| 1 |
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* fe-auth.c |
| 4 |
* The front-end (client) authorization routines |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 7 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* IDENTIFICATION |
| 10 |
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c |
| 11 |
* |
| 12 |
*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 13 |
*/ |
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
/* |
| 16 |
* INTERFACE ROUTINES |
| 17 |
* frontend (client) routines: |
| 18 |
* pg_fe_sendauth send authentication information |
| 19 |
* pg_fe_getauthname get user's name according to the client side |
| 20 |
* of the authentication system |
| 21 |
*/ |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
#include "postgres_fe.h" |
| 24 |
|
| 25 |
#ifdef WIN32 |
| 26 |
#include "win32.h" |
| 27 |
#else |
| 28 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 29 |
#include <fcntl.h> |
| 30 |
#include <limits.h> |
| 31 |
#include <pwd.h> |
| 32 |
#include <sys/param.h> /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN on most */ |
| 33 |
#include <sys/socket.h> |
| 34 |
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UCRED_H |
| 35 |
#include <sys/ucred.h> |
| 36 |
#endif |
| 37 |
#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN |
| 38 |
#include <netdb.h> /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN on some */ |
| 39 |
#endif |
| 40 |
#endif |
| 41 |
|
| 42 |
#include "common/md5.h" |
| 43 |
#include "common/oauth-common.h" |
| 44 |
#include "common/scram-common.h" |
| 45 |
#include "fe-auth.h" |
| 46 |
#include "fe-auth-sasl.h" |
| 47 |
#include "fe-auth-oauth.h" |
| 48 |
#include "libpq-fe.h" |
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 51 |
/* |
| 52 |
* GSSAPI authentication system. |
| 53 |
*/ |
| 54 |
|
| 55 |
#include "fe-gssapi-common.h" |
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
/* |
| 58 |
* Continue GSS authentication with next token as needed. |
| 59 |
*/ |
| 60 |
static int |
| 61 |
pg_GSS_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen) |
| 62 |
{ |
| 63 |
OM_uint32 maj_stat, |
| 64 |
min_stat, |
| 65 |
lmin_s, |
| 66 |
gss_flags = GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; |
| 67 |
gss_buffer_desc ginbuf; |
| 68 |
gss_buffer_desc goutbuf; |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
/* |
| 71 |
* On first call, there's no input token. On subsequent calls, read the |
| 72 |
* input token into a GSS buffer. |
| 73 |
*/ |
| 74 |
if (conn->gctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) |
| 75 |
{ |
| 76 |
ginbuf.length = payloadlen; |
| 77 |
ginbuf.value = malloc(payloadlen); |
| 78 |
if (!ginbuf.value) |
| 79 |
{ |
| 80 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory allocating GSSAPI buffer (%d)", |
| 81 |
payloadlen); |
| 82 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 83 |
} |
| 84 |
if (pqGetnchar(ginbuf.value, payloadlen, conn)) |
| 85 |
{ |
| 86 |
/* |
| 87 |
* Shouldn't happen, because the caller should've ensured that the |
| 88 |
* whole message is already in the input buffer. |
| 89 |
*/ |
| 90 |
free(ginbuf.value); |
| 91 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 92 |
} |
| 93 |
} |
| 94 |
else |
| 95 |
{ |
| 96 |
ginbuf.length = 0; |
| 97 |
ginbuf.value = NULL; |
| 98 |
} |
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
/* finished parsing, trace server-to-client message */ |
| 101 |
if (conn->Pfdebug) |
| 102 |
pqTraceOutputMessage(conn, conn->inBuffer + conn->inStart, false); |
| 103 |
|
| 104 |
/* Only try to acquire credentials if GSS delegation isn't disabled. */ |
| 105 |
if (!pg_GSS_have_cred_cache(&conn->gcred)) |
| 106 |
conn->gcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; |
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
if (conn->gssdelegation && conn->gssdelegation[0] == '1') |
| 109 |
gss_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; |
| 110 |
|
| 111 |
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, |
| 112 |
conn->gcred, |
| 113 |
&conn->gctx, |
| 114 |
conn->gtarg_nam, |
| 115 |
GSS_C_NO_OID, |
| 116 |
gss_flags, |
| 117 |
0, |
| 118 |
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, |
| 119 |
(ginbuf.value == NULL) ? GSS_C_NO_BUFFER : &ginbuf, |
| 120 |
NULL, |
| 121 |
&goutbuf, |
| 122 |
NULL, |
| 123 |
NULL); |
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
free(ginbuf.value); |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
if (goutbuf.length != 0) |
| 128 |
{ |
| 129 |
/* |
| 130 |
* GSS generated data to send to the server. We don't care if it's the |
| 131 |
* first or subsequent packet, just send the same kind of password |
| 132 |
* packet. |
| 133 |
*/ |
| 134 |
conn->current_auth_response = AUTH_RESPONSE_GSS; |
| 135 |
if (pqPacketSend(conn, PqMsg_GSSResponse, |
| 136 |
goutbuf.value, goutbuf.length) != STATUS_OK) |
| 137 |
{ |
| 138 |
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &goutbuf); |
| 139 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 140 |
} |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &goutbuf); |
| 143 |
|
| 144 |
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 145 |
{ |
| 146 |
pg_GSS_error(libpq_gettext("GSSAPI continuation error"), |
| 147 |
conn, |
| 148 |
maj_stat, min_stat); |
| 149 |
gss_release_name(&lmin_s, &conn->gtarg_nam); |
| 150 |
if (conn->gctx) |
| 151 |
gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &conn->gctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); |
| 152 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 153 |
} |
| 154 |
|
| 155 |
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) |
| 156 |
{ |
| 157 |
conn->client_finished_auth = true; |
| 158 |
gss_release_name(&lmin_s, &conn->gtarg_nam); |
| 159 |
conn->gssapi_used = true; |
| 160 |
} |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 163 |
} |
| 164 |
|
| 165 |
/* |
| 166 |
* Send initial GSS authentication token |
| 167 |
*/ |
| 168 |
static int |
| 169 |
pg_GSS_startup(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen) |
| 170 |
{ |
| 171 |
int ret; |
| 172 |
char *host = conn->connhost[conn->whichhost].host; |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
if (!(host && host[0] != '\0')) |
| 175 |
{ |
| 176 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "host name must be specified"); |
| 177 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 178 |
} |
| 179 |
|
| 180 |
if (conn->gctx) |
| 181 |
{ |
| 182 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "duplicate GSS authentication request"); |
| 183 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 184 |
} |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
ret = pg_GSS_load_servicename(conn); |
| 187 |
if (ret != STATUS_OK) |
| 188 |
return ret; |
| 189 |
|
| 190 |
/* |
| 191 |
* Initial packet is the same as a continuation packet with no initial |
| 192 |
* context. |
| 193 |
*/ |
| 194 |
conn->gctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; |
| 195 |
|
| 196 |
return pg_GSS_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 197 |
} |
| 198 |
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */ |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI |
| 202 |
/* |
| 203 |
* SSPI authentication system (Windows only) |
| 204 |
*/ |
| 205 |
|
| 206 |
static void |
| 207 |
pg_SSPI_error(PGconn *conn, const char *mprefix, SECURITY_STATUS r) |
| 208 |
{ |
| 209 |
char sysmsg[256]; |
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS | |
| 212 |
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, |
| 213 |
NULL, r, 0, |
| 214 |
sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0) |
| 215 |
appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, "%s: SSPI error %x\n", |
| 216 |
mprefix, (unsigned int) r); |
| 217 |
else |
| 218 |
appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, "%s: %s (%x)\n", |
| 219 |
mprefix, sysmsg, (unsigned int) r); |
| 220 |
} |
| 221 |
|
| 222 |
/* |
| 223 |
