| 1 |
/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
| 2 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 3 |
* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 7 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
| 23 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 35 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
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* |
| 41 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 |
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 |
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 |
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 |
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 |
*/ |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
#include <stdio.h> |
| 60 |
#include <time.h> |
| 61 |
#include <errno.h> |
| 62 |
|
| 63 |
#include "cryptlib.h" |
| 64 |
#include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| 65 |
#include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| 66 |
#include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 67 |
#include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 68 |
#include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| 69 |
#include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 70 |
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 71 |
#include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 72 |
#include "vpm_int.h" |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
/* CRL score values */ |
| 75 |
|
| 76 |
/* No unhandled critical extensions */ |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
/* certificate is within CRL scope */ |
| 81 |
|
| 82 |
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
/* CRL times valid */ |
| 85 |
|
| 86 |
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
| 87 |
|
| 88 |
/* Issuer name matches certificate */ |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
| 91 |
|
| 92 |
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ |
| 93 |
|
| 94 |
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) |
| 95 |
|
| 96 |
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ |
| 97 |
|
| 98 |
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
| 103 |
|
| 104 |
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ |
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
| 113 |
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
| 114 |
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); |
| 115 |
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 116 |
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 117 |
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 118 |
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 119 |
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 120 |
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 121 |
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 122 |
|
| 123 |
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
| 124 |
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
| 125 |
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 126 |
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
| 127 |
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, |
| 128 |
int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, |
| 129 |
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); |
| 130 |
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, |
| 131 |
int *pcrl_score); |
| 132 |
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
| 133 |
unsigned int *preasons); |
| 134 |
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
| 135 |
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 136 |
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
| 137 |
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); |
| 138 |
|
| 139 |
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
| 140 |
const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
| 143 |
{ |
| 144 |
return ok; |
| 145 |
} |
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
#if 0 |
| 148 |
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
| 149 |
{ |
| 150 |
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); |
| 151 |
} |
| 152 |
#endif |
| 153 |
/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
| 154 |
static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) |
| 155 |
{ |
| 156 |
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| 157 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) |
| 158 |
return 1; |
| 159 |
else |
| 160 |
return 0; |
| 161 |
} |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
| 164 |
|
| 165 |
static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 166 |
{ |
| 167 |
STACK_OF(X509) *certs; |
| 168 |
X509 *xtmp = NULL; |
| 169 |
int i; |
| 170 |
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ |
| 171 |
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); |
| 172 |
if (certs == NULL) |
| 173 |
return NULL; |
| 174 |
/* Look for exact match */ |
| 175 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { |
| 176 |
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| 177 |
if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) |
| 178 |
break; |
| 179 |
} |
| 180 |
if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) |
| 181 |
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 182 |
else |
| 183 |
xtmp = NULL; |
| 184 |
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); |
| 185 |
return xtmp; |
| 186 |
} |
| 187 |
|
| 188 |
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 189 |
{ |
| 190 |
X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; |
| 191 |
int bad_chain = 0; |
| 192 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; |
| 193 |
int depth, i, ok = 0; |
| 194 |
int num, j, retry; |
| 195 |
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| 196 |
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; |
| 197 |
int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| 198 |
int err; |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
| 201 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
| 202 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
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return -1; |
| 204 |
} |
| 205 |
if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
| 206 |
/* |
| 207 |
* This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We |
| 208 |
* cannot do another one. |
| 209 |
*/ |
| 210 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
| 212 |
return -1; |
| 213 |
} |
| 214 |
|
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cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
/* |
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* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that |
| 219 |
* the first entry is in place |
| 220 |
*/ |
| 221 |
if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
| 222 |
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { |
| 223 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 224 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 225 |
ok = -1; |
| 226 |
goto err; |
| 227 |
} |
| 228 |
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 229 |
ctx->last_untrusted = 1; |
| 230 |
|
| 231 |
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ |
| 232 |
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
| 233 |
&& (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { |
| 234 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 235 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 236 |
ok = -1; |
| 237 |
goto err; |
| 238 |
} |
| 239 |
|
| 240 |
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 241 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); |
| 242 |
depth = param->depth; |
| 243 |
|
| 244 |
for (;;) { |
| 245 |
/* If we have enough, we break */ |
| 246 |
if (depth < num) |
| 247 |
break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
| 248 |
* note of it and, if appropriate, use the |
| 249 |
* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code |
| 250 |
* later. */ |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
/* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| 253 |
if (cert_self_signed(x)) |
| 254 |
break; |
| 255 |
/* |
| 256 |
* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first |
| 257 |
*/ |
| 258 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { |
| 259 |
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| 260 |
if (ok < 0) { |
| 261 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
| 262 |
goto err; |
| 263 |
} |
| 264 |
/* |
| 265 |
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up |
| 266 |
* again later. |
| 267 |
*/ |
| 268 |
if (ok > 0) { |
| 269 |
X509_free(xtmp); |
| 270 |
break; |
| 271 |
} |
| 272 |
} |
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ |
| 275 |
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { |
| 276 |
xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); |
| 277 |
if (xtmp != NULL) { |
| 278 |
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { |
| 279 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 280 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 281 |
ok = -1; |
| 282 |
goto err; |
| 283 |
} |
| 284 |
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 285 |
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); |
| 286 |
ctx->last_untrusted++; |
| 287 |
x = xtmp; |
| 288 |
num++; |
| 289 |
/* |
| 290 |
* reparse the full chain for the next one |
| 291 |
*/ |
| 292 |
continue; |
| 293 |
} |
| 294 |
} |
| 295 |
break; |
| 296 |
} |
| 297 |
|
| 298 |
/* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ |
| 299 |
j = num; |
| 300 |
/* |
| 301 |
* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. |
| 302 |
* We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we |
| 303 |
* complain. |
| 304 |
*/ |
| 305 |
|
| 306 |
do { |
| 307 |
/* |
| 308 |
* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. |
| 309 |
*/ |
| 310 |
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 311 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); |
| 312 |
if (cert_self_signed(x)) { |
| 313 |
/* we have a self signed certificate */ |
| 314 |
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { |
| 315 |
/* |
| 316 |
* We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can |
| 317 |
* find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid |
| 318 |
* possible impersonation. |
| 319 |
*/ |
| 320 |
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| 321 |
if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { |
| 322 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; |
| 323 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 324 |
ctx->error_depth = i - 1; |
| 325 |
if (ok == 1) |
| 326 |
X509_free(xtmp); |
| 327 |
bad_chain = 1; |
| 328 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 329 |
if (!ok) |
| 330 |
goto err; |
| 331 |
} else { |
| 332 |
/* |
| 333 |
* We have a match: replace certificate with store |
| 334 |
* version so we get any trust settings. |
| 335 |
*/ |
| 336 |
X509_free(x); |
| 337 |
x = xtmp; |
| 338 |
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); |
| 339 |
ctx->last_untrusted = 0; |
| 340 |
} |
| 341 |
} else { |
| 342 |
/* |
| 343 |
* extract and save self signed certificate for later use |
| 344 |
*/ |
| 345 |
chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
| 346 |
ctx->last_untrusted--; |
| 347 |
num--; |
| 348 |
j--; |
| 349 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); |
| 350 |
} |
| 351 |
} |
| 352 |
/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ |
| 353 |
for (;;) { |
| 354 |
/* If we have enough, we break */ |
| 355 |
if (depth < num) |
| 356 |
break; |
| 357 |
/* If we are self signed, we break */ |
| 358 |
if (cert_self_signed(x)) |
| 359 |
break; |
| 360 |
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
if (ok < 0) { |
| 363 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
