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Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

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1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected])
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young ([email protected]).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young ([email protected])"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include "vpm_int.h"
73
74 /* CRL score values */
75
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
83
84 /* CRL times valid */
85
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
128 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
131 int *pcrl_score);
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
141
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
143 {
144 return ok;
145 }
146
147 #if 0
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149 {
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
151 }
152 #endif
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
155 {
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158 return 1;
159 else
160 return 0;
161 }
162
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
164
165 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
166 {
167 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
168 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
169 int i;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
172 if (certs == NULL)
173 return NULL;
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
176 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
178 break;
179 }
180 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182 else
183 xtmp = NULL;
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
185 return xtmp;
186 }
187
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
189 {
190 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
191 int bad_chain = 0;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
193 int depth, i, ok = 0;
194 int num, j, retry;
195 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
196 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
197 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
198 int err;
199
200 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
202 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
203 return -1;
204 }
205 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
206 /*
207 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
208 * cannot do another one.
209 */
210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
211 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
212 return -1;
213 }
214
215 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
216
217 /*
218 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
219 * the first entry is in place
220 */
221 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
222 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
223 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
224 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
225 ok = -1;
226 goto err;
227 }
228 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
229 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
230
231 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
232 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
233 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
234 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
235 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
236 ok = -1;
237 goto err;
238 }
239
240 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
241 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
242 depth = param->depth;
243
244 for (;;) {
245 /* If we have enough, we break */
246 if (depth < num)
247 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
248 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
249 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
250 * later. */
251
252 /* If we are self signed, we break */
253 if (cert_self_signed(x))
254 break;
255 /*
256 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
257 */
258 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
259 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
260 if (ok < 0) {
261 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
262 goto err;
263 }
264 /*
265 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
266 * again later.
267 */
268 if (ok > 0) {
269 X509_free(xtmp);
270 break;
271 }
272 }
273
274 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
275 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
276 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
277 if (xtmp != NULL) {
278 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
279 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
280 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
281 ok = -1;
282 goto err;
283 }
284 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
285 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
286 ctx->last_untrusted++;
287 x = xtmp;
288 num++;
289 /*
290 * reparse the full chain for the next one
291 */
292 continue;
293 }
294 }
295 break;
296 }
297
298 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
299 j = num;
300 /*
301 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
302 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
303 * complain.
304 */
305
306 do {
307 /*
308 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
309 */
310 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
311 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
312 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
313 /* we have a self signed certificate */
314 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
315 /*
316 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
317 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
318 * possible impersonation.
319 */
320 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
322 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
323 ctx->current_cert = x;
324 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
325 if (ok == 1)
326 X509_free(xtmp);
327 bad_chain = 1;
328 ok = cb(0, ctx);
329 if (!ok)
330 goto err;
331 } else {
332 /*
333 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
334 * version so we get any trust settings.
335 */
336 X509_free(x);
337 x = xtmp;
338 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
339 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
340 }
341 } else {
342 /*
343 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
344 */
345 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
346 ctx->last_untrusted--;
347 num--;
348 j--;
349 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
350 }
351 }
352 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
353 for (;;) {
354 /* If we have enough, we break */
355 if (depth < num)
356 break;
357 /* If we are self signed, we break */
358 if (cert_self_signed(x))
359 break;
360 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
361
362 if (ok < 0) {
363 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
364 goto err;
365 }
366 if (ok == 0)
367 break;
368 x = xtmp;
369 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
370 X509_free(xtmp);
371 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
372 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
373 ok = -1;
374 goto err;
375 }
376 num++;
377 }
378
379 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
380 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
381 /* Callback already issued */
382 ok = 0;
383 goto err;
384 }
385
386 /*
387 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
388 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
389 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
390 * chain checking
391 */
392 retry = 0;
393 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
394 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
396 while (j-- > 1) {
397 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
398 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
399 if (ok < 0) {
400 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
401 goto err;
402 }
403 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
404 if (ok > 0) {
405 /*
406 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
407 */
408 X509_free(xtmp);
409
410 /*
411 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
412 * alternate chain
413 */
414 while (num > j) {
415 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
416 X509_free(xtmp);
417 num--;
418 }
419 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
420 retry = 1;
421 break;
422 }
423 }
424 }
425 } while (retry);
426
427 /*
428 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
429 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
430 * and set bad_chain == 1
431 */
432 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
433 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
434 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
435 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
436 else
437 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
