| 1 |
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| 2 |
|
| 3 |
#include <linux/magic.h> |
| 4 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
#include "sd-json.h" |
| 7 |
#include "sd-varlink.h" |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
#include "alloc-util.h" |
| 10 |
#include "build.h" |
| 11 |
#include "bus-polkit.h" |
| 12 |
#include "bus-util.h" |
| 13 |
#include "creds-util.h" |
| 14 |
#include "dirent-util.h" |
| 15 |
#include "errno-util.h" |
| 16 |
#include "escape.h" |
| 17 |
#include "fileio.h" |
| 18 |
#include "format-table.h" |
| 19 |
#include "hashmap.h" |
| 20 |
#include "hexdecoct.h" |
| 21 |
#include "json-util.h" |
| 22 |
#include "libmount-util.h" |
| 23 |
#include "log.h" |
| 24 |
#include "main-func.h" |
| 25 |
#include "memory-util.h" |
| 26 |
#include "options.h" |
| 27 |
#include "pager.h" |
| 28 |
#include "parse-argument.h" |
| 29 |
#include "parse-util.h" |
| 30 |
#include "polkit-agent.h" |
| 31 |
#include "pretty-print.h" |
| 32 |
#include "stat-util.h" |
| 33 |
#include "string-table.h" |
| 34 |
#include "string-util.h" |
| 35 |
#include "strv.h" |
| 36 |
#include "terminal-util.h" |
| 37 |
#include "time-util.h" |
| 38 |
#include "tpm2-pcr.h" |
| 39 |
#include "tpm2-util.h" |
| 40 |
#include "user-util.h" |
| 41 |
#include "varlink-io.systemd.Credentials.h" |
| 42 |
#include "varlink-util.h" |
| 43 |
#include "verbs.h" |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
typedef enum TranscodeMode { |
| 46 |
TRANSCODE_OFF, |
| 47 |
TRANSCODE_BASE64, |
| 48 |
TRANSCODE_UNBASE64, |
| 49 |
TRANSCODE_HEX, |
| 50 |
TRANSCODE_UNHEX, |
| 51 |
_TRANSCODE_MAX, |
| 52 |
_TRANSCODE_INVALID = -EINVAL, |
| 53 |
} TranscodeMode; |
| 54 |
|
| 55 |
static sd_json_format_flags_t arg_json_format_flags = SD_JSON_FORMAT_OFF; |
| 56 |
static PagerFlags arg_pager_flags = 0; |
| 57 |
static bool arg_legend = true; |
| 58 |
static bool arg_system = false; |
| 59 |
static TranscodeMode arg_transcode = TRANSCODE_OFF; |
| 60 |
static int arg_newline = -1; |
| 61 |
static sd_id128_t arg_with_key = _CRED_AUTO; |
| 62 |
static const char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; |
| 63 |
static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; |
| 64 |
static char *arg_tpm2_public_key = NULL; |
| 65 |
static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; |
| 66 |
static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL; |
| 67 |
static const char *arg_name = NULL; |
| 68 |
static bool arg_name_any = false; |
| 69 |
static usec_t arg_timestamp = USEC_INFINITY; |
| 70 |
static usec_t arg_not_after = USEC_INFINITY; |
| 71 |
static bool arg_pretty = false; |
| 72 |
static bool arg_quiet = false; |
| 73 |
static bool arg_varlink = false; |
| 74 |
static uid_t arg_uid = UID_INVALID; |
| 75 |
static CredentialFlags arg_credential_flags = 0; |
| 76 |
static bool arg_ask_password = true; |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_public_key, freep); |
| 79 |
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep); |
| 80 |
|
| 81 |
static const char* transcode_mode_table[_TRANSCODE_MAX] = { |
| 82 |
[TRANSCODE_OFF] = "off", |
| 83 |
[TRANSCODE_BASE64] = "base64", |
| 84 |
[TRANSCODE_UNBASE64] = "unbase64", |
| 85 |
[TRANSCODE_HEX] = "hex", |
| 86 |
[TRANSCODE_UNHEX] = "unhex", |
| 87 |
}; |
| 88 |
|
| 89 |
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(transcode_mode, TranscodeMode); |
| 90 |
|
| 91 |
typedef enum CredKeyType { |
| 92 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO, |
| 93 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO_INITRD, |
| 94 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST, |
| 95 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2, |
| 96 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC, |
| 97 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2, |
| 98 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_HOST, |
| 99 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2_PUBLIC, |
| 100 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC_HOST, |
| 101 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_NULL, |
| 102 |
CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_ABSENT, |
| 103 |
_CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX, |
| 104 |
_CRED_KEY_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL, |
| 105 |
} CredKeyType; |
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
static const char* cred_key_type_table[_CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
| 108 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO] = "auto", |
| 109 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO_INITRD] = "auto-initrd", |
| 110 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST] = "host", |
| 111 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2] = "tpm2", |
| 112 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC] = "tpm2-with-public-key", |
| 113 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2] = "host+tpm2", |
| 114 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_HOST] = "tpm2+host", |
| 115 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2_PUBLIC] = "host+tpm2-with-public-key", |
| 116 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC_HOST] = "tpm2-with-public-key+host", |
| 117 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_NULL] = "null", |
| 118 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_ABSENT] = "tpm2-absent", /* legacy alias */ |
| 119 |
}; |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(cred_key_type, CredKeyType); |
| 122 |
|
| 123 |
static sd_id128_t cred_key_id[_CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
| 124 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO] = _CRED_AUTO, |
| 125 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_AUTO_INITRD] = _CRED_AUTO_INITRD, |
| 126 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, |
| 127 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, |
| 128 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| 129 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, |
| 130 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_HOST] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, |
| 131 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_HOST_TPM2_PUBLIC] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| 132 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_PUBLIC_HOST] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| 133 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_NULL] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL, |
| 134 |
[CRED_KEY_TYPE_TPM2_ABSENT] = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL, |
| 135 |
}; |
| 136 |
|
| 137 |
static int open_credential_directory( |
| 138 |
bool encrypted, |
| 139 |
DIR **ret_dir, |
| 140 |
const char **ret_prefix) { |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
const char *p; |
| 143 |
DIR *d; |
| 144 |
int r; |
| 145 |
|
| 146 |
assert(ret_dir); |
| 147 |
|
| 148 |
if (arg_system) |
| 149 |
/* PID 1 ensures that system credentials are always accessible under the same fixed path. It |
| 150 |
* will create symlinks if necessary to guarantee that. */ |
| 151 |
r = (encrypted ? get_encrypted_system_credentials_dir : get_system_credentials_dir)(&p); |
| 152 |
else |
| 153 |
/* Otherwise take the dirs from the env vars we got passed */ |
| 154 |
r = (encrypted ? get_encrypted_credentials_dir : get_credentials_dir)(&p); |
| 155 |
if (r == -ENXIO) /* No environment variable? */ |
| 156 |