| 364 |
goto err; |
| 365 |
} |
| 366 |
if (ok == 0) |
| 367 |
break; |
| 368 |
x = xtmp; |
| 369 |
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { |
| 370 |
X509_free(xtmp); |
| 371 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 372 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 373 |
ok = -1; |
| 374 |
goto err; |
| 375 |
} |
| 376 |
num++; |
| 377 |
} |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ |
| 380 |
if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { |
| 381 |
/* Callback already issued */ |
| 382 |
ok = 0; |
| 383 |
goto err; |
| 384 |
} |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
/* |
| 387 |
* If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative |
| 388 |
* chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already |
| 389 |
* checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate |
| 390 |
* chain checking |
| 391 |
*/ |
| 392 |
retry = 0; |
| 393 |
if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED |
| 394 |
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) |
| 395 |
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { |
| 396 |
while (j-- > 1) { |
| 397 |
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); |
| 398 |
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); |
| 399 |
if (ok < 0) { |
| 400 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
| 401 |
goto err; |
| 402 |
} |
| 403 |
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */ |
| 404 |
if (ok > 0) { |
| 405 |
/* |
| 406 |
* Free up the found cert we'll add it again later |
| 407 |
*/ |
| 408 |
X509_free(xtmp); |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
/* |
| 411 |
* Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an |
| 412 |
* alternate chain |
| 413 |
*/ |
| 414 |
while (num > j) { |
| 415 |
xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
| 416 |
X509_free(xtmp); |
| 417 |
num--; |
| 418 |
} |
| 419 |
ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 420 |
retry = 1; |
| 421 |
break; |
| 422 |
} |
| 423 |
} |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
} while (retry); |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
/* |
| 428 |
* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single |
| 429 |
* self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already |
| 430 |
* and set bad_chain == 1 |
| 431 |
*/ |
| 432 |
if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { |
| 433 |
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { |
| 434 |
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) |
| 435 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; |
| 436 |
else |
| 437 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; |
| 438 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 439 |
} else { |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); |
| 442 |
num++; |
| 443 |
ctx->last_untrusted = num; |
| 444 |
ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; |
| 445 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; |
| 446 |
chain_ss = NULL; |
| 447 |
} |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
ctx->error_depth = num - 1; |
| 450 |
bad_chain = 1; |
| 451 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 452 |
if (!ok) |
| 453 |
goto err; |
| 454 |
} |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ |
| 457 |
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
if (!ok) |
| 460 |
goto err; |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
/* Check name constraints */ |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
if (!ok) |
| 467 |
goto err; |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
ok = check_id(ctx); |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
if (!ok) |
| 472 |
goto err; |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ |
| 475 |
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
/* |
| 478 |
* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because |
| 479 |
* they may be needed for CRL signature verification. |
| 480 |
*/ |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); |
| 483 |
if (!ok) |
| 484 |
goto err; |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, |
| 487 |
ctx->param->flags); |
| 488 |
if (err != X509_V_OK) { |
| 489 |
ctx->error = err; |
| 490 |
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); |
| 491 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 492 |
if (!ok) |
| 493 |
goto err; |
| 494 |
} |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ |
| 497 |
if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
| 498 |
ok = ctx->verify(ctx); |
| 499 |
else |
| 500 |
ok = internal_verify(ctx); |
| 501 |
if (!ok) |
| 502 |
goto err; |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
| 505 |
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
| 506 |
ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); |
| 507 |
if (!ok) |
| 508 |
goto err; |
| 509 |
ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); |
| 510 |
if (!ok) |
| 511 |
goto err; |
| 512 |
#endif |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
| 515 |
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) |
| 516 |
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); |
| 517 |
if (!ok) |
| 518 |
goto err; |
| 519 |
if (0) { |
| 520 |
err: |
| 521 |
/* Ensure we return an error */ |
| 522 |
if (ok > 0) |
| 523 |
ok = 0; |
| 524 |
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); |
| 525 |
} |
| 526 |
if (sktmp != NULL) |
| 527 |
sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
| 528 |
if (chain_ss != NULL) |
| 529 |
X509_free(chain_ss); |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
/* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ |
| 532 |
if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
| 533 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; |
| 534 |
return ok; |
| 535 |
} |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
/* |
| 538 |
* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) |
| 539 |
*/ |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
| 542 |
{ |
| 543 |
int i; |
| 544 |
X509 *issuer; |
| 545 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| 546 |
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| 547 |
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) |
| 548 |
return issuer; |
| 549 |
} |
| 550 |
return NULL; |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ |
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) |
| 556 |
{ |
| 557 |
int ret; |
| 558 |
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); |
| 559 |
if (ret == X509_V_OK) |
| 560 |
return 1; |
| 561 |
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ |
| 562 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) |
| 563 |
return 0; |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
ctx->error = ret; |
| 566 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 567 |
ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
| 568 |
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 569 |
} |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 574 |
{ |
| 575 |
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
| 576 |
if (*issuer) { |
| 577 |
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 578 |
return 1; |
| 579 |
} else |
| 580 |
return 0; |
| 581 |
} |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
/* |
| 584 |
* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied |
| 585 |
* purpose |
| 586 |
*/ |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 589 |
{ |
| 590 |
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
| 591 |
return 1; |
| 592 |
#else |
| 593 |
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
| 594 |
X509 *x; |
| 595 |
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| 596 |
int proxy_path_length = 0; |
| 597 |
int purpose; |
| 598 |
int allow_proxy_certs; |
| 599 |
cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
/*- |
| 602 |
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: |
| 603 |
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct |
| 604 |
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). |
| 605 |
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not |
| 606 |
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. |
| 607 |
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for |
| 608 |
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. |
| 609 |
*/ |
| 610 |
must_be_ca = -1; |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
/* CRL path validation */ |
| 613 |
if (ctx->parent) { |
| 614 |
allow_proxy_certs = 0; |
| 615 |
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; |
| 616 |
} else { |
| 617 |
allow_proxy_certs = |
| 618 |
! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); |
| 619 |
/* |
| 620 |
* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software |
| 621 |
* happy |
| 622 |
*/ |
| 623 |
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) |
| 624 |
allow_proxy_certs = 1; |
| 625 |
purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
/* Check all untrusted certificates */ |
| 629 |
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { |
| 630 |
int ret; |
| 631 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| 632 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
| 633 |
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { |
| 634 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; |
| 635 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 636 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 637 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 638 |
if (!ok) |
| 639 |
goto end; |
| 640 |
} |
| 641 |
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { |
| 642 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| 643 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 644 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 645 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 646 |
if (!ok) |
| 647 |
goto end; |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
| 650 |
switch (must_be_ca) { |
| 651 |
case -1: |
| 652 |
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) |
| 653 |
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { |
| 654 |
ret = 0; |
| 655 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
| 656 |
} else |
| 657 |
ret = 1; |
| 658 |
break; |
| 659 |
case 0: |
| 660 |
if (ret != 0) { |
| 661 |
ret = 0; |
| 662 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; |
| 663 |
} else |
| 664 |
ret = 1; |
| 665 |
break; |
| 666 |
default: |
| 667 |
if ((ret == 0) |
| 668 |
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) |
| 669 |
&& (ret != 1))) { |
| 670 |
ret = 0; |
| 671 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
| 672 |
} else |
| 673 |
ret = 1; |
| 674 |
break; |
| 675 |
} |
| 676 |
if (ret == 0) { |
| 677 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 678 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 679 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 680 |
if (!ok) |
| 681 |
goto end; |
| 682 |
} |
| 683 |
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { |
| 684 |
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); |
| 685 |
if ((ret == 0) |
| 686 |
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) |
| 687 |
&& (ret != 1))) { |
| 688 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; |
| 689 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 690 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 691 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 692 |
if (!ok) |
| 693 |
goto end; |
| 694 |
} |
| 695 |
} |
| 696 |
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
| 697 |
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) |
| 698 |
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1) |
| 699 |
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { |
| 700 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
