flags); |
| 1036 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1037 |
return r; |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
r = dns_answer_find_cname_or_dname(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL, flags); |
| 1040 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1041 |
return r; |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
return false; |
| 1044 |
} |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
static int dns_transaction_fix_rcode(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 1047 |
int r; |
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
assert(t); |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
/* Fix up the RCODE to SUCCESS if we get at least one matching RR in a response. Note that this contradicts the |
| 1052 |
* DNS RFCs a bit. Specifically, RFC 6604 Section 3 clarifies that the RCODE shall say something about a |
| 1053 |
* CNAME/DNAME chain element coming after the last chain element contained in the message, and not the first |
| 1054 |
* one included. However, it also indicates that not all DNS servers implement this correctly. Moreover, when |
| 1055 |
* using DNSSEC we usually only can prove the first element of a CNAME/DNAME chain anyway, hence let's settle |
| 1056 |
* on always processing the RCODE as referring to the immediate look-up we do, i.e. the first element of a |
| 1057 |
* CNAME/DNAME chain. This way, we uniformly handle CNAME/DNAME chains, regardless if the DNS server |
| 1058 |
* incorrectly implements RCODE, whether DNSSEC is in use, or whether the DNS server only supplied us with an |
| 1059 |
* incomplete CNAME/DNAME chain. |
| 1060 |
* |
| 1061 |
* Or in other words: if we get at least one positive reply in a message we patch NXDOMAIN to become SUCCESS, |
| 1062 |
* and then rely on the CNAME chasing logic to figure out that there's actually a CNAME error with a new |
| 1063 |
* lookup. */ |
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
if (t->answer_rcode != DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) |
| 1066 |
return 0; |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL); |
| 1069 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 1070 |
return r; |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 1073 |
return 0; |
| 1074 |
} |
| 1075 |
|
| 1076 |
void dns_transaction_process_reply(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket *p, bool encrypted) { |
| 1077 |
bool retry_with_tcp = false; |
| 1078 |
int r; |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
assert(t); |
| 1081 |
assert(p); |
| 1082 |
assert(t->scope); |
| 1083 |
assert(t->scope->manager); |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING) |
| 1086 |
return; |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
/* Increment the total failure counter only when it is the first attempt at querying and the upstream |
| 1089 |
* server returns a failure response code. This ensures a more accurate count of the number of queries |
| 1090 |
* that received a failure response code, as it doesn't consider retries. */ |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
if (t->n_attempts == 1 && !IN_SET(dns_packet_rcode(p), DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS, DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)) |
| 1093 |
t->scope->manager->n_failure_responses_total++; |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
/* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers |
| 1096 |
* should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction |
| 1097 |
* after calling this function. */ |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
log_debug("Processing incoming packet of size %zu on transaction %" PRIu16" (rcode=%s).", |
| 1100 |
p->size, |
| 1101 |
t->id, FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p))); |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 1106 |
/* For LLMNR we will not accept any packets from other interfaces */ |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
if (p->ifindex != dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope)) |
| 1109 |
return; |
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
if (p->family != t->scope->family) |
| 1112 |
return; |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
/* Tentative packets are not full responses but still |
| 1115 |
* useful for identifying uniqueness conflicts during |
| 1116 |
* probing. */ |
| 1117 |
if (DNS_PACKET_LLMNR_T(p)) { |
| 1118 |
dns_transaction_tentative(t, p); |
| 1119 |
return; |
| 1120 |
} |
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
break; |
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS: |
| 1125 |
/* For mDNS we will not accept any packets from other interfaces */ |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
if (p->ifindex != dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope)) |
| 1128 |
return; |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
if (p->family != t->scope->family) |
| 1131 |
return; |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
break; |
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS: |
| 1136 |
/* Note that we do not need to verify the |
| 1137 |
* addresses/port numbers of incoming traffic, as we |
| 1138 |
* invoked connect() on our UDP socket in which case |
| 1139 |
* the kernel already does the needed verification for |
| 1140 |
* us. */ |
| 1141 |
break; |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
default: |
| 1144 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 1145 |
} |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
if (t->received != p) |
| 1148 |
DNS_PACKET_REPLACE(t->received, dns_packet_ref(p)); |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK; |
| 1151 |
|
| 1152 |
if (p->ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP) { |
| 1153 |
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) { |
| 1154 |
/* Truncated via TCP? Somebody must be fucking with us */ |
| 1155 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 1156 |
return; |
| 1157 |
} |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) { |
| 1160 |
/* Not the reply to our query? Somebody must be fucking with us */ |
| 1161 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 1162 |
return; |
| 1163 |
} |
| 1164 |
} |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) { |
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
/* Truncated packets for mDNS are not allowed. Give up immediately. */ |
| 1169 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS) { |
| 1170 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 1171 |
return; |
| 1172 |
} |
| 1173 |
|
| 1174 |
/* Response was truncated, let's try again with good old TCP */ |
| 1175 |
log_debug("Reply truncated, retrying via TCP."); |
| 1176 |
retry_with_tcp = true; |
| 1177 |
|
| 1178 |
} else if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && |
| 1179 |
DNS_PACKET_IS_FRAGMENTED(p)) { |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
/* Report the fragment size, so that we downgrade from LARGE to regular EDNS0 if needed */ |
| 1182 |
if (t->server) |
| 1183 |
dns_server_packet_udp_fragmented(t->server, dns_packet_size_unfragmented(p)); |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
if (t->current_feature_level > DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP) { |
| 1186 |
/* Packet was fragmented. Let's retry with TCP to avoid fragmentation attack |
| 1187 |
* issues. (We don't do that on the lowest feature level however, since crappy DNS |
| 1188 |
* servers often do not implement TCP, hence falling back to TCP on fragmentation is |
| 1189 |
* counter-productive there.) */ |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
log_debug("Reply fragmented, retrying via TCP. (Largest fragment size: %zu; Datagram size: %zu)", |
| 1192 |
p->fragsize, p->size); |
| 1193 |
retry_with_tcp = true; |
| 1194 |
} |
| 1195 |
} |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
if (retry_with_tcp) { |
| 1198 |
r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t); |
| 1199 |
if (r == -ESRCH) { |
| 1200 |
/* No servers found? Damn! */ |
| 1201 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS); |
| 1202 |
return; |
| 1203 |
} |
| 1204 |
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
| 1205 |
/* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */ |
| 1206 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED); |
| 1207 |
return; |
| 1208 |
} |
| 1209 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1210 |
/* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to the host, |
| 1211 |
* we immediately give up */ |
| 1212 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 1213 |
goto fail; |
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
/* On DNS, couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */ |
| 1216 |
if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) |
| 1217 |
return; |
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
/* No new server to try, give up */ |
| 1220 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED); |
| 1221 |
} |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
return; |
| 1224 |
} |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
/* After the superficial checks, actually parse the message. */ |
| 1227 |
r = dns_packet_extract(p); |
| 1228 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1229 |
if (t->server) { |
| 1230 |
dns_server_packet_invalid(t->server, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t); |
| 1233 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1234 |
goto fail; |
| 1235 |
if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */ |
| 1236 |
return; |
| 1237 |
} |
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 1240 |
return; |
| 1241 |
} |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS: { |
| 1246 |
assert(t->server); |
| 1247 |
|
| 1248 |
(void) dns_packet_ede_rcode(p, &t->answer_ede_rcode, &t->answer_ede_msg); |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
if (!t->bypass && |
| 1251 |
IN_SET(dns_packet_rcode(p), DNS_RCODE_FORMERR, DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL, DNS_RCODE_NOTIMP)) { |
| 1252 |
/* If the server has replied with detailed error data, using a degraded feature set |
| 1253 |
* will likely not help anyone. Examine the detailed error to determine the best |
| 1254 |
* course of action. */ |
| 1255 |
if (t->answer_ede_rcode >= 0 && dns_packet_rcode(p) == DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL) { |
| 1256 |
/* These codes are related to DNSSEC configuration errors. If accurate, |
| 1257 |
* this is the domain operator's problem, and retrying won't help. */ |
| 1258 |
if (dns_ede_rcode_is_dnssec(t->answer_ede_rcode)) { |
| 1259 |
log_debug("Server returned error: %s (%s%s%s). Lookup failed.", |
| 1260 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p)), |
| 1261 |
FORMAT_DNS_EDE_RCODE(t->answer_ede_rcode), |
| 1262 |
isempty(t->answer_ede_msg) ? "" : ": ", |
| 1263 |
strempty(t->answer_ede_msg)); |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UPSTREAM_FAILURE; |
| 1266 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED); |
| 1267 |
return; |
| 1268 |
} |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
/* These codes probably indicate a transient error. Let's try again. */ |
| 1271 |
if (t->answer_ede_rcode == DNS_EDE_RCODE_NOT_READY) { |
| 1272 |
log_debug("Server returned error: %s (%s%s%s), retrying transaction.", |
| 1273 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p)), |
| 1274 |
FORMAT_DNS_EDE_RCODE(t->answer_ede_rcode), |
| 1275 |
isempty(t->answer_ede_msg) ? "" : ": ", |
| 1276 |
strempty(t->answer_ede_msg)); |
| 1277 |
dns_transaction_retry(t, false); |
| 1278 |
return; |
| 1279 |
} |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
/* OK, the query failed, but we still shouldn't degrade the feature set for |
| 1282 |
* this server. */ |
| 1283 |
log_debug("Server returned error: %s (%s%s%s)", |
| 1284 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p)), |
| 1285 |
FORMAT_DNS_EDE_RCODE(t->answer_ede_rcode), |
| 1286 |
isempty(t->answer_ede_msg) ? "" : ": ", |
| 1287 |
strempty(t->answer_ede_msg)); |
| 1288 |
break; |
| 1289 |
} |
| 1290 |
|
| 1291 |
/* Request failed, immediately try again with reduced features */ |
| 1292 |
|
| 1293 |
if (t->current_feature_level <= DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP) { |
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
/* This was already at UDP feature level? If so, it doesn't make sense to downgrade |
| 1296 |
* this transaction anymore, but let's see if it might make sense to send the request |
| 1297 |
* to a different DNS server instead. If not let's process the response, and accept the |
| 1298 |
* rcode. Note that we don't retry on TCP, since that's a suitable way to mitigate |
| 1299 |
* packet loss, but is not going to give us better rcodes should we actually have |
| 1300 |
* managed to get them already at UDP level. */ |
| 1301 |
|
| 1302 |
if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) |
| 1303 |
return; |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
/* Give up, accept the rcode */ |
| 1306 |
log_debug("Server returned error: %s", FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p))); |
| 1307 |
break; |
| 1308 |
} |
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
/* SERVFAIL can happen for many reasons and may be transient. |
| 1311 |
* To avoid unnecessary downgrades retry once with the initial level. |
| 1312 |
* Check for clamp_feature_level_servfail having an invalid value as a sign that this is the |
| 1313 |
* first attempt to downgrade. If so, clamp to the current value so that the transaction |
| 1314 |
* is retried without actually downgrading. If the next try also fails we will downgrade by |
| 1315 |
* hitting the else branch below. */ |
| 1316 |
if (dns_packet_rcode(p) == DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL && |
| 1317 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail < 0) { |
| 1318 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = t->current_feature_level; |
| 1319 |
log_debug("Server returned error %s, retrying transaction.", |
| 1320 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p))); |
| 1321 |
} else { |
| 1322 |
/* Reduce this feature level by one and try again. */ |
| 1323 |
switch (t->current_feature_level) { |
| 1324 |
case DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_DO: |
| 1325 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN; |
| 1326 |
break; |
| 1327 |
case DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN + 1: |
| 1328 |
/* Skip plain TLS when TLS is not supported */ |
| 1329 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN - 1; |
| 1330 |
break; |
| 1331 |
default: |
| 1332 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = t->current_feature_level - 1; |
| 1333 |
} |
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
log_debug("Server returned error %s, retrying transaction with reduced feature level %s.", |
| 1336 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dns_packet_rcode(p)), |
| 1337 |
dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->clamp_feature_level_servfail)); |
| 1338 |
} |
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
dns_transaction_retry(t, false /* use the same server */); |
| 1341 |
return; |
| 1342 |
} |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
if (dns_packet_rcode(p) == DNS_RCODE_REFUSED) { |
| 1345 |