goto not_found; |
| 157 |
if (r < 0) |
| 158 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get credentials directory: %m"); |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
d = opendir(p); |
| 161 |
if (!d) { |
| 162 |
/* No such dir? Then no creds where passed. (We conditionalize this on arg_system, since for |
| 163 |
* the per-service case a non-existing path would indicate an issue since the env var would |
| 164 |
* be set incorrectly in that case.) */ |
| 165 |
if (arg_system && errno == ENOENT) |
| 166 |
goto not_found; |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open credentials directory '%s': %m", p); |
| 169 |
} |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
*ret_dir = d; |
| 172 |
|
| 173 |
if (ret_prefix) |
| 174 |
*ret_prefix = p; |
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
return 1; |
| 177 |
|
| 178 |
not_found: |
| 179 |
*ret_dir = NULL; |
| 180 |
|
| 181 |
if (ret_prefix) |
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*ret_prefix = NULL; |
| 183 |
|
| 184 |
return 0; |
| 185 |
} |
| 186 |
|
| 187 |
static int is_tmpfs_with_noswap(dev_t devno) { |
| 188 |
_cleanup_(mnt_free_tablep) struct libmnt_table *table = NULL; |
| 189 |
int r; |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
r = DLOPEN_LIBMOUNT(LOG_DEBUG, SD_ELF_NOTE_DLOPEN_PRIORITY_RECOMMENDED); |
| 192 |
if (r < 0) |
| 193 |
return r; |
| 194 |
|
| 195 |
table = sym_mnt_new_table(); |
| 196 |
if (!table) |
| 197 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
r = sym_mnt_table_parse_mtab(table, /* filename= */ NULL); |
| 200 |
if (r < 0) |
| 201 |
return r; |
| 202 |
|
| 203 |
struct libmnt_fs *fs = sym_mnt_table_find_devno(table, devno, MNT_ITER_FORWARD); |
| 204 |
if (!fs) |
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return -ENODEV; |
| 206 |
|
| 207 |
r = sym_mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "noswap", /* value= */ NULL, /* valuesz= */ NULL); |
| 208 |
if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
| 210 |
|
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return r == 0; |
| 212 |
} |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
static int add_credentials_to_table(Table *t, bool encrypted) { |
| 215 |
_cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; |
| 216 |
const char *prefix; |
| 217 |
int r; |
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
assert(t); |
| 220 |
|
| 221 |
r = open_credential_directory(encrypted, &d, &prefix); |
| 222 |
if (r < 0) |
| 223 |
return r; |
| 224 |
if (!d) |
| 225 |
return 0; /* No creds dir set */ |
| 226 |
|
| 227 |
for (;;) { |
| 228 |
_cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; |
| 229 |
const char *secure, *secure_color = NULL; |
| 230 |
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| 231 |
struct dirent *de; |
| 232 |
struct stat st; |
| 233 |
|
| 234 |
errno = 0; |
| 235 |
de = readdir_no_dot(d); |
| 236 |
if (!de) { |
| 237 |
if (errno == 0) |
| 238 |
break; |
| 239 |
|
| 240 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read credentials directory: %m"); |
| 241 |
} |
| 242 |
|
| 243 |
if (!IN_SET(de->d_type, DT_REG, DT_UNKNOWN)) |
| 244 |
continue; |
| 245 |
|
| 246 |
if (!credential_name_valid(de->d_name)) |
| 247 |
continue; |
| 248 |
|
| 249 |
fd = openat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW); |
| 250 |
if (fd < 0) { |
| 251 |
if (errno == ENOENT) /* Vanished by now? */ |
| 252 |
continue; |
| 253 |
|
| 254 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open credential '%s': %m", de->d_name); |
| 255 |
} |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) |
| 258 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat credential '%s': %m", de->d_name); |
| 259 |
|
| 260 |
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) |
| 261 |
continue; |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
if (encrypted) { |
| 264 |
secure = "encrypted"; |
| 265 |
secure_color = ansi_highlight_green(); |
| 266 |
} else if ((st.st_mode & 0377) != 0) { |
| 267 |
secure = "insecure"; /* Anything that is accessible more than read-only to its owner is insecure */ |
| 268 |
secure_color = ansi_highlight_red(); |
| 269 |
} else { |
| 270 |
struct statfs sfs; |
| 271 |
if (fstatfs(fd, &sfs) < 0) |
| 272 |
return log_error_errno(r, "fstatfs() failed on '%s': %m", de->d_name); |
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
bool is_secure; |
| 275 |
if (is_fs_type(&sfs, RAMFS_MAGIC)) |
| 276 |
is_secure = true; /* ramfs is not swappable, hence "secure" */ |
| 277 |
else if (is_fs_type(&sfs, TMPFS_MAGIC)) { |
| 278 |
r = is_tmpfs_with_noswap(st.st_dev); |
| 279 |
if (r < 0) |
| 280 |
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if file system of '%s' has 'noswap' enabled, assuming not: %m", de->d_name); |
| 281 |
|
| 282 |
is_secure = r > 0; |
| 283 |
} else |
| 284 |
is_secure = false; /* everything else we assume is not "secure" */ |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
secure = is_secure ? "secure" : "weak"; |
| 287 |
secure_color = is_secure ? ansi_highlight_green() : ansi_highlight_yellow4(); |
| 288 |
} |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
j = path_join(prefix, de->d_name); |
| 291 |
if (!j) |
| 292 |
return log_oom(); |
| 293 |
|
| 294 |
r = table_add_many( |
| 295 |
t, |
| 296 |
TABLE_STRING, de->d_name, |
| 297 |
TABLE_STRING, secure, |
| 298 |
TABLE_SET_COLOR, secure_color, |
| 299 |
TABLE_SIZE, (uint64_t) st.st_size, |
| 300 |
TABLE_STRING, j); |
| 301 |
if (r < 0) |
| 302 |
return table_log_add_error(r); |
| 303 |
} |
| 304 |
|
| 305 |
return 1; /* Creds dir set */ |
| 306 |
} |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
VERB_DEFAULT_NOARG(verb_list, "list", "Show list of passed credentials"); |
| 309 |
static int verb_list(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 310 |
_cleanup_(table_unrefp) Table *t = NULL; |
| 311 |
int r, q; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
t = table_new("name", "secure", "size", "path"); |
| 314 |
if (!t) |
| 315 |
return log_oom(); |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
(void) table_set_align_percent(t, table_get_cell(t, 0, 2), 100); |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
r = add_credentials_to_table(t, /* encrypted= */ true); |
| 320 |
if (r < 0) |
| 321 |
return r; |
| 322 |
|
| 323 |
q = add_credentials_to_table(t, /* encrypted= */ false); |
| 324 |
if (q < 0) |
| 325 |
return q; |
| 326 |
|
| 327 |
if (r == 0 && q == 0) { |
| 328 |
if (arg_system) |
| 329 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO), "No credentials passed to system."); |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO), "No credentials passed. (i.e. $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY not set.)"); |
| 332 |
} |
| 333 |
|
| 334 |
if (table_isempty(t) && !sd_json_format_enabled(arg_json_format_flags)) { |
| 335 |
log_info("No credentials"); |
| 336 |
return 0; |
| 337 |
} |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
return table_print_with_pager(t, arg_json_format_flags, arg_pager_flags, arg_legend); |
| 340 |
} |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
static int transcode( |
| 343 |
const void *input, |
| 344 |
size_t input_size, |
| 345 |
void **ret_output, |
| 346 |
size_t *ret_output_size) { |
| 347 |
|
| 348 |
int r; |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
assert(input); |
| 351 |
assert(input_size); |
| 352 |
assert(ret_output); |
| 353 |
assert(ret_output_size); |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