438 ctx->current_cert = x;
439 } else {
440
441 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
442 num++;
443 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
444 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
446 chain_ss = NULL;
447 }
448
449 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
450 bad_chain = 1;
451 ok = cb(0, ctx);
452 if (!ok)
453 goto err;
454 }
455
456 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
457 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
458
459 if (!ok)
460 goto err;
461
462 /* Check name constraints */
463
464 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
465
466 if (!ok)
467 goto err;
468
469 ok = check_id(ctx);
470
471 if (!ok)
472 goto err;
473
474 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
475 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
476
477 /*
478 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
479 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
480 */
481
482 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
483 if (!ok)
484 goto err;
485
486 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
487 ctx->param->flags);
488 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
489 ctx->error = err;
490 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
491 ok = cb(0, ctx);
492 if (!ok)
493 goto err;
494 }
495
496 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
497 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
498 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
499 else
500 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
501 if (!ok)
502 goto err;
503
504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
505 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
506 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
507 if (!ok)
508 goto err;
509 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
510 if (!ok)
511 goto err;
512 #endif
513
514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
517 if (!ok)
518 goto err;
519 if (0) {
520 err:
521 /* Ensure we return an error */
522 if (ok > 0)
523 ok = 0;
524 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
525 }
526 if (sktmp != NULL)
527 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
528 if (chain_ss != NULL)
529 X509_free(chain_ss);
530
531 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
532 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
534 return ok;
535 }
536
537 /*
538 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
539 */
540
541 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
542 {
543 int i;
544 X509 *issuer;
545 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
546 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
547 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
548 return issuer;
549 }
550 return NULL;
551 }
552
553 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
554
555 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
556 {
557 int ret;
558 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
559 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
560 return 1;
561 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
562 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
563 return 0;
564
565 ctx->error = ret;
566 ctx->current_cert = x;
567 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
568 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
569 }
570
571 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
572
573 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
574 {
575 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
576 if (*issuer) {
577 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
578 return 1;
579 } else
580 return 0;
581 }
582
583 /*
584 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
585 * purpose
586 */
587
588 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
589 {
590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
591 return 1;
592 #else
593 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
594 X509 *x;
595 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
596 int proxy_path_length = 0;
597 int purpose;
598 int allow_proxy_certs;
599 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
600
601 /*-
602 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
603 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
604 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
605 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
606 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
607 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
608 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
609 */
610 must_be_ca = -1;
611
612 /* CRL path validation */
613 if (ctx->parent) {
614 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
615 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
616 } else {
617 allow_proxy_certs =
618 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
619 /*
620 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
621 * happy
622 */
623 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
624 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
625 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
626 }
627
628 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
629 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
630 int ret;
631 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
632 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
633 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
635 ctx->error_depth = i;
636 ctx->current_cert = x;
637 ok = cb(0, ctx);
638 if (!ok)
639 goto end;
640 }
641 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
642 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
643 ctx->error_depth = i;
644 ctx->current_cert = x;
645 ok = cb(0, ctx);
646 if (!ok)
647 goto end;
648 }
649 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
650 switch (must_be_ca) {
651 case -1:
652 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
653 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
654 ret = 0;
655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
656 } else
657 ret = 1;
658 break;
659 case 0:
660 if (ret != 0) {
661 ret = 0;
662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
663 } else
664 ret = 1;
665 break;
666 default:
667 if ((ret == 0)
668 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
669 && (ret != 1))) {
670 ret = 0;
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
672 } else
673 ret = 1;
674 break;
675 }
676 if (ret == 0) {
677 ctx->error_depth = i;
678 ctx->current_cert = x;
679 ok = cb(0, ctx);
680 if (!ok)
681 goto end;
682 }
683 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
684 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
685 if ((ret == 0)
686 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
687 && (ret != 1))) {
688 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
689 ctx->error_depth = i;
690 ctx->current_cert = x;
691 ok = cb(0, ctx);
692 if (!ok)
693 goto end;
694 }
695 }
696 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
697 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
698 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
699 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
703 ok = cb(0, ctx);
704 if (!ok)
705 goto end;
706 }
707 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
708 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
709 plen++;
710 /*
711 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
712 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
713 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
714 */
715 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
716 /*
717 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
718 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
719 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
720 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
721 *
722 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
723 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
724 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
725 * increment proxy_path_length.
726 */
727 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
728 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
730 ctx->error_depth = i;
731 ctx->current_cert = x;
732 ok = cb(0, ctx);
733 if (!ok)
734 goto end;
735 }
736 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
737 }
738 proxy_path_length++;
739 must_be_ca = 0;
740 } else
741 must_be_ca = 1;
742 }
743 ok = 1;
744 end:
745 return ok;
746 #endif
747 }
748
749 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
750 {
751 X509 *x;
752 int i, j, rv;
753 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
754 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
755 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
756 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
757 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
758 continue;
759
760 /*
761 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
762 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
763 * added.