* Continue SSPI authentication with next token as needed. |
| 224 |
*/ |
| 225 |
static int |
| 226 |
pg_SSPI_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen) |
| 227 |
{ |
| 228 |
SECURITY_STATUS r; |
| 229 |
CtxtHandle newContext; |
| 230 |
ULONG contextAttr; |
| 231 |
SecBufferDesc inbuf; |
| 232 |
SecBufferDesc outbuf; |
| 233 |
SecBuffer OutBuffers[1]; |
| 234 |
SecBuffer InBuffers[1]; |
| 235 |
char *inputbuf = NULL; |
| 236 |
|
| 237 |
if (conn->sspictx != NULL) |
| 238 |
{ |
| 239 |
/* |
| 240 |
* On runs other than the first we have some data to send. Put this |
| 241 |
* data in a SecBuffer type structure. |
| 242 |
*/ |
| 243 |
inputbuf = malloc(payloadlen); |
| 244 |
if (!inputbuf) |
| 245 |
{ |
| 246 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory allocating SSPI buffer (%d)", |
| 247 |
payloadlen); |
| 248 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 249 |
} |
| 250 |
if (pqGetnchar(inputbuf, payloadlen, conn)) |
| 251 |
{ |
| 252 |
/* |
| 253 |
* Shouldn't happen, because the caller should've ensured that the |
| 254 |
* whole message is already in the input buffer. |
| 255 |
*/ |
| 256 |
free(inputbuf); |
| 257 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 258 |
} |
| 259 |
|
| 260 |
inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; |
| 261 |
inbuf.cBuffers = 1; |
| 262 |
inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers; |
| 263 |
InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = inputbuf; |
| 264 |
InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = payloadlen; |
| 265 |
InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; |
| 266 |
} |
| 267 |
|
| 268 |
/* finished parsing, trace server-to-client message */ |
| 269 |
if (conn->Pfdebug) |
| 270 |
pqTraceOutputMessage(conn, conn->inBuffer + conn->inStart, false); |
| 271 |
|
| 272 |
OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL; |
| 273 |
OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; |
| 274 |
OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0; |
| 275 |
outbuf.cBuffers = 1; |
| 276 |
outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers; |
| 277 |
outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; |
| 278 |
|
| 279 |
r = InitializeSecurityContext(conn->sspicred, |
| 280 |
conn->sspictx, |
| 281 |
conn->sspitarget, |
| 282 |
ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY, |
| 283 |
0, |
| 284 |
SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP, |
| 285 |
(conn->sspictx == NULL) ? NULL : &inbuf, |
| 286 |
0, |
| 287 |
&newContext, |
| 288 |
&outbuf, |
| 289 |
&contextAttr, |
| 290 |
NULL); |
| 291 |
|
| 292 |
/* we don't need the input anymore */ |
| 293 |
free(inputbuf); |
| 294 |
|
| 295 |
if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 296 |
{ |
| 297 |
pg_SSPI_error(conn, libpq_gettext("SSPI continuation error"), r); |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 300 |
} |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
if (conn->sspictx == NULL) |
| 303 |
{ |
| 304 |
/* On first run, transfer retrieved context handle */ |
| 305 |
conn->sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle)); |
| 306 |
if (conn->sspictx == NULL) |
| 307 |
{ |
| 308 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 309 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 310 |
} |
| 311 |
memcpy(conn->sspictx, &newContext, sizeof(CtxtHandle)); |
| 312 |
} |
| 313 |
|
| 314 |
/* |
| 315 |
* If SSPI returned any data to be sent to the server (as it normally |
| 316 |
* would), send this data as a password packet. |
| 317 |
*/ |
| 318 |
if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0) |
| 319 |
{ |
| 320 |
if (outbuf.cBuffers != 1) |
| 321 |
{ |
| 322 |
/* |
| 323 |
* This should never happen, at least not for Kerberos |
| 324 |
* authentication. Keep check in case it shows up with other |
| 325 |
* authentication methods later. |
| 326 |
*/ |
| 327 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 328 |
"SSPI returned invalid number of output buffers\n"); |
| 329 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 330 |
} |
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
/* |
| 333 |
* If the negotiation is complete, there may be zero bytes to send. |
| 334 |
* The server is at this point not expecting any more data, so don't |
| 335 |
* send it. |
| 336 |
*/ |
| 337 |
if (outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0) |
| 338 |
{ |
| 339 |
conn->current_auth_response = AUTH_RESPONSE_GSS; |
| 340 |
if (pqPacketSend(conn, PqMsg_GSSResponse, |
| 341 |
outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer, outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer)) |
| 342 |
{ |
| 343 |
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer); |
| 344 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
} |
| 347 |
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer); |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
if (r == SEC_E_OK) |
| 351 |
conn->client_finished_auth = true; |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
/* Cleanup is handled by the code in freePGconn() */ |
| 354 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 355 |
} |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
/* |
| 358 |
* Send initial SSPI authentication token. |
| 359 |
* If use_negotiate is 0, use kerberos authentication package which is |
| 360 |
* compatible with Unix. If use_negotiate is 1, use the negotiate package |
| 361 |
* which supports both kerberos and NTLM, but is not compatible with Unix. |
| 362 |
*/ |
| 363 |
static int |
| 364 |
pg_SSPI_startup(PGconn *conn, int use_negotiate, int payloadlen) |
| 365 |
{ |
| 366 |
SECURITY_STATUS r; |
| 367 |
TimeStamp expire; |
| 368 |
char *host = conn->connhost[conn->whichhost].host; |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
if (conn->sspictx) |
| 371 |
{ |
| 372 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "duplicate SSPI authentication request"); |
| 373 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
/* |
| 377 |
* Retrieve credentials handle |
| 378 |
*/ |
| 379 |
conn->sspicred = malloc(sizeof(CredHandle)); |
| 380 |
if (conn->sspicred == NULL) |
| 381 |
{ |
| 382 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 383 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 384 |
} |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL, |
| 387 |
use_negotiate ? "negotiate" : "kerberos", |
| 388 |
SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, |
| 389 |
NULL, |
| 390 |
NULL, |
| 391 |
NULL, |
| 392 |
NULL, |
| 393 |
conn->sspicred, |
| 394 |
&expire); |
| 395 |
if (r != SEC_E_OK) |
| 396 |
{ |
| 397 |
pg_SSPI_error(conn, libpq_gettext("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r); |
| 398 |
free(conn->sspicred); |
| 399 |
conn->sspicred = NULL; |
| 400 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 401 |
} |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
/* |
| 404 |
* Compute target principal name. SSPI has a different format from GSSAPI, |
| 405 |
* but not more complex. We can skip the @REALM part, because Windows will |
| 406 |
* fill that in for us automatically. |
| 407 |
*/ |
| 408 |
if (!(host && host[0] != '\0')) |
| 409 |
{ |
| 410 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "host name must be specified"); |
| 411 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 412 |
} |
| 413 |
conn->sspitarget = malloc(strlen(conn->krbsrvname) + strlen(host) + 2); |
| 414 |
if (!conn->sspitarget) |
| 415 |
{ |
| 416 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 417 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 418 |
} |
| 419 |
sprintf(conn->sspitarget, "%s/%s", conn->krbsrvname, host); |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
/* |
| 422 |
* Indicate that we're in SSPI authentication mode to make sure that |
| 423 |
* pg_SSPI_continue is called next time in the negotiation. |
| 424 |
*/ |
| 425 |
conn->usesspi = 1; |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