switch (arg_transcode) { |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
case TRANSCODE_BASE64: { |
| 358 |
char *buf; |
| 359 |
ssize_t l; |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
l = base64mem_full(input, input_size, 79, &buf); |
| 362 |
if (l < 0) |
| 363 |
return l; |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
*ret_output = buf; |
| 366 |
*ret_output_size = l; |
| 367 |
return 0; |
| 368 |
} |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
case TRANSCODE_UNBASE64: |
| 371 |
r = unbase64mem_full(input, input_size, true, ret_output, ret_output_size); |
| 372 |
if (r == -EPIPE) /* Uneven number of chars */ |
| 373 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
return r; |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
case TRANSCODE_HEX: { |
| 378 |
char *buf; |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
buf = hexmem(input, input_size); |
| 381 |
if (!buf) |
| 382 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
*ret_output = buf; |
| 385 |
*ret_output_size = input_size * 2; |
| 386 |
return 0; |
| 387 |
} |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
case TRANSCODE_UNHEX: |
| 390 |
r = unhexmem_full(input, input_size, true, ret_output, ret_output_size); |
| 391 |
if (r == -EPIPE) /* Uneven number of chars */ |
| 392 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
return r; |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
default: |
| 397 |
assert_not_reached(); |
| 398 |
} |
| 399 |
} |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
static int print_newline(FILE *f, const char *data, size_t l) { |
| 402 |
assert(f); |
| 403 |
assert(data || l == 0); |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
/* If turned off explicitly, don't print newline */ |
| 406 |
if (arg_newline == 0) |
| 407 |
return 0; |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
/* If data already has newline, don't print either */ |
| 410 |
if (l > 0 && data[l-1] == '\n') |
| 411 |
return 0; |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
/* If not explicitly requested, don't bother if the output is not a tty */ |
| 414 |
if (arg_newline < 0) { |
| 415 |
int fd = fileno(f); |
| 416 |
if (fd >= 0 && !isatty_safe(fd)) |
| 417 |
return 0; |
| 418 |
} |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
if (fputc('\n', f) == EOF) |
| 421 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to write trailing newline: %m"); |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
return 1; |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
static int write_blob(FILE *f, const void *data, size_t size) { |
| 427 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *transcoded = NULL; |
| 428 |
int r; |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
if (arg_transcode == TRANSCODE_OFF && |
| 431 |
sd_json_format_enabled(arg_json_format_flags)) { |
| 432 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *suffixed = NULL; |
| 433 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL; |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
r = make_cstring(data, size, MAKE_CSTRING_REFUSE_TRAILING_NUL, &suffixed); |
| 436 |
if (r < 0) |
| 437 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to convert binary string to C string: %m"); |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
r = sd_json_parse(suffixed, SD_JSON_PARSE_SENSITIVE, &v, NULL, NULL); |
| 440 |
if (r < 0) |
| 441 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse JSON: %m"); |
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
sd_json_variant_dump(v, arg_json_format_flags, f, NULL); |
| 444 |
return 0; |
| 445 |
} |
| 446 |
|
| 447 |
if (arg_transcode != TRANSCODE_OFF) { |
| 448 |
r = transcode(data, size, &transcoded, &size); |
| 449 |
if (r < 0) |
| 450 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to transcode data: %m"); |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
data = transcoded; |
| 453 |
} |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
if (fwrite(data, 1, size, f) != size) |
| 456 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to write credential data."); |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
r = print_newline(f, data, size); |
| 459 |
if (r < 0) |
| 460 |
return r; |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
r = fflush_and_check(f); |
| 463 |
if (r < 0) |
| 464 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to flush output: %m"); |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
return 0; |
| 467 |
} |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
VERB(verb_cat, "cat", "CREDENTIAL...", 2, VERB_ANY, 0, |
| 470 |
"Show contents of specified credentials"); |
| 471 |
static int verb_cat(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 472 |
usec_t timestamp; |
| 473 |
int r, ret = 0; |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
timestamp = arg_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY ? arg_timestamp : now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
STRV_FOREACH(cn, strv_skip(argv, 1)) { |
| 478 |
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *content = NULL; |
| 479 |
size_t size = 0; |
| 480 |
int encrypted; |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
if (!credential_name_valid(*cn)) { |
| 483 |
RET_GATHER(ret, log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential name '%s' is not valid.", *cn)); |
| 484 |
continue; |
| 485 |
} |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
/* Look both in regular and in encrypted credentials */ |
| 488 |
for (encrypted = 0; encrypted < 2; encrypted++) { |
| 489 |
_cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
r = open_credential_directory(encrypted, &d, NULL); |
| 492 |
if (r < 0) |
| 493 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open credentials directory: %m"); |
| 494 |
if (!d) /* Not set */ |
| 495 |
continue; |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
ReadFullFileFlags flags = READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE; |
| 498 |
if (encrypted) |
| 499 |
flags |= READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64; |
| 500 |
|
| 501 |
r = read_full_file_full( |
| 502 |
dirfd(d), *cn, |
| 503 |
UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, |
| 504 |
flags, |
| 505 |
NULL, |
| 506 |
(char**) &content, &size); |
| 507 |
if (r == -ENOENT) /* Not found */ |
| 508 |
continue; |
| 509 |
if (r >= 0) /* Found */ |
| 510 |
break; |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
RET_GATHER(ret, log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read credential '%s': %m", *cn)); |
| 513 |
} |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
if (encrypted >= 2) { /* Found nowhere */ |
| 516 |
RET_GATHER(ret, log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT), "Credential '%s' not set.", *cn)); |
| 517 |
continue; |
| 518 |
} |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
if (encrypted) { |
| 521 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec plaintext = {}; |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
if (geteuid() != 0) |
| 524 |
r = ipc_decrypt_credential( |
| 525 |
*cn, |
| 526 |
timestamp, |
| 527 |
uid_is_valid(arg_uid) ? arg_uid : getuid(), |
| 528 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(content, size), |
| 529 |
arg_credential_flags | CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE, |
| 530 |
&plaintext); |
| 531 |
else |
| 532 |
r = decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 533 |