764 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
765 */
766 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
767 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
768 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
769 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
770 int last_object_nid = 0;
771 int err = X509_V_OK;
772 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
773
774 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
775 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
776 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
777 goto proxy_name_done;
778 }
779
780 /*
781 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
782 * there is in issuer.
783 */
784 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
785 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
786 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
787 goto proxy_name_done;
788 }
789
790 /*
791 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
792 * multivalued RDN
793 */
794 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
795 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
796 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
797 goto proxy_name_done;
798 }
799
800 /*
801 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
802 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
803 */
804 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
805 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
806 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
807 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
808 return 0;
809 }
810
811 tmpentry =
812 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
813 last_object_nid =
814 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
815
816 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
817 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
818 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
819 }
820
821 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
822 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
823
824 proxy_name_done:
825 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
826 ctx->error = err;
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ctx->current_cert = x;
829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
830 return 0;
831 }
832 }
833
834 /*
835 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
836 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
837 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
838 * to be obeyed.
839 */
840 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
841 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
842 if (nc) {
843 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
844 switch (rv) {
845 case X509_V_OK:
846 continue;
847 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
848 ctx->error = rv;
849 return 0;
850 default:
851 ctx->error = rv;
852 ctx->error_depth = i;
853 ctx->current_cert = x;
854 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
855 return 0;
856 break;
857 }
858 }
859 }
860 }
861 return 1;
862 }
863
864 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
865 {
866 ctx->error = errcode;
867 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
868 ctx->error_depth = 0;
869 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
870 }
871
872 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
873 {
874 int i;
875 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
876 char *name;
877
878 if (id->peername != NULL) {
879 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
880 id->peername = NULL;
881 }
882 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
883 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
884 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
885 return 1;
886 }
887 return n == 0;
888 }
889
890 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
891 {
892 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
893 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
894 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
895 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
896 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
897 return 0;
898 }
899 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
900 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
901 return 0;
902 }
903 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
904 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
905 return 0;
906 }
907 return 1;
908 }
909
910 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
911 {
912 int i, ok;
913 X509 *x = NULL;
914 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
915 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
916 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
917 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
918 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
919 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
920 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
921 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
922 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
923 /*
924 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
925 * overridden.
926 */
927 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
928 ctx->error_depth = i;
929 ctx->current_cert = x;
930 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
931 ok = cb(0, ctx);
932 if (!ok)
933 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
934 }
935 }
936 /*
937 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
938 * return success.
939 */
940 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
941 X509 *mx;
942 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
943 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
944 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
945 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
946 if (mx) {
947 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
948 X509_free(x);
949 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
950 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
951 }
952 }
953
954 /*
955 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
956 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
957 */
958 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
959 }
960
961 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
962 {
963 int i, last, ok;
964 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
965 return 1;
966 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
967 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
968 else {
969 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
970 if (ctx->parent)
971 return 1;
972 last = 0;
973 }
974 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
975 ctx->error_depth = i;
976 ok = check_cert(ctx);
977 if (!ok)
978 return ok;
979 }
980 return 1;
981 }
982
983 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
984 {
985 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
986 X509 *x;
987 int ok = 0; /* current openssl sets 'ok' to zero here */
988 int cnum;
989 unsigned int last_reasons;
990 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
991 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
992 ctx->current_cert = x;
993 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
994 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
995 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
996 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
997 return 1;
998 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
999 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1000 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1001 if (ctx->get_crl)
1002 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1003 else
1004 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1005 /*
1006 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
1007 */
1008 if (!ok) {
1009 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1010 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1011 goto err;
1012 }
1013 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1014 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1015 if (!ok)
1016 goto err;
1017
1018 if (dcrl) {
1019 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1020 if (!ok)
1021 goto err;
1022 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1023 if (!ok)
1024 goto err;
1025 } else
1026 ok = 1;
1027
1028 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1029 if (ok != 2) {
1030 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1031 if (!ok)
1032 goto err;
1033 }
1034
1035 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1036 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1037 crl = NULL;
1038 dcrl = NULL;
1039 /*
1040 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1041 * so exit loop.
