| 1 |
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* fe-auth-scram.c |
| 4 |
* The front-end (client) implementation of SCRAM authentication. |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 7 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* IDENTIFICATION |
| 10 |
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c |
| 11 |
* |
| 12 |
*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 13 |
*/ |
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
#include "postgres_fe.h" |
| 16 |
|
| 17 |
#include "common/base64.h" |
| 18 |
#include "common/hmac.h" |
| 19 |
#include "common/saslprep.h" |
| 20 |
#include "common/scram-common.h" |
| 21 |
#include "fe-auth.h" |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
/* The exported SCRAM callback mechanism. */ |
| 25 |
static void *scram_init(PGconn *conn, const char *password, |
| 26 |
const char *sasl_mechanism); |
| 27 |
static SASLStatus scram_exchange(void *opaq, bool final, |
| 28 |
char *input, int inputlen, |
| 29 |
char **output, int *outputlen); |
| 30 |
static bool scram_channel_bound(void *opaq); |
| 31 |
static void scram_free(void *opaq); |
| 32 |
|
| 33 |
const pg_fe_sasl_mech pg_scram_mech = { |
| 34 |
scram_init, |
| 35 |
scram_exchange, |
| 36 |
scram_channel_bound, |
| 37 |
scram_free |
| 38 |
}; |
| 39 |
|
| 40 |
/* |
| 41 |
* Status of exchange messages used for SCRAM authentication via the |
| 42 |
* SASL protocol. |
| 43 |
*/ |
| 44 |
typedef enum |
| 45 |
{ |
| 46 |
FE_SCRAM_INIT, |
| 47 |
FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT, |
| 48 |
FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT, |
| 49 |
FE_SCRAM_FINISHED, |
| 50 |
} fe_scram_state_enum; |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
typedef struct |
| 53 |
{ |
| 54 |
fe_scram_state_enum state; |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
/* These are supplied by the user */ |
| 57 |
PGconn *conn; |
| 58 |
char *password; |
| 59 |
char *sasl_mechanism; |
| 60 |
|
| 61 |
/* State data depending on the hash type */ |
| 62 |
pg_cryptohash_type hash_type; |
| 63 |
int key_length; |
| 64 |
|
| 65 |
/* We construct these */ |
| 66 |
uint8 SaltedPassword[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 67 |
char *client_nonce; |
| 68 |
char *client_first_message_bare; |
| 69 |
char *client_final_message_without_proof; |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
/* These come from the server-first message */ |
| 72 |
char *server_first_message; |
| 73 |
uint8 *salt; |
| 74 |
int saltlen; |
| 75 |
int iterations; |
| 76 |
char *nonce; |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
/* These come from the server-final message */ |
| 79 |
char *server_final_message; |
| 80 |
uint8 ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 81 |
} fe_scram_state; |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input); |
| 84 |
static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input); |
| 85 |
static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state); |
| 86 |
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state); |
| 87 |
static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match, |
| 88 |
const char **errstr); |
| 89 |
static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, |
| 90 |
const char *client_final_message_without_proof, |
| 91 |
uint8 *result, const char **errstr); |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
/* |
| 94 |
* Initialize SCRAM exchange status. |
| 95 |
*/ |
| 96 |
static void * |
| 97 |
scram_init(PGconn *conn, |
| 98 |
const char *password, |
| 99 |
const char *sasl_mechanism) |
| 100 |
{ |
| 101 |
fe_scram_state *state; |
| 102 |
char *prep_password; |
| 103 |
pg_saslprep_rc rc; |
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
Assert(sasl_mechanism != NULL); |
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
state = (fe_scram_state *) malloc(sizeof(fe_scram_state)); |
| 108 |
if (!state) |
| 109 |
return NULL; |
| 110 |
memset(state, 0, sizeof(fe_scram_state)); |
| 111 |
state->conn = conn; |
| 112 |
state->state = FE_SCRAM_INIT; |
| 113 |
state->key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN; |
| 114 |
state->hash_type = PG_SHA256; |
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
state->sasl_mechanism = strdup(sasl_mechanism); |
| 117 |
if (!state->sasl_mechanism) |
| 118 |
{ |
| 119 |
free(state); |
| 120 |
return NULL; |
| 121 |
} |
| 122 |
|
| 123 |
if (password) |
| 124 |
{ |
| 125 |
/* Normalize the password with SASLprep, if possible */ |
| 126 |
rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password); |
| 127 |
if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM) |
| 128 |
{ |
| 129 |
free(state->sasl_mechanism); |
| 130 |
free(state); |
| 131 |
return NULL; |
| 132 |
} |
| 133 |
if (rc != SASLPREP_SUCCESS) |
| 134 |
{ |
| 135 |
prep_password = strdup(password); |
| 136 |
if (!prep_password) |
| 137 |
{ |
| 138 |
free(state->sasl_mechanism); |
| 139 |
free(state); |
| 140 |
return NULL; |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
} |
| 143 |
state->password = prep_password; |
| 144 |
} |
| 145 |
|
| 146 |
return state; |
| 147 |
} |
| 148 |
|
| 149 |
/* |
| 150 |
* Return true if channel binding was employed and the SCRAM exchange |
| 151 |
* completed. This should be used after a successful exchange to determine |
| 152 |
* whether the server authenticated itself to the client. |
| 153 |
* |
| 154 |
* Note that the caller must also ensure that the exchange was actually |
| 155 |
* successful. |
| 156 |
*/ |
| 157 |
static bool |
| 158 |
scram_channel_bound(void *opaq) |
| 159 |
{ |
| 160 |
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq; |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
/* no SCRAM exchange done */ |
| 163 |
if (state == NULL) |
| 164 |
return false; |
| 165 |
|
| 166 |
/* SCRAM exchange not completed */ |
| 167 |
if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_FINISHED) |
| 168 |
return false; |
| 169 |
|
| 170 |
/* channel binding mechanism not used */ |
| 171 |
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) != 0) |
| 172 |
return false; |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
/* all clear! */ |
| 175 |
return true; |
| 176 |
} |
| 177 |
|
| 178 |
/* |
| 179 |
* Free SCRAM exchange status |
| 180 |
*/ |
| 181 |
static void |
| 182 |
scram_free(void *opaq) |
| 183 |
{ |
| 184 |
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq; |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
free(state->password); |
| 187 |
free(state->sasl_mechanism); |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
/* client messages */ |
| 190 |
free(state->client_nonce); |
| 191 |
free(state->client_first_message_bare); |
| 192 |
free(state->client_final_message_without_proof); |
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
/* first message from server */ |
| 195 |
free(state->server_first_message); |
| 196 |
free(state->salt); |
| 197 |
free(state->nonce); |
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
/* final message from server */ |
| 200 |
free(state->server_final_message); |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
free(state); |
| 203 |
} |
| 204 |
|
| 205 |
/* |
| 206 |
* Exchange a SCRAM message with backend. |
| 207 |
*/ |
| 208 |
static SASLStatus |
| 209 |
scram_exchange(void *opaq, bool final, |
| 210 |
char *input, int inputlen, |
| 211 |
char **output, int *outputlen) |
| 212 |
{ |
| 213 |
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq; |
| 214 |
PGconn *conn = state->conn; |
| 215 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
*output = NULL; |
| 218 |
*outputlen = 0; |
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
/* |
| 221 |
* Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input. |
| 222 |
* We can ignore inputlen after this. |
| 223 |
*/ |
| 224 |
if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_INIT) |
| 225 |
{ |
| 226 |
if (inputlen == 0) |
| 227 |
{ |
| 228 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (empty message)"); |
| 229 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 230 |
} |
| 231 |
if (inputlen != strlen(input)) |
| 232 |
{ |
| 233 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (length mismatch)"); |
| 234 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 235 |
} |
| 236 |
} |
| 237 |
|
| 238 |
switch (state->state) |
| 239 |
{ |
| 240 |
case FE_SCRAM_INIT: |
| 241 |
/* Begin the SCRAM handshake, by sending client nonce */ |
| 242 |
*output = build_client_first_message(state); |
| 243 |
if (*output == NULL) |
| 244 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 245 |
|
| 246 |
*outputlen = strlen(*output); |
| 247 |
state->state = FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT; |
| 248 |
return SASL_CONTINUE; |
| 249 |
|
| 250 |
case FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT: |
| 251 |
/* Receive salt and server nonce, send response. */ |
| 252 |
if (!read_server_first_message(state, input)) |
| 253 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 254 |
|
| 255 |
*output = build_client_final_message(state); |
| 256 |
