| 1 |
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ |
| 2 |
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
| 3 |
* All rights reserved. |
| 4 |
* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 |
* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
| 7 |
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 |
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 |
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 |
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 |
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 |
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
| 15 |
* |
| 16 |
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 |
* the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 |
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 |
* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 |
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 |
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 |
* |
| 23 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 |
* are met: |
| 26 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 |
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 |
* must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 |
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 |
* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
| 35 |
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 |
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 |
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 |
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 |
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
| 40 |
* |
| 41 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 |
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 |
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 |
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 |
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 |
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 |
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 |
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 |
* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 |
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 |
*/ |
| 58 |
/* ==================================================================== |
| 59 |
* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 60 |
* |
| 61 |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 62 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 63 |
* are met: |
| 64 |
* |
| 65 |
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 66 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 67 |
* |
| 68 |
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 69 |
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 70 |
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 71 |
* distribution. |
| 72 |
* |
| 73 |
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 74 |
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 75 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 76 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 77 |
* |
| 78 |
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 79 |
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 80 |
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 81 |
* [email protected]. |
| 82 |
* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 84 |
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 85 |
* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
| 87 |
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 88 |
* acknowledgment: |
| 89 |
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 90 |
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 91 |
* |
| 92 |
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 93 |
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 94 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 95 |
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 96 |
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 97 |
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 98 |
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 99 |
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 100 |
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 101 |
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 102 |
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 103 |
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 104 |
* ==================================================================== |
| 105 |
* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 107 |
* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <stdio.h> |
| 113 |
#include "cryptlib.h" |
| 114 |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 115 |
#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| 116 |
#include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
#ifndef RSA_NULL |
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 121 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
| 122 |
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 123 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
| 124 |
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 125 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
| 126 |
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 127 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); |
| 128 |
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, |
| 129 |
BN_CTX *ctx); |
| 130 |
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); |
| 131 |
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); |
| 132 |
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { |
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"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", |
| 134 |
RSA_eay_public_encrypt, |
| 135 |
RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ |
| 136 |
RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ |
| 137 |
RSA_eay_private_decrypt, |
| 138 |
RSA_eay_mod_exp, |
| 139 |
BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery |
| 140 |
* if e == 3 */ |
| 141 |
RSA_eay_init, |
| 142 |
RSA_eay_finish, |
| 143 |
0, /* flags */ |
| 144 |
NULL, |
| 145 |
0, /* rsa_sign */ |
| 146 |
0, /* rsa_verify */ |
| 147 |
NULL /* rsa_keygen */ |
| 148 |
}; |
| 149 |
|
| 150 |
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) |
| 151 |
{ |
| 152 |
return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); |
| 153 |
} |
| 154 |
|
| 155 |
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 156 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| 157 |
{ |
| 158 |
BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
| 159 |
int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; |
| 160 |
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| 161 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
| 164 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
| 165 |
return -1; |
| 166 |
} |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { |
| 169 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| 170 |
return -1; |
| 171 |
} |
| 172 |
|
| 173 |
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ |
| 174 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { |
| 175 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { |
| 176 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| 177 |
return -1; |
| 178 |
} |
| 179 |
} |
| 180 |
|
| 181 |
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| 182 |
goto err; |
| 183 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 184 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 185 |
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 186 |
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
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buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| 188 |
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 190 |
goto err; |
| 191 |
} |
| 192 |
|
| 193 |
switch (padding) { |
| 194 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 195 |
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); |
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break; |
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# endif |
| 202 |
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
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i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); |
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break; |
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default: |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
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goto err; |
| 211 |
} |
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if (i <= 0) |
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goto err; |
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|