*cn, |
| 534 |
timestamp, |
| 535 |
arg_tpm2_device, |
| 536 |
arg_tpm2_signature, |
| 537 |
uid_is_valid(arg_uid) ? arg_uid : getuid(), |
| 538 |
&IOVEC_MAKE(content, size), |
| 539 |
arg_credential_flags | CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE, |
| 540 |
&plaintext); |
| 541 |
if (r < 0) |
| 542 |
return r; |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
erase_and_free(content); |
| 545 |
content = TAKE_PTR(plaintext.iov_base); |
| 546 |
size = plaintext.iov_len; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
r = write_blob(stdout, content, size); |
| 550 |
if (r < 0) |
| 551 |
return r; |
| 552 |
} |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
return ret; |
| 555 |
} |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
VERB(verb_encrypt, "encrypt", "INPUT OUTPUT", 3, 3, 0, |
| 558 |
"Encrypt plaintext credential file and write to ciphertext credential file"); |
| 559 |
static int verb_encrypt(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 560 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec plaintext = {}, output = {}; |
| 561 |
_cleanup_free_ char *base64_buf = NULL, *fname = NULL; |
| 562 |
const char *input_path, *output_path, *name; |
| 563 |
ssize_t base64_size; |
| 564 |
usec_t timestamp; |
| 565 |
int r; |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
assert(argc == 3); |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
input_path = empty_or_dash(argv[1]) ? NULL : argv[1]; |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
if (input_path) |
| 572 |
r = read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD, input_path, UINT64_MAX, CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX, READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, NULL, (char**) &plaintext.iov_base, &plaintext.iov_len); |
| 573 |
else |
| 574 |
r = read_full_stream_full(stdin, NULL, UINT64_MAX, CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX, READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, (char**) &plaintext.iov_base, &plaintext.iov_len); |
| 575 |
if (r == -E2BIG) |
| 576 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Plaintext too long for credential (allowed size: %zu).", (size_t) CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX); |
| 577 |
if (r < 0) |
| 578 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read plaintext: %m"); |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
output_path = empty_or_dash(argv[2]) ? NULL : argv[2]; |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
if (arg_name_any) |
| 583 |
name = NULL; |
| 584 |
else if (arg_name) |
| 585 |
name = arg_name; |
| 586 |
else if (output_path) { |
| 587 |
r = path_extract_filename(output_path, &fname); |
| 588 |
if (r < 0) |
| 589 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from '%s': %m", output_path); |
| 590 |
if (r == O_DIRECTORY) |
| 591 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Path '%s' refers to directory, refusing.", output_path); |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
name = fname; |
| 594 |
} else { |
| 595 |
log_warning("No credential name specified, not embedding credential name in encrypted data. (Disable this warning with --name=)"); |
| 596 |
name = NULL; |
| 597 |
} |
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
timestamp = arg_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY ? arg_timestamp : now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
if (arg_not_after != USEC_INFINITY && arg_not_after < timestamp) |
| 602 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential is invalidated before it is valid."); |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
if (geteuid() != 0) { |
| 605 |
(void) polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL, arg_ask_password); |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
r = ipc_encrypt_credential( |
| 608 |
name, |
| 609 |
timestamp, |
| 610 |
arg_not_after, |
| 611 |
arg_uid, |
| 612 |
&plaintext, |
| 613 |
arg_credential_flags, |
| 614 |
&output); |
| 615 |
} else |
| 616 |
r = encrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 617 |
arg_with_key, |
| 618 |
name, |
| 619 |
timestamp, |
| 620 |
arg_not_after, |
| 621 |
arg_tpm2_device, |
| 622 |
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, |
| 623 |
arg_tpm2_public_key, |
| 624 |
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, |
| 625 |
arg_uid, |
| 626 |
&plaintext, |
| 627 |
arg_credential_flags, |
| 628 |
&output); |
| 629 |
if (r < 0) |
| 630 |
return r; |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
base64_size = base64mem_full(output.iov_base, output.iov_len, arg_pretty ? 69 : 79, &base64_buf); |
| 633 |
if (base64_size < 0) |
| 634 |
return base64_size; |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
/* Pretty print makes sense only if we're printing stuff to stdout |
| 637 |
* and if a cred name is provided via --name= (since we can't use |
| 638 |
* the output file name as the cred name here) */ |
| 639 |
if (arg_pretty && !output_path && name) { |
| 640 |
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL, *indented = NULL, *j = NULL; |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
escaped = cescape(name); |
| 643 |
if (!escaped) |
| 644 |
return log_oom(); |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
indented = strreplace(base64_buf, "\n", " \\\n "); |
| 647 |
if (!indented) |
| 648 |
return log_oom(); |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
j = strjoin("SetCredentialEncrypted=", escaped, ": \\\n ", indented, "\n"); |
| 651 |
if (!j) |
| 652 |
return log_oom(); |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
free_and_replace(base64_buf, j); |
| 655 |
} |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
if (output_path) |
| 658 |
r = write_string_file(output_path, base64_buf, WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC|WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE); |
| 659 |
else |
| 660 |
r = write_string_stream(stdout, base64_buf, 0); |
| 661 |
if (r < 0) |
| 662 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write result: %m"); |
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
return EXIT_SUCCESS; |
| 665 |
} |
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
VERB(verb_decrypt, "decrypt", "INPUT [OUTPUT]", 2, 3, 0, |
| 668 |
"Decrypt ciphertext credential file and write to plaintext credential file"); |
| 669 |
static int verb_decrypt(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 670 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec input = {}, plaintext = {}; |
| 671 |
_cleanup_free_ char *fname = NULL; |
| 672 |
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *output_file = NULL; |
| 673 |
const char *input_path, *output_path, *name; |
| 674 |
usec_t timestamp; |
| 675 |
FILE *f; |
| 676 |
int r; |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
assert(IN_SET(argc, 2, 3)); |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
input_path = empty_or_dash(argv[1]) ? NULL : argv[1]; |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
if (input_path) |
| 683 |
r = read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD, argv[1], UINT64_MAX, CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX, READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, NULL, (char**) &input, &input.iov_len); |
| 684 |
else |
| 685 |
r = read_full_stream_full(stdin, NULL, UINT64_MAX, CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX, READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, (char**) &input, &input.iov_len); |