if (*output == NULL) |
| 257 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
*outputlen = strlen(*output); |
| 260 |
state->state = FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT; |
| 261 |
return SASL_CONTINUE; |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
case FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT: |
| 264 |
{ |
| 265 |
bool match; |
| 266 |
|
| 267 |
/* Receive server signature */ |
| 268 |
if (!read_server_final_message(state, input)) |
| 269 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
/* |
| 272 |
* Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the |
| 273 |
* genuine server. |
| 274 |
*/ |
| 275 |
if (!verify_server_signature(state, &match, &errstr)) |
| 276 |
{ |
| 277 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not verify server signature: %s", errstr); |
| 278 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 279 |
} |
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
if (!match) |
| 282 |
{ |
| 283 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "incorrect server signature"); |
| 284 |
} |
| 285 |
state->state = FE_SCRAM_FINISHED; |
| 286 |
state->conn->client_finished_auth = true; |
| 287 |
return match ? SASL_COMPLETE : SASL_FAILED; |
| 288 |
} |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
default: |
| 291 |
/* shouldn't happen */ |
| 292 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "invalid SCRAM exchange state"); |
| 293 |
break; |
| 294 |
} |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
return SASL_FAILED; |
| 297 |
} |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
/* |
| 300 |
* Read value for an attribute part of a SCRAM message. |
| 301 |
* |
| 302 |
* The buffer at **input is destructively modified, and *input is |
| 303 |
* advanced over the "attr=value" string and any following comma. |
| 304 |
* |
| 305 |
* On failure, append an error message to *errorMessage and return NULL. |
| 306 |
*/ |
| 307 |
static char * |
| 308 |
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr, PQExpBuffer errorMessage) |
| 309 |
{ |
| 310 |
char *begin = *input; |
| 311 |
char *end; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
if (*begin != attr) |
| 314 |
{ |
| 315 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, |
| 316 |
"malformed SCRAM message (attribute \"%c\" expected)", |
| 317 |
attr); |
| 318 |
return NULL; |
| 319 |
} |
| 320 |
begin++; |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
if (*begin != '=') |
| 323 |
{ |
| 324 |
libpq_append_error(errorMessage, |
| 325 |
"malformed SCRAM message (expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\")", |
| 326 |
attr); |
| 327 |
return NULL; |
| 328 |
} |
| 329 |
begin++; |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
end = begin; |
| 332 |
while (*end && *end != ',') |
| 333 |
end++; |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
if (*end) |
| 336 |
{ |
| 337 |
*end = '\0'; |
| 338 |
*input = end + 1; |
| 339 |
} |
| 340 |
else |
| 341 |
*input = end; |
| 342 |
|
| 343 |
return begin; |
| 344 |
} |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
/* |
| 347 |
* Build the first exchange message sent by the client. |
| 348 |
*/ |
| 349 |
static char * |
| 350 |
build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state) |
| 351 |
{ |
| 352 |
PGconn *conn = state->conn; |
| 353 |
uint8 raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN + 1]; |
| 354 |
char *result; |
| 355 |
int channel_info_len; |
| 356 |
int encoded_len; |
| 357 |
PQExpBufferData buf; |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
/* |
| 360 |
* Generate a "raw" nonce. This is converted to ASCII-printable form by |
| 361 |
* base64-encoding it. |
| 362 |
*/ |
| 363 |
if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN)) |
| 364 |
{ |
| 365 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not generate nonce"); |
| 366 |
return NULL; |
| 367 |
} |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN); |
| 370 |
/* don't forget the zero-terminator */ |
| 371 |
state->client_nonce = malloc(encoded_len + 1); |
| 372 |
if (state->client_nonce == NULL) |
| 373 |
{ |
| 374 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 375 |
return NULL; |
| 376 |
} |
| 377 |
encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN, |
| 378 |
state->client_nonce, encoded_len); |
| 379 |
if (encoded_len < 0) |
| 380 |
{ |
| 381 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encode nonce"); |
| 382 |
return NULL; |
| 383 |
} |
| 384 |