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if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) |
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goto err; |
| 217 |
|
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if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
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/* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, |
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RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
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goto err; |
| 223 |
} |
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|
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
| 226 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
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(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
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goto err; |
| 229 |
|
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
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rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 232 |
goto err; |
| 233 |
|
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/* |
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* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the |
| 236 |
* modulus |
| 237 |
*/ |
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j = BN_num_bytes(ret); |
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i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); |
| 240 |
for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) |
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to[k] = 0; |
| 242 |
|
| 243 |
r = num; |
| 244 |
err: |
| 245 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 246 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 247 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 248 |
} |
| 249 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 250 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
| 251 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 252 |
} |
| 253 |
return (r); |
| 254 |
} |
| 255 |
|
| 256 |
static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 257 |
{ |
| 258 |
BN_BLINDING *ret; |
| 259 |
int got_write_lock = 0; |
| 260 |
CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
| 261 |
|
| 262 |
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 263 |
|
| 264 |
if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { |
| 265 |
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 266 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 267 |
got_write_lock = 1; |
| 268 |
|
| 269 |
if (rsa->blinding == NULL) |
| 270 |
rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
| 271 |
} |
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
ret = rsa->blinding; |
| 274 |
if (ret == NULL) |
| 275 |
goto err; |
| 276 |
|
| 277 |
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
| 278 |
if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { |
| 279 |
/* rsa->blinding is ours! */ |
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
*local = 1; |
| 282 |
} else { |
| 283 |
/* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ |
| 284 |
|
| 285 |
/* |
| 286 |
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the |
| 287 |
* BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and |
| 288 |
* that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING |
| 289 |
*/ |
| 290 |
*local = 0; |
| 291 |
|
| 292 |
if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { |
| 293 |
if (!got_write_lock) { |
| 294 |
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 295 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 296 |
got_write_lock = 1; |
| 297 |
} |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) |
| 300 |
rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
ret = rsa->mt_blinding; |
| 303 |
} |
| 304 |
|
| 305 |
err: |
| 306 |
if (got_write_lock) |
| 307 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 308 |
else |
| 309 |
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| 310 |
return ret; |
| 311 |
} |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, |
| 314 |
BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 315 |
{ |
| 316 |
if (unblind == NULL) |
| 317 |
/* |
| 318 |
* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. |
| 319 |
*/ |
| 320 |
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); |
| 321 |
else { |
| 322 |
/* |
| 323 |
* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. |
| 324 |
*/ |
| 325 |
int ret; |
| 326 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); |
| 327 |
ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); |
| 328 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); |
| 329 |
return ret; |
| 330 |
} |
| 331 |
} |
| 332 |
|
| 333 |
static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, |
| 334 |
BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 335 |
{ |
| 336 |
/* |
| 337 |
* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex |
| 338 |
* will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING |
| 339 |
* is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: |
| 340 |
* BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and |
| 341 |
* will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe |
| 342 |
* to access the blinding without a lock. |
| 343 |
*/ |
| 344 |
return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
/* signing */ |
| 348 |
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 349 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| 350 |
{ |
| 351 |
BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; |
| 352 |
int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; |
| 353 |
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| 354 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 355 |
int local_blinding = 0; |
| 356 |
/* |
| 357 |
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind |
| 358 |
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store |
| 359 |
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. |
| 360 |
*/ |
| 361 |
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; |
| 362 |
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| 365 |
goto err; |
| 366 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 367 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 368 |
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 369 |
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| 370 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| 371 |
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
| 372 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 373 |
goto err; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
switch (padding) { |
| 377 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 378 |
i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); |
| 379 |
break; |
| 380 |
case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| 381 |
i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); |
| 382 |
break; |
| 383 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 384 |
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); |
| 385 |
break; |
| 386 |
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| 387 |
default: |
| 388 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 389 |
goto err; |
| 390 |
} |
| 391 |
if (i <= 0) |
| 392 |
goto err; |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) |
| 395 |
goto err; |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 398 |
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
| 399 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, |
| 400 |
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 401 |
goto err; |
| 402 |
} |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { |
| 405 |
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); |
| 406 |
if (blinding == NULL) { |
| 407 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 408 |
goto err; |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
} |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
if (blinding != NULL) { |
| 413 |
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { |
| 414 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 415 |
goto err; |
| 416 |
} |
| 417 |
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) |
| 418 |
goto err; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
| 422 |
((rsa->p != NULL) && |
| 423 |
(rsa->q != NULL) && |
| 424 |
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { |
| 425 |
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) |
| 426 |
goto err; |
| 427 |
} else { |
| 428 |
BIGNUM local_d; |
| 429 |
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 432 |