| 686 |
if (r == -E2BIG) |
| 687 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Data too long for encrypted credential (allowed size: %zu).", (size_t) CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX); |
| 688 |
if (r < 0) |
| 689 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read encrypted credential data: %m"); |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
output_path = (argc < 3 || empty_or_dash(argv[2])) ? NULL : argv[2]; |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
if (arg_name_any) |
| 694 |
name = NULL; |
| 695 |
else if (arg_name) |
| 696 |
name = arg_name; |
| 697 |
else if (input_path) { |
| 698 |
r = path_extract_filename(input_path, &fname); |
| 699 |
if (r < 0) |
| 700 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract filename from '%s': %m", input_path); |
| 701 |
if (r == O_DIRECTORY) |
| 702 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EISDIR), "Path '%s' refers to directory, refusing.", input_path); |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
name = fname; |
| 705 |
} else { |
| 706 |
log_warning("No credential name specified, not validating credential name embedded in encrypted data. (Disable this warning with --name=.)"); |
| 707 |
name = NULL; |
| 708 |
} |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
timestamp = arg_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY ? arg_timestamp : now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
if (geteuid() != 0) { |
| 713 |
(void) polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL, arg_ask_password); |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
r = ipc_decrypt_credential( |
| 716 |
name, |
| 717 |
timestamp, |
| 718 |
arg_uid, |
| 719 |
&input, |
| 720 |
arg_credential_flags, |
| 721 |
&plaintext); |
| 722 |
} else |
| 723 |
r = decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 724 |
name, |
| 725 |
timestamp, |
| 726 |
arg_tpm2_device, |
| 727 |
arg_tpm2_signature, |
| 728 |
arg_uid, |
| 729 |
&input, |
| 730 |
arg_credential_flags, |
| 731 |
&plaintext); |
| 732 |
if (r < 0) |
| 733 |
return r; |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
if (output_path) { |
| 736 |
output_file = fopen(output_path, "we"); |
| 737 |
if (!output_file) |
| 738 |
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create output file '%s': %m", output_path); |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
f = output_file; |
| 741 |
} else |
| 742 |
f = stdout; |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
r = write_blob(f, plaintext.iov_base, plaintext.iov_len); |
| 745 |
if (r < 0) |
| 746 |
return r; |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
return EXIT_SUCCESS; |
| 749 |
} |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
VERB_NOARG(verb_setup, "setup", |
| 752 |
"Generate credentials host key, if not existing yet"); |
| 753 |
static int verb_setup(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 754 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec host_key = {}; |
| 755 |
int r; |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
r = get_credential_host_secret(CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE|CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED, &host_key); |
| 758 |
if (r < 0) |
| 759 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to setup credentials host key: %m"); |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
log_info("%zu byte credentials host key set up.", host_key.iov_len); |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
return EXIT_SUCCESS; |
| 764 |
} |
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
/* For backward compatibility. Hidden from help. */ |
| 767 |
VERB(verb_has_tpm2, "has-tpm2", NULL, VERB_ANY, 1, 0, /* help= */ NULL); |
| 768 |
static int verb_has_tpm2(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { |
| 769 |
if (!arg_quiet) |
| 770 |
log_notice("The 'systemd-creds %1$s' command has been replaced by 'systemd-analyze %1$s'. Redirecting invocation.", argv[0]); |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
return verb_has_tpm2_generic(arg_quiet); |
| 773 |
} |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
static int help(void) { |
| 776 |
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; |
| 777 |
_cleanup_(table_unrefp) Table *options = NULL, *verbs = NULL; |
| 778 |
int r; |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-creds", "1", &link); |
| 781 |
if (r < 0) |
| 782 |
return log_oom(); |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
r = verbs_get_help_table(&verbs); |
| 785 |
if (r < 0) |
| 786 |
return r; |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
r = option_parser_get_help_table(&options); |
| 789 |
if (r < 0) |
| 790 |
return r; |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
(void) table_sync_column_widths(0, verbs, options); |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
printf("%s [OPTIONS...] COMMAND ...\n\n" |
| 795 |
"%sDisplay and Process Credentials.%s\n" |
| 796 |
"\n%sCommands:%s\n", |
| 797 |
program_invocation_short_name, |
| 798 |
ansi_highlight(), |
| 799 |
ansi_normal(), |
| 800 |
ansi_underline(), |
| 801 |
ansi_normal()); |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
r = table_print_or_warn(verbs); |
| 804 |
if (r < 0) |
| 805 |
return r; |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
printf("\n%sOptions:%s\n", |
| 808 |
ansi_underline(), |
| 809 |
ansi_normal()); |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
r = table_print_or_warn(options); |
| 812 |
if (r < 0) |
| 813 |
return r; |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
printf("\nSee the %s for details.\n", link); |
| 816 |
return 0; |
| 817 |
} |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
VERB_COMMON_HELP(help); |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[], char ***ret_args) { |
| 822 |
assert(argc >= 0); |
| 823 |
assert(argv); |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
OptionParser opts = { argc, argv }; |
| 826 |
int r; |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
FOREACH_OPTION_OR_RETURN(c, &opts) |
| 829 |
switch (c) { |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
OPTION_COMMON_HELP: |
| 832 |
return help(); |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
OPTION_COMMON_VERSION: |
| 835 |
return version(); |
| 836 |
|
| 837 |
OPTION_COMMON_NO_PAGER: |
| 838 |
arg_pager_flags |= PAGER_DISABLE; |
| 839 |
break; |
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
OPTION_COMMON_NO_LEGEND: |
| 842 |
arg_legend = false; |
| 843 |
break; |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
OPTION_COMMON_JSON: |
| 846 |
r = parse_json_argument(opts.arg, &arg_json_format_flags); |
| 847 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 848 |
return r; |
| 849 |
break; |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
OPTION_LONG("system", NULL, "Show credentials passed to system"): |
| 852 |
arg_system = true; |
| 853 |
break; |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
OPTION_LONG("transcode", "METHOD", |
| 856 |
"Transcode credential data (base64, unbase64, hex, unhex)"): |
| 857 |
if (streq(opts.arg, "help")) { |
| 858 |
if (arg_legend) |
| 859 |
puts("Supported transcode types:"); |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
return DUMP_STRING_TABLE(transcode_mode, TranscodeMode, _TRANSCODE_MAX); |
| 862 |