/* This server refused our request? If so, try again, use a different server */ |
| 1346 |
if (t->answer_ede_rcode >= 0) |
| 1347 |
log_debug("Server returned REFUSED (%s), switching servers, and retrying.", |
| 1348 |
FORMAT_DNS_EDE_RCODE(t->answer_ede_rcode)); |
| 1349 |
else |
| 1350 |
log_debug("Server returned REFUSED, switching servers, and retrying."); |
| 1351 |
|
| 1352 |
if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) |
| 1353 |
return; |
| 1354 |
|
| 1355 |
break; |
| 1356 |
} |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) |
| 1359 |
dns_server_packet_truncated(t->server, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
break; |
| 1362 |
} |
| 1363 |
|
| 1364 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 1365 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS: |
| 1366 |
dns_scope_packet_received(t->scope, p->timestamp - t->start_usec); |
| 1367 |
break; |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
default: |
| 1370 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 1371 |
} |
| 1372 |
|
| 1373 |
if (t->server) { |
| 1374 |
/* Report that we successfully received a valid packet with a good rcode after we initially got a bad |
| 1375 |
* rcode and subsequently downgraded the protocol */ |
| 1376 |
|
| 1377 |
if (IN_SET(dns_packet_rcode(p), DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS, DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) && |
| 1378 |
t->clamp_feature_level_servfail != _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID) |
| 1379 |
dns_server_packet_rcode_downgrade(t->server, t->clamp_feature_level_servfail); |
| 1380 |
|
| 1381 |
/* Report that the OPT RR was missing */ |
| 1382 |
if (!p->opt) |
| 1383 |
dns_server_packet_bad_opt(t->server, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1384 |
|
| 1385 |
/* Report that the server didn't copy our query DO bit from request to response */ |
| 1386 |
if (dns_packet_do(t->sent) && !dns_packet_do(t->received)) |
| 1387 |
dns_server_packet_do_off(t->server, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
/* Report that we successfully received a packet. We keep track of the largest packet |
| 1390 |
* size/fragment size we got. Which is useful for announcing the EDNS(0) packet size we can |
| 1391 |
* receive to our server. */ |
| 1392 |
dns_server_packet_received(t->server, p->ipproto, t->current_feature_level, dns_packet_size_unfragmented(p)); |
| 1393 |
} |
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
/* See if we know things we didn't know before that indicate we better restart the lookup immediately. */ |
| 1396 |
r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t); |
| 1397 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1398 |
goto fail; |
| 1399 |
if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */ |
| 1400 |
return; |
| 1401 |
|
| 1402 |
/* When dealing with protocols other than mDNS only consider responses with equivalent query section |
| 1403 |
* to the request. For mDNS this check doesn't make sense, because the section 6 of RFC6762 states |
| 1404 |
* that "Multicast DNS responses MUST NOT contain any questions in the Question Section". */ |
| 1405 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS) { |
| 1406 |
r = dns_packet_is_reply_for(p, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 1407 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1408 |
goto fail; |
| 1409 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1410 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY); |
| 1411 |
return; |
| 1412 |
} |
| 1413 |
} |
| 1414 |
|
| 1415 |
/* Install the answer as answer to the transaction. We ref the answer twice here: the main `answer` |
| 1416 |
* field is later replaced by the DNSSEC validated subset. The 'answer_auxiliary' field carries the |
| 1417 |
* original complete record set, including RRSIG and friends. We use this when passing data to |
| 1418 |
* clients that ask for DNSSEC metadata. */ |
| 1419 |
DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, dns_answer_ref(p->answer)); |
| 1420 |
t->answer_rcode = dns_packet_rcode(p); |
| 1421 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID; |
| 1422 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false); |
| 1423 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, encrypted); |
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
r = dns_transaction_fix_rcode(t); |
| 1426 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1427 |
goto fail; |
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
/* Block GC while starting requests for additional DNSSEC RRs */ |
| 1430 |
t->block_gc++; |
| 1431 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys(t); |
| 1432 |
t->block_gc--; |
| 1433 |
|
| 1434 |
/* Maybe the transaction is ready for GC'ing now? If so, free it and return. */ |
| 1435 |
if (!dns_transaction_gc(t)) |
| 1436 |
return; |
| 1437 |
|
| 1438 |
/* Requesting additional keys might have resulted in this transaction to fail, since the auxiliary |
| 1439 |
* request failed for some reason. If so, we are not in pending state anymore, and we should exit |
| 1440 |
* quickly. */ |
| 1441 |
if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING) |
| 1442 |
return; |
| 1443 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1444 |
goto fail; |
| 1445 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 1446 |
/* There are DNSSEC transactions pending now. Update the state accordingly. */ |
| 1447 |
t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING; |
| 1448 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 1449 |
dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t); |
| 1450 |
return; |
| 1451 |
} |
| 1452 |
|
| 1453 |
dns_transaction_process_dnssec(t); |
| 1454 |
return; |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
fail: |
| 1457 |
dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r); |
| 1458 |
} |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
static int on_dns_packet(sd_event_source *s, int fd, uint32_t revents, void *userdata) { |
| 1461 |
_cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL; |
| 1462 |
DnsTransaction *t = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
| 1463 |
int r; |
| 1464 |
|
| 1465 |
assert(t->scope); |
| 1466 |
|
| 1467 |
r = manager_recv(t->scope->manager, fd, DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS, &p); |
| 1468 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1469 |
if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(r)) { |
| 1470 |
usec_t usec; |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
/* UDP connection failures get reported via ICMP and then are possibly delivered to us on the |
| 1473 |
* next recvmsg(). Treat this like a lost packet. */ |
| 1474 |
|
| 1475 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Connection failure for DNS UDP packet: %m"); |
| 1476 |
assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &usec) >= 0); |
| 1477 |
dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, IPPROTO_UDP, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1478 |
|
| 1479 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, /* use_graveyard= */ false); |
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) /* Try a different server */ |
| 1482 |
return 0; |
| 1483 |
} |
| 1484 |
dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r); |
| 1485 |
return 0; |
| 1486 |
} |
| 1487 |
if (r == 0) |
| 1488 |
/* Spurious wakeup without any data */ |
| 1489 |
return 0; |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
r = dns_packet_validate_reply(p); |
| 1492 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1493 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Received invalid DNS packet as response, ignoring: %m"); |
| 1494 |
return 0; |
| 1495 |
} |
| 1496 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1497 |
log_debug("Received inappropriate DNS packet as response, ignoring."); |
| 1498 |
return 0; |
| 1499 |
} |
| 1500 |
|
| 1501 |
if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) { |
| 1502 |
log_debug("Received packet with incorrect transaction ID, ignoring."); |
| 1503 |
return 0; |
| 1504 |
} |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
dns_transaction_process_reply(t, p, false); |
| 1507 |
return 0; |
| 1508 |
} |
| 1509 |
|
| 1510 |
static int dns_transaction_emit_udp(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 1511 |
int r; |
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
assert(t); |
| 1514 |
|
| 1515 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) { |
| 1516 |
|
| 1517 |
r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t); |
| 1518 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1519 |
return r; |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
if (manager_server_is_stub(t->scope->manager, t->server)) |
| 1522 |
return -ELOOP; |
| 1523 |
|
| 1524 |
if (t->current_feature_level < DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP || DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level)) |
| 1525 |
return -EAGAIN; /* Sorry, can't do UDP, try TCP! */ |
| 1526 |
|
| 1527 |
if (!t->bypass && !dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server) && dns_type_is_dnssec(dns_transaction_key(t)->type)) |
| 1528 |
return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
if (r > 0 || t->dns_udp_fd < 0) { /* Server changed, or no connection yet. */ |
| 1531 |
int fd; |
| 1532 |
|
| 1533 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 1534 |
|
| 1535 |
/* Before we allocate a new UDP socket, let's process the graveyard a bit to free some fds */ |
| 1536 |
manager_socket_graveyard_process(t->scope->manager); |
| 1537 |
|
| 1538 |
fd = dns_scope_socket_udp(t->scope, t->server); |
| 1539 |
if (fd < 0) |
| 1540 |
return fd; |
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
r = sd_event_add_io(t->scope->manager->event, &t->dns_udp_event_source, fd, EPOLLIN, on_dns_packet, t); |
| 1543 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1544 |
safe_close(fd); |
| 1545 |
return r; |
| 1546 |
} |
| 1547 |
|
| 1548 |
(void) sd_event_source_set_description(t->dns_udp_event_source, "dns-transaction-udp"); |
| 1549 |
t->dns_udp_fd = fd; |
| 1550 |
} |
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 |
if (!t->bypass) { |
| 1553 |
r = dns_server_adjust_opt(t->server, t->sent, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1554 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1555 |
return r; |
| 1556 |
} |
| 1557 |
} else |
| 1558 |
dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true); |
| 1559 |
|
| 1560 |
r = dns_scope_emit_udp(t->scope, t->dns_udp_fd, t->server ? t->server->family : AF_UNSPEC, t->sent); |
| 1561 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1562 |
return r; |
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
dns_transaction_reset_answer(t); |
| 1565 |
|
| 1566 |
return 0; |
| 1567 |
} |
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
static int on_transaction_timeout(sd_event_source *s, usec_t usec, void *userdata) { |
| 1570 |
DnsTransaction *t = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
| 1571 |
|
| 1572 |
assert(s); |
| 1573 |
|
| 1574 |
t->seen_timeout = true; |
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 |
if (t->initial_jitter_scheduled && !t->initial_jitter_elapsed) { |
| 1577 |
log_debug("Initial jitter phase for transaction %" PRIu16 " elapsed.", t->id); |
| 1578 |
t->initial_jitter_elapsed = true; |
| 1579 |
} else { |
| 1580 |
/* Timeout reached? Increase the timeout for the server used */ |
| 1581 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS: |
| 1584 |
assert(t->server); |
| 1585 |
dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, t->stream ? IPPROTO_TCP : IPPROTO_UDP, t->current_feature_level); |
| 1586 |
break; |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 1589 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS: |
| 1590 |
dns_scope_packet_lost(t->scope, usec - t->start_usec); |
| 1591 |
break; |
| 1592 |
|
| 1593 |
default: |
| 1594 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 1595 |
} |
| 1596 |
|
| 1597 |
log_debug("Timeout reached on transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id); |
| 1598 |
} |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
dns_transaction_retry(t, /* next_server= */ true); /* try a different server, but given this means |
| 1601 |
* packet loss, let's do so even if we already |
| 1602 |
* tried a bunch */ |
| 1603 |
return 0; |
| 1604 |
} |
| 1605 |
|
| 1606 |
static int dns_transaction_setup_timeout( |
| 1607 |
DnsTransaction *t, |
| 1608 |
usec_t timeout_usec /* relative */, |
| 1609 |
usec_t next_usec /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */) { |
| 1610 |
|
| 1611 |
int r; |
| 1612 |
|
| 1613 |
assert(t); |
| 1614 |
|
| 1615 |
dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t); |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
r = sd_event_add_time_relative( |
| 1618 |
t->scope->manager->event, |
| 1619 |
&t->timeout_event_source, |
| 1620 |
CLOCK_BOOTTIME, |
| 1621 |
timeout_usec, 0, |
| 1622 |
on_transaction_timeout, t); |
| 1623 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1624 |
return r; |
| 1625 |
|
| 1626 |
(void) sd_event_source_set_description(t->timeout_event_source, "dns-transaction-timeout"); |
| 1627 |
|
| 1628 |
t->next_attempt_after = next_usec; |
| 1629 |
t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING; |
| 1630 |
return 0; |
| 1631 |
} |
| 1632 |
|
| 1633 |
static usec_t transaction_get_resend_timeout(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 1634 |
assert(t); |
| 1635 |
assert(t->scope); |
| 1636 |
|
| 1637 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 1638 |
|
| 1639 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS: |
| 1640 |
|
| 1641 |
if (t->stream) |
| 1642 |
return TRANSACTION_TCP_TIMEOUT_USEC; |
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 |
return TRANSACTION_UDP_TIMEOUT_USEC; |
| 1645 |
|
| 1646 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS: |
| 1647 |
if (t->probing) |
| 1648 |
return MDNS_PROBING_INTERVAL_USEC; |
| 1649 |
|
| 1650 |
/* See RFC 6762 Section 5.1 suggests that timeout should be a few seconds. */ |
| 1651 |
assert(t->n_attempts > 0); |
| 1652 |
return (1 << (t->n_attempts - 1)) * USEC_PER_SEC; |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 1655 |
return t->scope->resend_timeout; |
| 1656 |
|
| 1657 |
default: |
| 1658 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 1659 |
} |
| 1660 |
} |
| 1661 |
|
| 1662 |
static void dns_transaction_randomize_answer(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 1663 |
int r; |
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 |
assert(t); |
| 1666 |
|
| 1667 |
/* Randomizes the order of the answer array. This is done for all cached responses, so that we return |
| 1668 |
* a different order each time. We do this only for DNS traffic, in order to do some minimal, crappy |
| 1669 |
* load balancing. We don't do this for LLMNR or mDNS, since the order (preferring link-local |
| 1670 |
* addresses, and such like) might have meaning there, and load balancing is pointless. */ |
| 1671 |
|
| 1672 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 1673 |
return; |
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
/* No point in randomizing, if there's just one RR */ |
| 1676 |
if (dns_answer_size(t->answer) <= 1) |
| 1677 |
return; |
| 1678 |
|
| 1679 |
r = dns_answer_reserve_or_clone(&t->answer, 0); |
| 1680 |
