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1 \chapter{\bacula{} Security Issues}
2 \label{blb:SecurityChapter}
3 \index[general]{\bacula{} Security Issues}
4 \index[general]{Security}
5 \index[general]{Issues!\bacula{} Security}
6
7 \begin{bitemize}
8 \item Security means being able to restore your files, so read the
9 \bilink{Critical Items Chapter}{blb:Critical} of this manual.
10 \item The Clients (\btool{bacula-fd}) must run as root to be able to access all
11 the system files.
12 \item It is not necessary to run the Director as \texttt{root}.
13 \item It is not necessary to run the Storage daemon as \texttt{root}, but you must
14 ensure that it can open the tape drives, which are often restricted to \texttt{root}
15 access by default. In addition, if you do not run the Storage daemon as \texttt{root},
16 it will not be able to automatically set your tape drive parameters on most
17 \acs{OS}es since these functions, unfortunately require root access.
18 \item You should restrict access to the \bacula{} configuration files, so that
19 the passwords are not world-readable. The \textbf{\bacula{}} daemons are password
20 protected using CRAM-MD5 (i.e. the password is not sent across the network).
21 This will ensure that not everyone can access the daemons. It is a reasonably
22 good protection, but can be cracked by experts.
23 \item If you are using the recommended ports 9101, 9102, and 9103, you will
24 probably want to protect these ports from external access using a firewall
25 and/or using tcp wrappers (\bfilename{etc/hosts.allow}).
26 \item By default, all data that is sent across the network is unencrypted.
27 However, \bacula{} does support \ac{TLS} and can encrypt transmitted data. Please read the
28 \bilink{\acs{TLS} (\acs{SSL}) Communications Encryption}{blb:CommEncryption}
29 section of this manual.
30 \item You should ensure that the \bacula{} working directories are readable and
31 writable only by the \bacula{} daemons.
32 \item If you are using \mysql{} it is not necessary for it to run with
33 \textbf{root} permission.
34 \item The default \bacula{} \btool{grant-mysql-permissions} script grants all
35 permissions to use the \mysql{} database without a password. If you want
36 security, please tighten this up!
37 \item Don't forget that \bacula{} is a network program, so anyone anywhere on
38 the network with the console program and the Director's password can access
39 \bacula{} and the backed up data.
40 \item You can restrict what IP addresses \bacula{} will bind to by using the
41 appropriate \textbf{DirAddress}, \textbf{FDAddress}, or \textbf{SDAddress} records in
42 the respective daemon configuration files.
43 \item Be aware that if you are backing up your database using the default
44 script, if you have a password on your database, it will be passed as
45 a command line option to that script, and any user will be able to see
46 this information. If you want it to be secure, you will need to pass it
47 by an environment variable or a secure file.
48
49 See also \bilink{Backing Up Your \bacula{} Database --- Security Considerations}{blb:BackingUp\bacula{}SecurityConsiderations}
50 for more information.
51 \end{bitemize}
52
53
54 \section{Backward Compatibility}
55 \index[general]{Backward Compatibility}
56 One of the major goals of \bacula{} is to ensure that you can restore
57 tapes (I'll use the word tape to include disk Volumes) that you wrote years
58 ago. This means that each new version of \bacula{} should be able to read old
59 format tapes. The first problem you will have is to ensure that the
60 hardware is still working some years down the road, and the second
61 problem will be to ensure that the media will still be good, then
62 your \acs{OS} must be able to interface to the device, and finally \bacula{}
63 must be able to recognize old formats. All the problems except the
64 last are ones that we cannot solve, but by careful planning you can.
65
66 Since the very beginning of \bacula{} (January 2000) until today (December
67 2005), there have been two major \bacula{} tape formats. The second format
68 was introduced in version 1.27 in November of 2002, and it has not
69 changed since then. In principle, \bacula{} can still read the original
70 format, but I haven't tried it lately so who knows \ldots{}
71
72 Though the tape format is fixed, the kinds of data that we can put on the
73 tapes are extensible, and that is how we added new features
74 such as \acsp{ACL}, Win32 data, encrypted data, \ldots{} Obviously, an older
75 version of \bacula{} would not know how to read these newer data streams,
76 but each newer version of \bacula{} should know how to read all the
77 older streams.
78
79 If you want to be 100\% sure that you can read old tapes, you should:
80 \begin{benumerate}
81 \item Try reading old tapes from time to time -- e.g. at least once a year.
82 \item Keep statically linked copies of every version of \bacula{} that you use in
83 production then if for some reason, we botch up old tape compatibility, you
84 can always pull out an old copy of \bacula{} \ldots{}
85 \end{benumerate}
86 The second point is probably overkill but if you want to be sure, it may
87 save you someday.
88
89
90
91 \label{blb:wrappers}
92 \section{Configuring and Testing TCP Wrappers}
93 \index[general]{Configuring and Testing TCP Wrappers}
94 \index[general]{TCP Wrappers}
95 \index[general]{Wrappers!TCP}
96 \index[general]{libwrappers}
97
98 TCP Wrappers are implemented if you turn them on when configuring
99 (\btool{./configure {-}{-}with-tcp-wrappers}).
100 With this code enabled, you may control who may access your
101 daemons. This control is done by modifying the file: \bfilename{/etc/hosts.allow}.
102 The program name that \textbf{\bacula{}} uses when
103 applying these access restrictions is the name you specify in the
104 daemon configuration file (see below for examples).
105 You must not use the \textbf{twist} option in your \bfilename{/etc/hosts.allow}
106 or it will terminate the \bacula{} daemon when a connection is refused.
107
108 The exact name of the package you need loaded to build with TCP wrappers
109 depends on the system. For example, on SuSE, the TCP wrappers libraries needed to link \bacula{} are
110 contained in the tcpd-devel package. On Red Hat, the package is named
111 \texttt{tcp\_wrappers}.
112
113 Dan Langille has provided the following information on configuring and
114 testing TCP wrappers with \bacula{}.
115
116 If you read \texttt{hosts\_options}(5), you will see an option called twist. This
117 option replaces the current process by an instance of the specified shell
118 command. Typically, something like this is used:
119
120 \begin{bVerbatim}
121 ALL : ALL \
122 : severity auth.info \
123 : twist /bin/echo "You are not welcome to use %d from %h."
124 \end{bVerbatim}
125
126 The libwrap code tries to avoid \textbf{twist} if it runs in a resident process,
127 but that test will not protect the first \texttt{hosts\_access()} call. This will
128 result in the process (e.g. \btool{bacula-fd}, \btool{bacula-sd}, \btool{bacula-dir}) being terminated
129 if the first connection to their port results in the twist option being
130 invoked. The potential, and I stress potential, exists for an attacker to
131 prevent the daemons from running. This situation is eliminated if your
132 \bfilename{/etc/hosts.allow} file contains an appropriate rule set. The following example
133 is sufficient:
134
135 \begin{bVerbatim}
136 undef-fd : localhost : allow
137 undef-sd : localhost : allow
138 undef-dir : localhost : allow
139 undef-fd : ALL : deny
140 undef-sd : ALL : deny
141 undef-dir : ALL : deny
142 \end{bVerbatim}
143
144 You must adjust the names to be the same as the Name directives found
145 in each of the daemon configuration files. They are, in general, not the
146 same as the binary daemon names. It is not possible to use the
147 daemon names because multiple daemons may be running on the same machine
148 but with different configurations.
149
150 In these examples, the Director is \texttt{undef-dir}, the
151 Storage Daemon is \texttt{undef-sd}, and the File Daemon is \texttt{undef-fd}. Adjust to suit
152 your situation. The above example rules assume that the SD, FD, and DIR all
153 reside on the same box. If you have a remote FD client, then the following
154 rule set on the remote client will suffice:
155
156 \begin{bVerbatim}
157 undef-fd : director.example.org : allow
158 undef-fd : ALL : deny
159 \end{bVerbatim}
160
161 where \url{director.example.org} is the host which will be contacting the client
162 (ie. the box on which the \bacula{} Director daemon runs). The use of
163 ``ALL : deny'' ensures that the twist option (if present) is not invoked. To properly
164 test your configuration, start the daemon(s), then attempt to connect from an
165 IP address which should be able to connect. You should see something like
166 this:
167
168 \begin{bVerbatim}
169 $ telnet undef 9103
170 Trying 192.168.0.56...
171 Connected to undef.example.org.
172 Escape character is '^]'.
173 Connection closed by foreign host.
174 $
175 \end{bVerbatim}
176
177 This is the correct response. If you see this:
178
179 \begin{bVerbatim}
180 $ telnet undef 9103
181 Trying 192.168.0.56...
182 Connected to undef.example.org.
183 Escape character is '^]'.
184 You are not welcome to use undef-sd from xeon.example.org.
185 Connection closed by foreign host.
186 $
187 \end{bVerbatim}
188
189 then twist has been invoked and your configuration is not correct and you need
190 to add the deny statement. It is important to note that your testing must
191 include restarting the daemons after each connection attempt. You can also use
192 \texttt{btool}(8) and \btool{tcpdmatch}(8) to validate your \bfilename{/etc/hosts.allow} rules. Here is a
193 simple test using \btool{tcpdmatch}:
194
195 \begin{bVerbatim}
196 $ tcpdmatch undef-dir xeon.example.org
197 warning: undef-dir: no such process name in /etc/inetd.conf
198 client: hostname xeon.example.org
199 client: address 192.168.0.18
200 server: process undef-dir
201 matched: /etc/hosts.allow line 40
202 option: allow
203 access: granted
204 \end{bVerbatim}
205
206 If you are running \bacula{} as a standalone daemon, the warning above can be
207 safely ignored. Here is an example which indicates that your rules are missing
208 a deny statement and the twist option has been invoked.
209
210 \begin{bVerbatim}
211 $ tcpdmatch undef-dir 10.0.0.1
212 warning: undef-dir: no such process name in /etc/inetd.conf
213 client: address 10.0.0.1
214 server: process undef-dir
215 matched: /etc/hosts.allow line 91
216 option: severity auth.info
217 option: twist /bin/echo "You are not welcome to use
218 undef-dir from 10.0.0.1."
219 access: delegated
220 \end{bVerbatim}
221
222 \section{Running as non-root}
223 \index[general]{Running as non-root}
224
225 Security advice from Dan Langille:
226 % TODO: don't use specific name
227
228 % TODO: don't be too specific on operating system
229
230 % TODO: maybe remove personalization?
231
232 It is a good idea to run daemons with the lowest possible privileges. In
233 other words, if you can, don't run applications as root which do not have to
234 be root. The Storage Daemon and the Director Daemon do not need to be root.
235 The File Daemon needs to be root in order to access all files on your system.
236 In order to run as non-root, you need to create a user and a group. Choosing
237 \texttt{bacula} as both the user name and the group name sounds like a good idea
238 to me.
239
240 The FreeBSD port creates this user and group for you.
241 Here is what those entries looked like on my FreeBSD laptop:
242
243 \begin{bVerbatim}
244 bacula:*:1002:1002::0:0:\bacula{} Daemon:/var/db/bacula:/sbin/nologin
245 \end{bVerbatim}
246
247 I used \btool{vipw} to create this entry. I selected a User ID and Group ID of 1002
248 as they were unused on my system.
249
250 I also created a group in \bfilename{/etc/group}:
251 \begin{bVerbatim}
252 bacula:*:1002:
253 \end{bVerbatim}
254
255 The \texttt{bacula} user (as opposed to the \bacula{} daemon) will have a home directory
256 of \bdirectoryname{/var/db/bacula} which is the default location for the \bacula{}
257 database.
258
259 Now that you have both a bacula user and a bacula group, you can secure the
260 bacula home directory by issuing this command:
261
262 \begin{bVerbatim}
263 chown -R bacula:bacula /var/db/bacula/
264 \end{bVerbatim}
265
266 This ensures that only the bacula user can access this directory. It also
267 means that if we run the Director and the Storage daemon as bacula, those
268 daemons also have restricted access. This would not be the case if they were
269 running as root.
270
271 It is important to note that the storage daemon actually needs to be in the
272 operator group for normal access to tape drives etc (at least on a FreeBSD
273 system, that's how things are set up by default) Such devices are normally
274 \btool{chown root:operator}. It is easier and less error prone to make \bacula{} a
275 member of that group than it is to play around with system permissions.
276
277 Starting the \bacula{} daemons
278
279 To start the \bacula{} daemons on a FreeBSD system, issue the following command:
280
281 \begin{bVerbatim}
282 /usr/local/etc/rc.d/bacula-dir start
283 /usr/local/etc/rc.d/bacula-sd start
284 /usr/local/etc/rc.d/bacula-fd start
285 \end{bVerbatim}
286
287 To confirm they are all running:
288
289 \begin{bVerbatim}
290 $ ps auwx | grep bacula
291 root 63418 0.0 0.3 1856 1036 ?? Ss 4:09PM 0:00.00
292 /usr/local/sbin/bacula-fd -v -c /usr/local/etc/bacula-fd.conf
293 bacula 63416 0.0 0.3 2040 1172 ?? Ss 4:09PM 0:00.01
294 /usr/local/sbin/bacula-sd -v -c /usr/local/etc/bacula-sd.conf
295 bacula 63422 0.0 0.4 2360 1440 ?? Ss 4:09PM 0:00.00
296 /usr/local/sbin/bacula-dir -v -c /usr/local/etc/bacula-dir.conf
297 \end{bVerbatim}