1042 */
1043 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1044 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1045 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1046 goto err;
1047 }
1048 }
1049 err:
1050 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1051 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1052
1053 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1054 return ok;
1055
1056 }
1057
1058 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1059
1060 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1061 {
1062 time_t *ptime;
1063 int i;
1064 if (notify)
1065 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1066 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1067 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1068 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1069 return 1;
1070 else
1071 ptime = NULL;
1072
1073 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1074 if (i == 0) {
1075 if (!notify)
1076 return 0;
1077 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1078 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1079 return 0;
1080 }
1081
1082 if (i > 0) {
1083 if (!notify)
1084 return 0;
1085 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1086 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1087 return 0;
1088 }
1089
1090 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1091 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1092
1093 if (i == 0) {
1094 if (!notify)
1095 return 0;
1096 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1097 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1098 return 0;
1099 }
1100 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1101 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1102 if (!notify)
1103 return 0;
1104 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1105 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108 }
1109
1110 if (notify)
1111 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1112
1113 return 1;
1114 }
1115
1116 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1117 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1118 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1119 {
1120 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1121 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1122 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1123 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1124 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1125
1126 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1127 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1128 reasons = *preasons;
1129 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1130 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1131 continue;
1132 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1133 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1134 int day, sec;
1135 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1136 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1137 continue;
1138 /*
1139 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1140 * and |sec|.
1141 */
1142 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1143 continue;
1144 }
1145 best_crl = crl;
1146 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1147 best_score = crl_score;
1148 best_reasons = reasons;
1149 }
1150
1151 if (best_crl) {
1152 if (*pcrl)
1153 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1154 *pcrl = best_crl;
1155 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1156 *pscore = best_score;
1157 *preasons = best_reasons;
1158 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1159 if (*pdcrl) {
1160 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1161 *pdcrl = NULL;
1162 }
1163 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1164 }
1165
1166 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1167 return 1;
1168
1169 return 0;
1170 }
1171
1172 /*
1173 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1174 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1175 */
1176
1177 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1178 {
1179 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1180 int i;
1181 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1182 if (i >= 0) {
1183 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1184 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1185 return 0;
1186 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1187 } else
1188 exta = NULL;
1189
1190 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1191
1192 if (i >= 0) {
1193
1194 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1195 return 0;
1196 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1197 } else
1198 extb = NULL;
1199
1200 if (!exta && !extb)
1201 return 1;
1202
1203 if (!exta || !extb)
1204 return 0;
1205
1206 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1207 return 0;
1208
1209 return 1;
1210 }
1211
1212 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1213
1214 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1215 {
1216 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1217 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1218 return 0;
1219 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1220 if (!base->crl_number)
1221 return 0;
1222 /* Issuer names must match */
1223 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1224 return 0;
1225 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1226 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1227 return 0;
1228 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1229 return 0;
1230 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1231 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1232 return 0;
1233 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1234 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1235 return 1;
1236 return 0;
1237 }
1238
1239 /*
1240 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1241 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1242 */
1243
1244 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1245 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1246 {
1247 X509_CRL *delta;
1248 int i;
1249 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1250 return;
1251 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1252 return;
1253 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1254 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1255 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1256 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1257 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1258 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1259 *dcrl = delta;
1260 return;
1261 }
1262 }
1263 *dcrl = NULL;
1264 }
1265
1266 /*
1267 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1268 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1269 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1270 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1271 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1272 */
1273
1274 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1275 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1276 {
1277
1278 int crl_score = 0;
1279 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1280
1281 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1282
1283 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1284 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1285 return 0;
1286 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1287 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1288 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1289 return 0;
1290 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1291 /* If no new reasons reject */
1292 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1293 return 0;
1294 }
1295 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1296 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1297 return 0;
1298 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1299 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1300 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1301 return 0;
1302 } else
1303 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1304
1305 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1306 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1307
1308 /* Check expiry */
1309 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1310 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1311
1312 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1313 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1314
1315 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1316
1317 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1318 return 0;
1319
1320 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1321
1322 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1323 /* If no new reasons reject */
1324 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1325 return 0;
1326 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1327 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1328 }
1329
1330 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1331
1332 return crl_score;
1333
1334 }
1335
1336 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1337 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1338 {
1339 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1340 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1341 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1342 int i;
1343
1344 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1345 cidx++;
1346
1347 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1348
1349 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1350 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1351 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1352 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1353 return;
1354 }
1355 }
1356
1357 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1358 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1359 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1360 continue;
1361 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1362 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1363 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1364 return;
1365 }
1366 }
1367
1368 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1369
1370 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1371 return;
1372
1373 /*
1374 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1375 * untrusted certificates.