if (r < 0) /* If this fails, just don't randomize, this is non-essential stuff after all */ |
| 1681 |
return (void) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to clone answer record, not randomizing RR order of answer: %m"); |
| 1682 |
|
| 1683 |
dns_answer_randomize(t->answer); |
| 1684 |
} |
| 1685 |
|
| 1686 |
static int dns_transaction_prepare(DnsTransaction *t, usec_t ts) { |
| 1687 |
int r; |
| 1688 |
|
| 1689 |
assert(t); |
| 1690 |
|
| 1691 |
/* Returns 0 if dns_transaction_complete() has been called. In that case the transaction and query |
| 1692 |
* candidate objects may have been invalidated and must not be accessed. Returns 1 if the transaction |
| 1693 |
* has been prepared. */ |
| 1694 |
|
| 1695 |
dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t); |
| 1696 |
|
| 1697 |
if (t->n_attempts == 1 && t->seen_timeout) |
| 1698 |
t->scope->manager->n_timeouts_total++; |
| 1699 |
|
| 1700 |
if (!dns_scope_network_good(t->scope)) { |
| 1701 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK_DOWN); |
| 1702 |
return 0; |
| 1703 |
} |
| 1704 |
|
| 1705 |
if (t->n_attempts >= dns_transaction_attempts_max(t->scope->protocol, t->query_flags)) { |
| 1706 |
DnsTransactionState result; |
| 1707 |
|
| 1708 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR) |
| 1709 |
/* If we didn't find anything on LLMNR, it's not an error, but a failure to resolve |
| 1710 |
* the name. */ |
| 1711 |
result = DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND; |
| 1712 |
else |
| 1713 |
result = DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED; |
| 1714 |
|
| 1715 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, result); |
| 1716 |
return 0; |
| 1717 |
} |
| 1718 |
|
| 1719 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR && t->tried_stream) { |
| 1720 |
/* If we already tried via a stream, then we don't |
| 1721 |
* retry on LLMNR. See RFC 4795, Section 2.7. */ |
| 1722 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED); |
| 1723 |
return 0; |
| 1724 |
} |
| 1725 |
|
| 1726 |
t->n_attempts++; |
| 1727 |
t->start_usec = ts; |
| 1728 |
|
| 1729 |
dns_transaction_reset_answer(t); |
| 1730 |
dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(t); |
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
/* Check the trust anchor. Do so only on classic DNS, since DNSSEC does not apply otherwise. */ |
| 1733 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && |
| 1734 |
!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR)) { |
| 1735 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, dns_transaction_key(t), &t->answer); |
| 1736 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1737 |
return r; |
| 1738 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 1739 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 1740 |
t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR; |
| 1741 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED|SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true); |
| 1742 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS); |
| 1743 |
return 0; |
| 1744 |
} |
| 1745 |
|
| 1746 |
if (dns_name_is_root(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t))) && |
| 1747 |
dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { |
| 1748 |
|
| 1749 |
/* Hmm, this is a request for the root DS? A DS RR doesn't exist in the root zone, |
| 1750 |
* and if our trust anchor didn't know it either, this means we cannot do any DNSSEC |
| 1751 |
* logic anymore. */ |
| 1752 |
|
| 1753 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE) { |
| 1754 |
/* We are in downgrade mode. In this case, synthesize an unsigned empty |
| 1755 |
* response, so that the any lookup depending on this one can continue |
| 1756 |
* assuming there was no DS, and hence the root zone was unsigned. */ |
| 1757 |
|
| 1758 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 1759 |
t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR; |
| 1760 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false); |
| 1761 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true); |
| 1762 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS); |
| 1763 |
} else |
| 1764 |
/* If we are not in downgrade mode, then fail the lookup, because we cannot |
| 1765 |
* reasonably answer it. There might be DS RRs, but we don't know them, and |
| 1766 |
* the DNS server won't tell them to us (and even if it would, we couldn't |
| 1767 |
* validate and trust them. */ |
| 1768 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR); |
| 1769 |
|
| 1770 |
return 0; |
| 1771 |
} |
| 1772 |
} |
| 1773 |
|
| 1774 |
/* Check the zone. */ |
| 1775 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_ZONE)) { |
| 1776 |
r = dns_zone_lookup(&t->scope->zone, dns_transaction_key(t), dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope), &t->answer, NULL, NULL); |
| 1777 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1778 |
return r; |
| 1779 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 1780 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 1781 |
t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE; |
| 1782 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED|SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true); |
| 1783 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS); |
| 1784 |
return 0; |
| 1785 |
} |
| 1786 |
} |
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
/* Check the cache. */ |
| 1789 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_CACHE)) { |
| 1790 |
|
| 1791 |
/* Before trying the cache, let's make sure we figured out a server to use. Should this cause |
| 1792 |
* a change of server this might flush the cache. */ |
| 1793 |
(void) dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope); |
| 1794 |
|
| 1795 |
/* Let's then prune all outdated entries */ |
| 1796 |
dns_cache_prune(&t->scope->cache); |
| 1797 |
|
| 1798 |
/* For the initial attempt or when no stale data is requested, disable serve stale |
| 1799 |
* and answer the question from the cache (honors ttl property). |
| 1800 |
* On the second attempt, if StaleRetentionSec is greater than zero, |
| 1801 |
* try to answer the question using stale date (honors until property) */ |
| 1802 |
uint64_t query_flags = t->query_flags; |
| 1803 |
if (t->n_attempts == 1 || t->scope->manager->stale_retention_usec == 0) |
| 1804 |
query_flags |= SD_RESOLVED_NO_STALE; |
| 1805 |
|
| 1806 |
r = dns_cache_lookup( |
| 1807 |
&t->scope->cache, |
| 1808 |
dns_transaction_key(t), |
| 1809 |
query_flags, |
| 1810 |
&t->answer_rcode, |
| 1811 |
&t->answer, |
| 1812 |
&t->received, |
| 1813 |
&t->answer_query_flags, |
| 1814 |
&t->answer_dnssec_result); |
| 1815 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1816 |
return r; |
| 1817 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 1818 |
dns_transaction_randomize_answer(t); |
| 1819 |
|
| 1820 |
if (t->bypass && t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && !t->received) |
| 1821 |
/* When bypass mode is on, do not use cached data unless it came with a full |
| 1822 |
* packet. */ |
| 1823 |
dns_transaction_reset_answer(t); |
| 1824 |
else { |
| 1825 |
if (t->n_attempts > 1 && !FLAGS_SET(query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_STALE)) { |
| 1826 |
|
| 1827 |
if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS) { |
| 1828 |
if (t->seen_timeout) |
| 1829 |
t->scope->manager->n_timeouts_served_stale_total++; |
| 1830 |
else |
| 1831 |
t->scope->manager->n_failure_responses_served_stale_total++; |
| 1832 |
} |
| 1833 |
|
| 1834 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 1835 |
log_debug("Serve Stale response rcode=%s for %s", |
| 1836 |
FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(t->answer_rcode), |
| 1837 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str)); |
| 1838 |
} |
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 |
t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_CACHE; |
| 1841 |
if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS) |
| 1842 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS); |
| 1843 |
else { |
| 1844 |
if (t->received) |
| 1845 |
(void) dns_packet_ede_rcode(t->received, &t->answer_ede_rcode, &t->answer_ede_msg); |
| 1846 |
|
| 1847 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE); |
| 1848 |
} |
| 1849 |
return 0; |
| 1850 |
} |
| 1851 |
} |
| 1852 |
} |
| 1853 |
|
| 1854 |
if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_NETWORK)) { |
| 1855 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SOURCE); |
| 1856 |
return 0; |
| 1857 |
} |
| 1858 |
|
| 1859 |
return 1; |
| 1860 |
} |
| 1861 |
|
| 1862 |
static int dns_packet_append_zone(DnsPacket *p, DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *k, unsigned *nscount) { |
| 1863 |
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; |
| 1864 |
bool tentative; |
| 1865 |
int r; |
| 1866 |
|
| 1867 |
assert(p); |
| 1868 |
assert(t); |
| 1869 |
assert(k); |
| 1870 |
|
| 1871 |
if (k->type != DNS_TYPE_ANY) |
| 1872 |
return 0; |
| 1873 |
|
| 1874 |
r = dns_zone_lookup(&t->scope->zone, k, t->scope->link->ifindex, &answer, NULL, &tentative); |
| 1875 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1876 |
return r; |
| 1877 |
|
| 1878 |
return dns_packet_append_answer(p, answer, nscount); |
| 1879 |
} |
| 1880 |
|
| 1881 |
static int mdns_make_dummy_packet(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket **ret_packet, Set **ret_keys) { |
| 1882 |
_cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL; |
| 1883 |
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *keys = NULL; |
| 1884 |
bool add_known_answers = false; |
| 1885 |
unsigned qdcount; |
| 1886 |
usec_t ts; |
| 1887 |
int r; |
| 1888 |
|
| 1889 |
assert(t); |
| 1890 |
assert(t->scope); |
| 1891 |
assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS); |
| 1892 |
assert(ret_packet); |
| 1893 |
assert(ret_keys); |
| 1894 |
|
| 1895 |
r = dns_packet_new_query(&p, t->scope->protocol, 0, false); |
| 1896 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1897 |
return r; |
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(t), 0, NULL); |
| 1900 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1901 |
return r; |
| 1902 |
|
| 1903 |
qdcount = 1; |
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
if (dns_key_is_shared(dns_transaction_key(t))) |
| 1906 |
add_known_answers = true; |
| 1907 |
|
| 1908 |
r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL); |
| 1909 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1910 |
return r; |
| 1911 |
|
| 1912 |
/* Save appended keys */ |
| 1913 |
r = set_ensure_put(&keys, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 1914 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1915 |
return r; |
| 1916 |
|
| 1917 |
assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) >= 0); |
| 1918 |
|
| 1919 |
LIST_FOREACH(transactions_by_scope, other, t->scope->transactions) { |
| 1920 |
|
| 1921 |
/* Skip ourselves */ |
| 1922 |
if (other == t) |
| 1923 |
continue; |
| 1924 |
|
| 1925 |
if (other->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING) |
| 1926 |
continue; |
| 1927 |
|
| 1928 |
if (other->next_attempt_after > ts) |
| 1929 |
continue; |
| 1930 |
|
| 1931 |
if (!set_contains(keys, dns_transaction_key(other))) { |
| 1932 |
size_t saved_packet_size; |
| 1933 |
|
| 1934 |
r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(other), 0, &saved_packet_size); |
| 1935 |
/* If we can't stuff more questions into the packet, just give up. |
| 1936 |
* One of the 'other' transactions will fire later and take care of the rest. */ |
| 1937 |
if (r == -EMSGSIZE) |
| 1938 |
break; |
| 1939 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1940 |
return r; |
| 1941 |
|
| 1942 |
r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, dns_transaction_key(other), NULL); |
| 1943 |
if (r == -EMSGSIZE) { |
| 1944 |
dns_packet_truncate(p, saved_packet_size); |
| 1945 |
break; |
| 1946 |
} |
| 1947 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1948 |
return r; |
| 1949 |
|
| 1950 |
r = set_ensure_put(&keys, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops, dns_transaction_key(other)); |
| 1951 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1952 |
return r; |
| 1953 |
} |
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
r = dns_transaction_prepare(other, ts); |
| 1956 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1957 |
return r; |
| 1958 |
if (r == 0) |
| 1959 |
/* In this case, not only this transaction, but multiple transactions may be |
| 1960 |
* freed. Hence, we need to restart the loop. */ |
| 1961 |
return -EAGAIN; |
| 1962 |
|
| 1963 |
usec_t timeout = transaction_get_resend_timeout(other); |
| 1964 |
r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(other, timeout, usec_add(ts, timeout)); |
| 1965 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1966 |
return r; |
| 1967 |
|
| 1968 |
if (dns_key_is_shared(dns_transaction_key(other))) |
| 1969 |
add_known_answers = true; |
| 1970 |
|
| 1971 |
qdcount++; |
| 1972 |
if (qdcount >= UINT16_MAX) |
| 1973 |
break; |
| 1974 |
} |
| 1975 |
|
| 1976 |
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->qdcount = htobe16(qdcount); |
| 1977 |
|
| 1978 |
/* Append known answers section if we're asking for any shared record */ |
| 1979 |
if (add_known_answers) { |
| 1980 |
r = dns_cache_export_shared_to_packet(&t->scope->cache, p, ts, 0); |
| 1981 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1982 |
return r; |
| 1983 |
} |
| 1984 |
|
| 1985 |
*ret_packet = TAKE_PTR(p); |
| 1986 |
*ret_keys = TAKE_PTR(keys); |
| 1987 |
return add_known_answers; |
| 1988 |
} |
| 1989 |
|
| 1990 |
static int dns_transaction_make_packet_mdns(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 1991 |
_cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL, *dummy = NULL; |
| 1992 |
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *keys = NULL; |
| 1993 |
bool add_known_answers; |
| 1994 |
DnsResourceKey *k; |
| 1995 |
unsigned c; |
| 1996 |
int r; |
| 1997 |
|
| 1998 |
assert(t); |
| 1999 |
assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS); |
| 2000 |
|
| 2001 |
/* Discard any previously prepared packet, so we can start over and coalesce again */ |
| 2002 |
t->sent = dns_packet_unref(t->sent); |
| 2003 |
|
| 2004 |
/* First, create a dummy packet to calculate the number of known answers to be appended in the first packet. */ |
| 2005 |
for (;;) { |
| 2006 |
r = mdns_make_dummy_packet(t, &dummy, &keys); |
| 2007 |
if (r == -EAGAIN) |
| 2008 |
continue; |
| 2009 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2010 |
return r; |
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
add_known_answers = r; |
| 2013 |
break; |
| 2014 |
} |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
/* Then, create actual packet. */ |
| 2017 |
r = dns_packet_new_query(&p, t->scope->protocol, 0, false); |
| 2018 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2019 |
return r; |
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 |
/* Questions */ |
| 2022 |
c = 0; |
| 2023 |
SET_FOREACH(k, keys) { |
| 2024 |
r = dns_packet_append_key(p, k, 0, NULL); |
| 2025 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2026 |
return r; |
| 2027 |
c++; |
| 2028 |
} |
| 2029 |
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->qdcount = htobe16(c); |
| 2030 |
|
| 2031 |
/* Known answers */ |
| 2032 |
if (add_known_answers) { |
| 2033 |
usec_t ts; |
| 2034 |
|
| 2035 |
assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) >= 0); |
