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Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

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1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */
2 /*
3 * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
4 * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
5 */
6
7 /* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
8
9 /*
10 * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:
11 * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security
12 * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new
13 * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,
14 * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:
15 * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements
16 * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of
17 * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
18 */
19
20 #include "constant_time_locl.h"
21
22 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
23 # include <stdio.h>
24 # include "cryptlib.h"
25 # include <openssl/bn.h>
26 # include <openssl/rsa.h>
27 # include <openssl/evp.h>
28 # include <openssl/rand.h>
29 # include <openssl/sha.h>
30
31 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
32 const unsigned char *from, int flen,
33 const unsigned char *param, int plen)
34 {
35 return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
36 param, plen, NULL, NULL);
37 }
38
39 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
40 const unsigned char *from, int flen,
41 const unsigned char *param, int plen,
42 const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
43 {
44 int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
45 unsigned char *db, *seed;
46 unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
47 int mdlen;
48
49 if (md == NULL)
50 md = EVP_sha1();
51 if (mgf1md == NULL)
52 mgf1md = md;
53
54 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
55
56 if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
57 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
58 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
59 return 0;
60 }
61
62 if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
63 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
64 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
65 return 0;
66 }
67
68 to[0] = 0;
69 seed = to + 1;
70 db = to + mdlen + 1;
71
72 if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
73 return 0;
74 memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
75 db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
76 memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
77 if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
78 return 0;
79 # ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
80 memcpy(seed,
81 "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
82 20);
83 # endif
84
85 dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
86 if (dbmask == NULL) {
87 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
88 return 0;
89 }
90
91 if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
92 goto err;
93 for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)
94 db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
95
96 if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
97 goto err;
98 for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
99 seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
100
101 OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
102 return 1;
103
104 err:
105 OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
106 return 0;
107 }
108
109 int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
110 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
111 const unsigned char *param, int plen)
112 {
113 return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,
114 param, plen, NULL, NULL);
115 }
116
117 int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
118 const unsigned char *from, int flen,
119 int num, const unsigned char *param,
120 int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
121 const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
122 {
123 int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
124 unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
125 const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
126 /*
127 * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
128 * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB
129 */
130 unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
131 phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
132 int mdlen;
133
134 if (md == NULL)
135 md = EVP_sha1();
136 if (mgf1md == NULL)
137 mgf1md = md;
138
139 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
140
141 if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
142 return -1;
143 /*
144 * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
145 * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
146 * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
147 * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
148 * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
149 * This does not leak any side-channel information.
150 */
151 if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
152 goto decoding_err;
153
154 dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
155 db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
156 em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
157 if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
158 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
159 goto cleanup;
160 }
161
162 /*
163 * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
164 * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
165 * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
166 * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
167 *
168 * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
169 */
170 memset(em, 0, num);
171 memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
172
173 /*
174 * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
175 * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
176 * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
177 */
178 good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
179
180 maskedseed = em + 1;
181 maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
182
183 if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
184 goto cleanup;
185 for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
186 seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
187
188 if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
189 goto cleanup;
190 for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
191 db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
192
193 if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
194 goto cleanup;
195
196 good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
197
198 found_one_byte = 0;
199 for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
200 /*
201 * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
202 */
203 unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
204 unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
205 one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
206 i, one_index);
207 found_one_byte |= equals1;
208 good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
209 }
210
211 good &= found_one_byte;
212
213 /*
214 * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
215 * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
216 * concern.
217 */
218 if (!good)
219 goto decoding_err;
220
221 msg_index = one_index + 1;
222 mlen = dblen - msg_index;
223
224 if (tlen < mlen) {
225 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
226 mlen = -1;
227 } else {
228 memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
229 goto cleanup;
230 }
231
232 decoding_err:
233 /*
234 * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
235 * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
236 */
237 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
238 RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
239 cleanup:
240 if (db != NULL)
241 OPENSSL_free(db);
242 if (em != NULL)
243 OPENSSL_free(em);
244 return mlen;
245 }
246
247 int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
248 const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
249 {
250 long i, outlen = 0;
251 unsigned char cnt[4];
252 EVP_MD_CTX c;
253 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
254 int mdlen;
255 int rv = -1;
256
257 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
258 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
259 if (mdlen < 0)
260 goto err;
261 for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
262 cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
263 cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
264 cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
265 cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
266 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL)
267 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
268 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
269 goto err;
270 if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
271 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
272 goto err;
273 outlen += mdlen;
274 } else {
275 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
276 goto err;
277 memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
278 outlen = len;
279 }
280 }
281 rv = 0;
282 err:
283 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
284 return rv;
285 }
286
287 #endif