state->client_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0'; |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
/* |
| 387 |
* Generate message. The username is left empty as the backend uses the |
| 388 |
* value provided by the startup packet. Also, as this username is not |
| 389 |
* prepared with SASLprep, the message parsing would fail if it includes |
| 390 |
* '=' or ',' characters. |
| 391 |
*/ |
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
initPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
/* |
| 396 |
* First build the gs2-header with channel binding information. |
| 397 |
*/ |
| 398 |
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0) |
| 399 |
{ |
| 400 |
Assert(conn->ssl_in_use); |
| 401 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "p=tls-server-end-point"); |
| 402 |
} |
| 403 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 404 |
else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */ |
| 405 |
conn->ssl_in_use) |
| 406 |
{ |
| 407 |
/* |
| 408 |
* Client supports channel binding, but thinks the server does not. |
| 409 |
*/ |
| 410 |
appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'y'); |
| 411 |
} |
| 412 |
#endif |
| 413 |
else |
| 414 |
{ |
| 415 |
/* |
| 416 |
* Client does not support channel binding, or has disabled it. |
| 417 |
*/ |
| 418 |
appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'n'); |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf)) |
| 422 |
goto oom_error; |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
channel_info_len = buf.len; |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",,n=,r=%s", state->client_nonce); |
| 427 |
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf)) |
| 428 |
goto oom_error; |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
/* |
| 431 |
* The first message content needs to be saved without channel binding |
| 432 |
* information. |
| 433 |
*/ |
| 434 |
state->client_first_message_bare = strdup(buf.data + channel_info_len + 2); |
| 435 |
if (!state->client_first_message_bare) |
| 436 |
goto oom_error; |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
result = strdup(buf.data); |
| 439 |
if (result == NULL) |
| 440 |
goto oom_error; |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 443 |
return result; |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
oom_error: |
| 446 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 447 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 448 |
return NULL; |
| 449 |
} |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
/* |
| 452 |
* Build the final exchange message sent from the client. |
| 453 |
*/ |
| 454 |
static char * |
| 455 |
build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state) |
| 456 |
{ |
| 457 |
PQExpBufferData buf; |
| 458 |
PGconn *conn = state->conn; |
| 459 |
uint8 client_proof[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 460 |
char *result; |
| 461 |
int encoded_len; |
| 462 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
initPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
/* |
| 467 |
* Construct client-final-message-without-proof. We need to remember it |
| 468 |
* for verifying the server proof in the final step of authentication. |
| 469 |
* |
| 470 |
* The channel binding flag handling (p/y/n) must be consistent with |
| 471 |
* build_client_first_message(), because the server will check that it's |
| 472 |
* the same flag both times. |
| 473 |
*/ |
| 474 |
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0) |
| 475 |
{ |
| 476 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 477 |
char *cbind_data = NULL; |
| 478 |
size_t cbind_data_len = 0; |
| 479 |
size_t cbind_header_len; |
| 480 |
char *cbind_input; |
| 481 |
size_t cbind_input_len; |
| 482 |
int encoded_cbind_len; |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
/* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */ |
| 485 |
cbind_data = |
| 486 |
pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(state->conn, |
| 487 |
&cbind_data_len); |
| 488 |
if (cbind_data == NULL) |
| 489 |
{ |
| 490 |
/* error message is already set on error */ |
| 491 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 492 |
return NULL; |
| 493 |
} |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c="); |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
/* p=type,, */ |
| 498 |
cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,"); |
| 499 |
cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len; |
| 500 |
cbind_input = malloc(cbind_input_len); |
| 501 |
if (!cbind_input) |
| 502 |
{ |
| 503 |