1376 */
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1378 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1379 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1380 continue;
1381 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1382 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1383 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1384 return;
1385 }
1386 }
1387 }
1388
1389 /*
1390 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1391 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1392 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1393 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1394 */
1395
1396 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1397 {
1398 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1399 int ret;
1400 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1401 if (ctx->parent)
1402 return 0;
1403 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1404 return -1;
1405
1406 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1407 /* Copy verify params across */
1408 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1409
1410 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1411 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1412
1413 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1414 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1415
1416 if (ret <= 0)
1417 goto err;
1418
1419 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1420
1421 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1422 err:
1423 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1424 return ret;
1425 }
1426
1427 /*
1428 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1429 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1430 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1431 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1432 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1433 * RFC5280 version
1434 */
1435
1436 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1437 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1438 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1439 {
1440 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1441 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1442 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1443 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1444 return 1;
1445 return 0;
1446 }
1447
1448 /*-
1449 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1450 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1451 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1452 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1453 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1454 */
1455
1456 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1457 {
1458 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1459 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1460 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1461 int i, j;
1462 if (!a || !b)
1463 return 1;
1464 if (a->type == 1) {
1465 if (!a->dpname)
1466 return 0;
1467 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1468 if (b->type == 1) {
1469 if (!b->dpname)
1470 return 0;
1471 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1472 return 1;
1473 else
1474 return 0;
1475 }
1476 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1477 nm = a->dpname;
1478 gens = b->name.fullname;
1479 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1480 if (!b->dpname)
1481 return 0;
1482 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1483 gens = a->name.fullname;
1484 nm = b->dpname;
1485 }
1486
1487 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1488 if (nm) {
1489 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1490 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1491 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1492 continue;
1493 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1494 return 1;
1495 }
1496 return 0;
1497 }
1498
1499 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1500
1501 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1502 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1503 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1504 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1505 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1506 return 1;
1507 }
1508 }
1509
1510 return 0;
1511
1512 }
1513
1514 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1515 {
1516 int i;
1517 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1518 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1519 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1520 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1521 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1522 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1523 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1524 continue;
1525 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1526 return 1;
1527 }
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530
1531 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1532
1533 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1534 unsigned int *preasons)
1535 {
1536 int i;
1537 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1538 return 0;
1539 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1540 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1541 return 0;
1542 } else {
1543 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1544 return 0;
1545 }
1546 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1547 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1548 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1549 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1550 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1551 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1552 return 1;
1553 }
1554 }
1555 }
1556 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1557 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1558 return 1;
1559 return 0;
1560 }
1561
1562 /*
1563 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1564 * to find a delta CRL too
1565 */
1566
1567 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1568 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1569 {
1570 int ok;
1571 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1572 int crl_score = 0;
1573 unsigned int reasons;
1574 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1575 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1576 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1577 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1578 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1579 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1580
1581 if (ok)
1582 goto done;
1583
1584 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1585
1586 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1587
1588 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1589 if (!skcrl && crl)
1590 goto done;
1591
1592 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1593
1594 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1595
1596 done:
1597
1598 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1599 if (crl) {
1600 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1601 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1602 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1603 *pcrl = crl;
1604 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1605 return 1;
1606 }
1607
1608 return 0;
1609 }
1610
1611 /* Check CRL validity */
1612 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1613 {
1614 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1615 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1616 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1617 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1618 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1619 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1620 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1621 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1622
1623 /*
1624 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1625 * certificate in chain.
1626 */
1627 else if (cnum < chnum)
1628 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1629 else {
1630 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1631 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1632 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1633 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1634 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1635 if (!ok)
1636 goto err;
1637 }
1638 }
1639
1640 if (issuer) {
1641 /*
1642 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1643 */
1644 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1645 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1646 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1647 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1648 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1649 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1650 if (!ok)
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653
1654 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1656 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1657 if (!ok)
1658 goto err;
1659 }
1660
1661 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1662 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1664 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1665 if (!ok)
1666 goto err;
1667 }
1668 }
1669
1670 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1672 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1673 if (!ok)
1674 goto err;
1675 }
1676
1677 }
1678
1679 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1680 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1681 if (!ok)
1682 goto err;
1683 }
1684
1685 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1686 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1687
1688 if (!ikey) {
1689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1690 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1691 if (!ok)
1692 goto err;
1693 } else {
1694 int rv;
1695 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1696 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1697 ctx->error = rv;
1698 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1699 if (!ok)
1700 goto err;
1701 }
1702 /* Verify CRL signature */
1703 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1704 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1705 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1706 if (!ok)
1707 goto err;
1708 }
1709 }
1710 }
1711
1712 ok = 1;
1713
1714 err:
1715 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1716 return ok;
1717 }
1718
1719 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1720 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1721 {
1722 int ok;
1723 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1724 /*
1725 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1726 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1727 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1728 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1729 */
1730 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1731 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1732 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1733 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1734 if (!ok)
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737 /*
1738 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1739 * is not removeFromCRL.