BN_init(&local_d); |
| 433 |
d = &local_d; |
| 434 |
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 435 |
} else |
| 436 |
d = rsa->d; |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
| 439 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 440 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
| 441 |
goto err; |
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
| 444 |
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 445 |
goto err; |
| 446 |
} |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
if (blinding) |
| 449 |
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) |
| 450 |
goto err; |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| 453 |
BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); |
| 454 |
if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) |
| 455 |
res = f; |
| 456 |
else |
| 457 |
res = ret; |
| 458 |
} else |
| 459 |
res = ret; |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
/* |
| 462 |
* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the |
| 463 |
* modulus |
| 464 |
*/ |
| 465 |
j = BN_num_bytes(res); |
| 466 |
i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); |
| 467 |
for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) |
| 468 |
to[k] = 0; |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
r = num; |
| 471 |
err: |
| 472 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 473 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 474 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 475 |
} |
| 476 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 477 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
| 478 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 479 |
} |
| 480 |
return (r); |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 484 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| 485 |
{ |
| 486 |
BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
| 487 |
int j, num = 0, r = -1; |
| 488 |
unsigned char *p; |
| 489 |
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| 490 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 491 |
int local_blinding = 0; |
| 492 |
/* |
| 493 |
* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind |
| 494 |
* instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store |
| 495 |
* the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. |
| 496 |
*/ |
| 497 |
BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; |
| 498 |
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| 501 |
goto err; |
| 502 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 503 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 504 |
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 505 |
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| 506 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| 507 |
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
| 508 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 509 |
goto err; |
| 510 |
} |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
/* |
| 513 |
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the |
| 514 |
* top '0' bytes |
| 515 |
*/ |
| 516 |
if (flen > num) { |
| 517 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, |
| 518 |
RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
| 519 |
goto err; |
| 520 |
} |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
/* make data into a big number */ |
| 523 |
if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) |
| 524 |
goto err; |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 527 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, |
| 528 |
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 529 |
goto err; |
| 530 |
} |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { |
| 533 |
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); |
| 534 |
if (blinding == NULL) { |
| 535 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 536 |
goto err; |
| 537 |
} |
| 538 |
} |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
if (blinding != NULL) { |
| 541 |
if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { |
| 542 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 543 |
goto err; |
| 544 |
} |
| 545 |
if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) |
| 546 |
goto err; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
/* do the decrypt */ |
| 550 |
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
| 551 |
((rsa->p != NULL) && |
| 552 |
(rsa->q != NULL) && |
| 553 |
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { |
| 554 |
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) |
| 555 |
goto err; |
| 556 |
} else { |
| 557 |
BIGNUM local_d; |
| 558 |
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 561 |
d = &local_d; |
| 562 |
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 563 |
} else |
| 564 |
d = rsa->d; |
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
| 567 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 568 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
| 569 |
goto err; |
| 570 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
| 571 |
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 572 |
goto err; |
| 573 |
} |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
if (blinding) |
| 576 |
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) |
| 577 |
goto err; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
p = buf; |
| 580 |
j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
switch (padding) { |
| 583 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 584 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); |
| 585 |
break; |
| 586 |
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 587 |
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| 588 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); |
| 589 |
break; |
| 590 |
# endif |
| 591 |
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| 592 |
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); |
| 593 |
break; |
| 594 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 595 |
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); |
| 596 |
break; |
| 597 |
default: |
| 598 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 599 |
goto err; |
| 600 |
} |
| 601 |
if (r < 0) |
| 602 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
err: |
| 605 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 606 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 607 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 608 |
} |
| 609 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 610 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
| 611 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 612 |
} |
| 613 |
return (r); |
| 614 |
} |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
/* signature verification */ |
| 617 |
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| 618 |
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| 619 |
{ |
| 620 |
BIGNUM *f, *ret; |
| 621 |
int i, num = 0, r = -1; |
| 622 |
unsigned char *p; |
| 623 |
unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| 624 |
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
| 627 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
| 628 |
return -1; |
| 629 |
} |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { |
| 632 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| 633 |
return -1; |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ |
| 637 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { |
| 638 |
if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { |
| 639 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| 640 |
return -1; |
| 641 |
} |
| 642 |
} |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| 645 |
goto err; |
| 646 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 647 |
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 648 |
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 649 |
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| 650 |
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| 651 |
if (!f || !ret || !buf) { |
| 652 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 653 |
goto err; |
| 654 |
} |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
/* |
| 657 |
* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the |
| 658 |
* top '0' bytes |
| 659 |
*/ |
| 660 |
if (flen > num) { |
| 661 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
| 662 |
goto err; |
| 663 |
} |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) |
| 666 |
goto err; |
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { |
| 669 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, |
| 670 |
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| 671 |
goto err; |