return pg_SSPI_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 428 |
} |
| 429 |
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */ |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
/* |
| 432 |
* Initialize SASL authentication exchange. |
| 433 |
*/ |
| 434 |
static int |
| 435 |
pg_SASL_init(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen, bool *async) |
| 436 |
{ |
| 437 |
char *initialresponse = NULL; |
| 438 |
int initialresponselen; |
| 439 |
const char *selected_mechanism; |
| 440 |
PQExpBufferData mechanism_buf; |
| 441 |
char *password = NULL; |
| 442 |
SASLStatus status; |
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
initPQExpBuffer(&mechanism_buf); |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
if (conn->channel_binding[0] == 'r' && /* require */ |
| 447 |
!conn->ssl_in_use) |
| 448 |
{ |
| 449 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "channel binding required, but SSL not in use"); |
| 450 |
goto error; |
| 451 |
} |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
if (conn->sasl_state && !conn->async_auth) |
| 454 |
{ |
| 455 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "duplicate SASL authentication request"); |
| 456 |
goto error; |
| 457 |
} |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
/* |
| 460 |
* Parse the list of SASL authentication mechanisms in the |
| 461 |
* AuthenticationSASL message, and select the best mechanism that we |
| 462 |
* support. Mechanisms are listed by order of decreasing importance. |
| 463 |
*/ |
| 464 |
selected_mechanism = NULL; |
| 465 |
for (;;) |
| 466 |
{ |
| 467 |
if (pqGets(&mechanism_buf, conn)) |
| 468 |
{ |
| 469 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 470 |
"fe_sendauth: invalid authentication request from server: invalid list of authentication mechanisms\n"); |
| 471 |
goto error; |
| 472 |
} |
| 473 |
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(mechanism_buf)) |
| 474 |
goto oom_error; |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
/* An empty string indicates end of list */ |
| 477 |
if (mechanism_buf.data[0] == '\0') |
| 478 |
break; |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
/* |
| 481 |
* Select the mechanism to use. Pick SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS over anything |
| 482 |
* else if a channel binding type is set and if the client supports it |
| 483 |
* (and did not set channel_binding=disable). Pick SCRAM-SHA-256 if |
| 484 |
* nothing else has already been picked. If we add more mechanisms, a |
| 485 |
* more refined priority mechanism might become necessary. |
| 486 |
*/ |
| 487 |
if (strcmp(mechanism_buf.data, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0) |
| 488 |
{ |
| 489 |
if (conn->ssl_in_use) |
| 490 |
{ |
| 491 |
/* The server has offered SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS. */ |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 494 |
/* |
| 495 |
* The client supports channel binding, which is chosen if |
| 496 |
* channel_binding is not disabled. |
| 497 |
*/ |
| 498 |
if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd') /* disable */ |
| 499 |
{ |
| 500 |
selected_mechanism = SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME; |
| 501 |
conn->sasl = &pg_scram_mech; |
| 502 |
conn->password_needed = true; |
| 503 |
} |
| 504 |
#else |
| 505 |
/* |
| 506 |
* The client does not support channel binding. If it is |
| 507 |
* required, complain immediately instead of the error below |
| 508 |
* which would be confusing as the server is publishing |
| 509 |
* SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS. |
| 510 |
*/ |
| 511 |
if (conn->channel_binding[0] == 'r') /* require */ |
| 512 |
{ |
| 513 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "channel binding is required, but client does not support it"); |
| 514 |
goto error; |
| 515 |
} |
| 516 |
#endif |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
else |
| 519 |
{ |
| 520 |
/* |
| 521 |
* The server offered SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the connection |
| 522 |
* is not SSL-encrypted. That's not sane. Perhaps SSL was |
| 523 |
* stripped by a proxy? There's no point in continuing, |
| 524 |
* because the server will reject the connection anyway if we |
| 525 |
* try authenticate without channel binding even though both |
| 526 |
* the client and server supported it. The SCRAM exchange |
| 527 |
* checks for that, to prevent downgrade attacks. |
| 528 |
*/ |
| 529 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "server offered SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS authentication over a non-SSL connection"); |
| 530 |
goto error; |
| 531 |
} |
| 532 |
} |
| 533 |
else if (strcmp(mechanism_buf.data, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME) == 0 && |
| 534 |
!selected_mechanism) |
| 535 |
{ |
| 536 |
selected_mechanism = SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME; |
| 537 |
conn->sasl = &pg_scram_mech; |
| 538 |
conn->password_needed = true; |
| 539 |
} |
| 540 |
else if (strcmp(mechanism_buf.data, OAUTHBEARER_NAME) == 0 && |
| 541 |
!selected_mechanism) |
| 542 |
{ |
| 543 |
selected_mechanism = OAUTHBEARER_NAME; |
| 544 |
conn->sasl = &pg_oauth_mech; |
| 545 |
conn->password_needed = false; |
| 546 |
} |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
if (!selected_mechanism) |
| 550 |
{ |
| 551 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "none of the server's SASL authentication mechanisms are supported"); |
| 552 |
goto error; |
| 553 |
} |
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
/* Make sure require_auth is satisfied. */ |
| 556 |
if (conn->require_auth) |
| 557 |
{ |
| 558 |
bool allowed = false; |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
for (int i = 0; i < lengthof(conn->allowed_sasl_mechs); i++) |
| 561 |
{ |
| 562 |
if (conn->sasl == conn->allowed_sasl_mechs[i]) |
| 563 |
{ |
| 564 |
allowed = true; |
| 565 |
break; |
| 566 |
} |
| 567 |
} |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
if (!allowed) |
| 570 |
{ |
| 571 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "authentication method requirement \"%s\" failed: server requested %s authentication", |
| 572 |
conn->require_auth, selected_mechanism); |
| 573 |
goto error; |
| 574 |
} |
| 575 |
} |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
if (conn->channel_binding[0] == 'r' && /* require */ |
| 578 |
strcmp(selected_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) != 0) |
| 579 |
{ |
| 580 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding"); |
| 581 |
goto error; |
| 582 |
} |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
/* |
| 585 |
* Now that the SASL mechanism has been chosen for the exchange, |
| 586 |
* initialize its state information. |
| 587 |
*/ |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
/* |
| 590 |
* First, select the password to use for the exchange, complaining if |
| 591 |
* there isn't one and the selected SASL mechanism needs it. |
| 592 |
*/ |
| 593 |
if (conn->password_needed && !conn->scram_client_key_binary) |
| 594 |
{ |
| 595 |
password = conn->connhost[conn->whichhost].password; |
| 596 |
if (password == NULL) |
| 597 |
password = conn->pgpass; |
| 598 |
if (password == NULL || password[0] == '\0') |
| 599 |
{ |
| 600 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 601 |
PQnoPasswordSupplied); |
| 602 |
goto error; |
| 603 |
} |
| 604 |
} |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
/* finished parsing, trace server-to-client message */ |
| 607 |
if (conn->Pfdebug) |
| 608 |
pqTraceOutputMessage(conn, conn->inBuffer + conn->inStart, false); |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
Assert(conn->sasl); |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
if (!conn->sasl_state) |
| 613 |
{ |
| 614 |
/* |
| 615 |
* Initialize the SASL state information with all the information |
| 616 |
