| 1 |
/* -*- linux-c -*- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* staprun_funcs.c - staprun functions |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This file is part of systemtap, and is free software. You can |
| 6 |
* redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General |
| 7 |
* Public License (GPL); either version 2, or (at your option) any |
| 8 |
* later version. |
| 9 |
* |
| 10 |
* Copyright (C) 2007-2018 Red Hat Inc. |
| 11 |
*/ |
| 12 |
|
| 13 |
#include "../config.h" |
| 14 |
#include "staprun.h" |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
#include <sys/mount.h> |
| 17 |
#include <sys/utsname.h> |
| 18 |
#include <grp.h> |
| 19 |
#include <pwd.h> |
| 20 |
#include <assert.h> |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
/* The module-renaming facility only works with new enough |
| 23 |
elfutils: 0.142+. */ |
| 24 |
#include <libelf.h> |
| 25 |
#include <gelf.h> |
| 26 |
|
| 27 |
#include <math.h> |
| 28 |
|
| 29 |
#include "modverify.h" |
| 30 |
#include "../privilege.h" |
| 31 |
|
| 32 |
typedef int (*check_module_path_func)(const char *module_path, int module_fd); |
| 33 |
|
| 34 |
extern long init_module(void *, unsigned long, const char *); |
| 35 |
extern gid_t get_gid (const char *group_name); |
| 36 |
|
| 37 |
/* Module errors get translated. */ |
| 38 |
const char *moderror(int err) |
| 39 |
{ |
| 40 |
switch (err) { |
| 41 |
case ENOEXEC: |
| 42 |
return "Invalid module format"; |
| 43 |
case ENOENT: |
| 44 |
return "Unknown symbol in module"; |
| 45 |
case ESRCH: |
| 46 |
return "Module has wrong symbol version"; |
| 47 |
case EINVAL: |
| 48 |
return "Invalid parameters"; |
| 49 |
default: |
| 50 |
return strerror(err); |
| 51 |
} |
| 52 |
} |
| 53 |
|
| 54 |
int insert_module( |
| 55 |
const char *path, |
| 56 |
const char *special_options, |
| 57 |
char **options, |
| 58 |
assert_permissions_func assert_permissions, |
| 59 |
privilege_t *user_credentials |
| 60 |
) { |
| 61 |
int i; |
| 62 |
long ret, module_read; |
| 63 |
void *module_file; |
| 64 |
char *opts; |
| 65 |
int saved_errno; |
| 66 |
char module_realpath[PATH_MAX]; |
| 67 |
int module_fd; |
| 68 |
struct stat sbuf; |
| 69 |
int rename_this_module; |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
dbug(2, "inserting module %s\n", path); |
| 72 |
|
| 73 |
/* Rename the script module if '-R' was passed, but not other modules |
| 74 |
* like uprobes. We can tell which this is by comparing to the global |
| 75 |
* modpath, but we must do it before it's transformed by realpath. */ |
| 76 |
rename_this_module = rename_mod && (strcmp(path, modpath) == 0); |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
if (special_options) |
| 79 |
opts = strdup(special_options); |
| 80 |
else |
| 81 |
opts = strdup(""); |
| 82 |
if (opts == NULL) { |
| 83 |
_perr("allocating memory failed"); |
| 84 |
return -1; |
| 85 |
} |
| 86 |
for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) { |
| 87 |
opts = realloc(opts, strlen(opts) + strlen(options[i]) + 2); |
| 88 |
if (opts == NULL) { |
| 89 |
_perr("[re]allocating memory failed"); |
| 90 |
return -1; |
| 91 |
} |
| 92 |
/* Note that these strcat() calls are OK, since we just |
| 93 |
* allocated space for the resulting string. */ |
| 94 |
strcat(opts, " "); |
| 95 |
strcat(opts, options[i]); |
| 96 |
} |
| 97 |
dbug(2, "module options: %s\n", opts); |
| 98 |
|
| 99 |
/* Use realpath() to canonicalize the module path. */ |
| 100 |
if (realpath(path, module_realpath) == NULL) { |
| 101 |
perr("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", path); |
| 102 |
free(opts); |
| 103 |
return -1; |
| 104 |
} |
| 105 |
dbug(2, "module path canonicalized to '%s'\n", module_realpath); |
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
/* Use module_realpath from this point on. "Poison" 'path' |
| 108 |
by setting it to NULL so that it doesn't get used again by |
| 109 |
mistake. */ |
| 110 |
path = NULL; |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
/* Open the module file. Work with the open file descriptor from this |
| 113 |
point on to avoid TOCTOU problems. */ |
| 114 |
module_fd = open(module_realpath, O_RDONLY); |
| 115 |
if (module_fd < 0) { |
| 116 |
perr("Couldn't open '%s'", module_realpath); |
| 117 |
free(opts); |
| 118 |
return -1; |
| 119 |
} |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
/* Now that the file is open, figure out how big it is. */ |
| 122 |
if (fstat(module_fd, &sbuf) < 0) { |
| 123 |
_perr("Error stat'ing '%s'", module_realpath); |
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close(module_fd); |