free(cbind_data); |
| 504 |
goto oom_error; |
| 505 |
} |
| 506 |
memcpy(cbind_input, "p=tls-server-end-point,,", cbind_header_len); |
| 507 |
memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len); |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len); |
| 510 |
if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_cbind_len)) |
| 511 |
{ |
| 512 |
free(cbind_data); |
| 513 |
free(cbind_input); |
| 514 |
goto oom_error; |
| 515 |
} |
| 516 |
encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_encode((uint8 *) cbind_input, cbind_input_len, |
| 517 |
buf.data + buf.len, |
| 518 |
encoded_cbind_len); |
| 519 |
if (encoded_cbind_len < 0) |
| 520 |
{ |
| 521 |
free(cbind_data); |
| 522 |
free(cbind_input); |
| 523 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 524 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 525 |
"could not encode cbind data for channel binding\n"); |
| 526 |
return NULL; |
| 527 |
} |
| 528 |
buf.len += encoded_cbind_len; |
| 529 |
buf.data[buf.len] = '\0'; |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
free(cbind_data); |
| 532 |
free(cbind_input); |
| 533 |
#else |
| 534 |
/* |
| 535 |
* Chose channel binding, but the SSL library doesn't support it. |
| 536 |
* Shouldn't happen. |
| 537 |
*/ |
| 538 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 539 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, |
| 540 |
"channel binding not supported by this build\n"); |
| 541 |
return NULL; |
| 542 |
#endif /* USE_SSL */ |
| 543 |
} |
| 544 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 545 |
else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */ |
| 546 |
conn->ssl_in_use) |
| 547 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=eSws"); /* base64 of "y,," */ |
| 548 |
#endif |
| 549 |
else |
| 550 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=biws"); /* base64 of "n,," */ |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf)) |
| 553 |
goto oom_error; |
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",r=%s", state->nonce); |
| 556 |
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf)) |
| 557 |
goto oom_error; |
| 558 |
|
| 559 |
state->client_final_message_without_proof = strdup(buf.data); |
| 560 |
if (state->client_final_message_without_proof == NULL) |
| 561 |
goto oom_error; |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
/* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */ |
| 564 |
if (!calculate_client_proof(state, |
| 565 |
state->client_final_message_without_proof, |
| 566 |
client_proof, &errstr)) |
| 567 |
{ |
| 568 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 569 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not calculate client proof: %s", errstr); |
| 570 |
return NULL; |
| 571 |
} |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, ",p="); |
| 574 |
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(state->key_length); |
| 575 |
if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_len)) |
| 576 |
goto oom_error; |
| 577 |
encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(client_proof, |
| 578 |
state->key_length, |
| 579 |
buf.data + buf.len, |
| 580 |
encoded_len); |
| 581 |
if (encoded_len < 0) |
| 582 |
{ |
| 583 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 584 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "could not encode client proof"); |
| 585 |
return NULL; |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
buf.len += encoded_len; |
| 588 |
buf.data[buf.len] = '\0'; |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
result = strdup(buf.data); |
| 591 |
if (result == NULL) |
| 592 |
goto oom_error; |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 595 |
return result; |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
oom_error: |
| 598 |
termPQExpBuffer(&buf); |
| 599 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 600 |
return NULL; |
| 601 |
} |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
/* |
| 604 |
* Read the first exchange message coming from the server. |
| 605 |
*/ |
| 606 |
static bool |
| 607 |
read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input) |
| 608 |
{ |
| 609 |
PGconn *conn = state->conn; |
| 610 |
char *iterations_str; |
| 611 |
char *endptr; |
| 612 |
char *encoded_salt; |
| 613 |
char *nonce; |
| 614 |
int decoded_salt_len; |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
state->server_first_message = strdup(input); |
| 617 |
if (state->server_first_message == NULL) |
| 618 |
{ |
| 619 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 620 |