| 2036 |
|
| 2037 |
r = dns_cache_export_shared_to_packet(&t->scope->cache, p, ts, be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(dummy)->ancount)); |
| 2038 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2039 |
return r; |
| 2040 |
} |
| 2041 |
|
| 2042 |
/* Authorities */ |
| 2043 |
c = 0; |
| 2044 |
SET_FOREACH(k, keys) { |
| 2045 |
r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, k, &c); |
| 2046 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2047 |
return r; |
| 2048 |
} |
| 2049 |
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->nscount = htobe16(c); |
| 2050 |
|
| 2051 |
t->sent = TAKE_PTR(p); |
| 2052 |
return 0; |
| 2053 |
} |
| 2054 |
|
| 2055 |
static int dns_transaction_make_packet(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2056 |
_cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL; |
| 2057 |
int r; |
| 2058 |
|
| 2059 |
assert(t); |
| 2060 |
|
| 2061 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS) |
| 2062 |
return dns_transaction_make_packet_mdns(t); |
| 2063 |
|
| 2064 |
if (t->sent) |
| 2065 |
return 0; |
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
if (t->bypass && t->bypass->protocol == t->scope->protocol) { |
| 2068 |
/* If bypass logic is enabled and the protocol if the original packet and our scope match, |
| 2069 |
* take the original packet, copy it, and patch in our new ID */ |
| 2070 |
r = dns_packet_dup(&p, t->bypass); |
| 2071 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2072 |
return r; |
| 2073 |
} else { |
| 2074 |
r = dns_packet_new_query( |
| 2075 |
&p, t->scope->protocol, |
| 2076 |
/* min_alloc_dsize= */ 0, |
| 2077 |
/* dnssec_checking_disabled= */ !FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) && |
| 2078 |
t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_NO); |
| 2079 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2080 |
return r; |
| 2081 |
|
| 2082 |
r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(t), 0, NULL); |
| 2083 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2084 |
return r; |
| 2085 |
|
| 2086 |
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->qdcount = htobe16(1); |
| 2087 |
} |
| 2088 |
|
| 2089 |
DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->id = t->id; |
| 2090 |
|
| 2091 |
t->sent = TAKE_PTR(p); |
| 2092 |
return 0; |
| 2093 |
} |
| 2094 |
|
| 2095 |
int dns_transaction_go(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2096 |
usec_t ts; |
| 2097 |
int r; |
| 2098 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 2099 |
|
| 2100 |
assert(t); |
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 |
/* Returns > 0 if the transaction is now pending, returns 0 if could be processed immediately and has |
| 2103 |
* finished now. In the latter case, the transaction and query candidate objects must not be accessed. |
| 2104 |
*/ |
| 2105 |
|
| 2106 |
assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) >= 0); |
| 2107 |
|
| 2108 |
r = dns_transaction_prepare(t, ts); |
| 2109 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 2110 |
return r; |
| 2111 |
|
| 2112 |
log_debug("Firing %s transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> scope %s on %s/%s (validate=%s).", |
| 2113 |
t->bypass ? "bypass" : "regular", |
| 2114 |
t->id, |
| 2115 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str), |
| 2116 |
dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol), |
| 2117 |
t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*", |
| 2118 |
af_to_name_short(t->scope->family), |
| 2119 |
yes_no(!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE))); |
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 |
if (!t->initial_jitter_scheduled && |
| 2122 |
IN_SET(t->scope->protocol, DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR, DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS)) { |
| 2123 |
usec_t jitter; |
| 2124 |
|
| 2125 |
/* RFC 4795 Section 2.7 suggests all LLMNR queries should be delayed by a random time from 0 to |
| 2126 |
* JITTER_INTERVAL. |
| 2127 |
* RFC 6762 Section 8.1 suggests initial probe queries should be delayed by a random time from |
| 2128 |
* 0 to 250ms. */ |
| 2129 |
|
| 2130 |
t->initial_jitter_scheduled = true; |
| 2131 |
t->n_attempts = 0; |
| 2132 |
|
| 2133 |
switch (t->scope->protocol) { |
| 2134 |
|
| 2135 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR: |
| 2136 |
jitter = random_u64_range(LLMNR_JITTER_INTERVAL_USEC); |
| 2137 |
break; |
| 2138 |
|
| 2139 |
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS: |
| 2140 |
if (t->probing) |
| 2141 |
jitter = random_u64_range(MDNS_PROBING_INTERVAL_USEC); |
| 2142 |
else |
| 2143 |
jitter = 0; |
| 2144 |
break; |
| 2145 |
default: |
| 2146 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 2147 |
} |
| 2148 |
|
| 2149 |
r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(t, jitter, ts); |
| 2150 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2151 |
return r; |
| 2152 |
|
| 2153 |
log_debug("Delaying %s transaction %" PRIu16 " for " USEC_FMT "us.", |
| 2154 |
dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol), |
| 2155 |
t->id, |
| 2156 |
jitter); |
| 2157 |
return 1; |
| 2158 |
} |
| 2159 |
|
| 2160 |
/* Otherwise, we need to ask the network */ |
| 2161 |
r = dns_transaction_make_packet(t); |
| 2162 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2163 |
return r; |
| 2164 |
|
| 2165 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR && |
| 2166 |
(dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), "in-addr.arpa") > 0 || |
| 2167 |
dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), "ip6.arpa") > 0)) { |
| 2168 |
|
| 2169 |
/* RFC 4795, Section 2.4. says reverse lookups shall |
| 2170 |
* always be made via TCP on LLMNR */ |
| 2171 |
r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t); |
| 2172 |
} else { |
| 2173 |
/* Try via UDP, and if that fails due to large size or lack of |
| 2174 |
* support try via TCP */ |
| 2175 |
r = dns_transaction_emit_udp(t); |
| 2176 |
if (r == -EMSGSIZE) |
| 2177 |
log_debug("Sending query via TCP since it is too large."); |
| 2178 |
else if (r == -EAGAIN) |
| 2179 |
log_debug("Sending query via TCP since UDP isn't supported or DNS-over-TLS is selected."); |
| 2180 |
else if (r == -EPERM) |
| 2181 |
log_debug("Sending query via TCP since UDP is blocked."); |
| 2182 |
if (IN_SET(r, -EMSGSIZE, -EAGAIN, -EPERM)) |
| 2183 |
r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t); |
| 2184 |
} |
| 2185 |
if (r == -ELOOP) { |
| 2186 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 2187 |
return r; |
| 2188 |
|
| 2189 |
/* One of our own stub listeners */ |
| 2190 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Detected that specified DNS server is our own extra listener, switching DNS servers."); |
| 2191 |
|
| 2192 |
dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server); |
| 2193 |
|
| 2194 |
if (dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope) == t->server) { |
| 2195 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Still pointing to extra listener after switching DNS servers, refusing operation."); |
| 2196 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_STUB_LOOP); |
| 2197 |
return 0; |
| 2198 |
} |
| 2199 |
|
| 2200 |
return dns_transaction_go(t); |
| 2201 |
} |
| 2202 |
if (r == -ESRCH) { |
| 2203 |
/* No servers to send this to? */ |
| 2204 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS); |
| 2205 |
return 0; |
| 2206 |
} |
| 2207 |
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
| 2208 |
/* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */ |
| 2209 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED); |
| 2210 |
return 0; |
| 2211 |
} |
| 2212 |
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR && ERRNO_IS_NEG_DISCONNECT(r)) { |
| 2213 |
/* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to a host via TCP when doing reverse lookups. This means we cannot |
| 2214 |
* answer this request with this protocol. */ |
| 2215 |
dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND); |
| 2216 |
return 0; |
| 2217 |
} |
| 2218 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 2219 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 2220 |
return r; |
| 2221 |
|
| 2222 |
/* Couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */ |
| 2223 |
dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server); |
| 2224 |
|
| 2225 |
return dns_transaction_go(t); |
| 2226 |
} |
| 2227 |
|
| 2228 |
usec_t timeout = transaction_get_resend_timeout(t); |
| 2229 |
r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(t, timeout, usec_add(ts, timeout)); |
| 2230 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2231 |
return r; |
| 2232 |
|
| 2233 |
return 1; |
| 2234 |
} |
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
static int dns_transaction_find_cyclic(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransaction *aux) { |
| 2237 |
DnsTransaction *n; |
| 2238 |
int r; |
| 2239 |
|
| 2240 |
assert(t); |
| 2241 |
assert(aux); |
| 2242 |
|
| 2243 |
/* Try to find cyclic dependencies between transaction objects */ |
| 2244 |
|
| 2245 |
if (t == aux) |
| 2246 |
return 1; |
| 2247 |
|
| 2248 |
SET_FOREACH(n, aux->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 2249 |
r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, n); |
| 2250 |
if (r != 0) |
| 2251 |
return r; |
| 2252 |
} |
| 2253 |
|
| 2254 |
return 0; |
| 2255 |
} |
| 2256 |
|
| 2257 |
static int dns_transaction_add_dnssec_transaction(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsTransaction **ret) { |
| 2258 |
_cleanup_(dns_transaction_gcp) DnsTransaction *aux = NULL; |
| 2259 |
int r; |
| 2260 |
|
| 2261 |
assert(t); |
| 2262 |
assert(ret); |
| 2263 |
assert(key); |
| 2264 |
|
| 2265 |
aux = dns_scope_find_transaction(t->scope, key, t->query_flags); |
| 2266 |
if (!aux) { |
| 2267 |
r = dns_transaction_new(&aux, t->scope, key, NULL, t->query_flags); |
| 2268 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2269 |
return r; |
| 2270 |
} else { |
| 2271 |
if (set_contains(t->dnssec_transactions, aux)) { |
| 2272 |
*ret = aux; |
| 2273 |
return 0; |
| 2274 |
} |
| 2275 |
|
| 2276 |
r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, aux); |
| 2277 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2278 |
return r; |
| 2279 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 2280 |
char s[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX], saux[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 2281 |
|
| 2282 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), |
| 2283 |
"Potential cyclic dependency, refusing to add transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s) as dependency for %" PRIu16 " (%s).", |
| 2284 |
aux->id, |
| 2285 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), s, sizeof s), |
| 2286 |
t->id, |
| 2287 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(aux), saux, sizeof saux)); |
| 2288 |
} |
| 2289 |
} |
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
r = set_ensure_allocated(&aux->notify_transactions_done, NULL); |
| 2292 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2293 |
return r; |
| 2294 |
|
| 2295 |
r = set_ensure_put(&t->dnssec_transactions, NULL, aux); |
| 2296 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2297 |
return r; |
| 2298 |
|
| 2299 |
r = set_ensure_put(&aux->notify_transactions, NULL, t); |
| 2300 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 2301 |
(void) set_remove(t->dnssec_transactions, aux); |
| 2302 |
return r; |
| 2303 |
} |
| 2304 |
|
| 2305 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(aux); |
| 2306 |
return 1; |
| 2307 |
} |
| 2308 |
|
| 2309 |
static int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr_full(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsTransaction **ret) { |
| 2310 |
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *a = NULL; |
| 2311 |
DnsTransaction *aux; |
| 2312 |
int r; |
| 2313 |
|
| 2314 |
assert(t); |
| 2315 |
assert(key); |
| 2316 |
|
| 2317 |
/* Try to get the data from the trust anchor */ |
| 2318 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, key, &a); |
| 2319 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2320 |
return r; |
| 2321 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 2322 |
r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, a); |
| 2323 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2324 |
return r; |
| 2325 |
|
| 2326 |
if (ret) |
| 2327 |
*ret = NULL; |
| 2328 |
return 0; |
| 2329 |
} |
| 2330 |
|
| 2331 |
/* This didn't work, ask for it via the network/cache then. */ |
| 2332 |
r = dns_transaction_add_dnssec_transaction(t, key, &aux); |
| 2333 |
if (r == -ELOOP) { /* This would result in a cyclic dependency */ |
| 2334 |
if (ret) |
| 2335 |
*ret = NULL; |
| 2336 |
return 0; |
| 2337 |
} |
| 2338 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2339 |
return r; |
| 2340 |
|
| 2341 |
if (aux->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL) { |
| 2342 |
r = dns_transaction_go(aux); |
| 2343 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2344 |
return r; |
| 2345 |
} |
| 2346 |
if (ret) |
| 2347 |
*ret = aux; |
| 2348 |
|
| 2349 |
return 1; |
| 2350 |
} |
| 2351 |
|
| 2352 |
static int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key) { |
| 2353 |
assert(t); |
| 2354 |
assert(key); |
| 2355 |
return dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr_full(t, key, NULL); |
| 2356 |
} |
| 2357 |
|
| 2358 |
static int dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(DnsTransaction *t, const char *name) { |
| 2359 |
int r; |
| 2360 |
|
| 2361 |
assert(t); |
| 2362 |
|
| 2363 |
/* Check whether the specified name is in the NTA |
| 2364 |
* database, either in the global one, or the link-local |
| 2365 |
* one. */ |
| 2366 |
|
| 2367 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, name); |
| 2368 |
if (r != 0) |
| 2369 |
return r; |
| 2370 |
|
| 2371 |
if (!t->scope->link) |
| 2372 |
return 0; |
| 2373 |
|
| 2374 |
return link_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t->scope->link, name); |
| 2375 |
} |
| 2376 |
|
| 2377 |
static int dns_transaction_has_negative_answer(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2378 |
int r; |
| 2379 |
|
| 2380 |
assert(t); |
| 2381 |
|
| 2382 |
/* Checks whether the answer is negative, and lacks NSEC/NSEC3 |
| 2383 |
* RRs to prove it */ |
| 2384 |
|
| 2385 |
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL); |
| 2386 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2387 |
return r; |
| 2388 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2389 |
return false; |
| 2390 |
|
| 2391 |
/* Is this key explicitly listed as a negative trust anchor? |
| 2392 |
* If so, it's nothing we need to care about */ |
| 2393 |
r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t))); |
| 2394 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2395 |
return r; |
| 2396 |
return !r; |
| 2397 |
} |
| 2398 |
|
| 2399 |
static int dns_transaction_is_primary_response(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 2400 |
int r; |
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
assert(t); |
| 2403 |
assert(rr); |
| 2404 |
|
| 2405 |
/* Check if the specified RR is the "primary" response, |
| 2406 |
* i.e. either matches the question precisely or is a |
| 2407 |
* CNAME/DNAME for it. */ |
| 2408 |
|
| 2409 |
r = dns_resource_key_match_rr(dns_transaction_key(t), rr, NULL); |
| 2410 |
if (r != 0) |
| 2411 |
return r; |