| 701 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 702 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 703 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 704 |
if (!ok) |
| 705 |
goto end; |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
/* Increment path length if not self issued */ |
| 708 |
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 709 |
plen++; |
| 710 |
/* |
| 711 |
* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate |
| 712 |
* must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, |
| 713 |
* the next certificate must be a CA certificate. |
| 714 |
*/ |
| 715 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| 716 |
/* |
| 717 |
* RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint |
| 718 |
* is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to |
| 719 |
* the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length |
| 720 |
* should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. |
| 721 |
* |
| 722 |
* Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start |
| 723 |
* with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, |
| 724 |
* and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, |
| 725 |
* increment proxy_path_length. |
| 726 |
*/ |
| 727 |
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { |
| 728 |
if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { |
| 729 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
| 730 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 731 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 732 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 733 |
if (!ok) |
| 734 |
goto end; |
| 735 |
} |
| 736 |
proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; |
| 737 |
} |
| 738 |
proxy_path_length++; |
| 739 |
must_be_ca = 0; |
| 740 |
} else |
| 741 |
must_be_ca = 1; |
| 742 |
} |
| 743 |
ok = 1; |
| 744 |
end: |
| 745 |
return ok; |
| 746 |
#endif |
| 747 |
} |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 750 |
{ |
| 751 |
X509 *x; |
| 752 |
int i, j, rv; |
| 753 |
/* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
| 754 |
for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| 755 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| 756 |
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ |
| 757 |
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| 758 |
continue; |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
/* |
| 761 |
* Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the |
| 762 |
* certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry |
| 763 |
* added. |
| 764 |
* (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) |
| 765 |
*/ |
| 766 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| 767 |
X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
| 768 |
X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 769 |
X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; |
| 770 |
int last_object_nid = 0; |
| 771 |
int err = X509_V_OK; |
| 772 |
int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
/* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ |
| 775 |
if (last_object_loc < 1) { |
| 776 |
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
| 777 |
goto proxy_name_done; |
| 778 |
} |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
/* |
| 781 |
* Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as |
| 782 |
* there is in issuer. |
| 783 |
*/ |
| 784 |
if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) |
| 785 |
!= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { |
| 786 |
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
| 787 |
goto proxy_name_done; |
| 788 |
} |
| 789 |
|
| 790 |
/* |
| 791 |
* Check that the last subject component isn't part of a |
| 792 |
* multivalued RDN |
| 793 |
*/ |
| 794 |
if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set |
| 795 |
== X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) { |
| 796 |
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
| 797 |
goto proxy_name_done; |
| 798 |
} |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
/* |
| 801 |
* Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that |
| 802 |
* all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly |
| 803 |
*/ |
| 804 |
tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); |
| 805 |
if (tmpsubject == NULL) { |
| 806 |
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 807 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 808 |
return 0; |
| 809 |
} |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
tmpentry = |
| 812 |
X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); |
| 813 |
last_object_nid = |
| 814 |
OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName |
| 817 |
|| X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { |
| 818 |
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
| 819 |
} |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); |
| 822 |
X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
proxy_name_done: |
| 825 |
if (err != X509_V_OK) { |
| 826 |
ctx->error = err; |
| 827 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 828 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 829 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 830 |
return 0; |
| 831 |
} |
| 832 |
} |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
/* |
| 835 |
* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain |
| 836 |
* including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed |
| 837 |
* but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them |
| 838 |
* to be obeyed. |
| 839 |
*/ |
| 840 |
for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { |
| 841 |
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; |
| 842 |
if (nc) { |
| 843 |
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
| 844 |
switch (rv) { |
| 845 |
case X509_V_OK: |
| 846 |
continue; |
| 847 |
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
| 848 |
ctx->error = rv; |
| 849 |
return 0; |
| 850 |
default: |
| 851 |
ctx->error = rv; |
| 852 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 853 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 854 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 855 |
return 0; |
| 856 |
break; |
| 857 |
} |
| 858 |
} |
| 859 |
} |
| 860 |
} |
| 861 |
return 1; |
| 862 |
} |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
| 865 |
{ |
| 866 |
ctx->error = errcode; |
| 867 |
ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; |
| 868 |
ctx->error_depth = 0; |
| 869 |
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 870 |
} |
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) |
| 873 |
{ |
| 874 |
int i; |
| 875 |
int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); |
| 876 |
char *name; |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
if (id->peername != NULL) { |
| 879 |
OPENSSL_free(id->peername); |
| 880 |
id->peername = NULL; |
| 881 |
} |
| 882 |
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
| 883 |
name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); |
| 884 |
if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0) |
| 885 |
return 1; |
| 886 |
} |
| 887 |
return n == 0; |
| 888 |
} |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 891 |
{ |
| 892 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; |
| 893 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; |
| 894 |
X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
| 895 |
if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { |
| 896 |
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
| 897 |
return 0; |
| 898 |
} |
| 899 |
if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
| 900 |
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
| 901 |
return 0; |
| 902 |
} |
| 903 |
if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
| 904 |
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
| 905 |
return 0; |
| 906 |
} |
| 907 |
return 1; |
| 908 |
} |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 911 |
{ |
| 912 |
int i, ok; |
| 913 |
X509 *x = NULL; |
| 914 |
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| 915 |
cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| 916 |
/* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ |
| 917 |
for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
| 918 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| 919 |
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
| 920 |
/* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
| 921 |
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
| 922 |
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| 923 |
/* |
| 924 |
* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not |
| 925 |
* overridden. |
| 926 |
*/ |
| 927 |
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { |
| 928 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 929 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 930 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; |
| 931 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 932 |
if (!ok) |
| 933 |
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
| 934 |
} |
| 935 |
} |
| 936 |
/* |
| 937 |
* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate |
| 938 |
* return success. |
| 939 |
*/ |
| 940 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
| 941 |
X509 *mx; |
| 942 |
if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) |
| 943 |
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| 944 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); |
| 945 |
mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
| 946 |
if (mx) { |
| 947 |
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); |
| 948 |
X509_free(x); |
| 949 |
ctx->last_untrusted = 0; |
| 950 |
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| 951 |
} |
| 952 |
} |
| 953 |
|
| 954 |
/* |
| 955 |
* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow |
| 956 |
* standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. |
| 957 |
*/ |
| 958 |
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| 959 |
} |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 962 |
{ |
| 963 |
int i, last, ok; |
| 964 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
| 965 |
return 1; |
| 966 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) |
| 967 |
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
| 968 |
else { |
| 969 |
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ |
| 970 |
if (ctx->parent) |
| 971 |
return 1; |
| 972 |
last = 0; |
| 973 |
} |
| 974 |
for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { |
| 975 |
ctx->error_depth = i; |
| 976 |
ok = check_cert(ctx); |
| 977 |
if (!ok) |
| 978 |
return ok; |
| 979 |
} |
| 980 |
return 1; |
| 981 |
} |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 984 |
{ |
| 985 |
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
| 986 |
X509 *x; |
| 987 |
int ok = 0; /* current openssl sets 'ok' to zero here */ |
| 988 |
int cnum; |
| 989 |
unsigned int last_reasons; |
| 990 |
cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
| 991 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); |
| 992 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 993 |
ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
| 994 |
ctx->current_crl_score = 0; |
| 995 |
ctx->current_reasons = 0; |
| 996 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) |
| 997 |
return 1; |
| 998 |
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
| 999 |
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
| 1000 |
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
| 1001 |
if (ctx->get_crl) |
| 1002 |
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); |
| 1003 |
else |
| 1004 |
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); |
| 1005 |
/* |
| 1006 |
* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback |
| 1007 |
*/ |
| 1008 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1009 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; |
| 1010 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1011 |
goto err; |
| 1012 |
} |
| 1013 |
ctx->current_crl = crl; |
| 1014 |
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); |
| 1015 |
if (!ok) |
| 1016 |
goto err; |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
if (dcrl) { |
| 1019 |
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); |
| 1020 |
if (!ok) |
| 1021 |
goto err; |
| 1022 |
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
| 1023 |
if (!ok) |
| 1024 |
goto err; |
| 1025 |
} else |
| 1026 |
ok = 1; |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ |
| 1029 |
if (ok != 2) { |
| 1030 |
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); |
| 1031 |
if (!ok) |
| 1032 |
goto err; |
| 1033 |
} |
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 |
X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| 1036 |
X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
| 1037 |
crl = NULL; |
| 1038 |
dcrl = NULL; |
| 1039 |
/* |
| 1040 |
* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, |
| 1041 |
* so exit loop. |
| 1042 |
*/ |
| 1043 |
if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { |
| 1044 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; |
| 1045 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1046 |
goto err; |
| 1047 |
} |
| 1048 |
} |
| 1049 |
err: |
| 1050 |
X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| 1051 |
X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
| 1054 |
return ok; |
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
} |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) |
| 1061 |
{ |
| 1062 |
time_t *ptime; |
| 1063 |
int i; |
| 1064 |
if (notify) |
| 1065 |
ctx->current_crl = crl; |
| 1066 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
| 1067 |
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
| 1068 |
else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
| 1069 |
return 1; |
| 1070 |
else |
| 1071 |
ptime = NULL; |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
| 1074 |
if (i == 0) { |
| 1075 |
if (!notify) |
| 1076 |
return 0; |
| 1077 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; |
| 1078 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1079 |
return 0; |
| 1080 |
} |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
if (i > 0) { |
| 1083 |
if (!notify) |
| 1084 |
return 0; |
| 1085 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; |
| 1086 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1087 |
return 0; |
| 1088 |
} |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
| 1091 |
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); |
| 1092 |
|
| 1093 |
if (i == 0) { |
| 1094 |
if (!notify) |
| 1095 |
return 0; |
| 1096 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; |
| 1097 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1098 |
return 0; |
| 1099 |
} |
| 1100 |
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
| 1101 |
if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { |
| 1102 |
if (!notify) |
| 1103 |
return 0; |
| 1104 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; |
| 1105 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1106 |
return 0; |
| 1107 |
} |
| 1108 |
} |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
if (notify) |
| 1111 |
ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
return 1; |
| 1114 |
} |
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
| 1117 |
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
| 1118 |
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
| 1119 |
{ |
| 1120 |
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; |
| 1121 |
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; |
| 1122 |
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; |
| 1123 |
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; |
| 1124 |
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { |
| 1127 |
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); |
| 1128 |
reasons = *preasons; |
| 1129 |
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); |
| 1130 |
if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
| 1131 |
continue; |
| 1132 |
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ |
| 1133 |
if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
| 1134 |
int day, sec; |
| 1135 |
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
| 1136 |
X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) |
| 1137 |
continue; |
| 1138 |
/* |
| 1139 |
* ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| |
| 1140 |
* and |sec|. |
| 1141 |
*/ |
| 1142 |
if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) |
| 1143 |
continue; |
| 1144 |
} |
| 1145 |
best_crl = crl; |
| 1146 |
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; |
| 1147 |
best_score = crl_score; |
| 1148 |
best_reasons = reasons; |
| 1149 |
} |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
if (best_crl) { |
| 1152 |
if (*pcrl) |
| 1153 |
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
| 1154 |
*pcrl = best_crl; |
| 1155 |
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer; |
| 1156 |
*pscore = best_score; |
| 1157 |
*preasons = best_reasons; |
| 1158 |
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); |
| 1159 |
if (*pdcrl) { |
| 1160 |
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
| 1161 |
*pdcrl = NULL; |
| 1162 |
} |
| 1163 |
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
| 1164 |
} |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) |
| 1167 |
return 1; |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
return 0; |
| 1170 |
} |
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
/* |
| 1173 |
* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be |
| 1174 |
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
| 1175 |
*/ |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) |
| 1178 |
{ |
| 1179 |
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; |
| 1180 |
int i; |
| 1181 |
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); |
| 1182 |
if (i >= 0) { |
| 1183 |
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */ |
| 1184 |
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) |
| 1185 |
return 0; |
| 1186 |
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); |
| 1187 |
} else |
| 1188 |
exta = NULL; |
| 1189 |
|
| 1190 |
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
| 1191 |
|
| 1192 |
if (i >= 0) { |
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
| 1195 |
return 0; |
| 1196 |
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); |
| 1197 |
} else |
| 1198 |
extb = NULL; |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
if (!exta && !extb) |
| 1201 |
return 1; |
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
if (!exta || !extb) |
| 1204 |
return 0; |
| 1205 |
|
| 1206 |
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
| 1207 |
return 0; |
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
return 1; |
| 1210 |
} |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */ |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) |
| 1215 |
{ |
| 1216 |
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */ |
| 1217 |
if (!delta->base_crl_number) |
| 1218 |
return 0; |
| 1219 |
/* Base must have a CRL number */ |
| 1220 |
if (!base->crl_number) |
| 1221 |
return 0; |
| 1222 |
/* Issuer names must match */ |
| 1223 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) |
| 1224 |
return 0; |
| 1225 |
/* AKID and IDP must match */ |
| 1226 |
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) |
| 1227 |
return 0; |
| 1228 |
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) |
| 1229 |
return 0; |
| 1230 |
/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ |
| 1231 |
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) |
| 1232 |
return 0; |
| 1233 |
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ |
| 1234 |
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) |
| 1235 |
return 1; |
| 1236 |
return 0; |
| 1237 |
} |
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 |
/* |
| 1240 |
* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or |
| 1241 |
* retrieve a chain of deltas... |
| 1242 |
*/ |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, |
| 1245 |
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
| 1246 |
{ |
| 1247 |
X509_CRL *delta; |
| 1248 |
int i; |
| 1249 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) |
| 1250 |
return; |
| 1251 |
if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) |
| 1252 |
return; |
| 1253 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { |
| 1254 |
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); |
| 1255 |
if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { |
| 1256 |
if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) |
| 1257 |
*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; |
| 1258 |
CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); |
| 1259 |
*dcrl = delta; |
| 1260 |
return; |
| 1261 |
} |
| 1262 |
} |
| 1263 |
*dcrl = NULL; |
| 1264 |
} |
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
/* |
| 1267 |
* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate |
| 1268 |
* 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not |
| 1269 |
* the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is |
| 1270 |
* also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL |
| 1271 |
* is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. |
| 1272 |
*/ |
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
| 1275 |
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
| 1276 |
{ |
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
int crl_score = 0; |
| 1279 |
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ |
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ |
| 1284 |
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) |
| 1285 |
return 0; |
| 1286 |
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ |
| 1287 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { |
| 1288 |
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) |
| 1289 |
return 0; |
| 1290 |
} else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { |
| 1291 |
/* If no new reasons reject */ |
| 1292 |
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) |
| 1293 |
return 0; |
| 1294 |
} |
| 1295 |
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */ |
| 1296 |
else if (crl->base_crl_number) |
| 1297 |
return 0; |
| 1298 |
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ |
| 1299 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { |
| 1300 |
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) |
| 1301 |
return 0; |
| 1302 |
} else |
| 1303 |
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) |
| 1306 |
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
/* Check expiry */ |
| 1309 |
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
| 1310 |
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; |
| 1311 |
|
| 1312 |
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ |
| 1313 |
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); |
| 1314 |
|
| 1315 |
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ |
| 1316 |
|
| 1317 |
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) |
| 1318 |
return 0; |
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ |
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 |
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { |
| 1323 |
/* If no new reasons reject */ |
| 1324 |
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) |
| 1325 |
return 0; |
| 1326 |
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; |
| 1327 |
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; |
| 1328 |
} |