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free(opts); |
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return -1; |
| 127 |
} |
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|
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/* Allocate memory for the entire module. */ |
| 130 |
module_file = calloc(1, sbuf.st_size); |
| 131 |
if (module_file == NULL) { |
| 132 |
_perr("Error allocating memory to read '%s'", module_realpath); |
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close(module_fd); |
| 134 |
free(opts); |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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/* Read in the entire module. Work with this copy of the data from this |
| 139 |
point on to avoid a TOCTOU race between path and signature checking |
| 140 |
below and module loading. */ |
| 141 |
module_read = 0; |
| 142 |
while (module_read < sbuf.st_size) { |
| 143 |
ret = read(module_fd, module_file + module_read, |
| 144 |
sbuf.st_size - module_read); |
| 145 |
if (ret > 0) |
| 146 |
module_read += ret; |
| 147 |
else if (ret == 0) { |
| 148 |
_err("Unexpected EOF reading '%s'", module_realpath); |
| 149 |
free(module_file); |
| 150 |
close(module_fd); |
| 151 |
free(opts); |
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return -1; |
| 153 |
} else if (errno != EINTR) { |
| 154 |
_perr("Error reading '%s'", module_realpath); |
| 155 |
free(module_file); |
| 156 |
close(module_fd); |
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free(opts); |
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return -1; |
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} |
| 160 |
} |
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|
| 162 |
/* Check whether this module can be loaded by the current user. |
| 163 |
* check_permissions will exit(-1) if permissions are insufficient*/ |
| 164 |
assert_permissions (module_realpath, module_fd, module_file, sbuf.st_size, user_credentials); |
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|
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/* Rename Module if '-R' was passed */ |
| 167 |
if (rename_this_module) { |
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dbug(2,"Renaming module '%s'\n", modname); |
| 169 |
if(rename_module(module_file, sbuf.st_size) < 0) { |
| 170 |
|
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_err("Error renaming module"); |
| 172 |
close(module_fd); |
| 173 |
free(opts); |
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return -1; |
| 175 |
} |
| 176 |
dbug(2,"Renamed module to '%s'\n", modname); |
| 177 |
} |
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|
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/* Now that the module has been renamed (if we are going to), |
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* set an environment variable that lets child processes know |
| 181 |
* what the module name is. */ |
| 182 |
if (setenv("SYSTEMTAP_MODULE", modname, 1)) { |
| 183 |
_perr("SYSTEMTAP_MODULE setenv failed"); |
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// Keep going... |
| 185 |
} |
| 186 |
|
| 187 |
/* As a debugging aid for testing risky stap modules. */ |
| 188 |
if (getenv ("SYSTEMTAP_SYNC") != NULL) |
| 189 |
sync(); |
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|
| 191 |
dbug(1,"Module %s inserted from file %s\n", modname, module_realpath); |
| 192 |
PROBE1(staprun, insert__module, (char*)module_realpath); |
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/* Actually insert the module */ |
| 194 |
ret = init_module(module_file, sbuf.st_size, opts); |
| 195 |
saved_errno = errno; |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
/* Cleanup. */ |
| 198 |
free(opts); |
| 199 |
free(module_file); |
| 200 |
close(module_fd); |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
if (ret != 0) { |
| 203 |
errno = saved_errno; |
| 204 |
return -errno; |
| 205 |
} |
| 206 |
return 0; |
| 207 |
} |
| 208 |
|
| 209 |
static Elf_Scn * |
| 210 |
find_section_in_module(const void* module_file, const __off_t st_size, const char *section_name) |
| 211 |
{ |
| 212 |
char *name; |
| 213 |
size_t shstrndx; |
| 214 |
Elf* elf; |
| 215 |
Elf_Scn *scn = 0; |
| 216 |
GElf_Shdr shdr_mem; |
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
/* Create descriptor for memory region. */ |
| 219 |
if((elf = elf_memory ((void *)module_file, st_size))== NULL) { |
| 220 |
_err("Error creating Elf object.\n"); |
| 221 |
return NULL; |
| 222 |
} |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
/* Get the string section index */ |
| 225 |
if(elf_getshdrstrndx (elf, &shstrndx) < 0) { |
| 226 |
