| 1 |
/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
| 2 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 3 |
* All rights reserved. |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 7 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 |
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 |
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
| 15 |
* |
| 16 |
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 |
* the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 |
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 |
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 |
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 |
* |
| 23 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 |
* are met: |
| 26 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 35 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
| 40 |
* |
| 41 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 |
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 |
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 |
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 |
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 |
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 |
* |
| 53 |
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 |
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 |
* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 |
*/ |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
#include <stdio.h> |
| 60 |
#include <ctype.h> |
| 61 |
#include "cryptlib.h" |
| 62 |
#include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| 63 |
#include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 64 |
#include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 65 |
#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 66 |
|
| 67 |
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 68 |
{ |
| 69 |
int i; |
| 70 |
X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
ai = a->cert_info; |
| 73 |
bi = b->cert_info; |
| 74 |
i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); |
| 75 |
if (i) |
| 76 |
return (i); |
| 77 |
return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); |
| 78 |
} |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 81 |
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
| 82 |
{ |
| 83 |
unsigned long ret = 0; |
| 84 |
EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| 85 |
unsigned char md[16]; |
| 86 |
char *f; |
| 87 |
|
| 88 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 89 |
f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); |
| 90 |
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
| 91 |
goto err; |
| 92 |
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
| 93 |
goto err; |
| 94 |
OPENSSL_free(f); |
| 95 |
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate |
| 96 |
(&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, |
| 97 |
(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) |
| 98 |
goto err; |
| 99 |
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
| 100 |
goto err; |
| 101 |
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
| 102 |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) |
| 103 |
) & 0xffffffffL; |
| 104 |
err: |
| 105 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 106 |
return (ret); |
| 107 |
} |
| 108 |
#endif |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 111 |
{ |
| 112 |
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 113 |
} |
| 114 |
|
| 115 |
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 116 |
{ |
| 117 |
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
| 118 |
} |
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| 121 |
{ |
| 122 |
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
| 123 |
} |
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 126 |
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
| 127 |
{ |
| 128 |
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); |
| 129 |
} |
| 130 |
#endif |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
| 133 |
{ |
| 134 |
return (a->cert_info->issuer); |
| 135 |
} |
| 136 |
|
| 137 |
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| 138 |
{ |
| 139 |
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 140 |
} |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 143 |
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| 144 |
{ |
| 145 |
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
| 146 |
} |
| 147 |
#endif |
| 148 |
|
| 149 |
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
| 150 |
{ |
| 151 |
return (a->cert_info->subject); |
| 152 |
} |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
| 155 |
{ |
| 156 |
return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
| 157 |
} |
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
| 160 |
{ |
| 161 |
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| 162 |
} |
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 165 |
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
| 166 |
{ |
| 167 |
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
| 168 |
} |
| 169 |
#endif |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 172 |
/* |
| 173 |
* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: |
| 174 |
* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" |
| 175 |
* arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these |
| 176 |
* operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
| 177 |
* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the |
| 178 |
* "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. |
| 179 |
*/ |
| 180 |
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
| 181 |
{ |
| 182 |
int rv; |
| 183 |
/* ensure hash is valid */ |
| 184 |
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); |
| 185 |
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); |
| 186 |
|
| 187 |
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 188 |
if (rv) |
| 189 |
return rv; |
| 190 |
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */ |
| 191 |
if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { |
| 192 |
rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); |
| 193 |
if (rv) |
| 194 |
return rv; |
| 195 |
return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, |
| 196 |
a->cert_info->enc.len); |
| 197 |
} |
| 198 |
return rv; |
| 199 |
} |
| 200 |
#endif |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
| 203 |
{ |
| 204 |
int ret; |
| 205 |
|
| 206 |
/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
| 209 |
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
| 210 |
if (ret < 0) |
| 211 |
return -2; |
| 212 |
} |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
| 215 |
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
| 216 |
if (ret < 0) |
| 217 |
return -2; |
| 218 |
} |
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
| 221 |
|
| 222 |
if (ret) |
| 223 |
return ret; |
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
| 226 |
|
| 227 |
} |
| 228 |
|
| 229 |
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
| 230 |
{ |
| 231 |
unsigned long ret = 0; |
| 232 |
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| 233 |
|
| 234 |
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| 235 |
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
| 236 |
if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), |
| 237 |
NULL)) |
| 238 |
return 0; |
| 239 |
|
| 240 |
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
| 241 |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) |
| 242 |
) & 0xffffffffL; |
| 243 |
return (ret); |
| 244 |
} |
| 245 |
|
| 246 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| 247 |
/* |
| 248 |
* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
| 249 |
* this is reasonably efficient. |
| 250 |
*/ |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) |
| 253 |
{ |
| 254 |
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| 255 |
unsigned long ret = 0; |
| 256 |
unsigned char md[16]; |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
| 259 |
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
| 260 |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| 261 |
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
| 262 |
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) |