} |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
if (parse_boolean(opts.arg) == 0) /* If specified as "false", turn transcoding off */ |
| 865 |
arg_transcode = TRANSCODE_OFF; |
| 866 |
else { |
| 867 |
TranscodeMode m; |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
m = transcode_mode_from_string(opts.arg); |
| 870 |
if (m < 0) |
| 871 |
return log_error_errno(m, "Failed to parse transcode mode: %m"); |
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
arg_transcode = m; |
| 874 |
} |
| 875 |
break; |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
OPTION_LONG("newline", "auto|yes|no", "Suffix output with newline"): |
| 878 |
r = parse_tristate_argument_with_auto("--newline=", opts.arg, &arg_newline); |
| 879 |
if (r < 0) |
| 880 |
return r; |
| 881 |
break; |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
OPTION('p', "pretty", NULL, "Output as SetCredentialEncrypted= line"): |
| 884 |
arg_pretty = true; |
| 885 |
break; |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
OPTION_LONG("name", "NAME", |
| 888 |
"Override filename included in encrypted credential"): |
| 889 |
if (isempty(opts.arg)) { |
| 890 |
arg_name = NULL; |
| 891 |
arg_name_any = true; |
| 892 |
break; |
| 893 |
} |
| 894 |
|
| 895 |
if (!credential_name_valid(opts.arg)) |
| 896 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", opts.arg); |
| 897 |
|
| 898 |
arg_name = opts.arg; |
| 899 |
arg_name_any = false; |
| 900 |
break; |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
OPTION_LONG("timestamp", "TIME", |
| 903 |
"Include specified timestamp in encrypted credential"): |
| 904 |
r = parse_timestamp(opts.arg, &arg_timestamp); |
| 905 |
if (r < 0) |
| 906 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse timestamp: %s", opts.arg); |
| 907 |
break; |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
OPTION_LONG("not-after", "TIME", |
| 910 |
"Include specified invalidation time in encrypted credential"): |
| 911 |
r = parse_timestamp(opts.arg, &arg_not_after); |
| 912 |
if (r < 0) |
| 913 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse --not-after= timestamp: %s", opts.arg); |
| 914 |
break; |
| 915 |
|
| 916 |
OPTION_LONG("with-key", "KEY", |
| 917 |
"Which keys to encrypt with (host, tpm2, host+tpm2, null, auto, auto-initrd)"): |
| 918 |
if (streq(opts.arg, "help")) { |
| 919 |
if (arg_legend) |
| 920 |
puts("Supported key types:"); |
| 921 |
return DUMP_STRING_TABLE(cred_key_type, CredKeyType, _CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX); |
| 922 |
} |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
if (isempty(opts.arg)) |
| 925 |
arg_with_key = _CRED_AUTO; |
| 926 |
else { |
| 927 |
CredKeyType t = cred_key_type_from_string(opts.arg); |
| 928 |
if (t < 0) |
| 929 |
return log_error_errno(t, "Failed to parse key type: %m"); |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
arg_with_key = cred_key_id[t]; |
| 932 |
} |
| 933 |
break; |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
OPTION_SHORT('H', NULL, "Shortcut for --with-key=host"): |
| 936 |
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST; |
| 937 |
break; |
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
OPTION_SHORT('T', NULL, "Shortcut for --with-key=tpm2"): |
| 940 |
arg_with_key = _CRED_AUTO_TPM2; |
| 941 |
break; |
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
OPTION_LONG("tpm2-device", "PATH", "Pick TPM2 device"): |
| 944 |
if (streq(opts.arg, "list")) |
| 945 |
return tpm2_list_devices(arg_legend, arg_quiet); |
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
arg_tpm2_device = streq(opts.arg, "auto") ? NULL : opts.arg; |
| 948 |
break; |
| 949 |
|
| 950 |
OPTION_LONG("tpm2-pcrs", "PCR1+PCR2+PCR3+…", |
| 951 |
"Specify TPM2 PCRs to seal against (fixed hash)"): |
| 952 |
/* For fixed hash PCR policies only */ |
| 953 |
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(opts.arg, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask); |
| 954 |
if (r < 0) |
| 955 |
return r; |
| 956 |
break; |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
OPTION_LONG("tpm2-public-key", "PATH", |
| 959 |
"Specify PEM certificate to seal against"): |
| 960 |
r = parse_path_argument(opts.arg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_tpm2_public_key); |
| 961 |
if (r < 0) |
| 962 |
return r; |
| 963 |
break; |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
OPTION_LONG("tpm2-public-key-pcrs", "PCR1+PCR2+…", |
| 966 |
"Specify TPM2 PCRs to seal against (public key)"): |
| 967 |
/* For public key PCR policies only */ |
| 968 |
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(opts.arg, &arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask); |
| 969 |
if (r < 0) |
| 970 |
return r; |
| 971 |
break; |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
OPTION_LONG("tpm2-signature", "PATH", |
| 974 |
"Specify signature for public key PCR policy"): |
| 975 |
r = parse_path_argument(opts.arg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_tpm2_signature); |
| 976 |
if (r < 0) |
| 977 |
return r; |
| 978 |
break; |
| 979 |
|
| 980 |
OPTION_LONG("user", NULL, "Select user-scoped credential encryption"): |
| 981 |
if (!uid_is_valid(arg_uid)) |
| 982 |
arg_uid = getuid(); |
| 983 |
break; |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
OPTION_LONG("uid", "UID", "Select user for scoped credentials"): |
| 986 |
if (isempty(opts.arg)) |
| 987 |
arg_uid = UID_INVALID; |
| 988 |
else if (streq(opts.arg, "self")) |
| 989 |
arg_uid = getuid(); |
| 990 |
else { |
| 991 |
r = get_user_creds( |
| 992 |
opts.arg, |
| 993 |
/* flags= */ 0, |
| 994 |
/* ret_username= */ NULL, |
| 995 |
&arg_uid, |
| 996 |
/* ret_gid= */ NULL, |
| 997 |
/* ret_home= */ NULL, |
| 998 |
/* ret_shell= */ NULL); |
| 999 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1000 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to resolve user '%s': %s", |
| 1001 |
opts.arg, STRERROR_USER(r)); |
| 1002 |
} |
| 1003 |
break; |
| 1004 |
|
| 1005 |
OPTION_LONG("allow-null", NULL, |
| 1006 |
"Allow decrypting credentials with null key"): |
| 1007 |
arg_credential_flags &= ~CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL; |
| 1008 |
arg_credential_flags |= CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL; |
| 1009 |
break; |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
OPTION_LONG("refuse-null", NULL, |
| 1012 |
"Refuse decrypting credentials with null key"): |
| 1013 |
arg_credential_flags |= CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL; |
| 1014 |
arg_credential_flags &= ~CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL; |
| 1015 |
break; |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
OPTION_COMMON_NO_ASK_PASSWORD: |
| 1018 |
arg_ask_password = false; |
| 1019 |
break; |
| 1020 |
|
| 1021 |
OPTION('q', "quiet", NULL, "Suppress informational messages"): |
| 1022 |
arg_quiet = true; |
| 1023 |
break; |
| 1024 |
} |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
SET_FLAG(arg_credential_flags, CREDENTIAL_IPC_ALLOW_INTERACTIVE, arg_ask_password); |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
if (uid_is_valid(arg_uid)) { |
| 1029 |
/* If a UID is specified, then switch to scoped credentials */ |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
if (sd_id128_equal(arg_with_key, _CRED_AUTO)) |
| 1032 |
arg_with_key = _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED; |
| 1033 |
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED)) |
| 1034 |
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED; |