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
*preasons = tmp_reasons; |
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
return crl_score; |
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
} |
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, |
| 1337 |
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
| 1338 |
{ |
| 1339 |
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; |
| 1340 |
X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
| 1341 |
int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
| 1342 |
int i; |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) |
| 1345 |
cidx++; |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 |
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| 1350 |
if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { |
| 1351 |
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; |
| 1352 |
*pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| 1353 |
return; |
| 1354 |
} |
| 1355 |
} |
| 1356 |
|
| 1357 |
for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { |
| 1358 |
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
| 1359 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
| 1360 |
continue; |
| 1361 |
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| 1362 |
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; |
| 1363 |
*pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| 1364 |
return; |
| 1365 |
} |
| 1366 |
} |
| 1367 |
|
| 1368 |
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ |
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) |
| 1371 |
return; |
| 1372 |
|
| 1373 |
/* |
| 1374 |
* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of |
| 1375 |
* untrusted certificates. |
| 1376 |
*/ |
| 1377 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { |
| 1378 |
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); |
| 1379 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
| 1380 |
continue; |
| 1381 |
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { |
| 1382 |
*pissuer = crl_issuer; |
| 1383 |
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; |
| 1384 |
return; |
| 1385 |
} |
| 1386 |
} |
| 1387 |
} |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
/* |
| 1390 |
* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new |
| 1391 |
* X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
| 1392 |
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
| 1393 |
* be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. |
| 1394 |
*/ |
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 1397 |
{ |
| 1398 |
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; |
| 1399 |
int ret; |
| 1400 |
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
| 1401 |
if (ctx->parent) |
| 1402 |
return 0; |
| 1403 |
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
| 1404 |
return -1; |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; |
| 1407 |
/* Copy verify params across */ |
| 1408 |
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); |
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 |
crl_ctx.parent = ctx; |
| 1411 |
crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| 1412 |
|
| 1413 |
/* Verify CRL issuer */ |
| 1414 |
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
if (ret <= 0) |
| 1417 |
goto err; |
| 1418 |
|
| 1419 |
/* Check chain is acceptable */ |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
| 1422 |
err: |
| 1423 |
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); |
| 1424 |
return ret; |
| 1425 |
} |
| 1426 |
|
| 1427 |
/* |
| 1428 |
* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and |
| 1429 |
* certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could |
| 1430 |
* be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more |
| 1431 |
* strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, |
| 1432 |
* though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the |
| 1433 |
* RFC5280 version |
| 1434 |
*/ |
| 1435 |
|
| 1436 |
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 1437 |
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
| 1438 |
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) |
| 1439 |
{ |
| 1440 |
X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; |
| 1441 |
cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); |
| 1442 |
crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); |
| 1443 |
if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) |
| 1444 |
return 1; |
| 1445 |
return 0; |
| 1446 |
} |
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
/*- |
| 1449 |
* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. |
| 1450 |
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
| 1451 |
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. |
| 1452 |
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. |
| 1453 |
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
| 1454 |
*/ |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
| 1457 |
{ |
| 1458 |
X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| 1459 |
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; |
| 1460 |
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; |
| 1461 |
int i, j; |
| 1462 |
if (!a || !b) |
| 1463 |
return 1; |
| 1464 |
if (a->type == 1) { |
| 1465 |
if (!a->dpname) |
| 1466 |
return 0; |
| 1467 |
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ |
| 1468 |
if (b->type == 1) { |
| 1469 |
if (!b->dpname) |
| 1470 |
return 0; |
| 1471 |
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) |
| 1472 |
return 1; |
| 1473 |
else |
| 1474 |
return 0; |
| 1475 |
} |
| 1476 |
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ |
| 1477 |
nm = a->dpname; |
| 1478 |
gens = b->name.fullname; |
| 1479 |
} else if (b->type == 1) { |
| 1480 |
if (!b->dpname) |
| 1481 |
return 0; |
| 1482 |
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ |
| 1483 |
gens = a->name.fullname; |
| 1484 |
nm = b->dpname; |
| 1485 |
} |
| 1486 |
|
| 1487 |
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ |
| 1488 |
if (nm) { |
| 1489 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| 1490 |
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| 1491 |
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
| 1492 |
continue; |
| 1493 |
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) |
| 1494 |
return 1; |
| 1495 |
} |
| 1496 |
return 0; |
| 1497 |
} |
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ |
| 1500 |
|
| 1501 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { |
| 1502 |
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); |
| 1503 |
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { |
| 1504 |
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); |
| 1505 |
if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) |
| 1506 |
return 1; |
| 1507 |
} |
| 1508 |
} |
| 1509 |
|
| 1510 |
return 0; |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
} |
| 1513 |
|
| 1514 |
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
| 1515 |
{ |
| 1516 |
int i; |
| 1517 |
X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
| 1518 |
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
| 1519 |
if (!dp->CRLissuer) |
| 1520 |
return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); |
| 1521 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| 1522 |
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| 1523 |
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
| 1524 |
continue; |
| 1525 |
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) |
| 1526 |
return 1; |
| 1527 |
} |
| 1528 |
return 0; |
| 1529 |
} |
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 |
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
| 1532 |
|
| 1533 |
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
| 1534 |
unsigned int *preasons) |
| 1535 |
{ |
| 1536 |
int i; |
| 1537 |
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) |
| 1538 |
return 0; |
| 1539 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { |
| 1540 |
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) |
| 1541 |
return 0; |
| 1542 |
} else { |
| 1543 |
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) |
| 1544 |
return 0; |
| 1545 |
} |
| 1546 |
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons; |
| 1547 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { |
| 1548 |
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); |
| 1549 |
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { |
| 1550 |
if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { |
| 1551 |
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; |
| 1552 |
return 1; |
| 1553 |
} |
| 1554 |
} |
| 1555 |
} |
| 1556 |
if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) |
| 1557 |
&& (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) |
| 1558 |
return 1; |
| 1559 |
return 0; |
| 1560 |
} |
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
/* |
| 1563 |
* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try |
| 1564 |
* to find a delta CRL too |
| 1565 |
*/ |
| 1566 |
|
| 1567 |
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 1568 |
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
| 1569 |
{ |
| 1570 |
int ok; |
| 1571 |
X509 *issuer = NULL; |
| 1572 |
int crl_score = 0; |
| 1573 |
unsigned int reasons; |
| 1574 |
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
| 1575 |
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; |
| 1576 |
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 1577 |
reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
| 1578 |
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, |
| 1579 |
&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); |
| 1580 |
|
| 1581 |
if (ok) |
| 1582 |
goto done; |
| 1583 |
|
| 1584 |
/* Lookup CRLs from store */ |
| 1585 |
|
| 1586 |
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ |
| 1589 |
if (!skcrl && crl) |
| 1590 |
goto done; |
| 1591 |
|
| 1592 |
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); |
| 1595 |
|
| 1596 |
done: |
| 1597 |
|
| 1598 |
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
| 1599 |
if (crl) { |
| 1600 |
ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
| 1601 |
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; |
| 1602 |
ctx->current_reasons = reasons; |
| 1603 |
*pcrl = crl; |
| 1604 |
*pdcrl = dcrl; |
| 1605 |
return 1; |
| 1606 |
} |
| 1607 |
|
| 1608 |
return 0; |
| 1609 |
} |
| 1610 |
|
| 1611 |
/* Check CRL validity */ |
| 1612 |
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) |
| 1613 |
{ |
| 1614 |
X509 *issuer = NULL; |
| 1615 |
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; |
| 1616 |
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; |
| 1617 |
cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
| 1618 |
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
| 1619 |
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
| 1620 |
if (ctx->current_issuer) |
| 1621 |
issuer = ctx->current_issuer; |
| 1622 |
|
| 1623 |
/* |
| 1624 |
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next |
| 1625 |
* certificate in chain. |
| 1626 |
*/ |
| 1627 |
else if (cnum < chnum) |
| 1628 |
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
| 1629 |
else { |
| 1630 |
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); |
| 1631 |
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */ |
| 1632 |
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { |
| 1633 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; |
| 1634 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1635 |
if (!ok) |
| 1636 |
goto err; |
| 1637 |
} |
| 1638 |
} |
| 1639 |
|
| 1640 |
if (issuer) { |
| 1641 |
/* |
| 1642 |
* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done |
| 1643 |
*/ |
| 1644 |
if (!crl->base_crl_number) { |
| 1645 |
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
| 1646 |
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && |
| 1647 |
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { |
| 1648 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; |
| 1649 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1650 |
if (!ok) |
| 1651 |
goto err; |
| 1652 |
} |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { |
| 1655 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; |
| 1656 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1657 |
if (!ok) |
| 1658 |
goto err; |
| 1659 |
} |
| 1660 |
|
| 1661 |
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { |
| 1662 |
if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { |
| 1663 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; |
| 1664 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1665 |
if (!ok) |
| 1666 |
goto err; |
| 1667 |
} |
| 1668 |
} |
| 1669 |
|
| 1670 |
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { |
| 1671 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; |
| 1672 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1673 |
if (!ok) |
| 1674 |
goto err; |
| 1675 |
} |
| 1676 |
|
| 1677 |
} |
| 1678 |
|
| 1679 |
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { |
| 1680 |
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); |
| 1681 |
if (!ok) |
| 1682 |
goto err; |
| 1683 |
} |
| 1684 |
|
| 1685 |
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
| 1686 |
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); |
| 1687 |
|
| 1688 |
if (!ikey) { |
| 1689 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
| 1690 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1691 |
if (!ok) |
| 1692 |
goto err; |
| 1693 |
} else { |
| 1694 |
int rv; |
| 1695 |
rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); |
| 1696 |
if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| 1697 |
ctx->error = rv; |
| 1698 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1699 |
if (!ok) |
| 1700 |
goto err; |
| 1701 |
} |
| 1702 |
/* Verify CRL signature */ |
| 1703 |
if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { |
| 1704 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; |
| 1705 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1706 |
if (!ok) |
| 1707 |
goto err; |
| 1708 |
} |
| 1709 |
} |
| 1710 |
} |
| 1711 |
|
| 1712 |
ok = 1; |
| 1713 |
|
| 1714 |
err: |
| 1715 |
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); |
| 1716 |
return ok; |
| 1717 |
} |
| 1718 |
|
| 1719 |
/* Check certificate against CRL */ |
| 1720 |
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
| 1721 |
{ |
| 1722 |
int ok; |
| 1723 |
X509_REVOKED *rev; |
| 1724 |
/* |
| 1725 |
* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled |
| 1726 |
* critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate |
| 1727 |
* was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can |
| 1728 |
* change the meaning of CRL entries. |
| 1729 |
*/ |
| 1730 |
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
| 1731 |
&& (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { |
| 1732 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; |
| 1733 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1734 |
if (!ok) |
| 1735 |
return 0; |
| 1736 |
} |
| 1737 |
/* |
| 1738 |
* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason |
| 1739 |
* is not removeFromCRL. |
| 1740 |
*/ |
| 1741 |
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { |
| 1742 |
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) |
| 1743 |
return 2; |
| 1744 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; |
| 1745 |
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1746 |
if (!ok) |
| 1747 |
return 0; |
| 1748 |
} |
| 1749 |
|
| 1750 |
return 1; |
| 1751 |
} |
| 1752 |
|
| 1753 |
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 1754 |
{ |
| 1755 |
int ret; |
| 1756 |
if (ctx->parent) |
| 1757 |
return 1; |
| 1758 |
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
| 1759 |
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); |
| 1760 |
if (ret == 0) { |
| 1761 |
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1762 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
| 1763 |
return 0; |
| 1764 |
} |
| 1765 |
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ |
| 1766 |
if (ret == -1) { |
| 1767 |
/* |
| 1768 |
* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. |
| 1769 |
*/ |
| 1770 |
X509 *x; |
| 1771 |
int i; |
| 1772 |
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
| 1773 |
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
| 1774 |
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) |
| 1775 |
continue; |
| 1776 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 1777 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; |
| 1778 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1779 |
return 0; |
| 1780 |
} |
| 1781 |
return 1; |
| 1782 |
} |
| 1783 |
if (ret == -2) { |
| 1784 |
ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
| 1785 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; |
| 1786 |
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
| 1787 |
} |
| 1788 |
|
| 1789 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { |
| 1790 |
ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
| 1791 |
/* |
| 1792 |
* Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed |
| 1793 |
* an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then |
| 1794 |
* remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier |
| 1795 |
* verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. |
| 1796 |
*/ |
| 1797 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
| 1798 |
return 0; |
| 1799 |
} |
| 1800 |
|
| 1801 |
return 1; |
| 1802 |
} |
| 1803 |
|
| 1804 |
static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 1805 |
{ |
| 1806 |
time_t *ptime; |
| 1807 |
int i; |
| 1808 |
|
| 1809 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
| 1810 |
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
| 1811 |
else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
| 1812 |
return 1; |
| 1813 |
else |
| 1814 |
ptime = NULL; |
| 1815 |
|
| 1816 |
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); |
| 1817 |
if (i == 0) { |
| 1818 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; |
| 1819 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 1820 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1821 |
return 0; |
| 1822 |
} |
| 1823 |
|
| 1824 |
if (i > 0) { |
| 1825 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; |
| 1826 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 1827 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1828 |
return 0; |
| 1829 |
} |
| 1830 |
|
| 1831 |
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); |
| 1832 |
if (i == 0) { |
| 1833 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; |
| 1834 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 1835 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1836 |
return 0; |
| 1837 |
} |
| 1838 |
|
| 1839 |
if (i < 0) { |
| 1840 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; |
| 1841 |
ctx->current_cert = x; |
| 1842 |
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
| 1843 |
return 0; |
| 1844 |
} |
| 1845 |
|
| 1846 |
return 1; |
| 1847 |
} |
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 1850 |
{ |
| 1851 |
int ok = 0, n; |
| 1852 |
X509 *xs, *xi; |
| 1853 |
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| 1854 |
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
| 1855 |
|
| 1856 |
cb = ctx->verify_cb; |
| 1857 |
|
| 1858 |
n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
| 1859 |
ctx->error_depth = n - 1; |
| 1860 |
n--; |
| 1861 |
xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| 1862 |
|
| 1863 |
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
| 1864 |
xs = xi; |
| 1865 |
else { |
| 1866 |
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
| 1867 |
xs = xi; |
| 1868 |
goto check_cert; |
| 1869 |
} |
| 1870 |
if (n <= 0) { |
| 1871 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; |
| 1872 |
ctx->current_cert = xi; |
| 1873 |
ok = cb(0, ctx); |
| 1874 |
goto end; |
| 1875 |
} else { |
| 1876 |
n--; |
| 1877 |
ctx->error_depth = n; |
| 1878 |
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| 1879 |
} |
| 1880 |
} |
| 1881 |
|
| 1882 |
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ |
| 1883 |
while (n >= 0) { |
| 1884 |
ctx->error_depth = n; |
| 1885 |
|
| 1886 |
/* |
| 1887 |
* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless |
| 1888 |
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes |
| 1889 |
* time. |
| 1890 |
*/ |
| 1891 |
if (!xs->valid |
| 1892 |
&& (xs != xi |
| 1893 |
|| (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { |
| 1894 |
if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
| 1895 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
| 1896 |
ctx->current_cert = xi; |
| 1897 |
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); |
| 1898 |
if (!ok) |
| 1899 |
goto end; |
| 1900 |
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { |
| 1901 |
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; |
| 1902 |
ctx->current_cert = xs; |
| 1903 |
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); |
| 1904 |
if (!ok) { |
| 1905 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1906 |
goto end; |
| 1907 |
} |
| 1908 |
} |
| 1909 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 1910 |
pkey = NULL; |
| 1911 |
} |
| 1912 |
|
| 1913 |
xs->valid = 1; |
| 1914 |
|
| 1915 |
check_cert: |
| 1916 |
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); |
| 1917 |
if (!ok) |
| 1918 |
goto end; |
| 1919 |
|
| 1920 |
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
| 1921 |
ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
| 1922 |
ctx->current_cert = xs; |
| 1923 |
ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); |
| 1924 |
if (!ok) |
| 1925 |
goto end; |
| 1926 |
|
| 1927 |
n--; |
| 1928 |
if (n >= 0) { |
| 1929 |
xi = xs; |
| 1930 |
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
| 1931 |
} |
| 1932 |
} |
| 1933 |
ok = 1; |
| 1934 |
end: |
| 1935 |
return ok; |
| 1936 |
} |
| 1937 |
|
| 1938 |
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
| 1939 |
{ |
| 1940 |
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
| 1941 |
} |
| 1942 |
|
| 1943 |
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
| 1944 |
{ |
| 1945 |
char *str; |
| 1946 |
ASN1_TIME atm; |
| 1947 |
long offset; |
| 1948 |
char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; |
| 1949 |
int i, j, remaining; |
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 |
p = buff1; |
| 1952 |
remaining = ctm->length; |
| 1953 |
str = (char *)ctm->data; |
| 1954 |
/* |
| 1955 |
* Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the |
| 1956 |
* time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: |
| 1957 |
* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
| 1958 |
* GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
| 1959 |
*/ |
| 1960 |
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
| 1961 |
/* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
| 1962 |
int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; |
| 1963 |
int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; |
| 1964 |
if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) |
| 1965 |
return 0; |
| 1966 |
memcpy(p, str, 10); |
| 1967 |
p += 10; |
| 1968 |
str += 10; |
| 1969 |
remaining -= 10; |
| 1970 |
} else { |
| 1971 |
/* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
| 1972 |
int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; |
| 1973 |
int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; |
| 1974 |
if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) |
| 1975 |
return 0; |
| 1976 |
memcpy(p, str, 12); |
| 1977 |
p += 12; |
| 1978 |
str += 12; |
| 1979 |
remaining -= 12; |
| 1980 |
} |
| 1981 |
|
| 1982 |