| 263 |
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) |
| 264 |
&& EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) |
| 265 |
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
| 266 |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) |
| 267 |
) & 0xffffffffL; |
| 268 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
return (ret); |
| 271 |
} |
| 272 |
#endif |
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ |
| 275 |
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
| 276 |
ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
| 277 |
{ |
| 278 |
int i; |
| 279 |
X509_CINF cinf; |
| 280 |
X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
| 281 |
|
| 282 |
if (!sk) |
| 283 |
return NULL; |
| 284 |
|
| 285 |
x.cert_info = &cinf; |
| 286 |
cinf.serialNumber = serial; |
| 287 |
cinf.issuer = name; |
| 288 |
|
| 289 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| 290 |
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| 291 |
if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) |
| 292 |
return (x509); |
| 293 |
} |
| 294 |
return (NULL); |
| 295 |
} |
| 296 |
|
| 297 |
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
| 298 |
{ |
| 299 |
X509 *x509; |
| 300 |
int i; |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
| 303 |
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
| 304 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) |
| 305 |
return (x509); |
| 306 |
} |
| 307 |
return (NULL); |
| 308 |
} |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
| 311 |
{ |
| 312 |
if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) |
| 313 |
return (NULL); |
| 314 |
return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); |
| 315 |
} |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
| 318 |
{ |
| 319 |
if (!x) |
| 320 |
return NULL; |
| 321 |
return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
| 322 |
} |
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
| 325 |
{ |
| 326 |
EVP_PKEY *xk; |
| 327 |
int ret; |
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
if (xk) |
| 332 |
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
| 333 |
else |
| 334 |
ret = -2; |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
switch (ret) { |
| 337 |
case 1: |
| 338 |
break; |
| 339 |
case 0: |
| 340 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
| 341 |
break; |
| 342 |
case -1: |
| 343 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
| 344 |
break; |
| 345 |
case -2: |
| 346 |
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| 347 |
} |
| 348 |
if (xk) |
| 349 |
EVP_PKEY_free(xk); |
| 350 |
if (ret > 0) |
| 351 |
return 1; |
| 352 |
return 0; |
| 353 |
} |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
/* |
| 356 |
* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID |
| 357 |
* of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a |
| 358 |
* flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. |
| 359 |
*/ |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
| 364 |
{ |
| 365 |
const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; |
| 366 |
int curve_nid; |
| 367 |
if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| 368 |
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); |
| 369 |
if (!grp) |
| 370 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; |
| 371 |
curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); |
| 372 |
/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ |
| 373 |
if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ |
| 374 |
/* |
| 375 |
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. |
| 376 |
*/ |
| 377 |
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) |
| 378 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| 379 |
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) |
| 380 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| 381 |
/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ |
| 382 |
*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; |
| 383 |
} else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ |
| 384 |
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) |
| 385 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| 386 |
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) |
| 387 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; |
| 388 |
} else |
| 389 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
| 395 |
unsigned long flags) |
| 396 |
{ |
| 397 |
int rv, i, sign_nid; |
| 398 |
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; |
| 399 |
unsigned long tflags; |
| 400 |
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
| 401 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 402 |
tflags = flags; |
| 403 |
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ |
| 404 |
if (x == NULL) { |
| 405 |
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); |
| 406 |
i = 1; |
| 407 |
} else |
| 408 |
i = 0; |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
| 411 |
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; |
| 412 |
/* Correct error depth */ |
| 413 |
i = 0; |
| 414 |
goto end; |
| 415 |
} |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| 418 |
/* Check EE key only */ |
| 419 |
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); |
| 420 |
if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| 421 |
/* Correct error depth */ |
| 422 |
i = 0; |
| 423 |
goto end; |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| 426 |
sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); |
| 427 |
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| 428 |
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { |
| 429 |
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; |
| 430 |
goto end; |
| 431 |
} |
| 432 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
| 433 |
pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| 434 |
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
| 435 |
if (rv != X509_V_OK) |
| 436 |
goto end; |
| 437 |
} |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
/* Final check: root CA signature */ |
| 440 |
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); |
| 441 |
end: |
| 442 |
if (pk) |
| 443 |
EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
| 444 |
if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
| 445 |
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ |
| 446 |
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM |
| 447 |
|| rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) |
| 448 |
i--; |
| 449 |
/* |
| 450 |
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 |
| 451 |
* with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. |
| 452 |
*/ |
| 453 |
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) |
| 454 |
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; |
| 455 |
if (perror_depth) |
| 456 |
*perror_depth = i; |
| 457 |
} |
| 458 |
return rv; |
| 459 |
} |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
| 462 |
{ |
| 463 |
int sign_nid; |
| 464 |
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
| 465 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 466 |
sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); |
| 467 |
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
| 468 |
} |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
#else |
| 471 |
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
| 472 |
unsigned long flags) |
| 473 |
{ |
| 474 |
return 0; |
| 475 |
} |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
| 478 |
{ |
| 479 |
return 0; |
| 480 |
} |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
#endif |
| 483 |
/* |
| 484 |
* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference |
| 485 |
* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of |
| 486 |
* each X509 structure. |
| 487 |
*/ |
| 488 |
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
| 489 |
{ |
| 490 |
STACK_OF(X509) *ret; |
| 491 |
int i; |
| 492 |
ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); |
| 493 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { |
| 494 |
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); |
| 495 |
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 496 |
} |
| 497 |
return ret; |
| 498 |
} |