| 672 |
} |
| 673 |
|
| 674 |
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
| 675 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 676 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
| 677 |
goto err; |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
| 680 |
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 681 |
goto err; |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) |
| 684 |
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) |
| 685 |
goto err; |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
p = buf; |
| 688 |
i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
switch (padding) { |
| 691 |
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| 692 |
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); |
| 693 |
break; |
| 694 |
case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| 695 |
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); |
| 696 |
break; |
| 697 |
case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| 698 |
r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); |
| 699 |
break; |
| 700 |
default: |
| 701 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| 702 |
goto err; |
| 703 |
} |
| 704 |
if (r < 0) |
| 705 |
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
err: |
| 708 |
if (ctx != NULL) { |
| 709 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 710 |
BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| 711 |
} |
| 712 |
if (buf != NULL) { |
| 713 |
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); |
| 714 |
OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| 715 |
} |
| 716 |
return (r); |
| 717 |
} |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| 720 |
{ |
| 721 |
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; |
| 722 |
BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; |
| 723 |
BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; |
| 724 |
int ret = 0; |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| 727 |
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 728 |
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 729 |
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
{ |
| 732 |
BIGNUM local_p, local_q; |
| 733 |
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
/* |
| 736 |
* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the |
| 737 |
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) |
| 738 |
*/ |
| 739 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 740 |
BN_init(&local_p); |
| 741 |
p = &local_p; |
| 742 |
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
BN_init(&local_q); |
| 745 |
q = &local_q; |
| 746 |
BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 747 |
} else { |
| 748 |
p = rsa->p; |
| 749 |
q = rsa->q; |
| 750 |
} |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { |
| 753 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 754 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) |
| 755 |
goto err; |
| 756 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 757 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) |
| 758 |
goto err; |
| 759 |
} |
| 760 |
} |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) |
| 763 |
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked |
| 764 |
(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) |
| 765 |
goto err; |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
/* compute I mod q */ |
| 768 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 769 |
c = &local_c; |
| 770 |
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 771 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) |
| 772 |
goto err; |
| 773 |
} else { |
| 774 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) |
| 775 |
goto err; |
| 776 |
} |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ |
| 779 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 780 |
dmq1 = &local_dmq1; |
| 781 |
BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 782 |
} else |
| 783 |
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; |
| 784 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) |
| 785 |
goto err; |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
/* compute I mod p */ |
| 788 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 789 |
c = &local_c; |
| 790 |
BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 791 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) |
| 792 |
goto err; |
| 793 |
} else { |
| 794 |
if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) |
| 795 |
goto err; |
| 796 |
} |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ |
| 799 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 800 |
dmp1 = &local_dmp1; |
| 801 |
BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 802 |
} else |
| 803 |
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; |
| 804 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) |
| 805 |
goto err; |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) |
| 808 |
goto err; |
| 809 |
/* |
| 810 |
* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the |
| 811 |
* multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size |
| 812 |
*/ |
| 813 |
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) |
| 814 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) |
| 815 |
goto err; |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) |
| 818 |
goto err; |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ |
| 821 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 822 |
pr1 = &local_r1; |
| 823 |
BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 824 |
} else |
| 825 |
pr1 = r1; |
| 826 |
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) |
| 827 |
goto err; |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
/* |
| 830 |
* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' |
| 831 |
* if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can |
| 832 |
* break the private key operations: the following second correction |
| 833 |
* should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen |
| 834 |
* with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] |
| 835 |
*/ |
| 836 |
if (BN_is_negative(r0)) |
| 837 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) |
| 838 |
goto err; |
| 839 |
if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) |
| 840 |
goto err; |
| 841 |
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) |
| 842 |
goto err; |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { |
| 845 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, |
| 846 |
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 847 |
goto err; |
| 848 |
/* |
| 849 |
* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will |
| 850 |
* be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the |
| 851 |
* verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for |
| 852 |
* absolute equality, just congruency. |
| 853 |
*/ |
| 854 |
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) |
| 855 |
goto err; |
| 856 |
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) |
| 857 |
goto err; |
| 858 |
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) |
| 859 |
if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) |
| 860 |
goto err; |
| 861 |
if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { |
| 862 |
/* |
| 863 |
* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak |
| 864 |
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and |
| 865 |
* return that instead. |
| 866 |
*/ |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
BIGNUM local_d; |
| 869 |
BIGNUM *d = NULL; |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { |
| 872 |
d = &local_d; |
| 873 |
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| 874 |
} else |
| 875 |
d = rsa->d; |
| 876 |
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, |
| 877 |
rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| 878 |
goto err; |
| 879 |
} |
| 880 |
} |
| 881 |
ret = 1; |
| 882 |
err: |
| 883 |
BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| 884 |
return (ret); |
| 885 |
} |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) |
| 888 |
{ |
| 889 |
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; |
| 890 |
return (1); |
| 891 |
} |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) |
| 894 |
{ |
| 895 |
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) |
| 896 |
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); |
| 897 |
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) |
| 898 |
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); |
| 899 |
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) |
| 900 |
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); |
| 901 |
return (1); |
| 902 |
} |
| 903 |
|
| 904 |
#endif |