return false; |
| 621 |
} |
| 622 |
|
| 623 |
/* parse the message */ |
| 624 |
nonce = read_attr_value(&input, 'r', |
| 625 |
&conn->errorMessage); |
| 626 |
if (nonce == NULL) |
| 627 |
{ |
| 628 |
/* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */ |
| 629 |
return false; |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
/* Verify immediately that the server used our part of the nonce */ |
| 633 |
if (strlen(nonce) < strlen(state->client_nonce) || |
| 634 |
timingsafe_bcmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0) |
| 635 |
{ |
| 636 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "invalid SCRAM response (nonce mismatch)"); |
| 637 |
return false; |
| 638 |
} |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
state->nonce = strdup(nonce); |
| 641 |
if (state->nonce == NULL) |
| 642 |
{ |
| 643 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 644 |
return false; |
| 645 |
} |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
encoded_salt = read_attr_value(&input, 's', &conn->errorMessage); |
| 648 |
if (encoded_salt == NULL) |
| 649 |
{ |
| 650 |
/* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */ |
| 651 |
return false; |
| 652 |
} |
| 653 |
decoded_salt_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt)); |
| 654 |
state->salt = malloc(decoded_salt_len); |
| 655 |
if (state->salt == NULL) |
| 656 |
{ |
| 657 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 658 |
return false; |
| 659 |
} |
| 660 |
state->saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt, |
| 661 |
strlen(encoded_salt), |
| 662 |
state->salt, |
| 663 |
decoded_salt_len); |
| 664 |
if (state->saltlen < 0) |
| 665 |
{ |
| 666 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid salt)"); |
| 667 |
return false; |
| 668 |
} |
| 669 |
|
| 670 |
iterations_str = read_attr_value(&input, 'i', &conn->errorMessage); |
| 671 |
if (iterations_str == NULL) |
| 672 |
{ |
| 673 |
/* read_attr_value() has appended an error string */ |
| 674 |
return false; |
| 675 |
} |
| 676 |
state->iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &endptr, 10); |
| 677 |
if (*endptr != '\0' || state->iterations < 1) |
| 678 |
{ |
| 679 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid iteration count)"); |
| 680 |
return false; |
| 681 |
} |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
if (*input != '\0') |
| 684 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-first-message)"); |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
return true; |
| 687 |
} |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
/* |
| 690 |
* Read the final exchange message coming from the server. |
| 691 |
*/ |
| 692 |
static bool |
| 693 |
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input) |
| 694 |
{ |
| 695 |
PGconn *conn = state->conn; |
| 696 |
char *encoded_server_signature; |
| 697 |
uint8 *decoded_server_signature; |
| 698 |
int server_signature_len; |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
state->server_final_message = strdup(input); |
| 701 |
if (!state->server_final_message) |
| 702 |
{ |
| 703 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 704 |
return false; |
| 705 |
} |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
/* Check for error result. */ |
| 708 |
if (*input == 'e') |
| 709 |
{ |
| 710 |
char *errmsg = read_attr_value(&input, 'e', |
| 711 |
&conn->errorMessage); |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
if (errmsg == NULL) |
| 714 |
{ |
| 715 |
/* read_attr_value() has appended an error message */ |
| 716 |
return false; |
| 717 |
} |
| 718 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "error received from server in SCRAM exchange: %s", |
| 719 |
errmsg); |
| 720 |
return false; |
| 721 |
} |
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
/* Parse the message. */ |
| 724 |
encoded_server_signature = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', |
| 725 |
&conn->errorMessage); |
| 726 |
if (encoded_server_signature == NULL) |
| 727 |
{ |
| 728 |
/* read_attr_value() has appended an error message */ |
| 729 |
return false; |
| 730 |
} |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
if (*input != '\0') |
| 733 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)"); |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
server_signature_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_server_signature)); |
| 736 |
decoded_server_signature = malloc(server_signature_len); |
| 737 |
if (!decoded_server_signature) |
| 738 |
{ |
| 739 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "out of memory"); |
| 740 |
return false; |
| 741 |
} |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
server_signature_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_signature, |
| 744 |
strlen(encoded_server_signature), |
| 745 |
decoded_server_signature, |
| 746 |
server_signature_len); |
| 747 |
if (server_signature_len != state->key_length) |
| 748 |
{ |
| 749 |
free(decoded_server_signature); |
| 750 |
libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "malformed SCRAM message (invalid server signature)"); |
| 751 |
return false; |
| 752 |
} |
| 753 |
memcpy(state->ServerSignature, decoded_server_signature, |
| 754 |
state->key_length); |
| 755 |
free(decoded_server_signature); |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
return true; |
| 758 |
} |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
/* |
| 761 |
* Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent |
| 762 |
* by the client. Returns true on success, false on failure with *errstr |
| 763 |
* pointing to a message about the error details. |
| 764 |
*/ |
| 765 |
static bool |
| 766 |
calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state, |
| 767 |
const char *client_final_message_without_proof, |
| 768 |
uint8 *result, const char **errstr) |
| 769 |
{ |
| 770 |
uint8 StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 771 |
uint8 ClientKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 772 |
uint8 ClientSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 773 |
int i; |
| 774 |
pg_hmac_ctx *ctx; |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type); |
| 777 |
if (ctx == NULL) |
| 778 |
{ |
| 779 |
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ |
| 780 |
return false; |
| 781 |
} |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
if (state->conn->scram_client_key_binary) |
| 784 |
{ |
| 785 |
memcpy(ClientKey, state->conn->scram_client_key_binary, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN); |
| 786 |
} |
| 787 |
else |
| 788 |
{ |
| 789 |
/* |
| 790 |
* Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can |
| 791 |
* reuse it later in verify_server_signature. |
| 792 |
*/ |
| 793 |
if (scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->hash_type, |
| 794 |
state->key_length, state->salt, state->saltlen, |
| 795 |
state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword, |
| 796 |
errstr) < 0 || |
| 797 |
scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, state->hash_type, |
| 798 |
state->key_length, ClientKey, errstr) < 0) |
| 799 |
{ |
| 800 |
/* errstr is already filled here */ |
| 801 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 802 |
return false; |
| 803 |
} |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
if (scram_H(ClientKey, state->hash_type, state->key_length, StoredKey, errstr) < 0) |
| 807 |
{ |
| 808 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 809 |
return false; |
| 810 |
} |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, StoredKey, state->key_length) < 0 || |
| 813 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 814 |
(uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare, |
| 815 |
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 || |
| 816 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 || |
| 817 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 818 |
(uint8 *) state->server_first_message, |
| 819 |
strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 || |
| 820 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 || |
| 821 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 822 |
(uint8 *) client_final_message_without_proof, |
| 823 |
strlen(client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 || |
| 824 |
pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, state->key_length) < 0) |
| 825 |
{ |
| 826 |
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); |
| 827 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 828 |
return false; |
| 829 |
} |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
for (i = 0; i < state->key_length; i++) |
| 832 |
result[i] = ClientKey[i] ^ ClientSignature[i]; |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 835 |
return true; |
| 836 |
} |
| 837 |
|
| 838 |
/* |
| 839 |
* Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange |
| 840 |
* message received from the server. *match tracks if the server signature |
| 841 |
* matched or not. Returns true if the server signature got verified, and |
| 842 |
* false for a processing error with *errstr pointing to a message about the |