| 2412 |
|
| 2413 |
return dns_resource_key_match_cname_or_dname(dns_transaction_key(t), rr->key, NULL); |
| 2414 |
} |
| 2415 |
|
| 2416 |
static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2417 |
assert(t); |
| 2418 |
|
| 2419 |
/* Checks whether our transaction's DNS server is assumed to be compatible with DNSSEC. Returns false as soon |
| 2420 |
* as we changed our mind about a server, and now believe it is incompatible with DNSSEC. */ |
| 2421 |
|
| 2422 |
if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) |
| 2423 |
return false; |
| 2424 |
|
| 2425 |
/* If we have picked no server, then we are working from the cache or some other source, and DNSSEC might well |
| 2426 |
* be supported, hence return true. */ |
| 2427 |
if (!t->server) |
| 2428 |
return true; |
| 2429 |
|
| 2430 |
/* Note that we do not check the feature level actually used for the transaction but instead the feature level |
| 2431 |
* the server is known to support currently, as the transaction feature level might be lower than what the |
| 2432 |
* server actually supports, since we might have downgraded this transaction's feature level because we got a |
| 2433 |
* SERVFAIL earlier and wanted to check whether downgrading fixes it. */ |
| 2434 |
|
| 2435 |
return dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server); |
| 2436 |
} |
| 2437 |
|
| 2438 |
static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_supported_full(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2439 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 2440 |
|
| 2441 |
assert(t); |
| 2442 |
|
| 2443 |
/* Checks whether our transaction our any of the auxiliary transactions couldn't do DNSSEC. */ |
| 2444 |
|
| 2445 |
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t)) |
| 2446 |
return false; |
| 2447 |
|
| 2448 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) |
| 2449 |
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(dt)) |
| 2450 |
return false; |
| 2451 |
|
| 2452 |
return true; |
| 2453 |
} |
| 2454 |
|
| 2455 |
int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2456 |
DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
| 2457 |
|
| 2458 |
/* Have we already requested a record that would be sufficient to validate an insecure delegation? */ |
| 2459 |
bool chased_insecure = false; |
| 2460 |
int r; |
| 2461 |
|
| 2462 |
assert(t); |
| 2463 |
|
| 2464 |
/* |
| 2465 |
* Retrieve all auxiliary RRs for the answer we got, so that |
| 2466 |
* we can verify signatures or prove that RRs are rightfully |
| 2467 |
* unsigned. Specifically: |
| 2468 |
* |
| 2469 |
* - For RRSIG we get the matching DNSKEY |
| 2470 |
* - For DNSKEY we get the matching DS |
| 2471 |
* - For unsigned SOA/NS we get the matching DS |
| 2472 |
* - For unsigned CNAME/DNAME/DS we get the parent DS RR |
| 2473 |
* - For other unsigned RRs we get the matching DS RR |
| 2474 |
* - For SOA/NS queries with no matching response RR, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the DS RR |
| 2475 |
* - For DS queries with no matching response RRs, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the parent's DS RR |
| 2476 |
* - For other queries with no matching response RRs, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the DS RR |
| 2477 |
*/ |
| 2478 |
|
| 2479 |
if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) || t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO) |
| 2480 |
return 0; |
| 2481 |
if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK) |
| 2482 |
return 0; /* We only need to validate stuff from the network */ |
| 2483 |
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t)) |
| 2484 |
return 0; /* If we can't do DNSSEC anyway there's no point in getting the auxiliary RRs */ |
| 2485 |
|
| 2486 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) { |
| 2487 |
|
| 2488 |
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type)) |
| 2489 |
continue; |
| 2490 |
|
| 2491 |
/* If this RR is in the negative trust anchor, we don't need to validate it. */ |
| 2492 |
r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2493 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2494 |
return r; |
| 2495 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2496 |
continue; |
| 2497 |
|
| 2498 |
switch (rr->key->type) { |
| 2499 |
|
| 2500 |
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: { |
| 2501 |
/* For each RRSIG we request the matching DNSKEY */ |
| 2502 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *dnskey = NULL; |
| 2503 |
DnsTransaction *aux; |
| 2504 |
|
| 2505 |
/* If this RRSIG is about a DNSKEY RR and the |
| 2506 |
* signer is the same as the owner, then we |
| 2507 |
* already have the DNSKEY, and we don't have |
| 2508 |
* to look for more. */ |
| 2509 |
if (rr->rrsig.type_covered == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) { |
| 2510 |
r = dns_name_equal(rr->rrsig.signer, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2511 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2512 |
return r; |
| 2513 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2514 |
continue; |
| 2515 |
} |
| 2516 |
|
| 2517 |
/* If the signer is not a parent of our |
| 2518 |
* original query, then this is about an |
| 2519 |
* auxiliary RRset, but not anything we asked |
| 2520 |
* for. In this case we aren't interested, |
| 2521 |
* because we don't want to request additional |
| 2522 |
* RRs for stuff we didn't really ask for, and |
| 2523 |
* also to avoid request loops, where |
| 2524 |
* additional RRs from one transaction result |
| 2525 |
* in another transaction whose additional RRs |
| 2526 |
* point back to the original transaction, and |
| 2527 |
* we deadlock. */ |
| 2528 |
r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), rr->rrsig.signer); |
| 2529 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2530 |
return r; |
| 2531 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2532 |
continue; |
| 2533 |
|
| 2534 |
dnskey = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, rr->rrsig.signer); |
| 2535 |
if (!dnskey) |
| 2536 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2537 |
|
| 2538 |
log_debug("Requesting DNSKEY to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, RRSIG with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").", |
| 2539 |
t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->rrsig.key_tag); |
| 2540 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr_full(t, dnskey, &aux); |
| 2541 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2542 |
return r; |
| 2543 |
|
| 2544 |
/* If we are requesting a DNSKEY, we can anticipate that we will want the matching DS |
| 2545 |
* in the near future. Let's request it in advance so we don't have to wait in the |
| 2546 |
* common case. */ |
| 2547 |
if (aux) { |
| 2548 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = |
| 2549 |
dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(dnskey)); |
| 2550 |
if (!ds) |
| 2551 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2552 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2553 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2554 |
return r; |
| 2555 |
} |
| 2556 |
break; |
| 2557 |
} |
| 2558 |
|
| 2559 |
case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY: { |
| 2560 |
/* For each DNSKEY we request the matching DS */ |
| 2561 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL; |
| 2562 |
|
| 2563 |
/* If the DNSKEY we are looking at is not for |
| 2564 |
* zone we are interested in, nor any of its |
| 2565 |
* parents, we aren't interested, and don't |
| 2566 |
* request it. After all, we don't want to end |
| 2567 |
* up in request loops, and want to keep |
| 2568 |
* additional traffic down. */ |
| 2569 |
|
| 2570 |
r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2571 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2572 |
return r; |
| 2573 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2574 |
continue; |
| 2575 |
|
| 2576 |
ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2577 |
if (!ds) |
| 2578 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2579 |
|
| 2580 |
log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, DNSKEY with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").", |
| 2581 |
t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dnssec_keytag(rr, false)); |
| 2582 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2583 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2584 |
return r; |
| 2585 |
|
| 2586 |
break; |
| 2587 |
} |
| 2588 |
|
| 2589 |
case DNS_TYPE_SOA: |
| 2590 |
case DNS_TYPE_NS: { |
| 2591 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL; |
| 2592 |
|
| 2593 |
/* For an unsigned SOA or NS, try to acquire |
| 2594 |
* the matching DS RR, as we are at a zone cut |
| 2595 |
* then, and whether a DS exists tells us |
| 2596 |
* whether the zone is signed. Do so only if |
| 2597 |
* this RR matches our original question, |
| 2598 |
* however. */ |
| 2599 |
|
| 2600 |
r = dns_resource_key_match_rr(dns_transaction_key(t), rr, NULL); |
| 2601 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2602 |
return r; |
| 2603 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 2604 |
/* Hmm, so this SOA RR doesn't match our original question. In this case, maybe this is |
| 2605 |
* a negative reply, and we need the SOA RR's TTL in order to cache a negative entry? |
| 2606 |
* If so, we need to validate it, too. */ |
| 2607 |
|
| 2608 |
r = dns_answer_match_key(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL); |
| 2609 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2610 |
return r; |
| 2611 |
if (r > 0) /* positive reply, we won't need the SOA and hence don't need to validate |
| 2612 |
* it. */ |
| 2613 |
continue; |
| 2614 |
|
| 2615 |
/* Only bother with this if the SOA/NS RR we are looking at is actually a parent of |
| 2616 |
* what we are looking for, otherwise there's no value in it for us. */ |
| 2617 |
r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2618 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2619 |
return r; |
| 2620 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2621 |
continue; |
| 2622 |
|
| 2623 |
/* If we were looking for the DS RR, don't request it again. */ |
| 2624 |
r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2625 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2626 |
return r; |
| 2627 |
if (r > 0 && dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2628 |
continue; |
| 2629 |
} |
| 2630 |
|
| 2631 |
r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key); |
| 2632 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2633 |
return r; |
| 2634 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2635 |
continue; |
| 2636 |
|
| 2637 |
chased_insecure = true; |
| 2638 |
ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2639 |
if (!ds) |
| 2640 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2641 |
|
| 2642 |
log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned SOA/NS RRset).", |
| 2643 |
t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2644 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2645 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2646 |
return r; |
| 2647 |
|
| 2648 |
break; |
| 2649 |
} |
| 2650 |
|
| 2651 |
case DNS_TYPE_DS: |
| 2652 |
case DNS_TYPE_CNAME: |
| 2653 |
case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: { |
| 2654 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL; |
| 2655 |
const char *name; |
| 2656 |
|
| 2657 |
/* CNAMEs and DNAMEs cannot be located at a |
| 2658 |
* zone apex, hence ask for the parent DS for |
| 2659 |
* unsigned CNAME/DNAME RRs, maybe that's the |
| 2660 |
* apex. But do all that only if this is |
| 2661 |
* actually a response to our original |
| 2662 |
* question. |
| 2663 |
* |
| 2664 |
* Similar for DS RRs, which are signed when |
| 2665 |
* the parent SOA is signed. */ |
| 2666 |
|
| 2667 |
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr); |
| 2668 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2669 |
return r; |
| 2670 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2671 |
continue; |
| 2672 |
|
| 2673 |
r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key); |
| 2674 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2675 |
return r; |
| 2676 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2677 |
continue; |
| 2678 |
|
| 2679 |
r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(t->answer, rr); |
| 2680 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2681 |
return r; |
| 2682 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2683 |
continue; |
| 2684 |
|
| 2685 |
name = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); |
| 2686 |
r = dns_name_parent(&name); |
| 2687 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2688 |
return r; |
| 2689 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2690 |
continue; |
| 2691 |
|
| 2692 |
ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, name); |
| 2693 |
if (!ds) |
| 2694 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2695 |
|
| 2696 |
log_debug("Requesting parent DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned CNAME/DNAME/DS RRset).", |
| 2697 |
t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2698 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2699 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2700 |
return r; |
| 2701 |
|
| 2702 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE && dns_name_is_root(name)) { |
| 2703 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *soa = NULL; |
| 2704 |
/* We made it all the way to the root zone. If we are in allow-downgrade |
| 2705 |
* mode, we need to make at least one request that we can be certain should |
| 2706 |
* have been signed, to test for servers that are not dnssec aware. */ |
| 2707 |
soa = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_SOA, name); |
| 2708 |
if (!soa) |
| 2709 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2710 |
|
| 2711 |
log_debug("Requesting root zone SOA to probe dnssec support."); |
| 2712 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa); |
| 2713 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2714 |
return r; |
| 2715 |
} |
| 2716 |
|
| 2717 |
break; |
| 2718 |
} |
| 2719 |
|
| 2720 |
default: { |
| 2721 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL; |
| 2722 |
|
| 2723 |
/* For other unsigned RRsets (including |
| 2724 |
* NSEC/NSEC3!), look for proof the zone is |
| 2725 |
* unsigned, by requesting the DS RR of the |
| 2726 |
* zone. However, do so only if they are |
| 2727 |
* directly relevant to our original |
| 2728 |
* question. */ |
| 2729 |
|
| 2730 |
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr); |
| 2731 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2732 |
return r; |
| 2733 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2734 |
continue; |
| 2735 |
|
| 2736 |
r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key); |
| 2737 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2738 |
return r; |
| 2739 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2740 |
continue; |
| 2741 |
|
| 2742 |
ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2743 |
if (!ds) |
| 2744 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2745 |
|
| 2746 |
log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned non-SOA/NS RRset <%s>).", |
| 2747 |
t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)); |