_err("Error getting section index.\n"); |
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return NULL; |
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} |
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|
| 230 |
/* Go through the sections looking for the given section" */ |
| 231 |
while ((scn = elf_nextscn (elf, scn))) { |
| 232 |
if((gelf_getshdr (scn, &shdr_mem))==NULL) { |
| 233 |
_err("Error getting section header.\n"); |
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return NULL; |
| 235 |
} |
| 236 |
name = elf_strptr (elf, shstrndx, shdr_mem.sh_name); |
| 237 |
if (name == NULL) { |
| 238 |
_err("Error getting section name.\n"); |
| 239 |
return NULL; |
| 240 |
} |
| 241 |
if(strcmp(name, section_name) == 0) { |
| 242 |
break; |
| 243 |
} |
| 244 |
} |
| 245 |
return scn; |
| 246 |
} |
| 247 |
|
| 248 |
int |
| 249 |
rename_module(void* module_file, const __off_t st_size) |
| 250 |
{ |
| 251 |
int length_to_replace; |
| 252 |
char newname[MODULE_NAME_LEN]; |
| 253 |
char *p; |
| 254 |
pid_t pid; |
| 255 |
Elf_Scn *scn = 0; |
| 256 |
Elf_Data *data = 0; |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
scn = find_section_in_module (module_file, st_size, ".gnu.linkonce.this_module"); |
| 259 |
if(!scn) { |
| 260 |
_err("Section name \".gnu.linkonce.this_module\" not found in module.\n"); |
| 261 |
return -1; |
| 262 |
} |
| 263 |
|
| 264 |
/* Get access to raw data from section; do not translate/copy. */ |
| 265 |
if ((data = elf_rawdata (scn, data)) == NULL) { |
| 266 |
_err("Error getting Elf data from section.\n"); |
| 267 |
return -1; |
| 268 |
} |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
/* Generate new module name with the same length as the old name. |
| 271 |
The new name is of the form: stap_<FirstPartOfOldname>_<pid>*/ |
| 272 |
if (strlen(modname) >= MODULE_NAME_LEN) { |
| 273 |
_err("Old module name is too long.\n"); |
| 274 |
return -1; |
| 275 |
} |
| 276 |
pid = getpid(); |
| 277 |
length_to_replace = (int)strlen(modname)-((int)log10(pid)+1) - 1; |
| 278 |
if(length_to_replace < 0 || length_to_replace > (int)strlen(modname)) { |
| 279 |
// don't treat this is as an error condition |
| 280 |
warn("Old module name '%s' is too short for renaming, ignoring -R.\n", modname); |
| 281 |
return -0; |
| 282 |
} |
| 283 |
if (snprintf(newname, sizeof(newname), "%.*s_%d", length_to_replace, modname, pid) < 0) { |
| 284 |
_err("Creating newname failed./n"); |
| 285 |
return -1; |
| 286 |
} |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
/* Find where it is in the module structure. |
| 289 |
To our knowledge, this section is always completely zeroed apart |
| 290 |
from the module name, so a simple search and replace should suffice. |
| 291 |
A signed module from any stapusr or stapsys user will already have been proven |
| 292 |
untampered. An unsigned module from a stapdev user could try to do |
| 293 |
naughty things, but we're already trusting these users so much |
| 294 |
that they can shoot their feet however they like. |
| 295 |
*/ |
| 296 |
for (p = data->d_buf; p < (char *)data->d_buf + data->d_size - strlen(modname); p++) { |
| 297 |
if (memcmp(p, modname, strlen(modname)) == 0) { |
| 298 |
strncpy(p, newname, strlen(p)); /* Actually replace the oldname in memory with the newname */ |
| 299 |
modname = strdup(newname); /* This is just to update the global variable containing the current module name */ |
| 300 |
if (modname == NULL) { |
| 301 |
_perr("allocating memory failed"); |
| 302 |
return -1; |
| 303 |
} |
| 304 |
return 0; |
| 305 |
} |
| 306 |
} |
| 307 |
_err("Could not find old name to replace!\n"); |
| 308 |
return -1; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
|
| 311 |
|
| 312 |
int mountfs(void) |
| 313 |
{ |
| 314 |
struct stat sb; |
| 315 |
struct statfs st; |
| 316 |
int rc; |
| 317 |
|
| 318 |
/* If the debugfs dir is already mounted correctly, we're done. */ |
| 319 |
if (statfs(DEBUGFSDIR, &st) == 0 |
| 320 |
&& (int) st.f_type == (int) DEBUGFS_MAGIC) |
| 321 |
return 0; |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
/* If DEBUGFSDIR exists (and is a directory), try to mount |
| 324 |
* DEBUGFSDIR. */ |
| 325 |
rc = stat(DEBUGFSDIR, &sb); |
| 326 |
if (rc == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { |
| 327 |
/* If we can mount the debugfs dir correctly, we're done. */ |
| 328 |
rc = mount ("debugfs", DEBUGFSDIR, "debugfs", 0, NULL); |
| 329 |
if (rc == 0) |
| 330 |
return 0; |
| 331 |
/* If we got ENODEV, that means that debugfs isn't |
| 332 |
* supported, so we'll need try try relayfs. If we |
| 333 |
* didn't get ENODEV, we got a real error. */ |
| 334 |
else if (errno != ENODEV) { |
| 335 |
perr("Couldn't mount %s", DEBUGFSDIR); |
| 336 |
return -1; |
| 337 |
} |
| 338 |
} |
| 339 |
|
| 340 |
/* DEBUGFSDIR couldn't be mounted. So, try RELAYFSDIR. */ |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
/* If the relayfs dir is already mounted correctly, we're done. */ |
| 343 |
if (statfs(RELAYFSDIR, &st) == 0 |
| 344 |
&& (int)st.f_type == (int)RELAYFS_MAGIC) |
| 345 |
return 0; |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
/* Ensure that RELAYFSDIR exists and is a directory. */ |
| 348 |
rc = stat(RELAYFSDIR, &sb); |
| 349 |
if (rc == 0 && ! S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { |
| 350 |
err("%s exists but isn't a directory.\n", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 351 |
return -1; |
| 352 |
} |
| 353 |
else if (rc < 0) { |
| 354 |
mode_t old_umask; |
| 355 |
int saved_errno; |
| 356 |
gid_t gid = getgid(); |
| 357 |
uid_t uid = getuid(); |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
/* To ensure the directory gets created with the proper |
| 360 |
* permissions, set umask to a known value. */ |
| 361 |
old_umask = umask(0002); |
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
/* To ensure the directory gets created with the |
| 364 |
* proper group, we'll have to temporarily switch to |
| 365 |
* root. */ |
| 366 |
/* XXX: Why not just chown() the thing? */ |
| 367 |
if (setuid (0) < 0) { |
| 368 |
_perr("Couldn't change user while creating %s", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 369 |
return -1; |
| 370 |
} |
| 371 |
if (setgid (0) < 0) { |
| 372 |
_perr("Couldn't change group while creating %s", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 373 |
return -1; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
/* Try to create the directory, saving the return |
| 377 |
* status and errno value. */ |
| 378 |
rc = mkdir(RELAYFSDIR, 0755); |
| 379 |
saved_errno = errno; |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
/* Restore everything we changed. */ |
| 382 |
if (setgid (gid) < 0) { |
| 383 |
_perr("Couldn't restore group while creating %s", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 384 |
return -1; |
| 385 |
} |
| 386 |
if (setuid (uid) < 0) { |
| 387 |
_perr("Couldn't restore user while creating %s", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 388 |
return -1; |
| 389 |
} |
| 390 |
umask(old_umask); |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
/* If creating the directory failed, error out. */ |
| 393 |
if (rc < 0) { |
| 394 |
err("Couldn't create %s: %s\n", RELAYFSDIR, strerror(saved_errno)); |
| 395 |
return -1; |
| 396 |
} |
| 397 |
} |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
/* Now that we're sure the directory exists, try mounting RELAYFSDIR. */ |
| 400 |
if (mount ("relayfs", RELAYFSDIR, "relayfs", 0, NULL) < 0) { |
| 401 |
perr("Couldn't mount %s", RELAYFSDIR); |
| 402 |
return -1; |
| 403 |
} |
| 404 |
return 0; |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
/* |
| 408 |
* Check the signature of the given module. |
| 409 |
* |
| 410 |
* Returns: -1 on errors, 0 on failure, 1 on success. |
| 411 |
*/ |
| 412 |
#if ! HAVE_NSS |
| 413 |
static int |
| 414 |
check_signature(const char *path __attribute__((unused)), |
| 415 |
const void *module_data __attribute__((unused)), |
| 416 |
off_t module_size __attribute__((unused))) |
| 417 |
{ |
| 418 |
return MODULE_UNTRUSTED; |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
#else |
| 421 |
static int |
| 422 |
check_signature(const char *path, const void *module_data, off_t module_size) |
| 423 |
{ |
| 424 |
char signature_realpath[PATH_MAX]; |
| 425 |
int rc; |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
dbug(2, "checking signature for %s\n", path); |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
/* Add the .sgn suffix to the canonicalized module path to get the signature |
| 430 |
file path. */ |
| 431 |
if (strlen (path) >= PATH_MAX - 5) { |
| 432 |
err("Path \"%s.sgn\" is too long.", path); |
| 433 |
return -1; |
| 434 |
} |
| 435 |
/* This use of sprintf() is OK, since we just checked the final |
| 436 |
* string's length. */ |
| 437 |
sprintf (signature_realpath, "%s.sgn", path); |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
rc = verify_module (signature_realpath, path, module_data, module_size); |
| 440 |
dbug(2, "verify_module returns %d\n", rc); |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
return rc; |
| 443 |
} |
| 444 |
#endif /* HAVE_NSS */ |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
/* |
| 447 |
* For stap modules which have not been signed by a trusted signer, |
| 448 |
* members of the 'stapusr' group can only use the "blessed" modules - |
| 449 |
* ones in the '/lib/modules/KVER/systemtap' directory. Make sure the |
| 450 |
* module path is in that directory. |
| 451 |
* |
| 452 |
* Returns: -1 on errors, 1 on success. |
| 453 |
*/ |
| 454 |
static int |
| 455 |
check_stap_module_path(const char *module_path, int module_fd) |
| 456 |
{ |
| 457 |
char staplib_dir_path[PATH_MAX]; |
| 458 |
char staplib_dir_realpath[PATH_MAX]; |
| 459 |
struct utsname utsbuf; |
| 460 |
struct stat sb; |
| 461 |
int rc = 1; |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
/* First, we need to figure out what the kernel |
| 464 |
* version is and build the '/lib/modules/KVER/systemtap' path. */ |
| 465 |
if (uname(&utsbuf) != 0) { |
| 466 |
_perr("ERROR: Unable to determine kernel version, uname failed"); |
| 467 |
return -1; |
| 468 |
} |
| 469 |
if (sprintf_chk(staplib_dir_path, "/lib/modules/%s/systemtap", utsbuf.release)) |
| 470 |
return -1; |
| 471 |
/* Use realpath() to canonicalize the module directory path. */ |
| 472 |
if (realpath(staplib_dir_path, staplib_dir_realpath) == NULL) { |
| 473 |
perr("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 474 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 475 |
" Unable to canonicalize that directory", |
| 476 |
staplib_dir_path); |
| 477 |
return -1; |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
/* To make sure the user can't specify something like |
| 481 |
* /lib/modules/`uname -r`/systemtapmod.ko, put a '/' on the |
| 482 |
* end of staplib_dir_realpath. */ |
| 483 |
if (strlen(staplib_dir_realpath) < (PATH_MAX - 1)) |
| 484 |
/* Note that this strcat() is OK, since we just |
| 485 |
* checked the length of the resulting string. */ |
| 486 |
strcat(staplib_dir_realpath, "/"); |
| 487 |
else { |
| 488 |
err("Path \"%s\" is too long.", staplib_dir_realpath); |
| 489 |
return -1; |
| 490 |
} |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
/* Validate /lib/modules/KVER/systemtap. No need to use fstat on |
| 493 |
an open file descriptor to avoid TOCTOU, since the path will |
| 494 |
not be used to access the file system. */ |
| 495 |
if (stat(staplib_dir_path, &sb) < 0) { |
| 496 |
perr("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 497 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 498 |
" Error getting information on that directory", |
| 499 |
staplib_dir_path); |
| 500 |
return -1; |
| 501 |
} |
| 502 |
/* Make sure it is a directory. */ |
| 503 |
if (! S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { |
| 504 |
err("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 505 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 506 |
" That path must refer to a directory.\n", |
| 507 |
staplib_dir_path); |
| 508 |
return -1; |
| 509 |
} |
| 510 |
/* Make sure it is owned by root. */ |
| 511 |
if (sb.st_uid != 0) { |
| 512 |
err("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 513 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 514 |
" That directory should be owned by root.\n", |
| 515 |
staplib_dir_path); |
| 516 |
return -1; |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
/* Make sure it isn't world writable. */ |
| 519 |
if (sb.st_mode & S_IWOTH) { |
| 520 |
err("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 521 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 522 |
" That directory should not be world writable.\n", |
| 523 |
staplib_dir_path); |
| 524 |
return -1; |
| 525 |
} |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
/* Now we've got two canonicalized paths. Make sure |
| 528 |
* module_path starts with staplib_dir_realpath. */ |
| 529 |
if (strncmp(staplib_dir_realpath, module_path, |
| 530 |
strlen(staplib_dir_realpath)) != 0) { |
| 531 |
err("Members of the \"stapusr\" and \"stapsys\" groups can only use unsigned modules within\n" |
| 532 |
" the \"%s\" directory.\n" |
| 533 |
" Module \"%s\" does not exist within that directory.\n", |
| 534 |
staplib_dir_path, module_path); |
| 535 |
return -1; |
| 536 |
} |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
/* Validate the module permisions. */ |
| 539 |
if (fstat(module_fd, &sb) < 0) { |
| 540 |
perr("Couldn't get information on the module\"%s\"", module_path); |
| 541 |
return -1; |
| 542 |
} |
| 543 |
/* Make sure it is owned by root. */ |
| 544 |
if (sb.st_uid != 0) { |
| 545 |
err("The module \"%s\" must be owned by root.\n", module_path); |
| 546 |
rc = -1; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
/* Make sure it isn't world writable. */ |
| 549 |
if (sb.st_mode & S_IWOTH) { |
| 550 |
err("The module \"%s\" must not be world writable.\n", module_path); |
| 551 |
rc = -1; |
| 552 |
} |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
return rc; |
| 555 |
} |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
/* |
| 558 |
* Don't allow path-based authorization for the uprobes module at all. |
| 559 |
* Members of the 'stapusr' group can load a signed uprobes module, but |
| 560 |
* nothing else. Later we could consider allowing specific paths, like |
| 561 |
* the installed runtime or /lib/modules/... |
| 562 |
* |
| 563 |
* Returns: -1 on errors, 0 on failure, 1 on success. |
| 564 |
*/ |
| 565 |
static int |
| 566 |
check_uprobes_module_path ( |
| 567 |
const char *module_path __attribute__ ((unused)), |
| 568 |
int module_fd __attribute__ ((unused)) |
| 569 |
) |
| 570 |
{ |
| 571 |
return 0; |
| 572 |
} |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
/* |
| 575 |
* Obtain the privilege credentials required to load the given module from the module itself. |
| 576 |
* |
| 577 |
* Returns the required credentials if they can be determined or the default safe required |
| 578 |
* credentials otherwise. |
| 579 |
*/ |
| 580 |
static privilege_t get_module_required_credentials ( |
| 581 |
const char *module_path, |
| 582 |
const void* module_file __attribute__ ((unused)), |
| 583 |
const __off_t st_size __attribute__ ((unused)) |
| 584 |
) |
| 585 |
{ |
| 586 |
Elf_Scn *scn = 0; |
| 587 |
Elf_Data *data = 0; |
| 588 |
GElf_Shdr shdr; |
| 589 |
privilege_t privilege; |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
/* Look for the section containing the privilege information in the module. If we can't |
| 592 |
find the section, then we can assume that it is an old stap module, correctly signed, because: |
| 593 |
1) We only check privilege credentials for correctly signed modules |
| 594 |
2) A newer module would contain the required section. |
| 595 |
We can therefore assume that pr_stapusr is the required privilege level. |
| 596 |
*/ |
| 597 |
scn = find_section_in_module (module_file, st_size, STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION); |
| 598 |
if (! scn) { |
| 599 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 600 |
eprintf ("Section name \"%s\" not found in module %s.\n", STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, |
| 601 |
module_path); |
| 602 |
eprintf ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_stapusr)); |
| 603 |
} |
| 604 |
return pr_stapusr; |
| 605 |
} |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
/* From here on if there is an error in the data, then it is most likely caused by a newer |
| 608 |
module containing data that we don't understand. We must then assume the highest privilege |
| 609 |
requirement. |
| 610 |
Get the section header. */ |
| 611 |
if (gelf_getshdr (scn, & shdr) == NULL) { |
| 612 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 613 |
eprintf ("Error getting section header from section %s in module %s.\n", STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, |
| 614 |
module_path); |
| 615 |
eprintf ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_highest)); |
| 616 |
} |
| 617 |
return pr_highest; |
| 618 |
} |
| 619 |
|
| 620 |
/* The section should have at least one data item. */ |
| 621 |
if (shdr.sh_size < 1) { |
| 622 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 623 |
eprintf ("Section header from section %s in module %s has no items\n", STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, |
| 624 |
module_path); |
| 625 |
eprintf ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_highest)); |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
return pr_highest; |
| 628 |
} |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
/* The first data item contains the privilege requirement of the module. */ |
| 631 |
if ((data = elf_getdata (scn, data)) == NULL) { |
| 632 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 633 |
eprintf ("Error getting data from section %s in module %s\n", STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, |
| 634 |
module_path); |
| 635 |
eprintf ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_highest)); |
| 636 |
} |
| 637 |
return pr_highest; |
| 638 |
} |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
/* Make sure the data is the correct size. */ |
| 641 |
if (data->d_size != sizeof (privilege)) { |
| 642 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 643 |
eprintf ("Data in section %s is in module %s not the correct size\n", STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, |
| 644 |
module_path); |
| 645 |
eprintf ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_highest)); |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
return pr_highest; |
| 648 |
} |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
/* Obtain the data. It should already be in host byte order. */ |
| 651 |
privilege = *(privilege_t*)data->d_buf; |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
/* Make sure that the data is coherent. */ |
| 654 |
switch (privilege) { |
| 655 |
case pr_stapusr: |
| 656 |
case pr_stapsys: |
| 657 |
case pr_stapdev: |
| 658 |
break; /* ok */ |
| 659 |
default: |
| 660 |
if (verbose >= 1) { |
| 661 |
eprintf ("Unknown privilege data, 0x%x in section %s in module %s\n", |
| 662 |
(int)privilege, STAP_PRIVILEGE_SECTION, module_path); |
| 663 |
err ("Assuming required privilege level of %s.\n", pr_name (pr_highest)); |
| 664 |
} |
| 665 |
return pr_highest; |
| 666 |
} |
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
/* ALl is ok. Return the extracted privilege data. */ |
| 669 |
return privilege; |
| 670 |
} |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
/* |
| 673 |
* Check the user's group membership. |
| 674 |
* |
| 675 |
* o root and members of stapdev can do anything |
| 676 |
* o members of stapsys and stapusr can load signed modules compiled for their privilege levels |
| 677 |
* o all users can load modules from certain module-specific paths |
| 678 |
* |
| 679 |
* Returns: |
| 680 |
* -2 user has no privilege credentials |
| 681 |
* 0 on failure |
| 682 |
* 1 on success |
| 683 |
*/ |
| 684 |
static int |
| 685 |
check_groups ( |
| 686 |
const char *module_path, |
| 687 |
int module_fd, |
| 688 |
int module_signature_status, |
| 689 |
check_module_path_func check_path, |
| 690 |
const void *module_data, |
| 691 |
off_t module_size, |
| 692 |
privilege_t *assigned_user_credentials |
| 693 |
) |
| 694 |
{ |
| 695 |
privilege_t user_credentials, module_required_credentials; |
| 696 |
int rc; |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
/* Lookup the user's privilege credentials. */ |
| 699 |
user_credentials = get_privilege_credentials (); |
| 700 |
if (assigned_user_credentials) |
| 701 |
*assigned_user_credentials = user_credentials; |
| 702 |
|
| 703 |
/* Users with stapdev credentials (includes root) can do anything. */ |
| 704 |
if (pr_contains (user_credentials, pr_stapdev)) |
| 705 |
return 1; |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
/* Users with stapsys and stapusr credentials may be able to load a signed module. */ |
| 708 |
if (module_signature_status == MODULE_OK) { |
| 709 |
/* We must verify that the module was compiled for that privilege level. */ |
| 710 |
module_required_credentials = get_module_required_credentials (module_path, module_data, module_size); |
| 711 |
if (pr_contains (user_credentials, module_required_credentials)) { |
| 712 |
/* Our credentials are sufficient */ |
| 713 |
return 1; |
| 714 |
} |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
/* Our credentials are insufficient to load this module. */ |
| 717 |
err("Your privilege credentials (%s) are insufficient to load the module %s (%s required)\n", |
| 718 |
pr_name (user_credentials), module_path, pr_name (module_required_credentials)); |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
if (user_credentials == pr_none) |
| 721 |
return -2; |
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
return 0; |
| 724 |
} |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
/* Not fatal. The module could still be on a blessed path. */ |
| 727 |
assert (module_signature_status == MODULE_UNTRUSTED || |
| 728 |
module_signature_status == MODULE_CHECK_ERROR); |
| 729 |
|
| 730 |
/* Check whether this module can be loaded based on its path. check_path is a pointer to a |
| 731 |
module-specific function which will do this. If we can load this module due to its path, |
| 732 |
then assign all privilege credentials to the user, since the module may require them. */ |
| 733 |
rc = check_path (module_path, module_fd); |
| 734 |
if (rc == 1) { |
| 735 |
if (assigned_user_credentials) |
| 736 |
*assigned_user_credentials = pr_all; |
| 737 |
} |
| 738 |
else |
| 739 |
err("Unable to verify the signature for the module %s.\n", module_path); |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
return rc; |
| 742 |
} |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
/* |
| 745 |
* Check the user's permissions. Is he allowed to run staprun, or is |
| 746 |
* he limited to "blessed" modules? |
| 747 |
* |
| 748 |
* There are several levels of possible permission: |
| 749 |
* |
| 750 |
* 1) root can do anything |
| 751 |
* 2) members of stapdev can do anything |
| 752 |
* 3) members of stapsys and stapusr can load signed modules compiled for their privilege levels |
| 753 |
* 4) all users can load unsigned modules from /lib/modules/KVER/systemtap |
| 754 |
* |
| 755 |
* It is only an error if all 4 levels of checking fail |
| 756 |
*/ |
| 757 |
void assert_stap_module_permissions( |
| 758 |
const char *module_path, |
| 759 |
int module_fd, |
| 760 |
const void *module_data, |
| 761 |
off_t module_size, |
| 762 |
privilege_t *user_credentials |
| 763 |
) { |
| 764 |
int check_groups_rc; |
| 765 |
int check_signature_rc; |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
/* Attempt to verify the module against its signature. Exit |
| 768 |
immediately if the module has been tampered with (altered). */ |
| 769 |
check_signature_rc = check_signature (module_path, module_data, module_size); |
| 770 |
if (check_signature_rc == MODULE_ALTERED) |
| 771 |
exit(-1); |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
/* If we're root, we can do anything. */ |
| 774 |
if (getuid() == 0) { |
| 775 |
/* ... like overriding the real UID */ |
| 776 |
const char *env_id = getenv("SYSTEMTAP_REAL_UID"); |
| 777 |
if (env_id && setreuid(atoi(env_id), -1)) |
| 778 |
warn("Couldn't set staprun UID to '%s': %s", |
| 779 |
env_id, strerror(errno)); |
| 780 |
|
| 781 |
/* ... or overriding the real GID */ |
| 782 |
env_id = getenv("SYSTEMTAP_REAL_GID"); |
| 783 |
if (env_id && setregid(atoi(env_id), -1)) |
| 784 |
warn("Couldn't set staprun GID to '%s': %s", |
| 785 |
env_id, strerror(errno)); |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
if (user_credentials) |
| 788 |
*user_credentials = pr_all; |
| 789 |
return; |
| 790 |
} |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
/* Check permissions for group membership. */ |
| 793 |
check_groups_rc = check_groups (module_path, module_fd, check_signature_rc, |
| 794 |
check_stap_module_path, module_data, module_size, |
| 795 |
user_credentials); |
| 796 |
if (check_groups_rc == 1) |
| 797 |
return; |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
/* Are we are an ordinary user?. */ |
| 800 |
if (check_groups_rc == -2) { |
| 801 |
err("You are trying to run systemtap as a normal user.\n" |
| 802 |
"You should either be root, or be part of " |
| 803 |
"group \"stapusr\" and possibly the groups \"stapsys\" or \"stapdev\".\n"); |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
exit(-1); |
| 807 |
} |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
/* |
| 810 |
* Check the user's permissions. Is he allowed to load the uprobes module? |
| 811 |
* |
| 812 |
* There are several levels of possible permission: |
| 813 |
* |
| 814 |
* 1) root can do anything |
| 815 |
* 2) members of stapdev can do anything |
| 816 |
* 3) members of stapusr can load a uprobes module which has been signed by a |
| 817 |
* trusted signer |
| 818 |
* |
| 819 |
* It is only an error if all 3 levels of checking fail |
| 820 |
*/ |
| 821 |
void assert_uprobes_module_permissions( |
| 822 |
const char *module_path, |
| 823 |
int module_fd, |
| 824 |
const void *module_data, |
| 825 |
off_t module_size, |
| 826 |
privilege_t *user_credentials |
| 827 |
) { |
| 828 |
int check_groups_rc; |
| 829 |
int check_signature_rc; |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
/* Attempt to verify the module against its signature. Return failure |
| 832 |
if the module has been tampered with (altered). */ |
| 833 |
check_signature_rc = check_signature (module_path, module_data, module_size); |
| 834 |
if (check_signature_rc == MODULE_ALTERED) |
| 835 |
exit(-1); |
| 836 |
|
| 837 |
/* root can still load this module. */ |
| 838 |
if (getuid() == 0) { |
| 839 |
if (user_credentials) |
| 840 |
*user_credentials = pr_all; |
| 841 |
return; |
| 842 |
} |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
/* Members of the groups stapdev and stapusr can still load this module. */ |
| 845 |
check_groups_rc = check_groups (module_path, module_fd, check_signature_rc, |
| 846 |
check_uprobes_module_path, module_data, module_size, |
| 847 |
user_credentials); |
| 848 |
if (check_groups_rc == 1) |
| 849 |
return; |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
/* Check permissions for group membership. */ |
| 852 |
if (check_groups_rc == -2) { |
| 853 |
err("You are trying to load the module %s as a normal user.\n" |
| 854 |
"You should either be root, or be part of " |
| 855 |
"group \"stapusr\" and possibly the groups \"stapsys\" or \"stapdev\".\n", |
| 856 |
module_path); |
| 857 |
} |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
exit(-1); |
| 860 |
} |