* gathered during the initial exchange. |
| 617 |
* |
| 618 |
* Note: Only tls-unique is supported for the moment. |
| 619 |
*/ |
| 620 |
conn->sasl_state = conn->sasl->init(conn, |
| 621 |
password, |
| 622 |
selected_mechanism); |
| 623 |
if (!conn->sasl_state) |
| 624 |
goto oom_error; |
| 625 |
} |
| 626 |
else |
| 627 |
{ |
| 628 |
/* |
| 629 |
* This is only possible if we're returning from an async loop. |
| 630 |
* Disconnect it now. |
| 631 |
*/ |
| 632 |
Assert(conn->async_auth); |
| 633 |
conn->async_auth = NULL; |
| 634 |
} |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
/* Get the mechanism-specific Initial Client Response, if any */ |
| 637 |
status = conn->sasl->exchange(conn->sasl_state, false, |
| 638 |
NULL, -1, |
| 639 |
&initialresponse, &initialresponselen); |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
if (status == SASL_FAILED) |
| 642 |
goto error; |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
if (status == SASL_ASYNC) |
| 645 |
{ |
| 646 |
/* |
| 647 |
* The mechanism should have set up the necessary callbacks; all we |
| 648 |
* need to do is signal the caller. |
| 649 |
* |
| 650 |
* In non-assertion builds, this postcondition is enforced at time of |
| 651 |
* use in PQconnectPoll(). |
| 652 |
*/ |
| 653 |
Assert(conn->async_auth); |
| 654 |
Assert(conn->cleanup_async_auth); |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
*async = true; |
| 657 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 658 |
} |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
/* |
| 661 |
* Build a SASLInitialResponse message, and send it. |
| 662 |
*/ |
| 663 |
if (pqPutMsgStart(PqMsg_SASLInitialResponse, conn)) |
| 664 |
goto error; |
| 665 |
if (pqPuts(selected_mechanism, conn)) |
| 666 |
goto error; |
| 667 |
if (initialresponse) |
| 668 |
{ |
| 669 |
if (pqPutInt(initialresponselen, 4, conn)) |
| 670 |
goto error; |
| 671 |
if (pqPutnchar(initialresponse, initialresponselen, conn)) |
| 672 |
goto error; |
| 673 |
} |
| 674 |
conn->current_auth_response = AUTH_RESPONSE_SASL_INITIAL; |
| 675 |
if (pqPutMsgEnd(conn)) |
| 676 |
goto error; |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
if (pqFlush(conn)) |
| 679 |
goto error; |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
termPQExpBuffer(&mechanism_buf); |
| 682 |
free(initialresponse); |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
error: |
| 687 |
termPQExpBuffer(&mechanism_buf); |
| 688 |
free(initialresponse); |
| 689 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
oom_error: |
| 692 |
termPQExpBuffer(&mechanism_buf); |
| 693 |
free(initialresponse); |
| 694 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 695 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 696 |
} |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
/* |
| 699 |
* Exchange a message for SASL communication protocol with the backend. |
| 700 |
* This should be used after calling pg_SASL_init to set up the status of |
| 701 |
* the protocol. |
| 702 |
*/ |
| 703 |
static int |
| 704 |
pg_SASL_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen, bool final, bool *async) |
| 705 |
{ |
| 706 |
char *output; |
| 707 |
int outputlen; |
| 708 |
int res; |
| 709 |
char *challenge; |
| 710 |
SASLStatus status; |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
/* Read the SASL challenge from the AuthenticationSASLContinue message. */ |
| 713 |
challenge = malloc(payloadlen + 1); |
| 714 |
if (!challenge) |
| 715 |
{ |
| 716 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory allocating SASL buffer (%d)", |
| 717 |
payloadlen); |
| 718 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 719 |
} |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
if (pqGetnchar(challenge, payloadlen, conn)) |
| 722 |
{ |
| 723 |
free(challenge); |
| 724 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 725 |
} |
| 726 |
|
| 727 |
/* finished parsing, trace server-to-client message */ |
| 728 |
if (conn->Pfdebug) |
| 729 |
pqTraceOutputMessage(conn, conn->inBuffer + conn->inStart, false); |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
/* For safety and convenience, ensure the buffer is NULL-terminated. */ |
| 732 |
challenge[payloadlen] = '\0'; |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
status = conn->sasl->exchange(conn->sasl_state, final, |
| 735 |
challenge, payloadlen, |
| 736 |
&output, &outputlen); |
| 737 |
free(challenge); /* don't need the input anymore */ |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
if (status == SASL_ASYNC) |
| 740 |
{ |
| 741 |
/* |
| 742 |
* The mechanism should have set up the necessary callbacks; all we |
| 743 |
* need to do is signal the caller. |
| 744 |
*/ |
| 745 |
*async = true; |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
/* |
| 748 |
* The mechanism may optionally generate some output to send before |
| 749 |
* switching over to async auth, so continue onwards. |
| 750 |
*/ |
| 751 |
} |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
if (final && status == SASL_CONTINUE) |
| 754 |
{ |
| 755 |
if (outputlen != 0) |
| 756 |
free(output); |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "AuthenticationSASLFinal received from server, but SASL authentication was not completed"); |
| 759 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 760 |
} |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
/* |
| 763 |
* If the exchange is not completed yet, we need to make sure that the |
| 764 |
* SASL mechanism has generated a message to send back. |
| 765 |
*/ |
| 766 |
if (output == NULL && status == SASL_CONTINUE) |
| 767 |
{ |
| 768 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "no client response found after SASL exchange success"); |
| 769 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
/* |
| 773 |
* SASL allows zero-length responses, so this check uses "output" and not |
| 774 |
* "outputlen" to allow the case of an empty message. |
| 775 |
*/ |
| 776 |
if (output) |
| 777 |
{ |
| 778 |
/* |
| 779 |
* Send the SASL response to the server. |
| 780 |
*/ |
| 781 |
conn->current_auth_response = AUTH_RESPONSE_SASL; |
| 782 |
res = pqPacketSend(conn, PqMsg_SASLResponse, output, outputlen); |
| 783 |
free(output); |
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
if (res != STATUS_OK) |
| 786 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 787 |
} |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
if (status == SASL_FAILED) |
| 790 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 793 |
} |
| 794 |
|
| 795 |
static int |
| 796 |
pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq) |
| 797 |
{ |
| 798 |
int ret; |
| 799 |
char *crypt_pwd = NULL; |
| 800 |
const char *pwd_to_send; |
| 801 |
uint8 md5Salt[4]; |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
/* Read the salt from the AuthenticationMD5Password message. */ |
| 804 |
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5) |
| 805 |
{ |
| 806 |
if (pqGetnchar(md5Salt, 4, conn)) |
| 807 |
return STATUS_ERROR; /* shouldn't happen */ |
| 808 |
} |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
/* finished parsing, trace server-to-client message */ |
| 811 |
if (conn->Pfdebug) |
| 812 |
pqTraceOutputMessage(conn, conn->inBuffer + conn->inStart, false); |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
/* Encrypt the password if needed. */ |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
switch (areq) |
| 817 |
{ |
| 818 |
case AUTH_REQ_MD5: |
| 819 |
{ |
| 820 |
char *crypt_pwd2; |
| 821 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
/* Allocate enough space for two MD5 hashes */ |
| 824 |
crypt_pwd = malloc(2 * (MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1)); |
| 825 |
if (!crypt_pwd) |
| 826 |
{ |
| 827 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 828 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 829 |
} |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
crypt_pwd2 = crypt_pwd + MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1; |