| 2748 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2749 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2750 |
return r; |
| 2751 |
break; |
| 2752 |
}} |
| 2753 |
} |
| 2754 |
|
| 2755 |
/* Above, we requested everything necessary to validate what |
| 2756 |
* we got. Now, let's request what we need to validate what we |
| 2757 |
* didn't get... */ |
| 2758 |
|
| 2759 |
r = dns_transaction_has_negative_answer(t); |
| 2760 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2761 |
return r; |
| 2762 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 2763 |
const char *name = dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 2764 |
bool was_signed = dns_answer_contains_nsec_or_nsec3(t->answer); |
| 2765 |
|
| 2766 |
/* If the response is empty, seek the DS for this name, just in case we're at a zone cut |
| 2767 |
* already, unless we just requested the DS, in which case we have to ask the parent to make |
| 2768 |
* progress. |
| 2769 |
* |
| 2770 |
* If this was an SOA or NS request, we could also skip to the parent, but in real world |
| 2771 |
* setups there are too many broken DNS servers (Hello, incapdns.net!) where non-terminal |
| 2772 |
* zones return NXDOMAIN even though they have further children. */ |
| 2773 |
|
| 2774 |
if (chased_insecure || was_signed) |
| 2775 |
/* In this case we already requested what we need above. */ |
| 2776 |
name = NULL; |
| 2777 |
else if (dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2778 |
/* If the DS response is empty, we'll walk up the dns labels requesting DS until we |
| 2779 |
* find a referral to the SOA or hit it anyway and get a positive DS response. */ |
| 2780 |
if (dns_name_parent(&name) <= 0) |
| 2781 |
name = NULL; |
| 2782 |
|
| 2783 |
if (name) { |
| 2784 |
_cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL; |
| 2785 |
|
| 2786 |
log_debug("Requesting DS (%s %s) to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s empty response).", |
| 2787 |
glyph(GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), name, t->id, |
| 2788 |
dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t))); |
| 2789 |
|
| 2790 |
ds = dns_resource_key_new(dns_transaction_key(t)->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, name); |
| 2791 |
if (!ds) |
| 2792 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 2793 |
|
| 2794 |
r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds); |
| 2795 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2796 |
return r; |
| 2797 |
} |
| 2798 |
} |
| 2799 |
|
| 2800 |
return dns_transaction_dnssec_is_live(t); |
| 2801 |
} |
| 2802 |
|
| 2803 |
DnsResourceKey* dns_transaction_key(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2804 |
assert(t); |
| 2805 |
|
| 2806 |
/* Return the lookup key of this transaction. Either takes the lookup key from the bypass packet if |
| 2807 |
* we are a bypass transaction. Or take the configured key for regular transactions. */ |
| 2808 |
|
| 2809 |
if (t->key) |
| 2810 |
return t->key; |
| 2811 |
|
| 2812 |
assert(t->bypass); |
| 2813 |
|
| 2814 |
return dns_question_first_key(t->bypass->question); |
| 2815 |
} |
| 2816 |
|
| 2817 |
void dns_transaction_notify(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransaction *source) { |
| 2818 |
assert(t); |
| 2819 |
assert(source); |
| 2820 |
|
| 2821 |
/* Invoked whenever any of our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions completed its work. If the state is still PENDING, |
| 2822 |
we are still in the loop that adds further DNSSEC transactions, hence don't check if we are ready yet. If |
| 2823 |
the state is VALIDATING however, we should check if we are complete now. */ |
| 2824 |
|
| 2825 |
if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING) |
| 2826 |
dns_transaction_process_dnssec(t); |
| 2827 |
} |
| 2828 |
|
| 2829 |
static int dns_transaction_validate_dnskey_by_ds(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 2830 |
DnsAnswerItem *item; |
| 2831 |
int r; |
| 2832 |
|
| 2833 |
assert(t); |
| 2834 |
|
| 2835 |
/* Add all DNSKEY RRs from the answer that are validated by DS |
| 2836 |
* RRs from the list of validated keys to the list of |
| 2837 |
* validated keys. */ |
| 2838 |
|
| 2839 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_ITEM(item, t->answer) { |
| 2840 |
|
| 2841 |
r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(item->rr, t->validated_keys); |
| 2842 |
if (r < 0 && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| 2843 |
return r; |
| 2844 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2845 |
continue; |
| 2846 |
|
| 2847 |
/* If so, the DNSKEY is validated too, but only mark it authenticated if the DS verification |
| 2848 |
* succeeded with a known algorithm. */ |
| 2849 |
if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| 2850 |
r = dns_answer_add_extend(&t->validated_keys, item->rr, item->ifindex, item->flags, NULL); |
| 2851 |
else |
| 2852 |
r = dns_answer_add_extend(&t->validated_keys, item->rr, item->ifindex, item->flags|DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, item->rrsig); |
| 2853 |
|
| 2854 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2855 |
return r; |
| 2856 |
} |
| 2857 |
|
| 2858 |
return 0; |
| 2859 |
} |
| 2860 |
|
| 2861 |
static int dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 2862 |
int r; |
| 2863 |
|
| 2864 |
assert(t); |
| 2865 |
assert(rr); |
| 2866 |
|
| 2867 |
/* Checks if the RR we are looking for must be signed with an |
| 2868 |
* RRSIG. This is used for positive responses. */ |
| 2869 |
|
| 2870 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO) |
| 2871 |
return false; |
| 2872 |
|
| 2873 |
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type)) |
| 2874 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 2875 |
|
| 2876 |
r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 2877 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2878 |
return r; |
| 2879 |
if (r > 0) |
| 2880 |
return false; |
| 2881 |
|
| 2882 |
switch (rr->key->type) { |
| 2883 |
|
| 2884 |
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: |
| 2885 |
/* RRSIGs are the signatures themselves, they need no signing. */ |
| 2886 |
return false; |
| 2887 |
|
| 2888 |
case DNS_TYPE_SOA: |
| 2889 |
case DNS_TYPE_NS: { |
| 2890 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 2891 |
|
| 2892 |
/* For SOA or NS RRs we look for a matching DS transaction */ |
| 2893 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 2894 |
|
| 2895 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class) |
| 2896 |
continue; |
| 2897 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2898 |
continue; |
| 2899 |
|
| 2900 |
r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt))); |
| 2901 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2902 |
return r; |
| 2903 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2904 |
continue; |
| 2905 |
|
| 2906 |
/* We found a DS transactions for the SOA/NS |
| 2907 |
* RRs we are looking at. If it discovered signed DS |
| 2908 |
* RRs, then we need to be signed, too. */ |
| 2909 |
|
| 2910 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 2911 |
return false; |
| 2912 |
|
| 2913 |
return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL); |
| 2914 |
} |
| 2915 |
|
| 2916 |
/* We found nothing that proves this is safe to leave |
| 2917 |
* this unauthenticated, hence ask inist on |
| 2918 |
* authentication. */ |
| 2919 |
return true; |
| 2920 |
} |
| 2921 |
|
| 2922 |
case DNS_TYPE_DS: |
| 2923 |
case DNS_TYPE_CNAME: |
| 2924 |
case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: { |
| 2925 |
const char *parent = NULL; |
| 2926 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 2927 |
|
| 2928 |
/* |
| 2929 |
* CNAME/DNAME RRs cannot be located at a zone apex, hence look directly for the parent DS. |
| 2930 |
* |
| 2931 |
* DS RRs are signed if the parent is signed, hence also look at the parent DS |
| 2932 |
*/ |
| 2933 |
|
| 2934 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 2935 |
|
| 2936 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class) |
| 2937 |
continue; |
| 2938 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2939 |
continue; |
| 2940 |
|
| 2941 |
if (!parent) { |
| 2942 |
parent = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); |
| 2943 |
r = dns_name_parent(&parent); |
| 2944 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2945 |
return r; |
| 2946 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 2947 |
if (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2948 |
return true; |
| 2949 |
|
| 2950 |
/* A CNAME/DNAME without a parent? That's sooo weird. */ |
| 2951 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), |
| 2952 |
"Transaction %" PRIu16 " claims CNAME/DNAME at root. Refusing.", t->id); |
| 2953 |
} |
| 2954 |
} |
| 2955 |
|
| 2956 |
r = dns_name_endswith(parent, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt))); |
| 2957 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2958 |
return r; |
| 2959 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2960 |
continue; |
| 2961 |
|
| 2962 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 2963 |
return false; |
| 2964 |
|
| 2965 |
/* We expect this to be signed when the DS record exists, and don't expect it to be |
| 2966 |
* signed when the DS record is proven not to exist. */ |
| 2967 |
return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL); |
| 2968 |
} |
| 2969 |
|
| 2970 |
return true; |
| 2971 |
} |
| 2972 |
|
| 2973 |
default: { |
| 2974 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 2975 |
|
| 2976 |
/* Any other kind of RR (including DNSKEY/NSEC/NSEC3). Let's see if our DS lookup was authenticated */ |
| 2977 |
|
| 2978 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 2979 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class) |
| 2980 |
continue; |
| 2981 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 2982 |
continue; |
| 2983 |
|
| 2984 |
r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt))); |
| 2985 |
if (r < 0) |
| 2986 |
return r; |
| 2987 |
if (r == 0) |
| 2988 |
continue; |
| 2989 |
|
| 2990 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 2991 |
return false; |
| 2992 |
|
| 2993 |
/* We expect this to be signed when the DS record exists, and don't expect it to be |
| 2994 |
* signed when the DS record is proven not to exist. */ |
| 2995 |
return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL); |
| 2996 |
} |
| 2997 |
|
| 2998 |
return true; |
| 2999 |
}} |
| 3000 |
} |
| 3001 |
|
| 3002 |
static int dns_transaction_in_private_tld(DnsTransaction *t, const DnsResourceKey *key) { |
| 3003 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 3004 |
const char *tld; |
| 3005 |
int r; |
| 3006 |
|
| 3007 |
/* If DNSSEC downgrade mode is on, checks whether the |
| 3008 |
* specified RR is one level below a TLD we have proven not to |
| 3009 |
* exist. In such a case we assume that this is a private |
| 3010 |
* domain, and permit it. |
| 3011 |
* |
| 3012 |
* This detects cases like the Fritz!Box router networks. Each |
| 3013 |
* Fritz!Box router serves a private "fritz.box" zone, in the |
| 3014 |
* non-existing TLD "box". Requests for the "fritz.box" domain |
| 3015 |
* are served by the router itself, while requests for the |
| 3016 |
* "box" domain will result in NXDOMAIN. |
| 3017 |
* |
| 3018 |
* Note that this logic is unable to detect cases where a |
| 3019 |
* router serves a private DNS zone directly under |
| 3020 |
* non-existing TLD. In such a case we cannot detect whether |
| 3021 |
* the TLD is supposed to exist or not, as all requests we |
| 3022 |
* make for it will be answered by the router's zone, and not |
| 3023 |
* by the root zone. */ |
| 3024 |
|
| 3025 |
assert(t); |
| 3026 |
|
| 3027 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE) |
| 3028 |
return false; /* In strict DNSSEC mode what doesn't exist, doesn't exist */ |
| 3029 |
|
| 3030 |
tld = dns_resource_key_name(key); |
| 3031 |
r = dns_name_parent(&tld); |
| 3032 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3033 |
return r; |
| 3034 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3035 |
return false; /* Already the root domain */ |
| 3036 |
|
| 3037 |
if (!dns_name_is_single_label(tld)) |
| 3038 |
return false; |
| 3039 |
|
| 3040 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 3041 |
|
| 3042 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != key->class) |
| 3043 |
continue; |
| 3044 |
|
| 3045 |
r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), tld); |
| 3046 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3047 |
return r; |
| 3048 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3049 |
continue; |
| 3050 |
|
| 3051 |
/* We found an auxiliary lookup we did for the TLD. If |
| 3052 |
* that returned with NXDOMAIN, we know the TLD didn't |
| 3053 |
* exist, and hence this might be a private zone. */ |
| 3054 |
|
| 3055 |
return dt->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN; |
| 3056 |
} |
| 3057 |
|
| 3058 |
return false; |
| 3059 |
} |
| 3060 |
|
| 3061 |
static int dns_transaction_requires_nsec(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 3062 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 3063 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 3064 |
const char *name; |
| 3065 |
int r; |
| 3066 |
|
| 3067 |
assert(t); |
| 3068 |
|
| 3069 |
/* Checks if we need to insist on NSEC/NSEC3 RRs for proving |
| 3070 |
* this negative reply */ |
| 3071 |
|
| 3072 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO) |
| 3073 |
return false; |
| 3074 |
|
| 3075 |
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(dns_transaction_key(t)->type)) |
| 3076 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 3077 |
|
| 3078 |
r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t))); |
| 3079 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3080 |
return r; |
| 3081 |
if (r > 0) |
| 3082 |
return false; |
| 3083 |
|
| 3084 |
r = dns_transaction_in_private_tld(t, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3085 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3086 |
return r; |
| 3087 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3088 |
/* The lookup is from a TLD that is proven not to |
| 3089 |
* exist, and we are in downgrade mode, hence ignore |
| 3090 |
* that fact that we didn't get any NSEC RRs. */ |
| 3091 |
|
| 3092 |
log_info("Detected a negative query %s in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned response.", |
| 3093 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str)); |
| 3094 |
return false; |
| 3095 |
} |
| 3096 |
|
| 3097 |
name = dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3098 |
|
| 3099 |
/* For all other RRs we check the DS on the same level to see |
| 3100 |
* if it's signed. */ |
| 3101 |
|
| 3102 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 3103 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != dns_transaction_key(t)->class) |
| 3104 |
continue; |
| 3105 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) |
| 3106 |
continue; |
| 3107 |
|
| 3108 |
r = dns_name_endswith(name, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt))); |
| 3109 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3110 |
return r; |
| 3111 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3112 |
continue; |
| 3113 |
|
| 3114 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 3115 |
return false; |
| 3116 |
|
| 3117 |
/* We expect this to be signed when the DS record exists, and don't expect it to be signed |
| 3118 |
