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src/nspawn/nspawn-seccomp.c

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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <linux/capability.h>
4 #include <linux/netlink.h>
5 #include <sys/socket.h>
6
7 #include "log.h"
8 #include "nspawn-seccomp.h"
9 #include "seccomp-util.h"
10 #include "set.h"
11 #include "strv.h"
12
13 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
14
15 static int add_syscall_filters(
16 scmp_filter_ctx ctx,
17 uint32_t arch,
18 uint64_t cap_list_retain,
19 char **syscall_allow_list,
20 char **syscall_deny_list) {
21
22 static const struct {
23 uint64_t capability;
24 const char* name;
25 } allow_list[] = {
26 /* Let's use set names where we can */
27 { 0, "@aio" },
28 { 0, "@basic-io" },
29 { 0, "@chown" },
30 { 0, "@default" },
31 { 0, "@file-system" },
32 { 0, "@io-event" },
33 { 0, "@ipc" },
34 { 0, "@keyring" },
35 { 0, "@mount" },
36 { 0, "@network-io" },
37 { 0, "@process" },
38 { 0, "@resources" },
39 { 0, "@setuid" },
40 { 0, "@signal" },
41 { 0, "@sync" },
42 { 0, "@timer" },
43
44 /* The following four are sets we optionally enable, n case the caps have been configured for it */
45 { CAP_SYS_TIME, "@clock" },
46 { CAP_SYS_MODULE, "@module" },
47 { CAP_SYS_RAWIO, "@raw-io" },
48 { CAP_IPC_LOCK, "@memlock" },
49
50 /* Plus a good set of additional syscalls which are not part of any of the groups above */
51 { 0, "arm_fadvise64_64" },
52 { 0, "brk" },
53 { 0, "cachestat" },
54 { 0, "capget" },
55 { 0, "capset" },
56 { 0, "copy_file_range" },
57 { 0, "fadvise64" },
58 { 0, "fadvise64_64" },
59 { 0, "flock" },
60 { 0, "get_mempolicy" },
61 { 0, "getcpu" },
62 { 0, "getpriority" },
63 { 0, "getrandom" },
64 { 0, "ioctl" },
65 { 0, "ioprio_get" },
66 { 0, "kcmp" },
67 { 0, "madvise" },
68 { 0, "mincore" },
69 { 0, "mprotect" },
70 { 0, "mremap" },
71 { 0, "name_to_handle_at" },
72 { 0, "oldolduname" },
73 { 0, "olduname" },
74 { 0, "personality" },
75 { 0, "readahead" },
76 { 0, "readdir" },
77 { 0, "remap_file_pages" },
78 { 0, "sched_get_priority_max" },
79 { 0, "sched_get_priority_min" },
80 { 0, "sched_getaffinity" },
81 { 0, "sched_getattr" },
82 { 0, "sched_getparam" },
83 { 0, "sched_getscheduler" },
84 { 0, "sched_rr_get_interval" },
85 { 0, "sched_rr_get_interval_time64" },
86 { 0, "sched_yield" },
87 { 0, "sendfile" },
88 { 0, "sendfile64" },
89 { 0, "setdomainname" },
90 { 0, "setfsgid" },
91 { 0, "setfsgid32" },
92 { 0, "setfsuid" },
93 { 0, "setfsuid32" },
94 { 0, "sethostname" },
95 { 0, "setpgid" },
96 { 0, "setsid" },
97 { 0, "splice" },
98 { 0, "sysinfo" },
99 { 0, "tee" },
100 { 0, "umask" },
101 { 0, "uname" },
102 { 0, "userfaultfd" },
103 { 0, "vmsplice" },
104
105 /* The following individual syscalls are added depending on specified caps */
106 { CAP_SYS_PACCT, "acct" },
107 { CAP_SYS_PTRACE, "process_vm_readv" },
108 { CAP_SYS_PTRACE, "process_vm_writev" },
109 { CAP_SYS_PTRACE, "ptrace" },
110 { CAP_SYS_BOOT, "reboot" },
111 { CAP_SYSLOG, "syslog" },
112 { CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, "vhangup" },
113 { CAP_BPF, "bpf", },
114
115 /*
116 * The following syscalls and groups are knowingly excluded:
117 *
118 * @cpu-emulation
119 * @obsolete
120 * @pkey
121 * @swap
122 *
123 * fanotify_init
124 * fanotify_mark
125 * kexec_file_load
126 * kexec_load
127 * lookup_dcookie
128 * nfsservctl
129 * open_by_handle_at
130 * perf_event_open
131 * quotactl
132 */
133 };
134
135 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **added = NULL;
136 int r;
137
138 FOREACH_ELEMENT(i, allow_list) {
139 if (i->capability != 0 && (cap_list_retain & (1ULL << i->capability)) == 0)
140 continue;
141
142 r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx,
143 i->name,
144 SCMP_ACT_ALLOW,
145 syscall_deny_list,
146 false,
147 &added);
148 if (r < 0)
149 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add syscall filter item %s: %m", i->name);
150 }
151
152 STRV_FOREACH(p, syscall_allow_list) {
153 r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, *p, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_deny_list, true, &added);
154 if (r < 0)
155 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s on %s, ignoring: %m",
156 *p, seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
157 }
158
159 /* The default action is ENOSYS. Respond with EPERM to all other "known" but not allow-listed
160 * syscalls. */
161 r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(ctx, "@known", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), added, true, NULL);
162 if (r < 0)
163 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for @known set on %s, ignoring: %m",
164 seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
165
166 #if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR >= 5) || SCMP_VER_MAJOR > 2
167 /* We have a large filter here, so let's turn on the binary tree mode if possible. */
168 r = sym_seccomp_attr_set(ctx, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_OPTIMIZE, 2);
169 if (r < 0)
170 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to set SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_OPTIMIZE, ignoring: %m");
171 #endif
172
173 return 0;
174 }
175
176 int setup_seccomp(
177 uint64_t cap_list_retain,
178 char **syscall_allow_list,
179 char **syscall_deny_list,
180 Set *restrict_address_families,
181 bool restrict_address_families_is_allowlist) {
182
183 uint32_t arch;
184 int r;
185
186 if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
187 log_debug("SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel or disabled at runtime, disabling SECCOMP filtering");
188 return 0;
189 }
190
191 SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
192 _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
193
194 log_debug("Applying allow list on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
195
196 /* We install ENOSYS as the default action, but it will only apply to syscalls which are not
197 * in the @known set, see above. */
198 r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOSYS));
199 if (r < 0)
200 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate seccomp object: %m");
201
202 r = add_syscall_filters(seccomp, arch, cap_list_retain, syscall_allow_list, syscall_deny_list);
203 if (r < 0)
204 return r;
205
206 r = sym_seccomp_load(seccomp);
207 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_SECCOMP_FATAL(r))
208 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install seccomp filter: %m");
209 if (r < 0)
210 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m",
211 seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
212 }
213
214 SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
215 _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
216
217 log_debug("Applying NETLINK_AUDIT mask on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
218
219 r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
220 if (r < 0)
221 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate seccomp object: %m");
222
223 /*
224 Audit is broken in containers, much of the userspace audit hookup will fail if running inside a
225 container. We don't care and just turn off creation of audit sockets.
226
227 This will make socket(AF_NETLINK, *, NETLINK_AUDIT) fail with EAFNOSUPPORT which audit userspace uses
228 as indication that audit is disabled in the kernel.
229 */
230
231 r = sym_seccomp_rule_add_exact(
232 seccomp,
233 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT),
234 SCMP_SYS(socket),
235 2,
236 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, AF_NETLINK),
237 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_EQ, NETLINK_AUDIT));
238 if (r < 0) {
239 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add audit seccomp rule, ignoring: %m");
240 continue;
241 }
242
243 r = sym_seccomp_load(seccomp);
244 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_SECCOMP_FATAL(r))
245 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install seccomp audit filter: %m");
246 if (r < 0)
247 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m",
248 seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
249 }
250
251 if (restrict_address_families_is_allowlist || !set_isempty(restrict_address_families)) {
252 r = seccomp_restrict_address_families(restrict_address_families, restrict_address_families_is_allowlist);
253 if (r < 0)
254 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install address family filter: %m");
255 }
256
257 return 0;
258 }
259
260 #else
261
262 int setup_seccomp(uint64_t cap_list_retain, char **syscall_allow_list, char **syscall_deny_list, Set *restrict_address_families, bool restrict_address_families_is_allowlist) {
263 return 0;
264 }
265
266 #endif