| 832 |
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, (uint8 *) conn->pguser, |
| 833 |
strlen(conn->pguser), crypt_pwd2, |
| 834 |
&errstr)) |
| 835 |
{ |
| 836 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encrypt password: %s", errstr); |
| 837 |
free(crypt_pwd); |
| 838 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 839 |
} |
| 840 |
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), md5Salt, |
| 841 |
4, crypt_pwd, &errstr)) |
| 842 |
{ |
| 843 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encrypt password: %s", errstr); |
| 844 |
free(crypt_pwd); |
| 845 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 846 |
} |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
pwd_to_send = crypt_pwd; |
| 849 |
break; |
| 850 |
} |
| 851 |
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: |
| 852 |
pwd_to_send = password; |
| 853 |
break; |
| 854 |
default: |
| 855 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 856 |
} |
| 857 |
conn->current_auth_response = AUTH_RESPONSE_PASSWORD; |
| 858 |
ret = pqPacketSend(conn, PqMsg_PasswordMessage, |
| 859 |
pwd_to_send, strlen(pwd_to_send) + 1); |
| 860 |
free(crypt_pwd); |
| 861 |
return ret; |
| 862 |
} |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
/* |
| 865 |
* Translate a disallowed AuthRequest code into an error message. |
| 866 |
*/ |
| 867 |
static const char * |
| 868 |
auth_method_description(AuthRequest areq) |
| 869 |
{ |
| 870 |
switch (areq) |
| 871 |
{ |
| 872 |
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: |
| 873 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested a cleartext password"); |
| 874 |
case AUTH_REQ_MD5: |
| 875 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested a hashed password"); |
| 876 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS: |
| 877 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: |
| 878 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested GSSAPI authentication"); |
| 879 |
case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: |
| 880 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested SSPI authentication"); |
| 881 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL: |
| 882 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: |
| 883 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: |
| 884 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested SASL authentication"); |
| 885 |
} |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
return libpq_gettext("server requested an unknown authentication type"); |
| 888 |
} |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
/* |
| 891 |
* Convenience macro for checking the allowed_auth_methods bitmask. Caller |
| 892 |
* must ensure that type is not greater than 31 (high bit of the bitmask). |
| 893 |
*/ |
| 894 |
#define auth_method_allowed(conn, type) \ |
| 895 |
(((conn)->allowed_auth_methods & (1 << (type))) != 0) |
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
/* |
| 898 |
* Verify that the authentication request is expected, given the connection |
| 899 |
* parameters. This is especially important when the client wishes to |
| 900 |
* authenticate the server before any sensitive information is exchanged. |
| 901 |
*/ |
| 902 |
static bool |
| 903 |
check_expected_areq(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn) |
| 904 |
{ |
| 905 |
bool result = true; |
| 906 |
const char *reason = NULL; |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
StaticAssertDecl((sizeof(conn->allowed_auth_methods) * CHAR_BIT) > AUTH_REQ_MAX, |
| 909 |
"AUTH_REQ_MAX overflows the allowed_auth_methods bitmask"); |
| 910 |
|
| 911 |
if (conn->sslcertmode[0] == 'r' /* require */ |
| 912 |
&& areq == AUTH_REQ_OK) |
| 913 |
{ |
| 914 |
/* |
| 915 |
* Trade off a little bit of complexity to try to get these error |
| 916 |
* messages as precise as possible. |
| 917 |
*/ |
| 918 |
if (!conn->ssl_cert_requested) |
| 919 |
{ |
| 920 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "server did not request an SSL certificate"); |
| 921 |
return false; |
| 922 |
} |
| 923 |
else if (!conn->ssl_cert_sent) |
| 924 |
{ |
| 925 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "server accepted connection without a valid SSL certificate"); |
| 926 |
return false; |
| 927 |
} |
| 928 |
} |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
/* |
| 931 |
* If the user required a specific auth method, or specified an allowed |
| 932 |
* set, then reject all others here, and make sure the server actually |
| 933 |
* completes an authentication exchange. |
| 934 |
*/ |
| 935 |
if (conn->require_auth) |
| 936 |
{ |
| 937 |
switch (areq) |
| 938 |
{ |
| 939 |
case AUTH_REQ_OK: |
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
/* |
| 942 |
* Check to make sure we've actually finished our exchange (or |
| 943 |
* else that the user has allowed an authentication-less |
| 944 |
* connection). |
| 945 |
* |
| 946 |
* If the user has allowed both SCRAM and unauthenticated |
| 947 |
* (trust) connections, then this check will silently accept |
| 948 |
* partial SCRAM exchanges, where a misbehaving server does |
| 949 |
* not provide its verifier before sending an OK. This is |
| 950 |
* consistent with historical behavior, but it may be a point |
| 951 |
* to revisit in the future, since it could allow a server |
| 952 |
* that doesn't know the user's password to silently harvest |
| 953 |
* material for a brute force attack. |
| 954 |
*/ |
| 955 |
if (!conn->auth_required || conn->client_finished_auth) |
| 956 |
break; |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
/* |
| 959 |
* No explicit authentication request was made by the server |
| 960 |
* -- or perhaps it was made and not completed, in the case of |
| 961 |
* SCRAM -- but there is one special case to check. If the |
| 962 |
* user allowed "gss", then a GSS-encrypted channel also |
| 963 |
* satisfies the check. |
| 964 |
*/ |
| 965 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 966 |
if (auth_method_allowed(conn, AUTH_REQ_GSS) && conn->gssenc) |
| 967 |
{ |
| 968 |
/* |
| 969 |
* If implicit GSS auth has already been performed via GSS |
| 970 |
* encryption, we don't need to have performed an |
| 971 |
* AUTH_REQ_GSS exchange. This allows require_auth=gss to |
| 972 |
* be combined with gssencmode, since there won't be an |
| 973 |
* explicit authentication request in that case. |
| 974 |
*/ |
| 975 |
} |
| 976 |
else |
| 977 |
#endif |
| 978 |
{ |
| 979 |
reason = libpq_gettext("server did not complete authentication"); |
| 980 |
result = false; |
| 981 |
} |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
break; |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: |
| 986 |
case AUTH_REQ_MD5: |
| 987 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS: |
| 988 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: |
| 989 |
case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: |
| 990 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL: |
| 991 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: |
| 992 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
/* |
| 995 |
* We don't handle these with the default case, to avoid |
| 996 |
* bit-shifting past the end of the allowed_auth_methods mask |
| 997 |
* if the server sends an unexpected AuthRequest. |
| 998 |
*/ |
| 999 |
result = auth_method_allowed(conn, areq); |
| 1000 |
break; |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
default: |
| 1003 |
result = false; |
| 1004 |
break; |
| 1005 |
} |
| 1006 |
} |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
if (!result) |
| 1009 |
{ |
| 1010 |
if (!reason) |
| 1011 |
reason = auth_method_description(areq); |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "authentication method requirement \"%s\" failed: %s", |
| 1014 |
conn->require_auth, reason); |
| 1015 |
return result; |
| 1016 |
} |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
/* |
| 1019 |
* When channel_binding=require, we must protect against two cases: (1) we |
| 1020 |
* must not respond to non-SASL authentication requests, which might leak |
| 1021 |
* information such as the client's password; and (2) even if we receive |
| 1022 |
* AUTH_REQ_OK, we still must ensure that channel binding has happened in |
| 1023 |
* order to authenticate the server. |
| 1024 |
*/ |
| 1025 |
if (conn->channel_binding[0] == 'r' /* require */ ) |
| 1026 |
{ |
| 1027 |
switch (areq) |
| 1028 |
{ |
| 1029 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL: |
| 1030 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: |
| 1031 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: |
| 1032 |
break; |
| 1033 |
case AUTH_REQ_OK: |
| 1034 |
if (!conn->sasl || !conn->sasl->channel_bound(conn->sasl_state)) |
| 1035 |
{ |
| 1036 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding"); |
| 1037 |
result = false; |
| 1038 |
} |
| 1039 |
break; |
| 1040 |
default: |
| 1041 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request"); |
| 1042 |
result = false; |
| 1043 |
break; |
| 1044 |
} |
| 1045 |
} |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
return result; |
| 1048 |
} |
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
/* |
| 1051 |
* pg_fe_sendauth |
| 1052 |
* client demux routine for processing an authentication request |
| 1053 |
* |
| 1054 |
* The server has sent us an authentication challenge (or OK). Send an |
| 1055 |
* appropriate response. The caller has ensured that the whole message is |
| 1056 |
* now in the input buffer, and has already read the type and length of |
| 1057 |
* it. We are responsible for reading any remaining extra data, specific |
| 1058 |
* to the authentication method. 'payloadlen' is the remaining length in |
| 1059 |
* the message. |
| 1060 |
* |
| 1061 |
* If *async is set to true on return, the client doesn't yet have enough |
| 1062 |
* information to respond, and the caller must temporarily switch to |
| 1063 |
* conn->async_auth() to continue driving the exchange. |
| 1064 |
*/ |
| 1065 |
int |
| 1066 |
pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, int payloadlen, PGconn *conn, bool *async) |
| 1067 |
{ |
| 1068 |
int oldmsglen; |
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 |
*async = false; |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
if (!check_expected_areq(areq, conn)) |
| 1073 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
switch (areq) |
| 1076 |
{ |
| 1077 |
case AUTH_REQ_OK: |
| 1078 |
break; |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
case AUTH_REQ_KRB4: |
| 1081 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "Kerberos 4 authentication not supported"); |
| 1082 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
case AUTH_REQ_KRB5: |
| 1085 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "Kerberos 5 authentication not supported"); |
| 1086 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1089 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS: |
| 1090 |
#if !defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1091 |
/* no native SSPI, so use GSSAPI library for it */ |
| 1092 |
case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: |
| 1093 |
#endif |
| 1094 |
{ |
| 1095 |
int r; |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
pglock_thread(); |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
/* |
| 1100 |
* If we have both GSS and SSPI support compiled in, use SSPI |
| 1101 |
* support by default. This is overridable by a connection |
| 1102 |
* string parameter. Note that when using SSPI we still leave |
| 1103 |
* the negotiate parameter off, since we want SSPI to use the |
| 1104 |
* GSSAPI kerberos protocol. For actual SSPI negotiate |
| 1105 |
* protocol, we use AUTH_REQ_SSPI. |
| 1106 |
*/ |
| 1107 |
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) && defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1108 |
if (conn->gsslib && (pg_strcasecmp(conn->gsslib, "gssapi") == 0)) |
| 1109 |
r = pg_GSS_startup(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1110 |
else |
| 1111 |
r = pg_SSPI_startup(conn, 0, payloadlen); |
| 1112 |
#elif defined(ENABLE_GSS) && !defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1113 |
r = pg_GSS_startup(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1114 |
#elif !defined(ENABLE_GSS) && defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1115 |
r = pg_SSPI_startup(conn, 0, payloadlen); |
| 1116 |
#endif |
| 1117 |
if (r != STATUS_OK) |
| 1118 |
{ |
| 1119 |
/* Error message already filled in. */ |
| 1120 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1121 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1122 |
} |
| 1123 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1124 |
} |
| 1125 |
break; |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: |
| 1128 |
{ |
| 1129 |
int r; |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
pglock_thread(); |
| 1132 |
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) && defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1133 |
if (conn->usesspi) |
| 1134 |
r = pg_SSPI_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1135 |
else |
| 1136 |
r = pg_GSS_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1137 |
#elif defined(ENABLE_GSS) && !defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1138 |
r = pg_GSS_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1139 |
#elif !defined(ENABLE_GSS) && defined(ENABLE_SSPI) |
| 1140 |
r = pg_SSPI_continue(conn, payloadlen); |
| 1141 |
#endif |
| 1142 |
if (r != STATUS_OK) |
| 1143 |
{ |
| 1144 |
/* Error message already filled in. */ |
| 1145 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1146 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1147 |
} |
| 1148 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1149 |
} |
| 1150 |
break; |
| 1151 |
#else /* defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI) */ |
| 1152 |
/* No GSSAPI *or* SSPI support */ |
| 1153 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS: |
| 1154 |
case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT: |
| 1155 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "GSSAPI authentication not supported"); |
| 1156 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1157 |
#endif /* defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI) */ |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI |
| 1160 |
case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: |
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
/* |
| 1163 |
* SSPI has its own startup message so libpq can decide which |
| 1164 |
* method to use. Indicate to pg_SSPI_startup that we want SSPI |
| 1165 |
* negotiation instead of Kerberos. |
| 1166 |
*/ |
| 1167 |
pglock_thread(); |
| 1168 |
if (pg_SSPI_startup(conn, 1, payloadlen) != STATUS_OK) |
| 1169 |
{ |
| 1170 |
/* Error message already filled in. */ |
| 1171 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1172 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1173 |
} |
| 1174 |
pgunlock_thread(); |
| 1175 |
break; |
| 1176 |
#else |
| 1177 |
|
| 1178 |
/* |
| 1179 |
* No SSPI support. However, if we have GSSAPI but not SSPI |
| 1180 |
* support, AUTH_REQ_SSPI will have been handled in the codepath |
| 1181 |
* for AUTH_REQ_GSS above, so don't duplicate the case label in |
| 1182 |
* that case. |
| 1183 |
*/ |
| 1184 |
#if !defined(ENABLE_GSS) |
| 1185 |
case AUTH_REQ_SSPI: |
| 1186 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "SSPI authentication not supported"); |
| 1187 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1188 |
#endif /* !define(ENABLE_GSS) */ |
| 1189 |
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */ |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
|
| 1192 |
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT: |
| 1193 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "Crypt authentication not supported"); |
| 1194 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 |
case AUTH_REQ_MD5: |
| 1197 |
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD: |
| 1198 |
{ |
| 1199 |
char *password; |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
conn->password_needed = true; |
| 1202 |
password = conn->connhost[conn->whichhost].password; |
| 1203 |
if (password == NULL) |
| 1204 |
password = conn->pgpass; |
| 1205 |
if (password == NULL || password[0] == '\0') |
| 1206 |
{ |
| 1207 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 1208 |
PQnoPasswordSupplied); |
| 1209 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1210 |
} |
| 1211 |
if (pg_password_sendauth(conn, password, areq) != STATUS_OK) |
| 1212 |
{ |
| 1213 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 1214 |
"fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n"); |
| 1215 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1216 |
} |
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
/* We expect no further authentication requests. */ |
| 1219 |
conn->client_finished_auth = true; |
| 1220 |
break; |
| 1221 |
} |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL: |
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
/* |
| 1226 |
* The request contains the name (as assigned by IANA) of the |
| 1227 |
* authentication mechanism. |
| 1228 |
*/ |
| 1229 |
if (pg_SASL_init(conn, payloadlen, async) != STATUS_OK) |
| 1230 |
{ |
| 1231 |
/* pg_SASL_init already set the error message */ |
| 1232 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1233 |
} |
| 1234 |
break; |
| 1235 |
|
| 1236 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT: |
| 1237 |
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN: |
| 1238 |
{ |
| 1239 |
bool final = false; |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
if (conn->sasl_state == NULL) |
| 1242 |
{ |
| 1243 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 1244 |
"fe_sendauth: invalid authentication request from server: AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT without AUTH_REQ_SASL\n"); |
| 1245 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1246 |
} |
| 1247 |
oldmsglen = conn->errorMessage.len; |
| 1248 |
|
| 1249 |
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN) |
| 1250 |
final = true; |
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
if (pg_SASL_continue(conn, payloadlen, final, async) != STATUS_OK) |
| 1253 |
{ |
| 1254 |
/* |
| 1255 |
* Append a generic error message unless pg_SASL_continue |
| 1256 |
* did set a more specific one already. |
| 1257 |
*/ |
| 1258 |
if (conn->errorMessage.len == oldmsglen) |
| 1259 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 1260 |
"fe_sendauth: error in SASL authentication\n"); |
| 1261 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1262 |
} |
| 1263 |
break; |
| 1264 |
} |
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
default: |
| 1267 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "authentication method %u not supported", areq); |
| 1268 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1269 |
} |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 1272 |
} |
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
/* |
| 1276 |
* pg_fe_getusername |
| 1277 |
* |
| 1278 |
* Returns a pointer to malloc'd space containing the name of the |
| 1279 |
* specified user_id. If there is an error, return NULL, and append |
| 1280 |
* a suitable error message to *errorMessage if that's not NULL. |
| 1281 |
* |
| 1282 |
* Caution: on Windows, the user_id argument is ignored, and we always |
| 1283 |
* fetch the current user's name. |
| 1284 |
*/ |
| 1285 |
char * |
| 1286 |
pg_fe_getusername(uid_t user_id, PQExpBuffer errorMessage) |
| 1287 |
{ |
| 1288 |
char *result = NULL; |
| 1289 |
const char *name = NULL; |
| 1290 |
|
| 1291 |
#ifdef WIN32 |
| 1292 |
/* Microsoft recommends buffer size of UNLEN+1, where UNLEN = 256 */ |
| 1293 |
char username[256 + 1]; |
| 1294 |
DWORD namesize = sizeof(username); |
| 1295 |
#else |
| 1296 |
struct passwd pwbuf; |
| 1297 |
struct passwd *pw = NULL; |
| 1298 |
char buf[1024]; |
| 1299 |
int rc; |
| 1300 |
#endif |
| 1301 |
|
| 1302 |
#ifdef WIN32 |
| 1303 |
if (GetUserName(username, &namesize)) |
| 1304 |
name = username; |
| 1305 |
else if (errorMessage) |
| 1306 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, |
| 1307 |
"user name lookup failure: error code %lu", |
| 1308 |
GetLastError()); |
| 1309 |
#else |
| 1310 |
rc = getpwuid_r(user_id, &pwbuf, buf, sizeof buf, &pw); |
| 1311 |
if (rc != 0) |
| 1312 |
{ |
| 1313 |
errno = rc; |
| 1314 |
if (errorMessage) |
| 1315 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, "could not look up local user ID %ld: %m", (long) user_id); |
| 1316 |
} |
| 1317 |
else if (!pw) |
| 1318 |
{ |
| 1319 |
if (errorMessage) |
| 1320 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, "local user with ID %ld does not exist", (long) user_id); |
| 1321 |
} |
| 1322 |
else |
| 1323 |
name = pw->pw_name; |
| 1324 |
#endif |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
if (name) |
| 1327 |
{ |
| 1328 |
result = strdup(name); |
| 1329 |
if (result == NULL && errorMessage) |
| 1330 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, "out of memory"); |
| 1331 |
} |
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
return result; |
| 1334 |
} |
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
/* |
| 1337 |
* pg_fe_getauthname |
| 1338 |
* |
| 1339 |
* Returns a pointer to malloc'd space containing whatever name the user |
| 1340 |
* has authenticated to the system. If there is an error, return NULL, |
| 1341 |
* and append a suitable error message to *errorMessage if that's not NULL. |
| 1342 |
*/ |
| 1343 |
char * |
| 1344 |
pg_fe_getauthname(PQExpBuffer errorMessage) |
| 1345 |
{ |
| 1346 |
#ifdef WIN32 |
| 1347 |
return pg_fe_getusername(0, errorMessage); |
| 1348 |
#else |
| 1349 |
return pg_fe_getusername(geteuid(), errorMessage); |
| 1350 |
#endif |
| 1351 |
} |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
|
| 1354 |
/* |
| 1355 |
* PQencryptPassword -- exported routine to encrypt a password with MD5 |
| 1356 |
* |
| 1357 |
* This function is equivalent to calling PQencryptPasswordConn with |
| 1358 |
* "md5" as the encryption method, except that this doesn't require |
| 1359 |
* a connection object. This function is deprecated, use |
| 1360 |
* PQencryptPasswordConn instead. |
| 1361 |
*/ |
| 1362 |
char * |
| 1363 |
PQencryptPassword(const char *passwd, const char *user) |
| 1364 |
{ |
| 1365 |
char *crypt_pwd; |
| 1366 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 1367 |
|
| 1368 |
crypt_pwd = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1); |
| 1369 |
if (!crypt_pwd) |
| 1370 |
return NULL; |
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 |
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(passwd, (uint8 *) user, strlen(user), crypt_pwd, &errstr)) |
| 1373 |
{ |
| 1374 |
free(crypt_pwd); |
| 1375 |
return NULL; |
| 1376 |
} |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
return crypt_pwd; |
| 1379 |
} |
| 1380 |
|
| 1381 |
/* |
| 1382 |
* PQencryptPasswordConn -- exported routine to encrypt a password |
| 1383 |
* |
| 1384 |
* This is intended to be used by client applications that wish to send |
| 1385 |
* commands like ALTER USER joe PASSWORD 'pwd'. The password need not |
| 1386 |
* be sent in cleartext if it is encrypted on the client side. This is |
| 1387 |
* good because it ensures the cleartext password won't end up in logs, |
| 1388 |
* pg_stat displays, etc. We export the function so that clients won't |
| 1389 |
* be dependent on low-level details like whether the encryption is MD5 |
| 1390 |
* or something else. |
| 1391 |
* |
| 1392 |
* Arguments are a connection object, the cleartext password, the SQL |
| 1393 |
* name of the user it is for, and a string indicating the algorithm to |
| 1394 |
* use for encrypting the password. If algorithm is NULL, this queries |
| 1395 |
* the server for the current 'password_encryption' value. If you wish |
| 1396 |
* to avoid that, e.g. to avoid blocking, you can execute |
| 1397 |
* 'show password_encryption' yourself before calling this function, and |
| 1398 |
* pass it as the algorithm. |
| 1399 |
* |
| 1400 |
* Return value is a malloc'd string. The client may assume the string |
| 1401 |
* doesn't contain any special characters that would require escaping. |
| 1402 |
* On error, an error message is stored in the connection object, and |
| 1403 |
* returns NULL. |
| 1404 |
*/ |
| 1405 |
char * |
| 1406 |
PQencryptPasswordConn(PGconn *conn, const char *passwd, const char *user, |
| 1407 |
const char *algorithm) |
| 1408 |
{ |
| 1409 |
#define MAX_ALGORITHM_NAME_LEN 50 |
| 1410 |
char algobuf[MAX_ALGORITHM_NAME_LEN + 1]; |
| 1411 |
char *crypt_pwd = NULL; |
| 1412 |
|
| 1413 |
if (!conn) |
| 1414 |
return NULL; |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
pqClearConnErrorState(conn); |
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
/* If no algorithm was given, ask the server. */ |
| 1419 |
if (algorithm == NULL) |
| 1420 |
{ |
| 1421 |
PGresult *res; |
| 1422 |
char *val; |
| 1423 |
|
| 1424 |
res = PQexec(conn, "show password_encryption"); |
| 1425 |
if (res == NULL) |
| 1426 |
{ |
| 1427 |
/* PQexec() should've set conn->errorMessage already */ |
| 1428 |
return NULL; |
| 1429 |
} |
| 1430 |
if (PQresultStatus(res) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK) |
| 1431 |
{ |
| 1432 |
/* PQexec() should've set conn->errorMessage already */ |
| 1433 |
PQclear(res); |
| 1434 |
return NULL; |
| 1435 |
} |
| 1436 |
if (PQntuples(res) != 1 || PQnfields(res) != 1) |
| 1437 |
{ |
| 1438 |
PQclear(res); |
| 1439 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "unexpected shape of result set returned for SHOW"); |
| 1440 |
return NULL; |
| 1441 |
} |
| 1442 |
val = PQgetvalue(res, 0, 0); |
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 |
if (strlen(val) > MAX_ALGORITHM_NAME_LEN) |
| 1445 |
{ |
| 1446 |
PQclear(res); |
| 1447 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "\"password_encryption\" value too long"); |
| 1448 |
return NULL; |
| 1449 |
} |
| 1450 |
strcpy(algobuf, val); |
| 1451 |
PQclear(res); |
| 1452 |
|
| 1453 |
algorithm = algobuf; |
| 1454 |
} |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
/* |
| 1457 |
* Also accept "on" and "off" as aliases for "md5", because |
| 1458 |
* password_encryption was a boolean before PostgreSQL 10. We refuse to |
| 1459 |
* send the password in plaintext even if it was "off". |
| 1460 |
*/ |
| 1461 |
if (strcmp(algorithm, "on") == 0 || |
| 1462 |
strcmp(algorithm, "off") == 0) |
| 1463 |
algorithm = "md5"; |
| 1464 |
|
| 1465 |
/* |
| 1466 |
* Ok, now we know what algorithm to use |
| 1467 |
*/ |
| 1468 |
if (strcmp(algorithm, "scram-sha-256") == 0) |
| 1469 |
{ |
| 1470 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
crypt_pwd = pg_fe_scram_build_secret(passwd, |
| 1473 |
conn->scram_sha_256_iterations, |
| 1474 |
&errstr); |
| 1475 |
if (!crypt_pwd) |
| 1476 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encrypt password: %s", errstr); |
| 1477 |
} |
| 1478 |
else if (strcmp(algorithm, "md5") == 0) |
| 1479 |
{ |
| 1480 |
crypt_pwd = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1); |
| 1481 |
if (crypt_pwd) |
| 1482 |
{ |
| 1483 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 1484 |
|
| 1485 |
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(passwd, (uint8 *) user, strlen(user), crypt_pwd, &errstr)) |
| 1486 |
{ |
| 1487 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encrypt password: %s", errstr); |
| 1488 |
free(crypt_pwd); |
| 1489 |
crypt_pwd = NULL; |
| 1490 |
} |
| 1491 |
} |
| 1492 |
else |
| 1493 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 1494 |
} |
| 1495 |
else |
| 1496 |
{ |
| 1497 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "unrecognized password encryption algorithm \"%s\"", |
| 1498 |
algorithm); |
| 1499 |
return NULL; |
| 1500 |
} |
| 1501 |
|
| 1502 |
return crypt_pwd; |
| 1503 |
} |
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
/* |
| 1506 |
* PQchangePassword -- exported routine to change a password |
| 1507 |
* |
| 1508 |
* This is intended to be used by client applications that wish to |
| 1509 |
* change the password for a user. The password is not sent in |
| 1510 |
* cleartext because it is encrypted on the client side. This is |
| 1511 |
* good because it ensures the cleartext password is never known by |
| 1512 |
* the server, and therefore won't end up in logs, pg_stat displays, |
| 1513 |
* etc. The password encryption is performed by PQencryptPasswordConn(), |
| 1514 |
* which is passed a NULL for the algorithm argument. Hence encryption |
| 1515 |
* is done according to the server's password_encryption |
| 1516 |
* setting. We export the function so that clients won't be dependent |
| 1517 |
* on the implementation specific details with respect to how the |
| 1518 |
* server changes passwords. |
| 1519 |
* |
| 1520 |
* Arguments are a connection object, the SQL name of the target user, |
| 1521 |
* and the cleartext password. |
| 1522 |
* |
| 1523 |
* Return value is the PGresult of the executed ALTER USER statement |
| 1524 |
* or NULL if we never get there. The caller is responsible to PQclear() |
| 1525 |
* the returned PGresult. |
| 1526 |
* |
| 1527 |
* PQresultStatus() should be called to check the return value for errors, |
| 1528 |
* and PQerrorMessage() used to get more information about such errors. |
| 1529 |
*/ |
| 1530 |
PGresult * |
| 1531 |
PQchangePassword(PGconn *conn, const char *user, const char *passwd) |
| 1532 |
{ |
| 1533 |
char *encrypted_password = PQencryptPasswordConn(conn, passwd, |
| 1534 |
user, NULL); |
| 1535 |
|
| 1536 |
if (!encrypted_password) |
| 1537 |
{ |
| 1538 |
/* PQencryptPasswordConn() already registered the error */ |
| 1539 |
return NULL; |
| 1540 |
} |
| 1541 |
else |
| 1542 |
{ |
| 1543 |
char *fmtpw = PQescapeLiteral(conn, encrypted_password, |
| 1544 |
strlen(encrypted_password)); |
| 1545 |
|
| 1546 |
/* no longer needed, so clean up now */ |
| 1547 |
PQfreemem(encrypted_password); |
| 1548 |
|
| 1549 |
if (!fmtpw) |
| 1550 |
{ |
| 1551 |
/* PQescapeLiteral() already registered the error */ |
| 1552 |
return NULL; |
| 1553 |
} |
| 1554 |
else |
| 1555 |
{ |
| 1556 |
char *fmtuser = PQescapeIdentifier(conn, user, strlen(user)); |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
if (!fmtuser) |
| 1559 |
{ |
| 1560 |
/* PQescapeIdentifier() already registered the error */ |
| 1561 |
PQfreemem(fmtpw); |
| 1562 |
return NULL; |
| 1563 |
} |
| 1564 |
else |
| 1565 |
{ |
| 1566 |
PQExpBufferData buf; |
| 1567 |
PGresult *res; |
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
initPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 1570 |
printfPQExpBuffer(&buf, "ALTER USER %s PASSWORD %s", |
| 1571 |
fmtuser, fmtpw); |
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
res = PQexec(conn, buf.data); |
| 1574 |
|
| 1575 |
/* clean up */ |
| 1576 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 1577 |
PQfreemem(fmtuser); |
| 1578 |
PQfreemem(fmtpw); |
| 1579 |
|
| 1580 |
return res; |
| 1581 |
} |
| 1582 |
} |
| 1583 |
} |
| 1584 |
} |
| 1585 |
|
| 1586 |
PQauthDataHook_type PQauthDataHook = PQdefaultAuthDataHook; |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
PQauthDataHook_type |
| 1589 |
PQgetAuthDataHook(void) |
| 1590 |
{ |
| 1591 |
return PQauthDataHook; |
| 1592 |
} |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
void |
| 1595 |
PQsetAuthDataHook(PQauthDataHook_type hook) |
| 1596 |
{ |
| 1597 |
PQauthDataHook = hook ? hook : PQdefaultAuthDataHook; |
| 1598 |
} |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
int |
| 1601 |
PQdefaultAuthDataHook(PGauthData type, PGconn *conn, void *data) |
| 1602 |
{ |
| 1603 |
return 0; /* handle nothing */ |
| 1604 |
} |