| 843 |
* error details. |
| 844 |
*/ |
| 845 |
static bool |
| 846 |
verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match, |
| 847 |
const char **errstr) |
| 848 |
{ |
| 849 |
uint8 expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 850 |
uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN]; |
| 851 |
pg_hmac_ctx *ctx; |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type); |
| 854 |
if (ctx == NULL) |
| 855 |
{ |
| 856 |
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(NULL); /* returns OOM */ |
| 857 |
return false; |
| 858 |
} |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
if (state->conn->scram_server_key_binary) |
| 861 |
{ |
| 862 |
memcpy(ServerKey, state->conn->scram_server_key_binary, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN); |
| 863 |
} |
| 864 |
else |
| 865 |
{ |
| 866 |
if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, state->hash_type, |
| 867 |
state->key_length, ServerKey, errstr) < 0) |
| 868 |
{ |
| 869 |
/* errstr is filled already */ |
| 870 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 871 |
return false; |
| 872 |
} |
| 873 |
} |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
/* calculate ServerSignature */ |
| 876 |
if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, ServerKey, state->key_length) < 0 || |
| 877 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 878 |
(uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare, |
| 879 |
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 || |
| 880 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 || |
| 881 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 882 |
(uint8 *) state->server_first_message, |
| 883 |
strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 || |
| 884 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 || |
| 885 |
pg_hmac_update(ctx, |
| 886 |
(uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof, |
| 887 |
strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 || |
| 888 |
pg_hmac_final(ctx, expected_ServerSignature, |
| 889 |
state->key_length) < 0) |
| 890 |
{ |
| 891 |
*errstr = pg_hmac_error(ctx); |
| 892 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 893 |
return false; |
| 894 |
} |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
pg_hmac_free(ctx); |
| 897 |
|
| 898 |
/* signature processed, so now check after it */ |
| 899 |
if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, |
| 900 |
state->key_length) != 0) |
| 901 |
*match = false; |
| 902 |
else |
| 903 |
*match = true; |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
return true; |
| 906 |
} |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
/* |
| 909 |
* Build a new SCRAM secret. |
| 910 |
* |
| 911 |
* On error, returns NULL and sets *errstr to point to a message about the |
| 912 |
* error details. |
| 913 |
*/ |
| 914 |
char * |
| 915 |
pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password, int iterations, const char **errstr) |
| 916 |
{ |
| 917 |
char *prep_password; |
| 918 |
pg_saslprep_rc rc; |
| 919 |
uint8 saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN]; |
| 920 |
char *result; |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
/* |
| 923 |
* Normalize the password with SASLprep. If that doesn't work, because |
| 924 |
* the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just |
| 925 |
* proceed with the original password. (See comments at the top of |
| 926 |
* auth-scram.c.) |
| 927 |
*/ |
| 928 |
rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password); |
| 929 |
if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM) |
| 930 |
{ |
| 931 |
*errstr = libpq_gettext("out of memory"); |
| 932 |
return NULL; |
| 933 |
} |
| 934 |
if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS) |
| 935 |
password = (const char *) prep_password; |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
/* Generate a random salt */ |
| 938 |
if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN)) |
| 939 |
{ |
| 940 |
*errstr = libpq_gettext("could not generate random salt"); |
| 941 |
free(prep_password); |
| 942 |
return NULL; |
| 943 |
} |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
result = scram_build_secret(PG_SHA256, SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN, saltbuf, |
| 946 |
SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, |
| 947 |
iterations, password, |
| 948 |
errstr); |
| 949 |
|
| 950 |
free(prep_password); |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
return result; |
| 953 |
} |