* when the DS record is proven not to exist. */ |
| 3119 |
return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL); |
| 3120 |
} |
| 3121 |
|
| 3122 |
/* If in doubt, require NSEC/NSEC3 */ |
| 3123 |
return true; |
| 3124 |
} |
| 3125 |
|
| 3126 |
static int dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 3127 |
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
| 3128 |
bool found = false; |
| 3129 |
int r; |
| 3130 |
|
| 3131 |
/* Checks whether any of the DNSKEYs used for the RRSIGs for |
| 3132 |
* the specified RRset is authenticated (i.e. has a matching |
| 3133 |
* DS RR). */ |
| 3134 |
|
| 3135 |
r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 3136 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3137 |
return r; |
| 3138 |
if (r > 0) |
| 3139 |
return false; |
| 3140 |
|
| 3141 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, t->answer) { |
| 3142 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 3143 |
|
| 3144 |
r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(rr->key, rrsig); |
| 3145 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3146 |
return r; |
| 3147 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3148 |
continue; |
| 3149 |
|
| 3150 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 3151 |
|
| 3152 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class) |
| 3153 |
continue; |
| 3154 |
|
| 3155 |
if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) { |
| 3156 |
|
| 3157 |
r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
| 3158 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3159 |
return r; |
| 3160 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3161 |
continue; |
| 3162 |
|
| 3163 |
/* OK, we found an auxiliary DNSKEY lookup. If that lookup is authenticated, |
| 3164 |
* report this. */ |
| 3165 |
|
| 3166 |
if (FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 3167 |
return true; |
| 3168 |
|
| 3169 |
found = true; |
| 3170 |
|
| 3171 |
} else if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { |
| 3172 |
|
| 3173 |
r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
| 3174 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3175 |
return r; |
| 3176 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3177 |
continue; |
| 3178 |
|
| 3179 |
/* OK, we found an auxiliary DS lookup. If that lookup is authenticated and |
| 3180 |
* non-zero, we won! */ |
| 3181 |
|
| 3182 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 3183 |
return false; |
| 3184 |
|
| 3185 |
return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL); |
| 3186 |
} |
| 3187 |
} |
| 3188 |
} |
| 3189 |
|
| 3190 |
return found ? false : -ENXIO; |
| 3191 |
} |
| 3192 |
|
| 3193 |
static int dns_transaction_known_signed(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { |
| 3194 |
assert(t); |
| 3195 |
assert(rr); |
| 3196 |
|
| 3197 |
/* We know that the root domain is signed, hence if it appears |
| 3198 |
* not to be signed, there's a problem with the DNS server */ |
| 3199 |
|
| 3200 |
return rr->key->class == DNS_CLASS_IN && |
| 3201 |
dns_name_is_root(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
| 3202 |
} |
| 3203 |
|
| 3204 |
static int dns_transaction_check_revoked_trust_anchors(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 3205 |
DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
| 3206 |
int r; |
| 3207 |
|
| 3208 |
assert(t); |
| 3209 |
|
| 3210 |
/* Maybe warn the user that we encountered a revoked DNSKEY |
| 3211 |
* for a key from our trust anchor. Note that we don't care |
| 3212 |
* whether the DNSKEY can be authenticated or not. It's |
| 3213 |
* sufficient if it is self-signed. */ |
| 3214 |
|
| 3215 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) { |
| 3216 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, rr, t->answer); |
| 3217 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3218 |
return r; |
| 3219 |
} |
| 3220 |
|
| 3221 |
return 0; |
| 3222 |
} |
| 3223 |
|
| 3224 |
static int dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 3225 |
bool changed; |
| 3226 |
int r; |
| 3227 |
|
| 3228 |
assert(t); |
| 3229 |
|
| 3230 |
/* Removes all DNSKEY/DS objects from t->validated_keys that |
| 3231 |
* our trust anchors database considers revoked. */ |
| 3232 |
|
| 3233 |
do { |
| 3234 |
DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
| 3235 |
|
| 3236 |
changed = false; |
| 3237 |
|
| 3238 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->validated_keys) { |
| 3239 |
r = dns_trust_anchor_is_revoked(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, rr); |
| 3240 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3241 |
return r; |
| 3242 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3243 |
r = dns_answer_remove_by_rr(&t->validated_keys, rr); |
| 3244 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3245 |
return r; |
| 3246 |
|
| 3247 |
assert(r > 0); |
| 3248 |
changed = true; |
| 3249 |
break; |
| 3250 |
} |
| 3251 |
} |
| 3252 |
} while (changed); |
| 3253 |
|
| 3254 |
return 0; |
| 3255 |
} |
| 3256 |
|
| 3257 |
static int dns_transaction_copy_validated(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 3258 |
DnsTransaction *dt; |
| 3259 |
int r; |
| 3260 |
|
| 3261 |
assert(t); |
| 3262 |
|
| 3263 |
/* Copy all validated RRs from the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions into our set of validated RRs */ |
| 3264 |
|
| 3265 |
SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) { |
| 3266 |
|
| 3267 |
if (DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(dt->state)) |
| 3268 |
continue; |
| 3269 |
|
| 3270 |
/* Some of the validated keys may not be authenticated, but are still useful to report |
| 3271 |
* insecure answers when the domain is signed only by unsupported algorithms. */ |
| 3272 |
r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, dt->validated_keys); |
| 3273 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3274 |
return r; |
| 3275 |
|
| 3276 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED)) |
| 3277 |
continue; |
| 3278 |
|
| 3279 |
r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, dt->answer); |
| 3280 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3281 |
return r; |
| 3282 |
} |
| 3283 |
|
| 3284 |
return 0; |
| 3285 |
} |
| 3286 |
|
| 3287 |
typedef enum { |
| 3288 |
DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY, /* Phase #1, only validate DNSKEYs */ |
| 3289 |
DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC, /* Phase #2, only validate NSEC+NSEC3 */ |
| 3290 |
DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL, /* Phase #3, validate everything else */ |
| 3291 |
} Phase; |
| 3292 |
|
| 3293 |
static int dnssec_validate_records( |
| 3294 |
DnsTransaction *t, |
| 3295 |
Phase phase, |
| 3296 |
bool *have_nsec, |
| 3297 |
unsigned *nvalidations, |
| 3298 |
DnsAnswer **validated) { |
| 3299 |
|
| 3300 |
DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
| 3301 |
int r; |
| 3302 |
|
| 3303 |
assert(have_nsec); |
| 3304 |
assert(nvalidations); |
| 3305 |
assert(validated); |
| 3306 |
|
| 3307 |
/* Returns negative on error, 0 if validation failed, 1 to restart validation, 2 when finished. */ |
| 3308 |
|
| 3309 |
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) { |
| 3310 |
_unused_ _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr_ref = dns_resource_record_ref(rr); |
| 3311 |
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig = NULL; |
| 3312 |
DnssecResult result; |
| 3313 |
|
| 3314 |
switch (rr->key->type) { |
| 3315 |
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: |
| 3316 |
continue; |
| 3317 |
|
| 3318 |
case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY: |
| 3319 |
/* We validate DNSKEYs only in the DNSKEY and ALL phases */ |
| 3320 |
if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC) |
| 3321 |
continue; |
| 3322 |
break; |
| 3323 |
|
| 3324 |
case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: |
| 3325 |
case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: |
| 3326 |
*have_nsec = true; |
| 3327 |
|
| 3328 |
/* We validate NSEC/NSEC3 only in the NSEC and ALL phases */ |
| 3329 |
if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY) |
| 3330 |
continue; |
| 3331 |
break; |
| 3332 |
|
| 3333 |
default: |
| 3334 |
/* We validate all other RRs only in the ALL phases */ |
| 3335 |
if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL) |
| 3336 |
continue; |
| 3337 |
} |
| 3338 |
|
| 3339 |
r = dnssec_verify_rrset_search( |
| 3340 |
t->answer, |
| 3341 |
rr->key, |
| 3342 |
t->validated_keys, |
| 3343 |
USEC_INFINITY, |
| 3344 |
&result, |
| 3345 |
&rrsig); |
| 3346 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3347 |
return r; |
| 3348 |
*nvalidations += r; |
| 3349 |
|
| 3350 |
log_debug("Looking at %s: %s", strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)), dnssec_result_to_string(result)); |
| 3351 |
|
| 3352 |
if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED) { |
| 3353 |
assert(rrsig); |
| 3354 |
|
| 3355 |
if (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) { |
| 3356 |
/* If we just validated a DNSKEY RRset, then let's add these keys to |
| 3357 |
* the set of validated keys for this transaction. */ |
| 3358 |
|
| 3359 |
r = dns_answer_copy_by_key(&t->validated_keys, t->answer, rr->key, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, rrsig); |
| 3360 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3361 |
return r; |
| 3362 |
|
| 3363 |
/* Some of the DNSKEYs we just added might already have been revoked, |
| 3364 |
* remove them again in that case. */ |
| 3365 |
r = dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(t); |
| 3366 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3367 |
return r; |
| 3368 |
} |
| 3369 |
|
| 3370 |
/* Add the validated RRset to the new list of validated RRsets, and remove it from |
| 3371 |
* the unvalidated RRsets. We mark the RRset as authenticated and cacheable. */ |
| 3372 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE, rrsig); |
| 3373 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3374 |
return r; |
| 3375 |
|
| 3376 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_SECURE, rr->key); |
| 3377 |
|
| 3378 |
/* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */ |
| 3379 |
return 1; |
| 3380 |
} |
| 3381 |
|
| 3382 |
/* If we haven't read all DNSKEYs yet a negative result of the validation is irrelevant, as |
| 3383 |
* there might be more DNSKEYs coming. Similar, if we haven't read all NSEC/NSEC3 RRs yet, |
| 3384 |
* we cannot do positive wildcard proofs yet, as those require the NSEC/NSEC3 RRs. */ |
| 3385 |
if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL) |
| 3386 |
continue; |
| 3387 |
|
| 3388 |
if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD) { |
| 3389 |
bool authenticated = false; |
| 3390 |
const char *source; |
| 3391 |
|
| 3392 |
assert(rrsig); |
| 3393 |
|
| 3394 |
/* This RRset validated, but as a wildcard. This means we need |
| 3395 |
* to prove via NSEC/NSEC3 that no matching non-wildcard RR exists. */ |
| 3396 |
|
| 3397 |
/* First step, determine the source of synthesis */ |
| 3398 |
r = dns_resource_record_source(rrsig, &source); |
| 3399 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3400 |
return r; |
| 3401 |
|
| 3402 |
r = dnssec_test_positive_wildcard(*validated, |
| 3403 |
dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), |
| 3404 |
source, |
| 3405 |
rrsig->rrsig.signer, |
| 3406 |
&authenticated); |
| 3407 |
|
| 3408 |
/* Unless the NSEC proof showed that the key really doesn't exist something is off. */ |
| 3409 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3410 |
result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
| 3411 |
else { |
| 3412 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key( |
| 3413 |
validated, |
| 3414 |
&t->answer, |
| 3415 |
rr->key, |
| 3416 |
authenticated ? (DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE) : 0, |
| 3417 |
rrsig); |
| 3418 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3419 |
return r; |
| 3420 |
|
| 3421 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3422 |
|
| 3423 |
/* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */ |
| 3424 |
return 1; |
| 3425 |
} |
| 3426 |
} |
| 3427 |
|
| 3428 |
if (result == DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE) { |
| 3429 |
r = dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(t, rr); |
| 3430 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3431 |
return r; |
| 3432 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 3433 |
/* Data does not require signing. In that case, just copy it over, |
| 3434 |
* but remember that this is by no means authenticated. */ |
| 3435 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key( |
| 3436 |
validated, |
| 3437 |
&t->answer, |
| 3438 |
rr->key, |
| 3439 |
0, |
| 3440 |
NULL); |
| 3441 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3442 |
return r; |
| 3443 |
|
| 3444 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3445 |
return 1; |
| 3446 |
} |
| 3447 |
|
| 3448 |
r = dns_transaction_known_signed(t, rr); |
| 3449 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3450 |
return r; |
| 3451 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3452 |
/* This is an RR we know has to be signed. If it isn't this means |
| 3453 |
* the server is not attaching RRSIGs, hence complain. */ |
| 3454 |
|
| 3455 |
dns_server_packet_rrsig_missing(t->server, t->current_feature_level); |
| 3456 |
|
| 3457 |
if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE) { |
| 3458 |
|
| 3459 |
/* Downgrading is OK? If so, just consider the information unsigned */ |
| 3460 |
|
| 3461 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL); |
| 3462 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3463 |
return r; |
| 3464 |
|
| 3465 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3466 |
return 1; |
| 3467 |
} |
| 3468 |
|
| 3469 |
/* Otherwise, fail */ |
| 3470 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER; |
| 3471 |
return 0; |
| 3472 |
} |
| 3473 |
|
| 3474 |
r = dns_transaction_in_private_tld(t, rr->key); |
| 3475 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3476 |
return r; |
| 3477 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3478 |
char s[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 3479 |
|
| 3480 |
/* The data is from a TLD that is proven not to exist, and we are in downgrade |
| 3481 |
* mode, hence ignore the fact that this was not signed. */ |
| 3482 |
|
| 3483 |
log_info("Detected RRset %s is in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned RRs.", |
| 3484 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(rr->key, s, sizeof s)); |
| 3485 |
|
| 3486 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL); |
| 3487 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3488 |
return r; |
| 3489 |
|
| 3490 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3491 |
return 1; |
| 3492 |
} |
| 3493 |
} |
| 3494 |
|
| 3495 |
/* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6840#section-5.2 */ |
| 3496 |
if (result == DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) { |
| 3497 |
if (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) { |
| 3498 |
/* This is a DNSKEY we cannot authenticate, but it might still be the best |
| 3499 |
* offer from the resolver. Add it to the validated keys in case it's the |
| 3500 |
* best we can find, but do not mark it as authenticated. |
| 3501 |
*/ |
| 3502 |
|
| 3503 |