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { |
| 1983 |
*(p++) = '0'; |
| 1984 |
*(p++) = '0'; |
| 1985 |
} else { |
| 1986 |
/* SS (seconds) */ |
| 1987 |
if (remaining < 2) |
| 1988 |
return 0; |
| 1989 |
*(p++) = *(str++); |
| 1990 |
*(p++) = *(str++); |
| 1991 |
remaining -= 2; |
| 1992 |
/* |
| 1993 |
* Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... |
| 1994 |
* TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. |
| 1995 |
* Can we just kill them altogether? |
| 1996 |
*/ |
| 1997 |
if (remaining && *str == '.') { |
| 1998 |
str++; |
| 1999 |
remaining--; |
| 2000 |
for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { |
| 2001 |
if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') |
| 2002 |
break; |
| 2003 |
} |
| 2004 |
} |
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 |
} |
| 2007 |
*(p++) = 'Z'; |
| 2008 |
*(p++) = '\0'; |
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
/* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
| 2011 |
if (!remaining) |
| 2012 |
return 0; |
| 2013 |
if (*str == 'Z') { |
| 2014 |
if (remaining != 1) |
| 2015 |
return 0; |
| 2016 |
offset = 0; |
| 2017 |
} else { |
| 2018 |
/* (+-)HHMM */ |
| 2019 |
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
| 2020 |
return 0; |
| 2021 |
/* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
| 2022 |
if (remaining != 5) |
| 2023 |
return 0; |
| 2024 |
if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || |
| 2025 |
str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') |
| 2026 |
return 0; |
| 2027 |
offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
| 2028 |
offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); |
| 2029 |
if (*str == '-') |
| 2030 |
offset = -offset; |
| 2031 |
} |
| 2032 |
atm.type = ctm->type; |
| 2033 |
atm.flags = 0; |
| 2034 |
atm.length = sizeof(buff2); |
| 2035 |
atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; |
| 2036 |
|
| 2037 |
if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) |
| 2038 |
return 0; |
| 2039 |
|
| 2040 |
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
| 2041 |
i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); |
| 2042 |
if (i < 50) |
| 2043 |
i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ |
| 2044 |
j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); |
| 2045 |
if (j < 50) |
| 2046 |
j += 100; |
| 2047 |
|
| 2048 |
if (i < j) |
| 2049 |
return -1; |
| 2050 |
if (i > j) |
| 2051 |
return 1; |
| 2052 |
} |
| 2053 |
i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); |
| 2054 |
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ |
| 2055 |
return -1; |
| 2056 |
else |
| 2057 |
return i; |
| 2058 |
} |
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 |
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
| 2061 |
{ |
| 2062 |
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
| 2063 |
} |
| 2064 |
|
| 2065 |
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
| 2066 |
{ |
| 2067 |
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); |
| 2068 |
} |
| 2069 |
|
| 2070 |
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, |
| 2071 |
int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
| 2072 |
{ |
| 2073 |
time_t t; |
| 2074 |
|
| 2075 |
if (in_tm) |
| 2076 |
t = *in_tm; |
| 2077 |
else |
| 2078 |
time(&t); |
| 2079 |
|
| 2080 |
if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { |
| 2081 |
if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
| 2082 |
return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| 2083 |
if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) |
| 2084 |
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| 2085 |
} |
| 2086 |
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); |
| 2087 |
} |
| 2088 |
|
| 2089 |
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| 2090 |
{ |
| 2091 |
EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; |
| 2092 |
int i, j; |
| 2093 |
|
| 2094 |
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) |
| 2095 |
return 1; |
| 2096 |
|
| 2097 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| 2098 |
ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
| 2099 |
if (ktmp == NULL) { |
| 2100 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, |
| 2101 |
X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| 2102 |
return 0; |
| 2103 |
} |
| 2104 |
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) |
| 2105 |
break; |
| 2106 |
else { |
| 2107 |
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
| 2108 |
ktmp = NULL; |
| 2109 |
} |
| 2110 |
} |
| 2111 |
if (ktmp == NULL) { |
| 2112 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, |
| 2113 |
X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); |
| 2114 |
return 0; |
| 2115 |
} |
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 |
/* first, populate the other certs */ |
| 2118 |
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { |
| 2119 |
ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
| 2120 |
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
| 2121 |
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); |
| 2122 |
} |
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
if (pkey != NULL) |
| 2125 |
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); |
| 2126 |
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
| 2127 |
return 1; |
| 2128 |
} |
| 2129 |
|
| 2130 |
/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
| 2131 |
|
| 2132 |
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, |
| 2133 |
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
| 2134 |
{ |
| 2135 |
X509_CRL *crl = NULL; |
| 2136 |
int i; |
| 2137 |
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; |
| 2138 |
/* CRLs can't be delta already */ |
| 2139 |
if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { |
| 2140 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); |
| 2141 |
return NULL; |
| 2142 |
} |
| 2143 |
/* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ |
| 2144 |
if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { |
| 2145 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); |
| 2146 |
return NULL; |
| 2147 |
} |
| 2148 |
/* Issuer names must match */ |
| 2149 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { |
| 2150 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); |
| 2151 |
return NULL; |
| 2152 |
} |
| 2153 |
/* AKID and IDP must match */ |
| 2154 |
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { |
| 2155 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); |
| 2156 |
return NULL; |
| 2157 |
} |
| 2158 |
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { |
| 2159 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); |
| 2160 |
return NULL; |
| 2161 |
} |
| 2162 |
/* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ |
| 2163 |
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { |
| 2164 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); |
| 2165 |
return NULL; |
| 2166 |
} |
| 2167 |
/* CRLs must verify */ |
| 2168 |
if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || |
| 2169 |
X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { |
| 2170 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); |
| 2171 |
return NULL; |
| 2172 |
} |
| 2173 |
/* Create new CRL */ |
| 2174 |
crl = X509_CRL_new(); |
| 2175 |
if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
| 2176 |
goto memerr; |
| 2177 |
/* Set issuer name */ |
| 2178 |
if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) |
| 2179 |
goto memerr; |
| 2180 |
|
| 2181 |
if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) |
| 2182 |
goto memerr; |
| 2183 |
if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) |
| 2184 |
goto memerr; |
| 2185 |
|
| 2186 |
/* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ |
| 2187 |
|
| 2188 |
if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) |
| 2189 |
goto memerr; |
| 2190 |
|
| 2191 |
/* |
| 2192 |
* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL |
| 2193 |
* number to correct value too. |
| 2194 |
*/ |
| 2195 |
|
| 2196 |
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { |
| 2197 |
X509_EXTENSION *ext; |
| 2198 |
ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); |
| 2199 |
if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) |
| 2200 |
goto memerr; |
| 2201 |
} |
| 2202 |
|
| 2203 |
/* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ |
| 2204 |
|
| 2205 |
revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); |
| 2206 |
|
| 2207 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { |
| 2208 |
X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; |
| 2209 |
rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); |
| 2210 |
/* |
| 2211 |
* Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here |
| 2212 |
* for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. |
| 2213 |
*/ |
| 2214 |
if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { |
| 2215 |
rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
| 2216 |
if (!rvtmp) |
| 2217 |
goto memerr; |
| 2218 |
if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { |
| 2219 |
X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); |
| 2220 |
goto memerr; |
| 2221 |
} |
| 2222 |
} |
| 2223 |
} |
| 2224 |
/* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ |
| 2225 |
|
| 2226 |
if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) |
| 2227 |
goto memerr; |
| 2228 |
|
| 2229 |
return crl; |
| 2230 |
|
| 2231 |
memerr: |
| 2232 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2233 |
if (crl) |
| 2234 |
X509_CRL_free(crl); |
| 2235 |
return NULL; |
| 2236 |
} |
| 2237 |
|
| 2238 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, |
| 2239 |
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| 2240 |
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, |
| 2241 |
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
| 2242 |
{ |
| 2243 |
/* |
| 2244 |
* This function is (usually) called only once, by |
| 2245 |
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). |
| 2246 |
*/ |
| 2247 |
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, |
| 2248 |
new_func, dup_func, free_func); |
| 2249 |
} |
| 2250 |
|
| 2251 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
| 2252 |
{ |
| 2253 |
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); |
| 2254 |
} |
| 2255 |
|
| 2256 |
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
| 2257 |
{ |
| 2258 |
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); |
| 2259 |
} |
| 2260 |
|
| 2261 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2262 |
{ |
| 2263 |
return ctx->error; |
| 2264 |
} |
| 2265 |
|
| 2266 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
| 2267 |
{ |
| 2268 |
ctx->error = err; |
| 2269 |
} |
| 2270 |
|
| 2271 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2272 |
{ |
| 2273 |
return ctx->error_depth; |
| 2274 |
} |
| 2275 |
|
| 2276 |
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2277 |
{ |
| 2278 |
return ctx->current_cert; |
| 2279 |
} |
| 2280 |
|
| 2281 |
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2282 |
{ |
| 2283 |
return ctx->chain; |
| 2284 |
} |
| 2285 |
|
| 2286 |
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2287 |
{ |
| 2288 |
if (!ctx->chain) |
| 2289 |
return NULL; |
| 2290 |
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); |
| 2291 |
} |
| 2292 |
|
| 2293 |
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2294 |
{ |
| 2295 |
return ctx->current_issuer; |
| 2296 |
} |
| 2297 |
|
| 2298 |
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2299 |
{ |
| 2300 |
return ctx->current_crl; |
| 2301 |
} |
| 2302 |
|
| 2303 |
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2304 |
{ |
| 2305 |
return ctx->parent; |
| 2306 |
} |
| 2307 |
|
| 2308 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
| 2309 |
{ |
| 2310 |
ctx->cert = x; |
| 2311 |
} |