1740 */
1741 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1742 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1743 return 2;
1744 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1745 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1746 if (!ok)
1747 return 0;
1748 }
1749
1750 return 1;
1751 }
1752
1753 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1754 {
1755 int ret;
1756 if (ctx->parent)
1757 return 1;
1758 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1759 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1760 if (ret == 0) {
1761 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1762 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1763 return 0;
1764 }
1765 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1766 if (ret == -1) {
1767 /*
1768 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1769 */
1770 X509 *x;
1771 int i;
1772 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1773 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1774 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1775 continue;
1776 ctx->current_cert = x;
1777 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1778 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1779 return 0;
1780 }
1781 return 1;
1782 }
1783 if (ret == -2) {
1784 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1785 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1786 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1787 }
1788
1789 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1790 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1791 /*
1792 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1793 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1794 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1795 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1796 */
1797 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1798 return 0;
1799 }
1800
1801 return 1;
1802 }
1803
1804 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1805 {
1806 time_t *ptime;
1807 int i;
1808
1809 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1810 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1811 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1812 return 1;
1813 else
1814 ptime = NULL;
1815
1816 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1817 if (i == 0) {
1818 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1819 ctx->current_cert = x;
1820 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1821 return 0;
1822 }
1823
1824 if (i > 0) {
1825 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1826 ctx->current_cert = x;
1827 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1828 return 0;
1829 }
1830
1831 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1832 if (i == 0) {
1833 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1834 ctx->current_cert = x;
1835 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1836 return 0;
1837 }
1838
1839 if (i < 0) {
1840 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1841 ctx->current_cert = x;
1842 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1843 return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 return 1;
1847 }
1848
1849 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1850 {
1851 int ok = 0, n;
1852 X509 *xs, *xi;
1853 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1854 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1855
1856 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1857
1858 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1859 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1860 n--;
1861 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1862
1863 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1864 xs = xi;
1865 else {
1866 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1867 xs = xi;
1868 goto check_cert;
1869 }
1870 if (n <= 0) {
1871 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1872 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1873 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1874 goto end;
1875 } else {
1876 n--;
1877 ctx->error_depth = n;
1878 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1879 }
1880 }
1881
1882 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1883 while (n >= 0) {
1884 ctx->error_depth = n;
1885
1886 /*
1887 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1888 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1889 * time.
1890 */
1891 if (!xs->valid
1892 && (xs != xi
1893 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1894 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1895 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1896 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1897 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1898 if (!ok)
1899 goto end;
1900 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1902 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1903 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1904 if (!ok) {
1905 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1906 goto end;
1907 }
1908 }
1909 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1910 pkey = NULL;
1911 }
1912
1913 xs->valid = 1;
1914
1915 check_cert:
1916 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1917 if (!ok)
1918 goto end;
1919
1920 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1921 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1922 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1923 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1924 if (!ok)
1925 goto end;
1926
1927 n--;
1928 if (n >= 0) {
1929 xi = xs;
1930 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1931 }
1932 }
1933 ok = 1;
1934 end:
1935 return ok;
1936 }
1937
1938 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1939 {
1940 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1941 }
1942
1943 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1944 {
1945 char *str;
1946 ASN1_TIME atm;
1947 long offset;
1948 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1949 int i, j, remaining;
1950
1951 p = buff1;
1952 remaining = ctm->length;
1953 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1954 /*
1955 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1956 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1957 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1958 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1959 */
1960 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1961 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1962 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1963 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1964 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1965 return 0;
1966 memcpy(p, str, 10);
1967 p += 10;
1968 str += 10;
1969 remaining -= 10;
1970 } else {
1971 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1972 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1973 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1974 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1975 return 0;
1976 memcpy(p, str, 12);
1977 p += 12;
1978 str += 12;
1979 remaining -= 12;
1980 }
1981
1982 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1983 *(p++) = '0';
1984 *(p++) = '0';
1985 } else {
1986 /* SS (seconds) */
1987 if (remaining < 2)
1988 return 0;
1989 *(p++) = *(str++);
1990 *(p++) = *(str++);
1991 remaining -= 2;
1992 /*
1993 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1994 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1995 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1996 */
1997 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1998 str++;
1999 remaining--;
2000 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
2001 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
2002 break;
2003 }
2004 }
2005
2006 }
2007 *(p++) = 'Z';
2008 *(p++) = '\0';
2009
2010 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
2011 if (!remaining)
2012 return 0;
2013 if (*str == 'Z') {
2014 if (remaining != 1)
2015 return 0;
2016 offset = 0;
2017 } else {
2018 /* (+-)HHMM */
2019 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
2020 return 0;
2021 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
2022 if (remaining != 5)
2023 return 0;
2024 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
2025 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
2026 return 0;
2027 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
2028 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
2029 if (*str == '-')
2030 offset = -offset;
2031 }
2032 atm.type = ctm->type;
2033 atm.flags = 0;
2034 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
2035 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
2036
2037 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
2038 return 0;
2039
2040 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
2041 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
2042 if (i < 50)
2043 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
2044 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
2045 if (j < 50)
2046 j += 100;
2047
2048 if (i < j)
2049 return -1;
2050 if (i > j)
2051 return 1;
2052 }
2053 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
2054 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
2055 return -1;
2056 else
2057 return i;
2058 }
2059
2060 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2061 {
2062 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2063 }
2064
2065 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2066 {
2067 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2068 }
2069
2070 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2071 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2072 {
2073 time_t t;
2074
2075 if (in_tm)
2076 t = *in_tm;
2077 else
2078 time(&t);
2079
2080 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2081 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2082 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2083 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2084 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2085 }
2086 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2087 }
2088
2089 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2090 {
2091 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2092 int i, j;
2093
2094 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2095 return 1;
2096
2097 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2098 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2099 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2100 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2101 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2102 return 0;
2103 }
2104 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2105 break;
2106 else {
2107 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2108 ktmp = NULL;
2109 }
2110 }
2111 if (ktmp == NULL) {
2112 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2113 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2114 return 0;
2115 }
2116
2117 /* first, populate the other certs */
2118 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2119 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2120 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2121 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2122 }
2123
2124 if (pkey != NULL)
2125 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2126 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2127 return 1;
2128 }
2129
2130 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2131
2132 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2133 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2134 {
2135 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2136 int i;
2137 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2138 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2139 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2140 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2141 return NULL;
2142 }
2143 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2144 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2145 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2146 return NULL;
2147 }
2148 /* Issuer names must match */
2149 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2150 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2151 return NULL;
2152 }
2153 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2154 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2155 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2156 return NULL;
2157 }
2158 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2159 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2160 return NULL;
2161 }
2162 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2163 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2164 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2165 return NULL;
2166 }
2167 /* CRLs must verify */
2168 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2169 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2170 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2171 return NULL;
2172 }
2173 /* Create new CRL */
2174 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2175 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2176 goto memerr;
2177 /* Set issuer name */
2178 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2179 goto memerr;
2180
2181 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2182 goto memerr;
2183 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2184 goto memerr;
2185
2186 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2187
2188 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2189 goto memerr;
2190
2191 /*
2192 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2193 * number to correct value too.
2194 */
2195
2196 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2197 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2198 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2199 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2200 goto memerr;
2201 }
2202
2203 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2204
2205 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2206
2207 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2208 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2209 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2210 /*
2211 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2212 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2213 */
2214 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2215 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2216 if (!rvtmp)
2217 goto memerr;
2218 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2219 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2220 goto memerr;
2221 }
2222 }
2223 }
2224 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2225
2226 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2227 goto memerr;
2228
2229 return crl;
2230
2231 memerr:
2232 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2233 if (crl)
2234 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2235 return NULL;
2236 }
2237
2238 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2239 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2240 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2241 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2242 {
2243 /*
2244 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2245 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2246 */
2247 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2248 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2249 }
2250
2251 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2252 {
2253 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2254 }
2255
2256 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2257 {
2258 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2259 }
2260
2261 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2262 {
2263 return ctx->error;
2264 }
2265
2266 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2267 {
2268 ctx->error = err;
2269 }
2270
2271 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2272 {
2273 return ctx->error_depth;
2274 }
2275
2276 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2277 {
2278 return ctx->current_cert;
2279 }
2280
2281 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2282 {
2283 return ctx->chain;
2284 }
2285
2286 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2287 {
2288 if (!ctx->chain)
2289 return NULL;
2290 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2291 }
2292
2293 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2294 {
2295 return ctx->current_issuer;
2296 }
2297
2298 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2299 {
2300 return ctx->current_crl;
2301 }
2302
2303 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2304 {
2305 return ctx->parent;
2306 }
2307
2308 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2309 {
2310 ctx->cert = x;
2311 }
2312
2313 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2314 {
2315 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2316 }
2317
2318 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2319 {
2320 ctx->crls = sk;
2321 }
2322
2323 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2324 {
2325 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2326 }
2327
2328 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2329 {
2330 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2331 }
2332
2333 /*
2334 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2335 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2336 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2337 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2338 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2339 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2340 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2341 * client/server.
2342 */
2343
2344 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2345 int purpose, int trust)
2346 {
2347 int idx;
2348 /* If purpose not set use default */
2349 if (!purpose)
2350 purpose = def_purpose;
2351 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2352 if (purpose) {
2353 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2354 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2355 if (idx == -1) {
2356 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2357 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2358 return 0;
2359 }
2360 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2361 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2362 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2363 if (idx == -1) {
2364 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2365 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2366 return 0;
2367 }
2368 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2369 }
2370 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2371 if (!trust)
2372 trust = ptmp->trust;
2373 }
2374 if (trust) {
2375 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2376 if (idx == -1) {
2377 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2378 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2379 return 0;
2380 }
2381 }
2382
2383 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2384 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2385 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2386 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2387 return 1;
2388 }
2389
2390 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2391 {
2392 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2393 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2394 if (!ctx) {
2395 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2396 return NULL;
2397 }
2398 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2399 return ctx;
2400 }
2401
2402 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2403 {
2404 if (!ctx)
2405 return;
2406 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2407 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2408 }
2409
2410 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2411 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2412 {
2413 int ret = 1;
2414 ctx->ctx = store;
2415 ctx->current_method = 0;
2416 ctx->cert = x509;
2417 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2418 ctx->crls = NULL;
2419 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2420 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2421 ctx->valid = 0;
2422 ctx->chain = NULL;
2423 ctx->error = 0;
2424 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2425 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2426 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2427 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2428 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2429 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2430 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2431 ctx->tree = NULL;
2432 ctx->parent = NULL;
2433 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2434 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2435
2436 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2437 if (!ctx->param) {
2438 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2439 return 0;
2440 }
2441
2442 /*
2443 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2444 */
2445 if (store)
2446 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2447 else
2448 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2449
2450 if (store) {
2451 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2452 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2453 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2454 } else
2455 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2456
2457 if (ret)
2458 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2459 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2460
2461 if (ret == 0) {
2462 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2463 goto err;
2464 }
2465
2466 if (store && store->check_issued)
2467 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2468 else
2469 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2470
2471 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2472 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2473 else
2474 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2475
2476 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2477 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2478 else
2479 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2480
2481 if (store && store->verify)
2482 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2483 else
2484 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2485
2486 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2487 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2488 else
2489 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2490
2491 if (store && store->get_crl)
2492 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2493 else
2494 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2495
2496 if (store && store->check_crl)
2497 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2498 else
2499 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2500
2501 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2502 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2503 else
2504 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2505
2506 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2507 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2508 else
2509 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2510
2511 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2512 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2513 else
2514 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2515
2516 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2517
2518 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2519 &ctx->ex_data))
2520 return 1;
2521 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2522
2523 err:
2524 /*
2525 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2526 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2527 */
2528 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2529 return 0;
2530 }
2531
2532 /*
2533 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2534 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2535 */
2536
2537 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2538 {
2539 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2540 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2541 }
2542
2543 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2544 {
2545 /*
2546 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2547 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2548 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2549 * pointers below after they're freed!
2550 */
2551 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2552 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2553 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2554 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2555 }
2556 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2557 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2558 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2559 ctx->param = NULL;
2560 }
2561 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2562 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2563 ctx->tree = NULL;
2564 }
2565 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2566 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2567 ctx->chain = NULL;
2568 }
2569 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2570 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2571 }
2572
2573 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2574 {
2575 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2576 }
2577
2578 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2579 {
2580 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2581 }
2582
2583 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2584 time_t t)
2585 {
2586 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2587 }
2588
2589 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2590 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2591 {
2592 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2593 }
2594
2595 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2596 {
2597 return ctx->tree;
2598 }
2599
2600 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2601 {
2602 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2603 }
2604
2605 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2606 {
2607 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2608 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2609 if (!param)
2610 return 0;
2611 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2612 }
2613
2614 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2615 {
2616 return ctx->param;
2617 }
2618
2619 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2620 {
2621 if (ctx->param)
2622 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2623 ctx->param = param;
2624 }
2625
2626 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2627
2628 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2629
2630 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2631
2632 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2633
2634 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)