r = dns_answer_copy_by_key(&t->validated_keys, t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL); |
| 3504 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3505 |
return r; |
| 3506 |
|
| 3507 |
/* Some of the DNSKEYs we just added might already have been revoked, |
| 3508 |
* remove them again in that case. */ |
| 3509 |
r = dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(t); |
| 3510 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3511 |
return r; |
| 3512 |
} |
| 3513 |
|
| 3514 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL); |
| 3515 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3516 |
return r; |
| 3517 |
|
| 3518 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3519 |
return 1; |
| 3520 |
} |
| 3521 |
|
| 3522 |
if (IN_SET(result, |
| 3523 |
DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY, |
| 3524 |
DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED)) { |
| 3525 |
|
| 3526 |
r = dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(t, rr); |
| 3527 |
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| 3528 |
return r; |
| 3529 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 3530 |
/* The DNSKEY transaction was not authenticated, this means there's |
| 3531 |
* no DS for this, which means it's OK if no keys are found for this signature. */ |
| 3532 |
|
| 3533 |
r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL); |
| 3534 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3535 |
return r; |
| 3536 |
|
| 3537 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key); |
| 3538 |
return 1; |
| 3539 |
} |
| 3540 |
} |
| 3541 |
|
| 3542 |
r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr); |
| 3543 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3544 |
return r; |
| 3545 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3546 |
/* Look for a matching DNAME for this CNAME */ |
| 3547 |
r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(t->answer, rr); |
| 3548 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3549 |
return r; |
| 3550 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 3551 |
/* Also look among the stuff we already validated */ |
| 3552 |
r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(*validated, rr); |
| 3553 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3554 |
return r; |
| 3555 |
} |
| 3556 |
|
| 3557 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 3558 |
if (IN_SET(result, |
| 3559 |
DNSSEC_INVALID, |
| 3560 |
DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED, |
| 3561 |
DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE)) |
| 3562 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, rr->key); |
| 3563 |
else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY, DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, |
| 3564 |
or DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS */ |
| 3565 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, rr->key); |
| 3566 |
|
| 3567 |
/* This is a primary response to our question, and it failed validation. |
| 3568 |
* That's fatal. */ |
| 3569 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = result; |
| 3570 |
return 0; |
| 3571 |
} |
| 3572 |
|
| 3573 |
/* This is a primary response, but we do have a DNAME RR |
| 3574 |
* in the RR that can replay this CNAME, hence rely on |
| 3575 |
* that, and we can remove the CNAME in favour of it. */ |
| 3576 |
} |
| 3577 |
|
| 3578 |
/* This is just some auxiliary data. Just remove the RRset and continue. */ |
| 3579 |
r = dns_answer_remove_by_key(&t->answer, rr->key); |
| 3580 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3581 |
return r; |
| 3582 |
|
| 3583 |
/* We dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning. */ |
| 3584 |
return 1; |
| 3585 |
} |
| 3586 |
|
| 3587 |
return 2; /* Finito. */ |
| 3588 |
} |
| 3589 |
|
| 3590 |
int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) { |
| 3591 |
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *validated = NULL; |
| 3592 |
Phase phase; |
| 3593 |
DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
| 3594 |
int r; |
| 3595 |
char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX]; |
| 3596 |
|
| 3597 |
assert(t); |
| 3598 |
|
| 3599 |
/* We have now collected all DS and DNSKEY RRs in t->validated_keys, let's see which RRs we can now |
| 3600 |
* authenticate with that. */ |
| 3601 |
|
| 3602 |
if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) || t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO) |
| 3603 |
return 0; |
| 3604 |
|
| 3605 |
/* Already validated */ |
| 3606 |
if (t->answer_dnssec_result != _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID) |
| 3607 |
return 0; |
| 3608 |
|
| 3609 |
/* Our own stuff needs no validation */ |
| 3610 |
if (IN_SET(t->answer_source, DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE, DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR)) { |
| 3611 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
| 3612 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, true); |
| 3613 |
return 0; |
| 3614 |
} |
| 3615 |
|
| 3616 |
/* Cached stuff is not affected by validation. */ |
| 3617 |
if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK) |
| 3618 |
return 0; |
| 3619 |
|
| 3620 |
if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported_full(t)) { |
| 3621 |
/* The server does not support DNSSEC, or doesn't augment responses with RRSIGs. */ |
| 3622 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER; |
| 3623 |
log_debug("Not validating response for %" PRIu16 ", used server feature level does not support DNSSEC.", t->id); |
| 3624 |
return 0; |
| 3625 |
} |
| 3626 |
|
| 3627 |
log_debug("Validating response from transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s).", |
| 3628 |
t->id, |
| 3629 |
dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str)); |
| 3630 |
|
| 3631 |
/* First, see if this response contains any revoked trust anchors we care about. */ |
| 3632 |
r = dns_transaction_check_revoked_trust_anchors(t); |
| 3633 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3634 |
return r; |
| 3635 |
|
| 3636 |
/* Second, copy all RRs we acquired successfully from auxiliary RRs over. */ |
| 3637 |
r = dns_transaction_copy_validated(t); |
| 3638 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3639 |
return r; |
| 3640 |
|
| 3641 |
/* Third, see if there are DNSKEYs we already know a validated DS for. */ |
| 3642 |
r = dns_transaction_validate_dnskey_by_ds(t); |
| 3643 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3644 |
return r; |
| 3645 |
|
| 3646 |
/* Fourth, remove all DNSKEY and DS RRs again that our trust anchor says are revoked. After all we |
| 3647 |
* might have marked some keys revoked above, but they might still be lingering in our validated_keys |
| 3648 |
* list. */ |
| 3649 |
r = dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(t); |
| 3650 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3651 |
return r; |
| 3652 |
|
| 3653 |
phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY; |
| 3654 |
for (unsigned nvalidations = 0;;) { |
| 3655 |
bool have_nsec = false; |
| 3656 |
|
| 3657 |
r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &nvalidations, &validated); |
| 3658 |
if (r <= 0) { |
| 3659 |
DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, TAKE_PTR(validated)); |
| 3660 |
return r; |
| 3661 |
} |
| 3662 |
|
| 3663 |
if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_VALIDATION_MAX) { |
| 3664 |
/* This reply requires an onerous number of signature validations to verify. Let's |
| 3665 |
* not waste our time trying, as this shouldn't happen for well-behaved domains |
| 3666 |
* anyway. */ |
| 3667 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS; |
| 3668 |
DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, TAKE_PTR(validated)); |
| 3669 |
return 0; |
| 3670 |
} |
| 3671 |
|
| 3672 |
/* Try again as long as we managed to achieve something */ |
| 3673 |
if (r == 1) |
| 3674 |
continue; |
| 3675 |
|
| 3676 |
if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY && have_nsec) { |
| 3677 |
/* OK, we processed all DNSKEYs, and there are NSEC/NSEC3 RRs, look at those now. */ |
| 3678 |
phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC; |
| 3679 |
continue; |
| 3680 |
} |
| 3681 |
|
| 3682 |
if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL) { |
| 3683 |
/* OK, we processed all DNSKEYs and NSEC/NSEC3 RRs, look at all the rest now. |
| 3684 |
* Note that in this third phase we start to remove RRs we couldn't validate. */ |
| 3685 |
phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL; |
| 3686 |
continue; |
| 3687 |
} |
| 3688 |
|
| 3689 |
/* We're done */ |
| 3690 |
break; |
| 3691 |
} |
| 3692 |
|
| 3693 |
DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, TAKE_PTR(validated)); |
| 3694 |
|
| 3695 |
/* At this point the answer only contains validated |
| 3696 |
* RRsets. Now, let's see if it actually answers the question |
| 3697 |
* we asked. If so, great! If it doesn't, then see if |
| 3698 |
* NSEC/NSEC3 can prove this. */ |
| 3699 |
r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, &flags); |
| 3700 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3701 |
/* Yes, it answers the question! */ |
| 3702 |
|
| 3703 |
if (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) { |
| 3704 |
/* The answer is fully authenticated, yay. */ |
| 3705 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
| 3706 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 3707 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, true); |
| 3708 |
} else { |
| 3709 |
/* The answer is not fully authenticated. */ |
| 3710 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED; |
| 3711 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false); |
| 3712 |
} |
| 3713 |
|
| 3714 |
} else if (r == 0) { |
| 3715 |
DnssecNsecResult nr; |
| 3716 |
bool authenticated = false; |
| 3717 |
|
| 3718 |
/* Bummer! Let's check NSEC/NSEC3 */ |
| 3719 |
r = dnssec_nsec_test(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), &nr, &authenticated, &t->answer_nsec_ttl); |
| 3720 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3721 |
return r; |
| 3722 |
|
| 3723 |
switch (nr) { |
| 3724 |
|
| 3725 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN: |
| 3726 |
/* NSEC proves the domain doesn't exist. Very good. */ |
| 3727 |
log_debug("Proved NXDOMAIN via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str); |
| 3728 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
| 3729 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN; |
| 3730 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, authenticated); |
| 3731 |
|
| 3732 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3733 |
break; |
| 3734 |
|
| 3735 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA: |
| 3736 |
/* NSEC proves that there's no data here, very good. */ |
| 3737 |
log_debug("Proved NODATA via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str); |
| 3738 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
| 3739 |
t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS; |
| 3740 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, authenticated); |
| 3741 |
|
| 3742 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3743 |
break; |
| 3744 |
|
| 3745 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT: |
| 3746 |
/* NSEC3 says the data might not be signed */ |
| 3747 |
log_debug("Data is NSEC3 opt-out via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str); |
| 3748 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED; |
| 3749 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false); |
| 3750 |
|
| 3751 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3752 |
break; |
| 3753 |
|
| 3754 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR: |
| 3755 |
/* No NSEC data? Bummer! */ |
| 3756 |
|
| 3757 |
r = dns_transaction_requires_nsec(t); |
| 3758 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3759 |
return r; |
| 3760 |
if (r > 0) { |
| 3761 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; |
| 3762 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3763 |
} else { |
| 3764 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED; |
| 3765 |
SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false); |
| 3766 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3767 |
} |
| 3768 |
|
| 3769 |
break; |
| 3770 |
|
| 3771 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: |
| 3772 |
/* We don't know the NSEC3 algorithm used? */ |
| 3773 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
| 3774 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3775 |
break; |
| 3776 |
|
| 3777 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND: |
| 3778 |
case DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME: |
| 3779 |
/* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */ |
| 3780 |
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH; |
| 3781 |
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, dns_transaction_key(t)); |
| 3782 |
break; |
| 3783 |
|
| 3784 |
default: |
| 3785 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 3786 |
} |
| 3787 |
} |
| 3788 |
|
| 3789 |
return 1; |
| 3790 |
} |
| 3791 |
|
| 3792 |
static const char* const dns_transaction_state_table[_DNS_TRANSACTION_STATE_MAX] = { |
| 3793 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL] = "null", |
| 3794 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING] = "pending", |
| 3795 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING] = "validating", |
| 3796 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE] = "rcode-failure", |
| 3797 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS] = "success", |
| 3798 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS] = "no-servers", |
| 3799 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT] = "timeout", |
| 3800 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED] = "attempts-max-reached", |
| 3801 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY] = "invalid-reply", |
| 3802 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO] = "errno", |
| 3803 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED] = "aborted", |
| 3804 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED] = "dnssec-failed", |
| 3805 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "no-trust-anchor", |
| 3806 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED] = "rr-type-unsupported", |
| 3807 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK_DOWN] = "network-down", |
| 3808 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND] = "not-found", |
| 3809 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SOURCE] = "no-source", |
| 3810 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_STUB_LOOP] = "stub-loop", |
| 3811 |
}; |
| 3812 |
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dns_transaction_state, DnsTransactionState); |
| 3813 |
|
| 3814 |
static const char* const dns_transaction_source_table[_DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_MAX] = { |
| 3815 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK] = "network", |
| 3816 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_CACHE] = "cache", |
| 3817 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE] = "zone", |
| 3818 |
[DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "trust-anchor", |
| 3819 |
}; |
| 3820 |
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dns_transaction_source, DnsTransactionSource); |