| 2312 |
|
| 2313 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| 2314 |
{ |
| 2315 |
ctx->untrusted = sk; |
| 2316 |
} |
| 2317 |
|
| 2318 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
| 2319 |
{ |
| 2320 |
ctx->crls = sk; |
| 2321 |
} |
| 2322 |
|
| 2323 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
| 2324 |
{ |
| 2325 |
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
| 2326 |
} |
| 2327 |
|
| 2328 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
| 2329 |
{ |
| 2330 |
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
| 2331 |
} |
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 |
/* |
| 2334 |
* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. |
| 2335 |
* This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and |
| 2336 |
* purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't |
| 2337 |
* set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then |
| 2338 |
* be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL |
| 2339 |
* structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the |
| 2340 |
* application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL |
| 2341 |
* client/server. |
| 2342 |
*/ |
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, |
| 2345 |
int purpose, int trust) |
| 2346 |
{ |
| 2347 |
int idx; |
| 2348 |
/* If purpose not set use default */ |
| 2349 |
if (!purpose) |
| 2350 |
purpose = def_purpose; |
| 2351 |
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
| 2352 |
if (purpose) { |
| 2353 |
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
| 2354 |
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
| 2355 |
if (idx == -1) { |
| 2356 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
| 2357 |
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
| 2358 |
return 0; |
| 2359 |
} |
| 2360 |
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| 2361 |
if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { |
| 2362 |
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); |
| 2363 |
if (idx == -1) { |
| 2364 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
| 2365 |
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
| 2366 |
return 0; |
| 2367 |
} |
| 2368 |
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| 2369 |
} |
| 2370 |
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ |
| 2371 |
if (!trust) |
| 2372 |
trust = ptmp->trust; |
| 2373 |
} |
| 2374 |
if (trust) { |
| 2375 |
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
| 2376 |
if (idx == -1) { |
| 2377 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
| 2378 |
X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); |
| 2379 |
return 0; |
| 2380 |
} |
| 2381 |
} |
| 2382 |
|
| 2383 |
if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) |
| 2384 |
ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
| 2385 |
if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) |
| 2386 |
ctx->param->trust = trust; |
| 2387 |
return 1; |
| 2388 |
} |
| 2389 |
|
| 2390 |
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
| 2391 |
{ |
| 2392 |
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; |
| 2393 |
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); |
| 2394 |
if (!ctx) { |
| 2395 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2396 |
return NULL; |
| 2397 |
} |
| 2398 |
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); |
| 2399 |
return ctx; |
| 2400 |
} |
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2403 |
{ |
| 2404 |
if (!ctx) |
| 2405 |
return; |
| 2406 |
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| 2407 |
OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| 2408 |
} |
| 2409 |
|
| 2410 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
| 2411 |
STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| 2412 |
{ |
| 2413 |
int ret = 1; |
| 2414 |
ctx->ctx = store; |
| 2415 |
ctx->current_method = 0; |
| 2416 |
ctx->cert = x509; |
| 2417 |
ctx->untrusted = chain; |
| 2418 |
ctx->crls = NULL; |
| 2419 |
ctx->last_untrusted = 0; |
| 2420 |
ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
| 2421 |
ctx->valid = 0; |
| 2422 |
ctx->chain = NULL; |
| 2423 |
ctx->error = 0; |
| 2424 |
ctx->explicit_policy = 0; |
| 2425 |
ctx->error_depth = 0; |
| 2426 |
ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
| 2427 |
ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
| 2428 |
ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
| 2429 |
ctx->current_crl_score = 0; |
| 2430 |
ctx->current_reasons = 0; |
| 2431 |
ctx->tree = NULL; |
| 2432 |
ctx->parent = NULL; |
| 2433 |
/* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
| 2434 |
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
| 2435 |
|
| 2436 |
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| 2437 |
if (!ctx->param) { |
| 2438 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2439 |
return 0; |
| 2440 |
} |
| 2441 |
|
| 2442 |
/* |
| 2443 |
* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. |
| 2444 |
*/ |
| 2445 |
if (store) |
| 2446 |
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); |
| 2447 |
else |
| 2448 |
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; |
| 2449 |
|
| 2450 |
if (store) { |
| 2451 |
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
| 2452 |
/* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ |
| 2453 |
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
| 2454 |
} else |
| 2455 |
ctx->cleanup = 0; |
| 2456 |
|
| 2457 |
if (ret) |
| 2458 |
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, |
| 2459 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); |
| 2460 |
|
| 2461 |
if (ret == 0) { |
| 2462 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2463 |
goto err; |
| 2464 |
} |
| 2465 |
|
| 2466 |
if (store && store->check_issued) |
| 2467 |
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
| 2468 |
else |
| 2469 |
ctx->check_issued = check_issued; |
| 2470 |
|
| 2471 |
if (store && store->get_issuer) |
| 2472 |
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
| 2473 |
else |
| 2474 |
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; |
| 2475 |
|
| 2476 |
if (store && store->verify_cb) |
| 2477 |
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
| 2478 |
else |
| 2479 |
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; |
| 2480 |
|
| 2481 |
if (store && store->verify) |
| 2482 |
ctx->verify = store->verify; |
| 2483 |
else |
| 2484 |
ctx->verify = internal_verify; |
| 2485 |
|
| 2486 |
if (store && store->check_revocation) |
| 2487 |
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
| 2488 |
else |
| 2489 |
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; |
| 2490 |
|
| 2491 |
if (store && store->get_crl) |
| 2492 |
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
| 2493 |
else |
| 2494 |
ctx->get_crl = NULL; |
| 2495 |
|
| 2496 |
if (store && store->check_crl) |
| 2497 |
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
| 2498 |
else |
| 2499 |
ctx->check_crl = check_crl; |
| 2500 |
|
| 2501 |
if (store && store->cert_crl) |
| 2502 |
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
| 2503 |
else |
| 2504 |
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; |
| 2505 |
|
| 2506 |
if (store && store->lookup_certs) |
| 2507 |
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; |
| 2508 |
else |
| 2509 |
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; |
| 2510 |
|
| 2511 |
if (store && store->lookup_crls) |
| 2512 |
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; |
| 2513 |
else |
| 2514 |
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; |
| 2515 |
|
| 2516 |
ctx->check_policy = check_policy; |
| 2517 |
|
| 2518 |
if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
| 2519 |
&ctx->ex_data)) |
| 2520 |
return 1; |
| 2521 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2522 |
|
| 2523 |
err: |
| 2524 |
/* |
| 2525 |
* On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not |
| 2526 |
* allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. |
| 2527 |
*/ |
| 2528 |
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| 2529 |
return 0; |
| 2530 |
} |
| 2531 |
|
| 2532 |
/* |
| 2533 |
* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This |
| 2534 |
* avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. |
| 2535 |
*/ |
| 2536 |
|
| 2537 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
| 2538 |
{ |
| 2539 |
ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
| 2540 |
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; |
| 2541 |
} |
| 2542 |
|
| 2543 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2544 |
{ |
| 2545 |
/* |
| 2546 |
* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls |
| 2547 |
* cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() |
| 2548 |
* calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the |
| 2549 |
* pointers below after they're freed! |
| 2550 |
*/ |
| 2551 |
/* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ |
| 2552 |
if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { |
| 2553 |
ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
| 2554 |
ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
| 2555 |
} |
| 2556 |
if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
| 2557 |
if (ctx->parent == NULL) |
| 2558 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| 2559 |
ctx->param = NULL; |
| 2560 |
} |
| 2561 |
if (ctx->tree != NULL) { |
| 2562 |
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
| 2563 |
ctx->tree = NULL; |
| 2564 |
} |
| 2565 |
if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
| 2566 |
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); |
| 2567 |
ctx->chain = NULL; |
| 2568 |
} |
| 2569 |
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
| 2570 |
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); |
| 2571 |
} |
| 2572 |
|
| 2573 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
| 2574 |
{ |
| 2575 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
| 2576 |
} |
| 2577 |
|
| 2578 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
| 2579 |
{ |
| 2580 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); |
| 2581 |
} |
| 2582 |
|
| 2583 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
| 2584 |
time_t t) |
| 2585 |
{ |
| 2586 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); |
| 2587 |
} |
| 2588 |
|
| 2589 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
| 2590 |
int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
| 2591 |
{ |
| 2592 |
ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; |
| 2593 |
} |
| 2594 |
|
| 2595 |
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2596 |
{ |
| 2597 |
return ctx->tree; |
| 2598 |
} |
| 2599 |
|
| 2600 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2601 |
{ |
| 2602 |
return ctx->explicit_policy; |
| 2603 |
} |
| 2604 |
|
| 2605 |
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
| 2606 |
{ |
| 2607 |
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; |
| 2608 |
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
| 2609 |
if (!param) |
| 2610 |
return 0; |
| 2611 |
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); |
| 2612 |
} |
| 2613 |
|
| 2614 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| 2615 |
{ |
| 2616 |
return ctx->param; |
| 2617 |
} |
| 2618 |
|
| 2619 |
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) |
| 2620 |
{ |
| 2621 |
if (ctx->param) |
| 2622 |
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| 2623 |
ctx->param = param; |
| 2624 |
} |
| 2625 |
|
| 2626 |
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
| 2627 |
|
| 2628 |
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) |
| 2629 |
|
| 2630 |
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
| 2631 |
|
| 2632 |
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
| 2633 |
|
| 2634 |
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |