| 1 |
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| 2 |
|
| 3 |
#include <pwd.h> |
| 4 |
#include <sys/file.h> |
| 5 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 6 |
#include "efivars.h" |
| 7 |
#include "time-util.h" |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
#include "sd-id128.h" |
| 10 |
#include "sd-json.h" |
| 11 |
#include "sd-varlink.h" |
| 12 |
|
| 13 |
#include "alloc-util.h" |
| 14 |
#include "blockdev-util.h" |
| 15 |
#include "chattr-util.h" |
| 16 |
#include "copy.h" |
| 17 |
#include "creds-util.h" |
| 18 |
#include "crypto-util.h" |
| 19 |
#include "efi-api.h" |
| 20 |
#include "env-util.h" |
| 21 |
#include "errno-util.h" |
| 22 |
#include "fd-util.h" |
| 23 |
#include "fileio.h" |
| 24 |
#include "find-esp.h" |
| 25 |
#include "format-util.h" |
| 26 |
#include "fs-util.h" |
| 27 |
#include "io-util.h" |
| 28 |
#include "json-util.h" |
| 29 |
#include "log.h" |
| 30 |
#include "memory-util.h" |
| 31 |
#include "mkdir.h" |
| 32 |
#include "parse-util.h" |
| 33 |
#include "path-util.h" |
| 34 |
#include "random-util.h" |
| 35 |
#include "recurse-dir.h" |
| 36 |
#include "sparse-endian.h" |
| 37 |
#include "stat-util.h" |
| 38 |
#include "string-util.h" |
| 39 |
#include "tmpfile-util.h" |
| 40 |
#include "tpm2-pcr.h" |
| 41 |
#include "tpm2-util.h" |
| 42 |
#include "user-util.h" |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
#define PUBLIC_KEY_MAX (UINT32_C(1024) * UINT32_C(1024)) |
| 45 |
|
| 46 |
bool credential_name_valid(const char *s) { |
| 47 |
/* We want that credential names are both valid in filenames (since that's our primary way to pass |
| 48 |
* them around) and as fdnames (which is how we might want to pass them around eventually) */ |
| 49 |
return filename_is_valid(s) && fdname_is_valid(s); |
| 50 |
} |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
bool credential_glob_valid(const char *s) { |
| 53 |
const char *e, *a; |
| 54 |
size_t n; |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
/* Checks if a credential glob expression is valid. Note that this is more restrictive than |
| 57 |
* fnmatch()! We only allow trailing asterisk matches for now (simply because we want some freedom |
| 58 |
* with automatically extending the pattern in a systematic way to cover for unit instances getting |
| 59 |
* per-instance credentials or similar. Moreover, credential globbing expressions are also more |
| 60 |
* restrictive than credential names: we don't allow *, ?, [, ] in them (except for the asterisk |
| 61 |
* match at the end of the string), simply to not allow ambiguity. After all, we want the flexibility |
| 62 |
* to one day add full globbing should the need arise. */ |
| 63 |
|
| 64 |
if (isempty(s)) |
| 65 |
return false; |
| 66 |
|
| 67 |
/* Find first glob (or NUL byte) */ |
| 68 |
n = strcspn(s, "*?[]"); |
| 69 |
e = s + n; |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
/* For now, only allow asterisk wildcards, and only at the end of the string. If it's anything else, refuse. */ |
| 72 |
if (isempty(e)) |
| 73 |
return credential_name_valid(s); |
| 74 |
|
| 75 |
if (!streq(e, "*")) /* only allow trailing "*", no other globs */ |
| 76 |
return false; |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
if (n == 0) /* Explicitly allow the complete wildcard. */ |
| 79 |
return true; |
| 80 |
|
| 81 |
if (n > NAME_MAX + strlen(e)) /* before we make a copy on the stack, let's check this is not overly large */ |
| 82 |
return false; |
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
/* Make a copy of the string without the '*' suffix */ |
| 85 |
a = strndupa_safe(s, n); |
| 86 |
|
| 87 |
return credential_name_valid(a); |
| 88 |
} |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
static int get_credentials_dir_internal(const char *envvar, const char **ret) { |
| 91 |
const char *e; |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
assert(ret); |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
e = secure_getenv(envvar); |
| 96 |
if (!e) |
| 97 |
return -ENXIO; |
| 98 |
|
| 99 |
if (!path_is_absolute(e) || !path_is_normalized(e)) |
| 100 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
*ret = e; |
| 103 |
return 0; |
| 104 |
} |
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
int get_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| 107 |
return get_credentials_dir_internal("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| 108 |
} |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
int get_encrypted_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| 111 |
return get_credentials_dir_internal("ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| 112 |
} |
| 113 |
|
| 114 |
int open_credentials_dir(void) { |
| 115 |
const char *d; |
| 116 |
int r; |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
r = get_credentials_dir(&d); |
| 119 |
if (r < 0) |
| 120 |
return r; |
| 121 |
|
| 122 |
return RET_NERRNO(open(d, O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY)); |
| 123 |
} |
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
int get_system_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| 126 |
int r; |
| 127 |
|
| 128 |
assert(ret); |
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
/* Note that for system credentials the environment variable we honour is just for debugging purpose |
| 131 |
* (unlike for the per-service credential path env var where it's key part of the protocol). */ |
| 132 |
r = get_credentials_dir_internal("SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| 133 |
if (r >= 0 || r != -ENXIO) |
| 134 |
return r; |
| 135 |
|
| 136 |
*ret = SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY; |
| 137 |
return 0; |
| 138 |
} |
| 139 |
|
| 140 |
int get_encrypted_system_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| 141 |
int r; |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
assert(ret); |
| 144 |
|
| 145 |
r = get_credentials_dir_internal("SYSTEMD_ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| 146 |
if (r >= 0 || r != -ENXIO) |
| 147 |
return r; |
| 148 |
|
| 149 |
*ret = ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY; |
| 150 |
return 0; |
| 151 |
} |
| 152 |
|
| 153 |
int read_credential(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| 154 |
_cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL; |
| 155 |
const char *d; |
| 156 |
int r; |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
assert(ret); |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
if (!credential_name_valid(name)) |
| 161 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
r = get_credentials_dir(&d); |
| 164 |
if (r < 0) |
| 165 |
return r; |
| 166 |
|
| 167 |
fn = path_join(d, name); |
| 168 |
if (!fn) |
| 169 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
return read_full_file_full( |
| 172 |
AT_FDCWD, fn, |
| 173 |
UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, |
| 174 |
READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE, |
| 175 |
NULL, |
| 176 |
(char**) ret, ret_size); |
| 177 |
} |
| 178 |
|
| 179 |
int read_credential_with_decryption(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| 180 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec ret_iovec = {}; |
| 181 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *data = NULL; |
| 182 |
_cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL; |
| 183 |
size_t sz = 0; |
| 184 |
const char *d; |
| 185 |
int r; |
| 186 |
|
| 187 |
/* Just like read_credential() but will also look for encrypted credentials. Note that services only |
| 188 |
* receive decrypted credentials, hence use read_credential() for those. This helper here is for |
| 189 |
* generators, i.e. code that runs outside of service context, and thus has no decrypted credentials |
| 190 |
* yet. |
| 191 |
* |
| 192 |
* Note that read_credential_harder_and_warn() logs on its own, while read_credential() does not! |
| 193 |
* (It's a lot more complex and error prone given its TPM2 connectivity, and is generally called from |
| 194 |
* generators only where logging is OK). |
| 195 |
* |
| 196 |
* Error handling is also a bit different: if we can't find a credential we'll return 0 and NULL |
| 197 |
* pointers/zero size, rather than -ENXIO/-ENOENT. */ |
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
if (!credential_name_valid(name)) |
| 200 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", name); |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
r = read_credential(name, ret, ret_size); |
| 203 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 204 |
return 1; /* found */ |
| 205 |
if (!IN_SET(r, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) |
| 206 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read unencrypted credential '%s': %m", name); |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
r = get_encrypted_credentials_dir(&d); |
| 209 |
if (r == -ENXIO) |
| 210 |
goto not_found; |
| 211 |
if (r < 0) |
| 212 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine encrypted credentials directory: %m"); |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
fn = path_join(d, name); |
| 215 |
if (!fn) |
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return log_oom(); |
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
r = read_full_file_full( |
| 219 |
AT_FDCWD, fn, |
| 220 |
UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, |
| 221 |
READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE, |
| 222 |
NULL, |
| 223 |
(char**) &data, &sz); |
| 224 |
if (r == -ENOENT) |
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goto not_found; |
| 226 |
if (r < 0) |
| 227 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read encrypted credential data: %m"); |
| 228 |
|
| 229 |
if (geteuid() != 0) |
| 230 |
r = ipc_decrypt_credential( |
| 231 |
name, |
| 232 |
now(CLOCK_REALTIME), |
| 233 |
getuid(), |
| 234 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(data, sz), |
| 235 |
CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE, |
| 236 |
&ret_iovec); |
| 237 |
else |
| 238 |
r = decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 239 |
name, |
| 240 |
now(CLOCK_REALTIME), |
| 241 |
/* tpm2_device= */ NULL, |
| 242 |
/* tpm2_signature_path= */ NULL, |
| 243 |
getuid(), |
| 244 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(data, sz), |
| 245 |
CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE, |
| 246 |
&ret_iovec); |
| 247 |
if (r < 0) |
| 248 |
return r; |
| 249 |
|
| 250 |
if (ret) |
| 251 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(ret_iovec.iov_base); |
| 252 |
if (ret_size) |
| 253 |
*ret_size = ret_iovec.iov_len; |
| 254 |
|
| 255 |
return 1; /* found */ |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
not_found: |
| 258 |
if (ret) |
| 259 |
*ret = NULL; |
| 260 |
if (ret_size) |
| 261 |
*ret_size = 0; |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
return 0; /* not found */ |
| 264 |
} |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
int read_credential_strings_many_internal( |
| 267 |
const char *first_name, char **first_value, |
| 268 |
...) { |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
_cleanup_free_ void *b = NULL; |
| 271 |
bool all = true; |
| 272 |
int r, ret = 0; |
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
assert(first_value); |
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
/* Reads a bunch of credentials into the specified buffers. If the specified buffers are already |
| 277 |
* non-NULL frees them if a credential is found. Only supports string-based credentials |
| 278 |
* (i.e. refuses embedded NUL bytes). |
| 279 |
* |
| 280 |
* 0 is returned when some or all credentials are missing. |
| 281 |
*/ |
| 282 |
|
| 283 |
if (!first_name) |
| 284 |
return 0; |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
r = read_credential(first_name, &b, NULL); |
| 287 |
if (r == -ENXIO) /* No creds passed at all? Bail immediately. */ |
| 288 |
return 0; |
| 289 |
if (r == -ENOENT) |
| 290 |
all = false; |
| 291 |
else if (r < 0) |
| 292 |
RET_GATHER(ret, r); |
| 293 |
else |
| 294 |
free_and_replace(*first_value, b); |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
va_list ap; |
| 297 |
va_start(ap, first_value); |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
for (;;) { |
| 300 |
_cleanup_free_ void *bb = NULL; |
| 301 |
const char *name; |
| 302 |
char **value; |
| 303 |
|
| 304 |
name = va_arg(ap, const char *); |
| 305 |
if (!name) |
| 306 |
break; |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
value = ASSERT_PTR(va_arg(ap, char **)); |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
r = read_credential(name, &bb, NULL); |
| 311 |
if (r == -ENOENT) |
| 312 |
all = false; |
| 313 |
else if (r < 0) |
| 314 |
RET_GATHER(ret, r); |
| 315 |
else |
| 316 |
free_and_replace(*value, bb); |
| 317 |
} |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
va_end(ap); |
| 320 |
return ret < 0 ? ret : all; |
| 321 |
} |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
int read_credential_bool(const char *name) { |
| 324 |
_cleanup_free_ void *data = NULL; |
| 325 |
int r; |
| 326 |
|
| 327 |
r = read_credential(name, &data, NULL); |
| 328 |
if (r < 0) |
| 329 |
return IN_SET(r, -ENXIO, -ENOENT) ? 0 : r; |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
return parse_boolean(data); |
| 332 |
} |
| 333 |
|
| 334 |
int get_credential_user_password(const char *username, char **ret_password, bool *ret_is_hashed) { |
| 335 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *creds_password = NULL; |
| 336 |
_cleanup_free_ char *cn = NULL; |
| 337 |
int r; |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
assert(ret_password); |
| 340 |
assert(ret_is_hashed); |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
/* Try to pick up the password for this account via the credentials logic */ |
| 343 |
cn = strjoin("passwd.hashed-password.", username); |
| 344 |
if (!cn) |
| 345 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_password, NULL); |
| 348 |
if (r == -ENOENT) { |
| 349 |
free(cn); |
| 350 |
cn = strjoin("passwd.plaintext-password.", username); |
| 351 |
if (!cn) |
| 352 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_password, NULL); |
| 355 |
if (r < 0) |
| 356 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn); |
| 357 |
else |
| 358 |
*ret_is_hashed = false; |
| 359 |
} else if (r < 0) |
| 360 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn); |
| 361 |
else |
| 362 |
*ret_is_hashed = true; |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
*ret_password = TAKE_PTR(creds_password); |
| 365 |
|
| 366 |
return r; |
| 367 |
} |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
#if HAVE_OPENSSL |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
#define CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE 4096 |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
static const sd_id128_t credential_app_id = |
| 374 |
SD_ID128_MAKE(d3,ac,ec,ba,0d,ad,4c,df,b8,c9,38,15,28,93,6c,58); |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
struct credential_host_secret_format { |
| 377 |
/* The hashed machine ID of the machine this belongs to. Why? We want to ensure that each machine |
| 378 |
* gets its own secret, even if people forget to flush out this secret file. Hence we bind it to the |
| 379 |
* machine ID, for which there's hopefully a better chance it will be flushed out. We use a hashed |
| 380 |
* machine ID instead of the literal one, because it's trivial to, and it might be a good idea not |
| 381 |
* being able to directly associate a secret key file with a host. */ |
| 382 |
sd_id128_t machine_id; |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
/* The actual secret key */ |
| 385 |
uint8_t data[CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE]; |
| 386 |
} _packed_; |
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
static void warn_not_encrypted(int fd, CredentialSecretFlags flags, const char *dirname, const char *filename) { |
| 389 |
int r; |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
assert(fd >= 0); |
| 392 |
assert(dirname); |
| 393 |
assert(filename); |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED)) |
| 396 |
return; |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
r = fd_is_encrypted(fd); |
| 399 |
if (r < 0) |
| 400 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if credential secret file '%s/%s' is encrypted.", |
| 401 |
dirname, filename); |
| 402 |
else if (r == 0) |
| 403 |
log_warning("Credential secret file '%s/%s' is not located on encrypted media, using anyway.", |
| 404 |
dirname, filename); |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
static int make_credential_host_secret( |
| 408 |
int dfd, |
| 409 |
const sd_id128_t machine_id, |
| 410 |
CredentialSecretFlags flags, |
| 411 |
const char *dirname, |
| 412 |
const char *fn, |
| 413 |
struct iovec *ret) { |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; |
| 416 |
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| 417 |
int r; |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
assert(dfd >= 0); |
| 420 |
assert(fn); |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
fd = open_tmpfile_linkable_at(dfd, fn, O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY, &t); |
| 423 |
if (fd < 0) |
| 424 |
return log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to create temporary file for credential host secret: %m"); |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
CLEANUP_TMPFILE_AT(dfd, t); |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
r = chattr_secret(fd, 0); |
| 429 |
if (r < 0) |
| 430 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set file attributes for secrets file, ignoring: %m"); |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
struct credential_host_secret_format buf = { |
| 433 |
.machine_id = machine_id, |
| 434 |
}; |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
CLEANUP_ERASE(buf); |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
r = crypto_random_bytes(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data)); |
| 439 |
if (r < 0) |
| 440 |
return r; |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
r = loop_write(fd, &buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| 443 |
if (r < 0) |
| 444 |
return r; |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
if (fchmod(fd, 0400) < 0) |
| 447 |
return -errno; |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
warn_not_encrypted(fd, flags, dirname, fn); |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
r = link_tmpfile_at(fd, dfd, t, fn, LINK_TMPFILE_SYNC); |
| 452 |
if (r < 0) |
| 453 |
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to link host key into place: %m"); |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
t = mfree(t); /* disarm CLEANUP_TMPFILE_AT() */ |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
if (ret) { |
| 458 |
void *copy; |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
copy = memdup(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data)); |
| 461 |
if (!copy) |
| 462 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
*ret = IOVEC_MAKE(copy, sizeof(buf.data)); |
| 465 |
} |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
return 0; |
| 468 |
} |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 471 |
_cleanup_free_ char *_dirname = NULL, *_filename = NULL; |
| 472 |
_cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF; |
| 473 |
sd_id128_t machine_id; |
| 474 |
const char *dirname, *filename; |
| 475 |
int r; |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
r = sd_id128_get_machine_app_specific(credential_app_id, &machine_id); |
| 478 |
if (r < 0) |
| 479 |
return r; |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
const char *e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET"); |
| 482 |
if (e) { |
| 483 |
if (!path_is_normalized(e)) |
| 484 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 485 |
if (!path_is_absolute(e)) |
| 486 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
r = path_split_prefix_filename(e, &_dirname, &_filename); |
| 489 |
if (r < 0) |
| 490 |
return r; |
| 491 |
if (r == O_DIRECTORY) |
| 492 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
/* We validate that the path is absolute above, hence dirname must be extractable. */ |
| 495 |
dirname = _dirname; |
| 496 |
filename = _filename; |
| 497 |
} else { |
| 498 |
dirname = "/var/lib/systemd"; |
| 499 |
filename = "credential.secret"; |
| 500 |
} |
| 501 |
|
| 502 |
assert(dirname); |
| 503 |
assert(filename); |
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
(void) mkdir_parents(dirname, 0755); |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
dfd = open_mkdir(dirname, O_CLOEXEC, 0755); |
| 508 |
if (dfd < 0) |
| 509 |
return log_debug_errno(dfd, "Failed to create or open directory '%s': %m", dirname); |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS)) { |
| 512 |
r = fd_is_temporary_fs(dfd); |
| 513 |
if (r < 0) |
| 514 |
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check directory '%s': %m", dirname); |
| 515 |
if (r > 0) |
| 516 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEDIUM), |
| 517 |
"Directory '%s' is on a temporary file system, refusing.", dirname); |
| 518 |
} |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
for (unsigned attempt = 0;; attempt++) { |
| 521 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) struct credential_host_secret_format *f = NULL; |
| 522 |
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| 523 |
size_t l = 0; |
| 524 |
ssize_t n = 0; |
| 525 |
struct stat st; |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
if (attempt >= 3) /* Somebody is playing games with us */ |
| 528 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), |
| 529 |
"All attempts to create secret store in %s failed.", dirname); |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
fd = openat(dfd, filename, O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW); |
| 532 |
if (fd < 0) { |
| 533 |
if (errno != ENOENT || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE)) |
| 534 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| 535 |
"Failed to open %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
r = make_credential_host_secret(dfd, machine_id, flags, dirname, filename, ret); |
| 538 |
if (r == -EEXIST) { |
| 539 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Credential secret %s/%s appeared while we were creating it, rereading.", |
| 540 |
dirname, filename); |
| 541 |
continue; |
| 542 |
} |
| 543 |
if (r < 0) |
| 544 |
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create credential secret %s/%s: %m", |
| 545 |
dirname, filename); |
| 546 |
return 0; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) |
| 550 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
r = stat_verify_regular(&st); |
| 553 |
if (r < 0) |
| 554 |
return log_debug_errno(r, "%s/%s is not a regular file: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 555 |
if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Deleted by now, try again */ |
| 556 |
continue; |
| 557 |
if (st.st_nlink > 1) |
| 558 |
/* Our deletion check won't work if hardlinked somewhere else */ |
| 559 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| 560 |
"%s/%s has too many links, refusing.", |
| 561 |
dirname, filename); |
| 562 |
if ((st.st_mode & 07777) != 0400) |
| 563 |
/* Don't use file if not 0400 access mode */ |
| 564 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| 565 |
"%s/%s has permissive access mode, refusing.", |
| 566 |
dirname, filename); |
| 567 |
l = st.st_size; |
| 568 |
if (l < offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data) + 1) |
| 569 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| 570 |
"%s/%s is too small, refusing.", dirname, filename); |
| 571 |
if (l > 16*1024*1024) |
| 572 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(E2BIG), |
| 573 |
"%s/%s is too big, refusing.", dirname, filename); |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
f = malloc(l+1); |
| 576 |
if (!f) |
| 577 |
return log_oom_debug(); |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
n = read(fd, f, l+1); |
| 580 |
if (n < 0) |
| 581 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| 582 |
"Failed to read %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 583 |
if ((size_t) n != l) /* What? The size changed? */ |
| 584 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), |
| 585 |
"Failed to read %s/%s.", dirname, filename); |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
if (sd_id128_equal(machine_id, f->machine_id)) { |
| 588 |
size_t sz; |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
warn_not_encrypted(fd, flags, dirname, filename); |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
sz = l - offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data); |
| 593 |
assert(sz > 0); |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
if (ret) { |
| 596 |
void *copy; |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
assert(sz <= sizeof(f->data)); /* Ensure we don't read past f->data bounds */ |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
copy = memdup(f->data, sz); |
| 601 |
if (!copy) |
| 602 |
return log_oom_debug(); |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
*ret = IOVEC_MAKE(copy, sz); |
| 605 |
} |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
return 0; |
| 608 |
} |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
/* Hmm, this secret is from somewhere else. Let's delete the file. Let's first acquire a lock |
| 611 |
* to ensure we are the only ones accessing the file while we delete it. */ |
| 612 |
|
| 613 |
if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) |
| 614 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| 615 |
"Failed to flock %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
/* Before we delete it check that the file is still linked into the file system */ |
| 618 |
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) |
| 619 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 620 |
if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Already deleted by now? */ |
| 621 |
continue; |
| 622 |
if (st.st_nlink != 1) /* Safety check, someone is playing games with us */ |
| 623 |
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| 624 |
"%s/%s unexpectedly has too many links.", |
| 625 |
dirname, filename); |
| 626 |
if (unlinkat(dfd, filename, 0) < 0) |
| 627 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unlink %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
/* And now try again */ |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
} |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
/* Construction is like this: |
| 634 |
* |
| 635 |
* A symmetric encryption key is derived from: |
| 636 |
* |
| 637 |
* 1. Either the "host" key (a key stored in /var/lib/credential.secret) |
| 638 |
* |
| 639 |
* 2. A key generated by letting the TPM2 calculate an HMAC hash of some nonce we pass to it, keyed |
| 640 |
* by a key derived from its internal seed key. |
| 641 |
* |
| 642 |
* 3. The concatenation of the above. |
| 643 |
* |
| 644 |
* 4. Or a fixed "empty" key. This will not provide confidentiality or authenticity, of course, but is |
| 645 |
* useful to encode credentials for the initrd on TPM-less systems, where we simply have no better |
| 646 |
* concept to bind things to. Note that decryption of a key set up like this will be refused on |
| 647 |
* systems that have a TPM and have SecureBoot enabled. |
| 648 |
* |
| 649 |
* The above is hashed with SHA256 which is then used as encryption key for AES256-GCM. The encrypted |
| 650 |
* credential is a short (unencrypted) header describing which of the three keys to use, the IV to use for |
| 651 |
* AES256-GCM and some more meta information (sizes of certain objects) that is strictly speaking redundant, |
| 652 |
* but kinda nice to have since we can have a more generic parser. If the TPM2 key is used this is followed |
| 653 |
* by another (unencrypted) header, with information about the TPM2 policy used (specifically: the PCR mask |
| 654 |
* to bind against, and a hash of the resulting policy — the latter being redundant, but speeding up things a |
| 655 |
* bit, since we can more quickly refuse PCR state), followed by a sealed/exported TPM2 HMAC key. This is |
| 656 |
* then followed by the encrypted data, which begins with a metadata header (which contains validity |
| 657 |
* timestamps as well as the credential name), followed by the actual credential payload. The file ends in |
| 658 |
* the AES256-GCM tag. To make things simple, the AES256-GCM AAD covers the main and the TPM2 header in |
| 659 |
* full. This means the whole file is either protected by AAD, or is ciphertext, or is the tag. No |
| 660 |
* unprotected data is included. |
| 661 |
*/ |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
struct _packed_ encrypted_credential_header { |
| 664 |
sd_id128_t id; |
| 665 |
le32_t key_size; |
| 666 |
le32_t block_size; |
| 667 |
le32_t iv_size; |
| 668 |
le32_t tag_size; |
| 669 |
uint8_t iv[]; |
| 670 |
/* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| 671 |
}; |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
struct _packed_ tpm2_credential_header { |
| 674 |
le64_t pcr_mask; /* Note that the spec for PC Clients only mandates 24 PCRs, and that's what systems |
| 675 |
* generally have. But keep the door open for more. */ |
| 676 |
le16_t pcr_bank; /* For now, either TPM2_ALG_SHA256 or TPM2_ALG_SHA1 */ |
| 677 |
le16_t primary_alg; /* Primary key algorithm (either TPM2_ALG_RSA or TPM2_ALG_ECC for now) */ |
| 678 |
le32_t blob_size; |
| 679 |
le32_t policy_hash_size; |
| 680 |
uint8_t policy_hash_and_blob[]; |
| 681 |
/* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| 682 |
}; |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
struct _packed_ tpm2_public_key_credential_header { |
| 685 |
le64_t pcr_mask; /* PCRs used for the public key PCR policy (usually just PCR 11, i.e. the unified kernel) */ |
| 686 |
le32_t size; /* Size of DER public key */ |
| 687 |
uint8_t data[]; /* DER public key */ |
| 688 |
/* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| 689 |
}; |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
struct _packed_ scoped_credential_header { |
| 692 |
le64_t flags; /* SCOPE_HASH_DATA_BASE_FLAGS for now */ |
| 693 |
}; |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
/* This header is encrypted */ |
| 696 |
struct _packed_ metadata_credential_header { |
| 697 |
le64_t timestamp; |
| 698 |
le64_t not_after; |
| 699 |
le32_t name_size; |
| 700 |
char name[]; |
| 701 |
/* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| 702 |
}; |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
struct _packed_ scoped_hash_data { |
| 705 |
le64_t flags; /* copy of the scoped_credential_header.flags */ |
| 706 |
le32_t uid; |
| 707 |
sd_id128_t machine_id; |
| 708 |
char username[]; /* followed by the username */ |
| 709 |
/* Later on we might want to extend this: with a cgroup path to allow per-app secrets, and with the user's $HOME encryption key */ |
| 710 |
}; |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
enum { |
| 713 |
/* Flags for scoped_hash_data.flags and scoped_credential_header.flags */ |
| 714 |
SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_UID = 1 << 0, |
| 715 |
SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_MACHINE = 1 << 1, |
| 716 |
SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_USERNAME = 1 << 2, |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
SCOPE_HASH_DATA_BASE_FLAGS = SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_UID | SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_USERNAME | SCOPE_HASH_DATA_HAS_MACHINE, |
| 719 |
}; |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
/* Some generic limit for parts of the encrypted credential for which we don't know the right size ahead of |
| 722 |
* time, but where we are really sure it won't be larger than this. Should be larger than any possible IV, |
| 723 |
* padding, tag size and so on. This is purely used for early filtering out of invalid sizes. */ |
| 724 |
#define CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX (16U*1024U) |
| 725 |
|
| 726 |
static int sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key( |
| 727 |
const struct iovec *host_key, |
| 728 |
const struct iovec *tpm2_key, |
| 729 |
uint8_t ret[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) { |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
_cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL; |
| 732 |
unsigned l; |
| 733 |
int r; |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
assert(iovec_is_valid(host_key)); |
| 736 |
assert(iovec_is_valid(tpm2_key)); |
| 737 |
assert(ret); |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
/* Combines the host key and the TPM2 HMAC hash into a SHA256 hash value we'll use as symmetric encryption key. */ |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
r = dlopen_libcrypto(LOG_DEBUG); |
| 742 |
if (r < 0) |
| 743 |
return r; |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
md = sym_EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| 746 |
if (!md) |
| 747 |
return log_oom(); |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
if (sym_EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, sym_EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1) |
| 750 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initial SHA256 context."); |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
if (iovec_is_set(host_key) && sym_EVP_DigestUpdate(md, host_key->iov_base, host_key->iov_len) != 1) |
| 753 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash host key."); |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
if (iovec_is_set(tpm2_key) && sym_EVP_DigestUpdate(md, tpm2_key->iov_base, tpm2_key->iov_len) != 1) |
| 756 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash TPM2 key."); |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
assert(sym_EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(md) == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
if (sym_EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, ret, &l) != 1) |
| 761 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize SHA256 hash."); |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
assert(l == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 764 |
return 0; |
| 765 |
} |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
static int mangle_uid_into_key( |
| 768 |
uid_t uid, |
| 769 |
uint8_t md[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) { |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
sd_id128_t mid; |
| 772 |
int r; |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
assert(uid_is_valid(uid)); |
| 775 |
assert(md); |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
/* If we shall encrypt for a specific user, we HMAC() a structure with the user's credentials |
| 778 |
* (specifically, UID, user name, machine ID) with the key we'd otherwise use for system credentials, |
| 779 |
* and use the resulting hash as actual encryption key. */ |
| 780 |
|
| 781 |
errno = 0; |
| 782 |
struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid); |
| 783 |
if (!pw) |
| 784 |
return log_error_errno( |
| 785 |
IN_SET(errno, 0, ENOENT) ? SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH) : errno, |
| 786 |
"Failed to resolve UID " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
r = sd_id128_get_machine(&mid); |
| 789 |
if (r < 0) |
| 790 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read machine ID: %m"); |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
size_t sz = offsetof(struct scoped_hash_data, username) + strlen(pw->pw_name) + 1; |
| 793 |
_cleanup_free_ struct scoped_hash_data *d = malloc0(sz); |
| 794 |
if (!d) |
| 795 |
return log_oom(); |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
d->flags = htole64(SCOPE_HASH_DATA_BASE_FLAGS); |
| 798 |
d->uid = htole32(uid); |
| 799 |
d->machine_id = mid; |
| 800 |
|
| 801 |
strcpy(d->username, pw->pw_name); |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *buf = NULL; |
| 804 |
size_t buf_size = 0; |
| 805 |
r = openssl_hmac_many( |
| 806 |
"sha256", |
| 807 |
md, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| 808 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(d, sz), 1, |
| 809 |
&buf, &buf_size); |
| 810 |
if (r < 0) |
| 811 |
return r; |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
assert(buf_size == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 814 |
memcpy(md, buf, buf_size); |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
return 0; |
| 817 |
} |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
int encrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 820 |
sd_id128_t with_key, |
| 821 |
const char *name, |
| 822 |
usec_t timestamp, |
| 823 |
usec_t not_after, |
| 824 |
const char *tpm2_device, |
| 825 |
uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, |
| 826 |
const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, |
| 827 |
uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, |
| 828 |
uid_t uid, |
| 829 |
const struct iovec *input, |
| 830 |
CredentialFlags flags, |
| 831 |
struct iovec *ret) { |
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec tpm2_blob = {}, tpm2_policy_hash = {}, iv = {}, pubkey = {}; |
| 834 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec tpm2_key = {}, output = {}, host_key = {}; |
| 835 |
_cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; |
| 836 |
_cleanup_free_ struct metadata_credential_header *m = NULL; |
| 837 |
#if HAVE_TPM2 |
| 838 |
uint16_t tpm2_pcr_bank = 0, tpm2_primary_alg = 0; |
| 839 |
#endif |
| 840 |
struct encrypted_credential_header *h; |
| 841 |
int ksz, bsz, ivsz, tsz, added, r; |
| 842 |
uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| 843 |
const EVP_CIPHER *cc; |
| 844 |
sd_id128_t id; |
| 845 |
size_t p, ml; |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
assert(iovec_is_valid(input)); |
| 848 |
assert(ret); |
| 849 |
|
| 850 |
/* Only one of these two flags may be set at the same time */ |
| 851 |
assert(!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL) || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL)); |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
CLEANUP_ERASE(md); |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
if (!CRED_KEY_IS_VALID(with_key) && !CRED_KEY_IS_AUTO(with_key)) |
| 856 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid key type: " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(with_key)); |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
if (name && !credential_name_valid(name)) |
| 859 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", name); |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY && timestamp != USEC_INFINITY && not_after < timestamp) |
| 862 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential is invalidated before it is valid (" USEC_FMT " < " USEC_FMT ").", not_after, timestamp); |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { |
| 865 |
char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX]; |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
if (name) |
| 868 |
log_debug("Including credential name '%s' in encrypted credential.", name); |
| 869 |
if (timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) |
| 870 |
log_debug("Including timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), timestamp)); |
| 871 |
if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY) |
| 872 |
log_debug("Including not-after timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), not_after)); |
| 873 |
} |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
if (CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(with_key)) { |
| 876 |
if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
| 877 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| 878 |
"Scoped credential key type "SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR" selected, but no UID specified.", SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(with_key)); |
| 879 |
} else |
| 880 |
uid = UID_INVALID; |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
if (CRED_KEY_WANTS_HOST(with_key) || CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_HOST(with_key)) { |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
r = get_credential_host_secret( |
| 885 |
CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE| |
| 886 |
CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED| |
| 887 |
(CRED_KEY_WANTS_HOST(with_key) ? CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS : 0), |
| 888 |
&host_key); |
| 889 |
if (r == -ENOMEDIUM && CRED_KEY_WANTS_HOST(with_key)) |
| 890 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Credential host secret location on temporary file system, not using."); |
| 891 |
else if (r < 0) |
| 892 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential host secret: %m"); |
| 893 |
} |
| 894 |
|
| 895 |
if (tpm2_hash_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX) |
| 896 |
tpm2_hash_pcr_mask = 0; |
| 897 |
if (tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX) |
| 898 |
tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT; |
| 899 |
|
| 900 |
#if HAVE_TPM2 |
| 901 |
bool try_tpm2; |
| 902 |
if (CRED_KEY_WANTS_TPM2(with_key)) { |
| 903 |
/* If automatic mode is selected lets see if a TPM2 it is present. If we are running in a |
| 904 |
* container tpm2_support will detect this, and will return a different flag combination of |
| 905 |
* TPM2_SUPPORT_FULL, effectively skipping the use of TPM2 when inside one. */ |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
try_tpm2 = tpm2_is_mostly_supported(); |
| 908 |
if (!try_tpm2) |
| 909 |
log_debug("System lacks TPM2 support or running in a container, not attempting to use TPM2."); |
| 910 |
} else |
| 911 |
try_tpm2 = CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2(with_key); |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
if (try_tpm2) { |
| 914 |
/* If the firmware does not support TPMs, then UKI measurements are not going to work, hence |
| 915 |
* PCR 11 public key stuff cannot work. Because of that, if PK is only wanted (but not |
| 916 |
* required) we won't try it. */ |
| 917 |
if ((CRED_KEY_WANTS_TPM2_PK(with_key) && tpm2_is_fully_supported()) || CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(with_key)) { |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
/* Load public key for PCR policies, if one is specified, or explicitly requested */ |
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(tpm2_pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len); |
| 922 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 923 |
if (r != -ENOENT || tpm2_pubkey_path || CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(with_key)) |
| 924 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM PCR public key: %m"); |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m"); |
| 927 |
} |
| 928 |
} |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
if (!iovec_is_set(&pubkey)) |
| 931 |
tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask = 0; |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL; |
| 934 |
r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(tpm2_device, &tpm2_context); |
| 935 |
if (r < 0) |
| 936 |
return r; |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
r = tpm2_get_best_pcr_bank(tpm2_context, tpm2_hash_pcr_mask | tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, &tpm2_pcr_bank); |
| 939 |
if (r < 0) |
| 940 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not find best pcr bank: %m"); |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
log_debug("Selected literal PCR mask: 0x%x, PK PCR mask: 0x%x", tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask); |
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
TPML_PCR_SELECTION tpm2_hash_pcr_selection; |
| 945 |
tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_mask(tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, tpm2_pcr_bank, &tpm2_hash_pcr_selection); |
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
_cleanup_free_ Tpm2PCRValue *tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL; |
| 948 |
size_t tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values; |
| 949 |
r = tpm2_pcr_read(tpm2_context, &tpm2_hash_pcr_selection, &tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values); |
| 950 |
if (r < 0) |
| 951 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not read PCR values: %m"); |
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
TPM2B_PUBLIC public; |
| 954 |
if (iovec_is_set(&pubkey)) { |
| 955 |
r = tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(pubkey.iov_base, pubkey.iov_len, &public); |
| 956 |
if (r < 0) |
| 957 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not convert public key to TPM2B_PUBLIC: %m"); |
| 958 |
} |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
TPM2B_DIGEST tpm2_policy = TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); |
| 961 |
r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy( |
| 962 |
tpm2_hash_pcr_values, |
| 963 |
tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, |
| 964 |
iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? &public : NULL, |
| 965 |
/* use_pin= */ false, |
| 966 |
/* pcrlock_policy= */ NULL, |
| 967 |
&tpm2_policy); |
| 968 |
if (r < 0) |
| 969 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not calculate sealing policy digest: %m"); |
| 970 |
|
| 971 |
struct iovec *blobs = NULL; |
| 972 |
size_t n_blobs = 0; |
| 973 |
CLEANUP_ARRAY(blobs, n_blobs, iovec_array_free); |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context, |
| 976 |
/* seal_key_handle= */ 0, |
| 977 |
&tpm2_policy, |
| 978 |
/* n_policy= */ 1, |
| 979 |
/* pin= */ NULL, |
| 980 |
&tpm2_key, |
| 981 |
&blobs, |
| 982 |
&n_blobs, |
| 983 |
&tpm2_primary_alg, |
| 984 |
/* ret_srk= */ NULL); |
| 985 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 986 |
if (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) |
| 987 |
log_warning("TPM2 present and used, but we didn't manage to talk to it. Credential will be refused if SecureBoot is enabled."); |
| 988 |
else if (!sd_id128_in_set(with_key, _CRED_AUTO, _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED)) |
| 989 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to seal to TPM2: %m"); |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 sealing didn't work, continuing without TPM2: %m"); |
| 992 |
} |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
if (!iovec_memdup(&IOVEC_MAKE(tpm2_policy.buffer, tpm2_policy.size), &tpm2_policy_hash)) |
| 995 |
return log_oom(); |
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
assert(n_blobs == 1); |
| 998 |
tpm2_blob = TAKE_STRUCT(blobs[0]); |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
assert(tpm2_blob.iov_len <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1001 |
assert(tpm2_policy_hash.iov_len <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1002 |
} |
| 1003 |
#endif |
| 1004 |
|
| 1005 |
if (CRED_KEY_IS_AUTO(with_key)) { |
| 1006 |
/* Let's settle the key type in auto mode now. */ |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
if (iovec_is_set(&host_key) && iovec_is_set(&tpm2_key)) |
| 1009 |
id = iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED) ? |
| 1010 |
CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK) |
| 1011 |
: (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED) ? |
| 1012 |
CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC); |
| 1013 |
else if (iovec_is_set(&tpm2_key) && !sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED)) |
| 1014 |
id = iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC; |
| 1015 |
else if (iovec_is_set(&host_key)) |
| 1016 |
id = sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED) ? CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST; |
| 1017 |
else if (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) |
| 1018 |
id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL; |
| 1019 |
else |
| 1020 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), |
| 1021 |
"TPM2 not available and host key located on temporary file system, no encryption key available."); |
| 1022 |
} else |
| 1023 |
id = with_key; |
| 1024 |
|
| 1025 |
if (sd_id128_equal(id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL)) { |
| 1026 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL)) |
| 1027 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EHWPOISON), "Attempted to encrypt with null key, but this is disallowed."); |
| 1028 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL)) |
| 1029 |
log_warning("Using a null key for encryption and signing. Confidentiality or authenticity will not be provided."); |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 |
/* Let's now take the host key and the TPM2 key and hash it together, to use as encryption key for the data */ |
| 1033 |
r = sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(&host_key, &tpm2_key, md); |
| 1034 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1035 |
return r; |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
| 1038 |
r = mangle_uid_into_key(uid, md); |
| 1039 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1040 |
return r; |
| 1041 |
} |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
r = dlopen_libcrypto(LOG_DEBUG); |
| 1044 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1045 |
return r; |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
assert_se(cc = sym_EVP_aes_256_gcm()); |
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
ksz = sym_EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cc); |
| 1050 |
assert(ksz == sizeof(md)); |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
bsz = sym_EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(cc); |
| 1053 |
assert(bsz > 0); |
| 1054 |
assert((size_t) bsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
ivsz = sym_EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cc); |
| 1057 |
if (ivsz > 0) { |
| 1058 |
assert((size_t) ivsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
r = crypto_random_bytes_allocate_iovec(ivsz, &iv); |
| 1061 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1062 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquired randomized IV: %m"); |
| 1063 |
} |
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
tsz = 16; /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3 there is EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(), until then let's hardcode this */ |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
context = sym_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
| 1068 |
if (!context) |
| 1069 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate encryption object: %s", |
| 1070 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
if (sym_EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, md, iv.iov_base) != 1) |
| 1073 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context: %s", |
| 1074 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1075 |
|
| 1076 |
/* Just an upper estimate */ |
| 1077 |
output.iov_len = |
| 1078 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz) + |
| 1079 |
ALIGN8(iovec_is_set(&tpm2_key) ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob.iov_len + tpm2_policy_hash.iov_len : 0) + |
| 1080 |
ALIGN8(iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + pubkey.iov_len : 0) + |
| 1081 |
ALIGN8(uid_is_valid(uid) ? sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header) : 0) + |
| 1082 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + strlen_ptr(name)) + |
| 1083 |
input->iov_len + 2U * (size_t) bsz + |
| 1084 |
tsz; |
| 1085 |
/* Silence static analyzers */ |
| 1086 |
assert(output.iov_len >= input->iov_len); |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
output.iov_base = malloc0(output.iov_len); |
| 1089 |
if (!output.iov_base) |
| 1090 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) output.iov_base; |
| 1093 |
h->id = id; |
| 1094 |
h->block_size = htole32(bsz); |
| 1095 |
h->key_size = htole32(ksz); |
| 1096 |
h->tag_size = htole32(tsz); |
| 1097 |
h->iv_size = htole32(ivsz); |
| 1098 |
memcpy(h->iv, iv.iov_base, ivsz); |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz); |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
#if HAVE_TPM2 |
| 1103 |
if (iovec_is_set(&tpm2_key)) { |
| 1104 |
struct tpm2_credential_header *t; |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p); |
| 1107 |
t->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_hash_pcr_mask); |
| 1108 |
t->pcr_bank = htole16(tpm2_pcr_bank); |
| 1109 |
t->primary_alg = htole16(tpm2_primary_alg); |
| 1110 |
t->blob_size = htole32(tpm2_blob.iov_len); |
| 1111 |
t->policy_hash_size = htole32(tpm2_policy_hash.iov_len); |
| 1112 |
memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob, tpm2_blob.iov_base, tpm2_blob.iov_len); |
| 1113 |
memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob + tpm2_blob.iov_len, tpm2_policy_hash.iov_base, tpm2_policy_hash.iov_len); |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob.iov_len + tpm2_policy_hash.iov_len); |
| 1116 |
} |
| 1117 |
#endif |
| 1118 |
if (iovec_is_set(&pubkey)) { |
| 1119 |
struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header *z; |
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
z = (struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p); |
| 1122 |
z->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask); |
| 1123 |
z->size = htole32(pubkey.iov_len); |
| 1124 |
memcpy(z->data, pubkey.iov_base, pubkey.iov_len); |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + pubkey.iov_len); |
| 1127 |
} |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
| 1130 |
struct scoped_credential_header *w; |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
w = (struct scoped_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p); |
| 1133 |
w->flags = htole64(SCOPE_HASH_DATA_BASE_FLAGS); |
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 |
p += ALIGN8(sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header)); |
| 1136 |
} |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
/* Pass the encrypted + TPM2 header + scoped header as AAD */ |
| 1139 |
if (sym_EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, output.iov_base, p) != 1) |
| 1140 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", |
| 1141 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
/* Now construct the metadata header */ |
| 1144 |
ml = strlen_ptr(name); |
| 1145 |
m = malloc0(ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)); |
| 1146 |
if (!m) |
| 1147 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
m->timestamp = htole64(timestamp); |
| 1150 |
m->not_after = htole64(not_after); |
| 1151 |
m->name_size = htole32(ml); |
| 1152 |
memcpy_safe(m->name, name, ml); |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
/* And encrypt the metadata header */ |
| 1155 |
if (sym_EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p, &added, (const unsigned char*) m, ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)) != 1) |
| 1156 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt metadata header: %s", |
| 1157 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
assert(added >= 0); |
| 1160 |
assert((size_t) added <= output.iov_len - p); |
| 1161 |
p += added; |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
/* Then encrypt the plaintext */ |
| 1164 |
if (sym_EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p, &added, input->iov_base, input->iov_len) != 1) |
| 1165 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt data: %s", |
| 1166 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
assert(added >= 0); |
| 1169 |
assert((size_t) added <= output.iov_len - p); |
| 1170 |
p += added; |
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
/* Finalize */ |
| 1173 |
if (sym_EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p, &added) != 1) |
| 1174 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize data encryption: %s", |
| 1175 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
assert(added >= 0); |
| 1178 |
assert((size_t) added <= output.iov_len - p); |
| 1179 |
p += added; |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
assert(p <= output.iov_len - tsz); |
| 1182 |
|
| 1183 |
/* Append tag */ |
| 1184 |
if (sym_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tsz, (uint8_t*) output.iov_base + p) != 1) |
| 1185 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to get tag: %s", |
| 1186 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
p += tsz; |
| 1189 |
assert(p <= output.iov_len); |
| 1190 |
output.iov_len = p; |
| 1191 |
|
| 1192 |
if (DEBUG_LOGGING && input->iov_len > 0) { |
| 1193 |
size_t base64_size; |
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
base64_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(output.iov_len * 4, 3); /* Include base64 size increase in debug output */ |
| 1196 |
assert(base64_size >= input->iov_len); |
| 1197 |
log_debug("Input of %zu bytes grew to output of %zu bytes (+%2zu%%).", input->iov_len, base64_size, base64_size * 100 / input->iov_len - 100); |
| 1198 |
} |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
*ret = TAKE_STRUCT(output); |
| 1201 |
return 0; |
| 1202 |
} |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
int decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 1205 |
const char *validate_name, |
| 1206 |
usec_t validate_timestamp, |
| 1207 |
const char *tpm2_device, |
| 1208 |
const char *tpm2_signature_path, |
| 1209 |
uid_t uid, |
| 1210 |
const struct iovec *input, |
| 1211 |
CredentialFlags flags, |
| 1212 |
struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec host_key = {}, plaintext = {}, tpm2_key = {}; |
| 1215 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *signature_json = NULL; |
| 1216 |
_cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; |
| 1217 |
struct encrypted_credential_header *h; |
| 1218 |
struct metadata_credential_header *m; |
| 1219 |
uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| 1220 |
const EVP_CIPHER *cc; |
| 1221 |
size_t p, hs; |
| 1222 |
int r, added; |
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
assert(iovec_is_valid(input)); |
| 1225 |
assert(ret); |
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
/* Only one of these two flags may be set at the same time */ |
| 1228 |
assert(!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL) || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL)); |
| 1229 |
|
| 1230 |
CLEANUP_ERASE(md); |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
/* Relevant error codes: |
| 1233 |
* |
| 1234 |
* -EBADMSG → Corrupted file |
| 1235 |
* -EOPNOTSUPP → Unsupported file type (could be: requires TPM but we have no TPM) |
| 1236 |
* -EHOSTDOWN → Need PCR signature file, but couldn't find it |
| 1237 |
* -EHWPOISON → Attempt to unlock with NULL key and either CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_REFUSE is on, or CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL is off, but the system has a TPM and SecureBoot is on |
| 1238 |
* -EMEDIUMTYPE → File has unexpected scope, i.e. user-scoped credential is attempted to be unlocked in system scope, or vice versa |
| 1239 |
* -EDESTADDRREQ → Credential is incorrectly named (i.e. the authenticated name does not match the actual name) |
| 1240 |
* -ESTALE → Credential's validity has passed |
| 1241 |
* -ESRCH → User specified for scope does not exist on this system |
| 1242 |
* |
| 1243 |
* (plus the various error codes tpm2_unseal() returns) */ |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) input->iov_base; |
| 1246 |
|
| 1247 |
/* The ID must fit in, for the current and all future formats */ |
| 1248 |
if (input->iov_len < sizeof(h->id)) |
| 1249 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
if (!CRED_KEY_IS_VALID(h->id)) |
| 1252 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Unknown encryption format, or corrupted data."); |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
if (CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(h->id)) { |
| 1255 |
r = tpm2_load_pcr_signature(tpm2_signature_path, &signature_json); |
| 1256 |
if (r == -ENOENT) |
| 1257 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EHOSTDOWN), "Couldn't find PCR signature file: %m"); |
| 1258 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1259 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load PCR signature: %m"); |
| 1260 |
} |
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
if (sd_id128_equal(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL)) { |
| 1263 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL)) |
| 1264 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EHWPOISON), |
| 1265 |
"Credential uses null key, but that's not allowed, refusing."); |
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL)) { |
| 1268 |
/* So this is a credential encrypted with a zero length key. We support this to cover for the |
| 1269 |
* case where neither a host key not a TPM2 are available (specifically: initrd environments |
| 1270 |
* where the host key is not yet accessible and no TPM2 chip exists at all), to minimize |
| 1271 |
* different codeflow for TPM2 and non-TPM2 codepaths. Of course, credentials encoded this |
| 1272 |
* way offer no confidentiality nor authenticity. Because of that it's important we refuse to |
| 1273 |
* use them on systems that actually *do* have a TPM2 chip – if we are in SecureBoot |
| 1274 |
* mode. Otherwise an attacker could hand us credentials like this and we'd use them thinking |
| 1275 |
* they are trusted, even though they are not. */ |
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
if (efi_has_tpm2()) { |
| 1278 |
if (is_efi_secure_boot()) |
| 1279 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EHWPOISON), |
| 1280 |
"Credential uses null key intended for fallback use when TPM2 is absent — but TPM2 is present, and SecureBoot is enabled, refusing."); |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
log_warning("Credential uses null key intended for use when TPM2 is absent, but TPM2 is present! Accepting anyway, since SecureBoot is disabled."); |
| 1283 |
} else |
| 1284 |
log_debug("Credential uses null key intended for use when TPM2 is absent, and TPM2 indeed is absent. Accepting."); |
| 1285 |
} |
| 1286 |
} |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
if (CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id)) { |
| 1289 |
if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
| 1290 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EMEDIUMTYPE), "Encrypted file is scoped to a user, but no user selected."); |
| 1291 |
} else { |
| 1292 |
/* Refuse to unlock system credentials if user scope is requested. */ |
| 1293 |
if (uid_is_valid(uid) && !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE)) |
| 1294 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EMEDIUMTYPE), "Encrypted file is scoped to the system, but user scope selected."); |
| 1295 |
|
| 1296 |
uid = UID_INVALID; |
| 1297 |
} |
| 1298 |
|
| 1299 |
/* Now we know the minimum header size */ |
| 1300 |
if (input->iov_len < offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv)) |
| 1301 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
/* Verify some basic header values */ |
| 1304 |
if (le32toh(h->key_size) != sizeof(md)) |
| 1305 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); |
| 1306 |
if (le32toh(h->block_size) <= 0 || le32toh(h->block_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| 1307 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); |
| 1308 |
if (le32toh(h->iv_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| 1309 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "IV size too large."); |
| 1310 |
if (le32toh(h->tag_size) != 16) /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3, let's verify via EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length() */ |
| 1311 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected tag size in header."); |
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 |
/* Ensure we have space for the full header now (we don't know the size of the name hence this is a |
| 1314 |
* lower limit only) */ |
| 1315 |
if (input->iov_len < |
| 1316 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + |
| 1317 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2(h->id) ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) : 0) + |
| 1318 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(h->id) ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) : 0) + |
| 1319 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id) ? sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header) : 0) + |
| 1320 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| 1321 |
le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| 1322 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1323 |
|
| 1324 |
p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)); |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
if (CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2(h->id)) { |
| 1327 |
#if HAVE_TPM2 |
| 1328 |
struct tpm2_credential_header* t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input->iov_base + p); |
| 1329 |
struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header *z = NULL; |
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
if (!TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(t->pcr_mask)) |
| 1332 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range."); |
| 1333 |
if (!tpm2_hash_alg_to_string(le16toh(t->pcr_bank))) |
| 1334 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR bank invalid or not supported"); |
| 1335 |
if (!tpm2_asym_alg_to_string(le16toh(t->primary_alg))) |
| 1336 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 primary key algorithm invalid or not supported."); |
| 1337 |
if (le32toh(t->blob_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| 1338 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 blob size."); |
| 1339 |
if (le32toh(t->policy_hash_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| 1340 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 policy hash size."); |
| 1341 |
|
| 1342 |
/* Ensure we have space for the full TPM2 header now (still don't know the name, and its size |
| 1343 |
* though, hence still just a lower limit test only) */ |
| 1344 |
if (input->iov_len < |
| 1345 |
p + |
| 1346 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + le32toh(t->blob_size) + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)) + |
| 1347 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(h->id) ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) : 0) + |
| 1348 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id) ? sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header) : 0) + |
| 1349 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| 1350 |
le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| 1351 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + |
| 1354 |
le32toh(t->blob_size) + |
| 1355 |
le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)); |
| 1356 |
|
| 1357 |
if (CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_TPM2_PK(h->id)) { |
| 1358 |
z = (struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input->iov_base + p); |
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 |
if (!TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(le64toh(z->pcr_mask)) || le64toh(z->pcr_mask) == 0) |
| 1361 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range."); |
| 1362 |
if (le32toh(z->size) > PUBLIC_KEY_MAX) |
| 1363 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected public key size."); |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
if (input->iov_len < |
| 1366 |
p + |
| 1367 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + le32toh(z->size)) + |
| 1368 |
ALIGN8(CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id) ? sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header) : 0) + |
| 1369 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| 1370 |
le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| 1371 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1372 |
|
| 1373 |
p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + |
| 1374 |
le32toh(z->size)); |
| 1375 |
} |
| 1376 |
|
| 1377 |
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL; |
| 1378 |
r = tpm2_context_new(tpm2_device, &tpm2_context); |
| 1379 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1380 |
return r; |
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 |
// TODO: Add the SRK data to the credential structure so it can be plumbed |
| 1383 |
// through and used to verify the TPM session. |
| 1384 |
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context, |
| 1385 |
le64toh(t->pcr_mask), |
| 1386 |
le16toh(t->pcr_bank), |
| 1387 |
z ? &IOVEC_MAKE(z->data, le32toh(z->size)) : NULL, |
| 1388 |
z ? le64toh(z->pcr_mask) : 0, |
| 1389 |
signature_json, |
| 1390 |
/* pin= */ NULL, |
| 1391 |
/* pcrlock_policy= */ NULL, |
| 1392 |
le16toh(t->primary_alg), |
| 1393 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(t->policy_hash_and_blob, le32toh(t->blob_size)), |
| 1394 |
/* n_blobs= */ 1, |
| 1395 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(t->policy_hash_and_blob + le32toh(t->blob_size), le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)), |
| 1396 |
/* n_known_policy_hash= */ 1, |
| 1397 |
/* srk= */ NULL, |
| 1398 |
&tpm2_key); |
| 1399 |
if (r == -EREMOTE) |
| 1400 |
return log_error_errno(r, "TPM key integrity check failed. Key most likely does not belong to this TPM."); |
| 1401 |
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_TPM2_UNSEAL_BAD_PCR(r)) |
| 1402 |
return log_error_errno(r, "TPM policy does not match current system state. Either system has been tempered with or policy out-of-date: %m"); |
| 1403 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1404 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unseal secret using TPM2: %m"); |
| 1405 |
#else |
| 1406 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Credential requires TPM2 support, but TPM2 support not available."); |
| 1407 |
#endif |
| 1408 |
} |
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 |
if (CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id)) { |
| 1411 |
struct scoped_credential_header* sh = (struct scoped_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input->iov_base + p); |
| 1412 |
|
| 1413 |
if (le64toh(sh->flags) != SCOPE_HASH_DATA_BASE_FLAGS) |
| 1414 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Scoped credential with unsupported flags."); |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
if (input->iov_len < |
| 1417 |
p + |
| 1418 |
sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header) + |
| 1419 |
ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| 1420 |
le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| 1421 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
p += sizeof(struct scoped_credential_header); |
| 1424 |
} |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
if (CRED_KEY_REQUIRES_HOST(h->id)) { |
| 1427 |
r = get_credential_host_secret(/* flags= */ 0, &host_key); |
| 1428 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1429 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential key: %m"); |
| 1430 |
} |
| 1431 |
|
| 1432 |
if (sd_id128_equal(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL) && !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL)) |
| 1433 |
log_warning("Warning: using a null key for decryption and authentication. Confidentiality or authenticity are not provided."); |
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 |
sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(&host_key, &tpm2_key, md); |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
if (CRED_KEY_IS_SCOPED(h->id)) { |
| 1438 |
r = mangle_uid_into_key(uid, md); |
| 1439 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1440 |
return r; |
| 1441 |
} |
| 1442 |
|
| 1443 |
r = dlopen_libcrypto(LOG_DEBUG); |
| 1444 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1445 |
return r; |
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
assert_se(cc = sym_EVP_aes_256_gcm()); |
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
/* Make sure cipher expectations match the header */ |
| 1450 |
if (sym_EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->key_size)) |
| 1451 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); |
| 1452 |
if (sym_EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->block_size)) |
| 1453 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); |
| 1454 |
|
| 1455 |
context = sym_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
| 1456 |
if (!context) |
| 1457 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate decryption object: %s", |
| 1458 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
if (sym_EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) |
| 1461 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context: %s", |
| 1462 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1463 |
|
| 1464 |
if (sym_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, le32toh(h->iv_size), NULL) != 1) |
| 1465 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV size on decryption context: %s", |
| 1466 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1467 |
|
| 1468 |
if (sym_EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, NULL, NULL, md, h->iv) != 1) |
| 1469 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV and key: %s", |
| 1470 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
if (sym_EVP_DecryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, input->iov_base, p) != 1) |
| 1473 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", |
| 1474 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1475 |
|
| 1476 |
plaintext.iov_base = malloc(input->iov_len - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); |
| 1477 |
if (!plaintext.iov_base) |
| 1478 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
if (sym_EVP_DecryptUpdate( |
| 1481 |
context, |
| 1482 |
plaintext.iov_base, |
| 1483 |
&added, |
| 1484 |
(uint8_t*) input->iov_base + p, |
| 1485 |
input->iov_len - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) |
| 1486 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to decrypt data: %s", |
| 1487 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
assert(added >= 0); |
| 1490 |
assert((size_t) added <= input->iov_len - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); |
| 1491 |
plaintext.iov_len = added; |
| 1492 |
|
| 1493 |
if (sym_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, le32toh(h->tag_size), (uint8_t*) input->iov_base + input->iov_len - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) |
| 1494 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set tag: %s", |
| 1495 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
if (sym_EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) plaintext.iov_base + plaintext.iov_len, &added) != 1) |
| 1498 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Decryption failed (incorrect key?): %s", |
| 1499 |
sym_ERR_error_string(sym_ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| 1500 |
|
| 1501 |
plaintext.iov_len += added; |
| 1502 |
|
| 1503 |
if (plaintext.iov_len < ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name))) |
| 1504 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
m = plaintext.iov_base; |
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && |
| 1509 |
le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && |
| 1510 |
le64toh(m->timestamp) >= le64toh(m->not_after)) |
| 1511 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Timestamps of credential are not in order, refusing."); |
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
if (le32toh(m->name_size) > CREDENTIAL_NAME_MAX) |
| 1514 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name too long, refusing."); |
| 1515 |
|
| 1516 |
hs = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + le32toh(m->name_size)); |
| 1517 |
if (plaintext.iov_len < hs) |
| 1518 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); |
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 |
if (le32toh(m->name_size) > 0) { |
| 1521 |
_cleanup_free_ char *embedded_name = NULL; |
| 1522 |
|
| 1523 |
r = make_cstring(m->name, le32toh(m->name_size), MAKE_CSTRING_REFUSE_TRAILING_NUL, &embedded_name); |
| 1524 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1525 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to convert embedded credential name to C string: %m"); |
| 1526 |
|
| 1527 |
if (!credential_name_valid(embedded_name)) |
| 1528 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name is not valid, refusing."); |
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
if (validate_name && !streq(embedded_name, validate_name)) { |
| 1531 |
|
| 1532 |
r = secure_getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME"); |
| 1533 |
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| 1534 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME: %m"); |
| 1535 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1536 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EDESTADDRREQ), "Embedded credential name '%s' does not match filename '%s', refusing.", embedded_name, validate_name); |
| 1537 |
|
| 1538 |
log_debug("Embedded credential name '%s' does not match expected name '%s', but configured to use credential anyway.", embedded_name, validate_name); |
| 1539 |
} |
| 1540 |
} |
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
if (validate_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) { |
| 1543 |
if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->timestamp) > validate_timestamp) |
| 1544 |
log_debug("Credential timestamp is from the future, assuming clock skew."); |
| 1545 |
|
| 1546 |
if (le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->not_after) < validate_timestamp) { |
| 1547 |
|
| 1548 |
r = secure_getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER"); |
| 1549 |
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| 1550 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER: %m"); |
| 1551 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1552 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Credential's time passed, refusing to use."); |
| 1553 |
|
| 1554 |
log_debug("Credential not-after timestamp has passed, but configured to use credential anyway."); |
| 1555 |
} |
| 1556 |
} |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
if (ret) { |
| 1559 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec without_metadata = {}; |
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
without_metadata.iov_len = plaintext.iov_len - hs; |
| 1562 |
without_metadata.iov_base = memdup_suffix0((uint8_t*) plaintext.iov_base + hs, without_metadata.iov_len); |
| 1563 |
if (!without_metadata.iov_base) |
| 1564 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1565 |
|
| 1566 |
*ret = TAKE_STRUCT(without_metadata); |
| 1567 |
} |
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
return 0; |
| 1570 |
} |
| 1571 |
|
| 1572 |
#else |
| 1573 |
|
| 1574 |
int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1575 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| 1576 |
} |
| 1577 |
|
| 1578 |
int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1579 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| 1580 |
} |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const char *tpm2_signature_path, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1583 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| 1584 |
} |
| 1585 |
|
| 1586 |
#endif |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
int ipc_encrypt_credential(const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1589 |
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *vl = NULL; |
| 1590 |
int r; |
| 1591 |
|
| 1592 |
assert(input && iovec_is_valid(input)); |
| 1593 |
assert(ret); |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
r = sd_varlink_connect_address(&vl, "/run/systemd/io.systemd.Credentials"); |
| 1596 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1597 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to connect to io.systemd.Credentials: %m"); |
| 1598 |
|
| 1599 |
/* Mark anything we get from the service as sensitive, given that it might use a NULL cypher, at least in theory */ |
| 1600 |
r = sd_varlink_set_input_sensitive(vl); |
| 1601 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1602 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enable sensitive Varlink input: %m"); |
| 1603 |
|
| 1604 |
/* Create the input data blob object separately, so that we can mark it as sensitive */ |
| 1605 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *jinput = NULL; |
| 1606 |
r = sd_json_build(&jinput, JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(input)); |
| 1607 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1608 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create input object: %m"); |
| 1609 |
|
| 1610 |
sd_json_variant_sensitive(jinput); |
| 1611 |
|
| 1612 |
sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; |
| 1613 |
const char *error_id = NULL; |
| 1614 |
r = sd_varlink_callbo( |
| 1615 |
vl, |
| 1616 |
"io.systemd.Credentials.Encrypt", |
| 1617 |
&reply, |
| 1618 |
&error_id, |
| 1619 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!!name, "name", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(name)), |
| 1620 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_VARIANT("data", jinput), |
| 1621 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(timestamp != USEC_INFINITY, "timestamp", SD_JSON_BUILD_UNSIGNED(timestamp)), |
| 1622 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(not_after != USEC_INFINITY, "notAfter", SD_JSON_BUILD_UNSIGNED(not_after)), |
| 1623 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE), "scope", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(uid_is_valid(uid) ? "user" : "system")), |
| 1624 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(uid_is_valid(uid), "uid", SD_JSON_BUILD_UNSIGNED(uid)), |
| 1625 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION((flags & (CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL|CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL)) != 0, "allowNull", SD_JSON_BUILD_BOOLEAN(flags & CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL)), |
| 1626 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("allowInteractiveAuthentication", FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_IPC_ALLOW_INTERACTIVE))); |
| 1627 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1628 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to call Encrypt() varlink call."); |
| 1629 |
if (!isempty(error_id)) { |
| 1630 |
if (streq(error_id, "io.systemd.Credentials.NoSuchUser")) |
| 1631 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "No such user."); |
| 1632 |
|
| 1633 |
return log_error_errno(sd_varlink_error_to_errno(error_id, reply), "Failed to encrypt: %s", error_id); |
| 1634 |
} |
| 1635 |
|
| 1636 |
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = { |
| 1637 |
{ "blob", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, 0, SD_JSON_MANDATORY }, |
| 1638 |
{}, |
| 1639 |
}; |
| 1640 |
|
| 1641 |
r = sd_json_dispatch(reply, dispatch_table, SD_JSON_LOG|SD_JSON_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| 1642 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1643 |
return r; |
| 1644 |
|
| 1645 |
return 0; |
| 1646 |
} |
| 1647 |
|
| 1648 |
int ipc_decrypt_credential(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret) { |
| 1649 |
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *vl = NULL; |
| 1650 |
int r; |
| 1651 |
|
| 1652 |
assert(input && iovec_is_valid(input)); |
| 1653 |
assert(ret); |
| 1654 |
|
| 1655 |
r = sd_varlink_connect_address(&vl, "/run/systemd/io.systemd.Credentials"); |
| 1656 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1657 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to connect to io.systemd.Credentials: %m"); |
| 1658 |
|
| 1659 |
r = sd_varlink_set_input_sensitive(vl); |
| 1660 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1661 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enable sensitive Varlink input: %m"); |
| 1662 |
|
| 1663 |
/* Create the input data blob object separately, so that we can mark it as sensitive (it's supposed |
| 1664 |
* to be encrypted, but who knows maybe it uses the NULL cypher). */ |
| 1665 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *jinput = NULL; |
| 1666 |
r = sd_json_build(&jinput, JSON_BUILD_IOVEC_BASE64(input)); |
| 1667 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1668 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create input object: %m"); |
| 1669 |
|
| 1670 |
sd_json_variant_sensitive(jinput); |
| 1671 |
|
| 1672 |
sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; |
| 1673 |
const char *error_id = NULL; |
| 1674 |
r = sd_varlink_callbo( |
| 1675 |
vl, |
| 1676 |
"io.systemd.Credentials.Decrypt", |
| 1677 |
&reply, |
| 1678 |
&error_id, |
| 1679 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!!validate_name, "name", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(validate_name)), |
| 1680 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_VARIANT("blob", jinput), |
| 1681 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(validate_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY, "timestamp", SD_JSON_BUILD_UNSIGNED(validate_timestamp)), |
| 1682 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE), "scope", SD_JSON_BUILD_STRING(uid_is_valid(uid) ? "user" : "system")), |
| 1683 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CONDITION(uid_is_valid(uid), "uid", SD_JSON_BUILD_UNSIGNED(uid)), |
| 1684 |
SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("allowInteractiveAuthentication", FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_IPC_ALLOW_INTERACTIVE))); |
| 1685 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1686 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to call Decrypt() varlink call."); |
| 1687 |
if (!isempty(error_id)) { |
| 1688 |
const CredentialsVarlinkError *e = credentials_varlink_error_by_id(error_id); |
| 1689 |
if (e) |
| 1690 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(e->errnum), "%s", e->msg); |
| 1691 |
|
| 1692 |
return log_error_errno(sd_varlink_error_to_errno(error_id, reply), "Failed to decrypt: %s", error_id); |
| 1693 |
} |
| 1694 |
|
| 1695 |
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = { |
| 1696 |
{ "data", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, 0, SD_JSON_MANDATORY }, |
| 1697 |
{}, |
| 1698 |
}; |
| 1699 |
|
| 1700 |
r = sd_json_dispatch(reply, dispatch_table, SD_JSON_LOG|SD_JSON_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| 1701 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1702 |
return r; |
| 1703 |
|
| 1704 |
return 0; |
| 1705 |
} |
| 1706 |
|
| 1707 |
int get_global_boot_credentials_path(char **ret) { |
| 1708 |
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL; |
| 1709 |
int r; |
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 |
assert(ret); |
| 1712 |
|
| 1713 |
/* Determines where to put global boot credentials in. Returns the path to the "/loader/credentials/" |
| 1714 |
* directory below the XBOOTLDR or ESP partition. Any credentials placed in this directory can be |
| 1715 |
* picked up later in the initrd. */ |
| 1716 |
|
| 1717 |
r = find_xbootldr_and_warn( |
| 1718 |
/* root= */ NULL, |
| 1719 |
/* path= */ NULL, |
| 1720 |
/* unprivileged_mode= */ false, |
| 1721 |
&path, |
| 1722 |
/* ret_fd= */ NULL); |
| 1723 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1724 |
if (r != -ENOKEY) |
| 1725 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find XBOOTLDR partition: %m"); |
| 1726 |
|
| 1727 |
r = find_esp_and_warn( |
| 1728 |
/* root= */ NULL, |
| 1729 |
/* path= */ NULL, |
| 1730 |
/* unprivileged_mode= */ false, |
| 1731 |
&path, |
| 1732 |
/* ret_fd= */ NULL); |
| 1733 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1734 |
if (r != -ENOKEY) |
| 1735 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find ESP partition: %m"); |
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
*ret = NULL; |
| 1738 |
return 0; /* not found! */ |
| 1739 |
} |
| 1740 |
} |
| 1741 |
|
| 1742 |
_cleanup_free_ char *joined = path_join(path, "loader/credentials"); |
| 1743 |
if (!joined) |
| 1744 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1745 |
|
| 1746 |
log_debug("Determined global boot credentials path as: %s", joined); |
| 1747 |
|
| 1748 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(joined); |
| 1749 |
return 1; /* found! */ |
| 1750 |
} |
| 1751 |
|
| 1752 |
static int pick_up_credential_one( |
| 1753 |
int credential_dir_fd, |
| 1754 |
const char *credential_name, |
| 1755 |
const PickUpCredential *table_entry) { |
| 1756 |
|
| 1757 |
_cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL, *target_path = NULL; |
| 1758 |
const char *e; |
| 1759 |
int r; |
| 1760 |
|
| 1761 |
assert(credential_dir_fd >= 0); |
| 1762 |
assert(credential_name); |
| 1763 |
assert(table_entry); |
| 1764 |
|
| 1765 |
e = startswith(credential_name, table_entry->credential_prefix); |
| 1766 |
if (!e) |
| 1767 |
return 0; /* unmatched */ |
| 1768 |
|
| 1769 |
fn = strjoin(e, table_entry->filename_suffix); |
| 1770 |
if (!fn) |
| 1771 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1772 |
|
| 1773 |
if (!filename_is_valid(fn)) |
| 1774 |
return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| 1775 |
"Passed credential '%s' would result in invalid filename '%s'.", |
| 1776 |
credential_name, fn); |
| 1777 |
|
| 1778 |
r = mkdir_p_label(table_entry->target_dir, 0755); |
| 1779 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1780 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to create '%s': %m", table_entry->target_dir); |
| 1781 |
|
| 1782 |
target_path = path_join(table_entry->target_dir, fn); |
| 1783 |
if (!target_path) |
| 1784 |
return log_oom(); |
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
r = copy_file_at( |
| 1787 |
credential_dir_fd, credential_name, |
| 1788 |
AT_FDCWD, target_path, |
| 1789 |
/* open_flags= */ 0, |
| 1790 |
0644, |
| 1791 |
/* copy_flags= */ 0); |
| 1792 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1793 |
return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to copy credential %s → file %s: %m", |
| 1794 |
credential_name, target_path); |
| 1795 |
|
| 1796 |
log_info("Installed %s from credential.", target_path); |
| 1797 |
return 1; /* done */ |
| 1798 |
} |
| 1799 |
|
| 1800 |
int pick_up_credentials(const PickUpCredential *table, size_t n_table_entry) { |
| 1801 |
_cleanup_close_ int credential_dir_fd = -EBADF; |
| 1802 |
int r, ret = 0; |
| 1803 |
|
| 1804 |
assert(table); |
| 1805 |
assert(n_table_entry > 0); |
| 1806 |
|
| 1807 |
credential_dir_fd = open_credentials_dir(); |
| 1808 |
if (IN_SET(credential_dir_fd, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) { |
| 1809 |
/* Credential env var not set, or dir doesn't exist. */ |
| 1810 |
log_debug("No credentials found."); |
| 1811 |
return 0; |
| 1812 |
} |
| 1813 |
if (credential_dir_fd < 0) |
| 1814 |
return log_error_errno(credential_dir_fd, "Failed to open credentials directory: %m"); |
| 1815 |
|
| 1816 |
_cleanup_free_ DirectoryEntries *des = NULL; |
| 1817 |
r = readdir_all(credential_dir_fd, RECURSE_DIR_SORT|RECURSE_DIR_IGNORE_DOT|RECURSE_DIR_ENSURE_TYPE, &des); |
| 1818 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1819 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate credentials: %m"); |
| 1820 |
|
| 1821 |
FOREACH_ARRAY(i, des->entries, des->n_entries) { |
| 1822 |
struct dirent *de = *i; |
| 1823 |
|
| 1824 |
if (de->d_type != DT_REG) |
| 1825 |
continue; |
| 1826 |
|
| 1827 |
FOREACH_ARRAY(t, table, n_table_entry) { |
| 1828 |
r = pick_up_credential_one(credential_dir_fd, de->d_name, t); |
| 1829 |
if (r != 0) { |
| 1830 |
RET_GATHER(ret, r); |
| 1831 |
break; /* Done, or failed. Let's move to the next credential. */ |
| 1832 |
} |
| 1833 |
} |
| 1834 |
} |
| 1835 |
|
| 1836 |
return ret; |
| 1837 |
} |
| 1838 |
|
| 1839 |
static const CredentialsVarlinkError credentials_varlink_error_table[] = { |
| 1840 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.BadFormat", EBADMSG, "Bad credential format." }, |
| 1841 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.NameMismatch", EDESTADDRREQ, "Name in credential doesn't match expectations." }, |
| 1842 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.TimeMismatch", ESTALE, "Outside of credential validity time window." }, |
| 1843 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.NoSuchUser", ESRCH, "No such user." }, |
| 1844 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.BadScope", EMEDIUMTYPE, "Scope mismatch." }, |
| 1845 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.CantFindPCRSignature", EHOSTDOWN, "PCR signature required for decryption, but could not be found." }, |
| 1846 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.NullKeyNotAllowed", EHWPOISON, "The key was encrypted with a null key, but that's now allowed during decryption." }, |
| 1847 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.KeyBelongsToOtherTPM", EREMOTE, "The TPM integrity check for this key failed, key probably belongs to another TPM, or was corrupted." }, |
| 1848 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.TPMInDictionaryLockout", ENOLCK, "The TPM is in dictionary lockout mode, cannot operate." }, |
| 1849 |
{ "io.systemd.Credentials.UnexpectedPCRState" , EUCLEAN, "Unexpected TPM PCR state of the system." }, |
| 1850 |
}; |
| 1851 |
|
| 1852 |
const CredentialsVarlinkError* credentials_varlink_error_by_id(const char *id) { |
| 1853 |
assert(id); |
| 1854 |
|
| 1855 |
FOREACH_ELEMENT(i, credentials_varlink_error_table) |
| 1856 |
if (streq(id, i->id)) |
| 1857 |
return i; |
| 1858 |
|
| 1859 |
return NULL; |
| 1860 |
} |
| 1861 |
|
| 1862 |
const CredentialsVarlinkError* credentials_varlink_error_by_errno(int errnum) { |
| 1863 |
assert(errnum != 0); |
| 1864 |
|
| 1865 |
errnum = ABS(errnum); |
| 1866 |
|
| 1867 |
FOREACH_ELEMENT(i, credentials_varlink_error_table) |
| 1868 |
if (errnum == i->errnum) |
| 1869 |
return i; |
| 1870 |
|
| 1871 |
return NULL; |
| 1872 |
} |