| 1035 |
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED)) |
| 1036 |
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED; |
| 1037 |
else if (sd_id128_in_set(arg_with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED)) |
| 1038 |
arg_with_key = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED; |
| 1039 |
else |
| 1040 |
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Selected key not available in --uid= scoped mode, refusing."); |
| 1041 |
} |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX) |
| 1044 |
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = 0; |
| 1045 |
if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX) |
| 1046 |
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT; |
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
r = sd_varlink_invocation(SD_VARLINK_ALLOW_ACCEPT); |
| 1049 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1050 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to check if invoked in Varlink mode: %m"); |
| 1051 |
arg_varlink = r; |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
*ret_args = option_parser_get_args(&opts); |
| 1054 |
return 1; |
| 1055 |
} |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
#define TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX (30*USEC_PER_SEC) |
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
static bool timestamp_is_fresh(usec_t x) { |
| 1060 |
usec_t n = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 1061 |
|
| 1062 |
/* We'll only allow unprivileged encryption/decryption for somehwhat "fresh" timestamps */ |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
if (x > n) |
| 1065 |
return x - n <= TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX; |
| 1066 |
else |
| 1067 |
return n - x <= TIMESTAMP_FRESH_MAX; |
| 1068 |
} |
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 |
typedef enum CredentialScope { |
| 1071 |
CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM, |
| 1072 |
CREDENTIAL_USER, |
| 1073 |
/* One day we should add more here, for example, per-app/per-service credentials */ |
| 1074 |
_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_MAX, |
| 1075 |
_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID = -EINVAL, |
| 1076 |
} CredentialScope; |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
static const char* credential_scope_table[_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_MAX] = { |
| 1079 |
[CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM] = "system", |
| 1080 |
[CREDENTIAL_USER] = "user", |
| 1081 |
}; |
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 |
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING(credential_scope, CredentialScope); |
| 1084 |
static JSON_DISPATCH_ENUM_DEFINE(dispatch_credential_scope, CredentialScope, credential_scope_from_string); |
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
typedef struct MethodEncryptParameters { |
| 1087 |
const char *name; |
| 1088 |
const char *text; |
| 1089 |
struct iovec data; |
| 1090 |
uint64_t timestamp; |
| 1091 |
uint64_t not_after; |
| 1092 |
CredentialScope scope; |
| 1093 |
sd_id128_t with_key; |
| 1094 |
uid_t uid; |
| 1095 |
} MethodEncryptParameters; |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
static void method_encrypt_parameters_done(MethodEncryptParameters *p) { |
| 1098 |
assert(p); |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
iovec_done_erase(&p->data); |
| 1101 |
} |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
static int settle_scope( |
| 1104 |
sd_varlink *link, |
| 1105 |
CredentialScope *scope, |
| 1106 |
uid_t *uid, |
| 1107 |
CredentialFlags *flags, |
| 1108 |
bool *any_scope_after_polkit) { |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
uid_t peer_uid; |
| 1111 |
int r; |
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
assert(link); |
| 1114 |
assert(scope); |
| 1115 |
assert(uid); |
| 1116 |
assert(flags); |
| 1117 |
|
| 1118 |
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid); |
| 1119 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1120 |
return r; |
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
if (*scope < 0) { |
| 1123 |
if (uid_is_valid(*uid)) |
| 1124 |
*scope = CREDENTIAL_USER; |
| 1125 |
else { |
| 1126 |
*scope = CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM; /* When encrypting, we spit out a system credential */ |
| 1127 |
*uid = peer_uid; /* When decrypting a user credential, use this UID */ |
| 1128 |
} |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
if (peer_uid == 0) |
| 1131 |
*flags |= CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE; |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
if (any_scope_after_polkit) |
| 1134 |
*any_scope_after_polkit = true; |
| 1135 |
} else if (*scope == CREDENTIAL_USER) { |
| 1136 |
if (!uid_is_valid(*uid)) |
| 1137 |
*uid = peer_uid; |
| 1138 |
} else { |
| 1139 |
assert(*scope == CREDENTIAL_SYSTEM); |
| 1140 |
if (uid_is_valid(*uid)) |
| 1141 |
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "uid"); |
| 1142 |
} |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
return 0; |
| 1145 |
} |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
static char normalize_separator(char c) { |
| 1148 |
if (IN_SET(c, '-', '+', '_')) |
| 1149 |
return '_'; |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
return c; |
| 1152 |
} |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
static bool enum_name_equal(const char *x, const char *y) { |
| 1155 |
if (x == y) |
| 1156 |
return true; |
| 1157 |
if (!x || !y) |
| 1158 |
return false; |
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
for (;; x++, y++) { |
| 1161 |
char a = normalize_separator(*x), b = normalize_separator(*y); |
| 1162 |
if (a != b) |
| 1163 |
return false; |
| 1164 |
if (a == 0) |
| 1165 |
return true; |
| 1166 |
} |
| 1167 |
} |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
static CredKeyType cred_key_type_from_string_harder(const char *s) { |
| 1170 |
if (!s) |
| 1171 |
return _CRED_KEY_TYPE_INVALID; |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
CredKeyType t = cred_key_type_from_string(s); |
| 1174 |
if (t >= 0) |
| 1175 |
return t; |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
/* Varlink doesn't like dashes and plusses in enum names. Try to match when considering them equal to underscores */ |
| 1178 |
for (t = 0; t < _CRED_KEY_TYPE_MAX; t++) |
| 1179 |
if (enum_name_equal(cred_key_type_table[t], s)) |
| 1180 |
return t; |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
return _CRED_KEY_TYPE_INVALID; |
| 1183 |
} |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
static int dispatch_credential_key_type( |
| 1186 |
const char *name, |
| 1187 |
sd_json_variant *variant, |
| 1188 |
sd_json_dispatch_flags_t flags, |
| 1189 |
void *userdata) { |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
sd_id128_t *id = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
if (sd_json_variant_is_null(variant)) { |
| 1194 |
*id = SD_ID128_NULL; |
| 1195 |
return 0; |
| 1196 |
} |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
const char *s = sd_json_variant_string(variant); |
| 1199 |
if (isempty(s)) { |
| 1200 |
*id = SD_ID128_NULL; |
| 1201 |
return 0; |
| 1202 |
} |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
CredKeyType t = cred_key_type_from_string_harder(s); |
| 1205 |
if (t < 0) |
| 1206 |
return json_log(variant, flags, t, "JSON field '%s' is not a valid key type.", strna(name)); |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
*id = cred_key_id[t]; |
| 1209 |
return 0; |
| 1210 |
} |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
static int vl_method_encrypt(sd_varlink *link, sd_json_variant *parameters, sd_varlink_method_flags_t flags, void *userdata) { |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = { |
| 1215 |
{ "name", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, name), 0 }, |
| 1216 |
{ "text", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, text), 0 }, |
| 1217 |
{ "data", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, data), 0 }, |
| 1218 |
{ "timestamp", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, timestamp), 0 }, |
| 1219 |
{ "notAfter", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, not_after), 0 }, |
| 1220 |
{ "scope", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_scope, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, scope), 0 }, |
| 1221 |
{ "withKey", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_key_type, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, with_key), SD_JSON_NULLABLE }, |
| 1222 |
{ "uid", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uid_gid, offsetof(MethodEncryptParameters, uid), 0 }, |
| 1223 |
VARLINK_DISPATCH_POLKIT_FIELD, |
| 1224 |
{} |
| 1225 |
}; |
| 1226 |
_cleanup_(method_encrypt_parameters_done) MethodEncryptParameters p = { |
| 1227 |
.timestamp = UINT64_MAX, |
| 1228 |
.not_after = UINT64_MAX, |
| 1229 |
.scope = _CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID, |
| 1230 |
.uid = UID_INVALID, |
| 1231 |
}; |
| 1232 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec output = {}; |
| 1233 |
Hashmap **polkit_registry = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
| 1234 |
CredentialFlags cflags = 0; |
| 1235 |
bool timestamp_fresh; |
| 1236 |
uid_t peer_uid; |
| 1237 |
int r; |
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 |
assert(link); |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
r = sd_varlink_dispatch(link, parameters, dispatch_table, &p); |
| 1242 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1243 |
return r; |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
if (p.name && !credential_name_valid(p.name)) |
| 1246 |
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "name"); |
| 1247 |
/* Specifying both or neither the text string and the binary data is not allowed */ |
| 1248 |
if (!!p.text == !!p.data.iov_base) |
| 1249 |
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "data"); |
| 1250 |
if (p.timestamp == UINT64_MAX) { |
| 1251 |
p.timestamp = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 1252 |
timestamp_fresh = true; |
| 1253 |
} else |
| 1254 |
timestamp_fresh = timestamp_is_fresh(p.timestamp); |
| 1255 |
if (p.not_after != UINT64_MAX && p.not_after < p.timestamp) |
| 1256 |
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "notAfter"); |
| 1257 |
|
| 1258 |
r = settle_scope(link, &p.scope, &p.uid, &cflags, /* any_scope_after_polkit= */ NULL); |
| 1259 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1260 |
return r; |
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid); |
| 1263 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1264 |
return r; |
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
/* Relax security requirements if peer wants to encrypt credentials for themselves */ |
| 1267 |
bool own_scope = p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER && p.uid == peer_uid; |
| 1268 |
|
| 1269 |
if (!own_scope || !timestamp_fresh) { |
| 1270 |
/* Insist on PK if client wants to encrypt for another user or the system, or if the timestamp was explicitly overridden. */ |
| 1271 |
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async( |
| 1272 |
link, |
| 1273 |
/* bus= */ NULL, |
| 1274 |
"io.systemd.credentials.encrypt", |
| 1275 |
/* details= */ NULL, |
| 1276 |
polkit_registry); |
| 1277 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 1278 |
return r; |
| 1279 |
} |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
r = encrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 1282 |
sd_id128_is_null(p.with_key) ? (p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER ? _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED : _CRED_AUTO) : p.with_key, |
| 1283 |
p.name, |
| 1284 |
p.timestamp, |
| 1285 |
p.not_after, |
| 1286 |
arg_tpm2_device, |
| 1287 |
arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, |
| 1288 |
arg_tpm2_public_key, |
| 1289 |
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, |
| 1290 |
p.uid, |
| 1291 |
p.text ? &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(p.text) : &p.data, |
| 1292 |
cflags, |
| 1293 |
&output); |
| 1294 |
if (r == -ESRCH) |
| 1295 |
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.Credentials.NoSuchUser", NULL); |
| 1296 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1297 |
return r; |
| 1298 |
|
| 1299 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; |
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
r = sd_json_buildo(&reply, JSON_BUILD_PAIR_IOVEC_BASE64("blob", &output)); |
| 1302 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1303 |
return r; |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
/* Let's also mark the (theoretically encrypted) reply as sensitive, in case the NULL encryption scheme was used. */ |
| 1306 |
sd_json_variant_sensitive(reply); |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
return sd_varlink_reply(link, reply); |
| 1309 |
} |
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
typedef struct MethodDecryptParameters { |
| 1312 |
const char *name; |
| 1313 |
struct iovec blob; |
| 1314 |
uint64_t timestamp; |
| 1315 |
CredentialScope scope; |
| 1316 |
uid_t uid; |
| 1317 |
int allow_null; |
| 1318 |
} MethodDecryptParameters; |
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
static void method_decrypt_parameters_done(MethodDecryptParameters *p) { |
| 1321 |
assert(p); |
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
iovec_done_erase(&p->blob); |
| 1324 |
} |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
static int vl_method_decrypt(sd_varlink *link, sd_json_variant *parameters, sd_varlink_method_flags_t flags, void *userdata) { |
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_table[] = { |
| 1329 |
{ "name", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, name), 0 }, |
| 1330 |
{ "blob", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, json_dispatch_unbase64_iovec, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, blob), SD_JSON_MANDATORY }, |
| 1331 |
{ "timestamp", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uint64, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, timestamp), 0 }, |
| 1332 |
{ "scope", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, dispatch_credential_scope, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, scope), 0 }, |
| 1333 |
{ "uid", _SD_JSON_VARIANT_TYPE_INVALID, sd_json_dispatch_uid_gid, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, uid), 0 }, |
| 1334 |
{ "allowNull", SD_JSON_VARIANT_BOOLEAN, sd_json_dispatch_tristate, offsetof(MethodDecryptParameters, allow_null), SD_JSON_NULLABLE }, |
| 1335 |
VARLINK_DISPATCH_POLKIT_FIELD, |
| 1336 |
{} |
| 1337 |
}; |
| 1338 |
_cleanup_(method_decrypt_parameters_done) MethodDecryptParameters p = { |
| 1339 |
.timestamp = UINT64_MAX, |
| 1340 |
.scope = _CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_INVALID, |
| 1341 |
.uid = UID_INVALID, |
| 1342 |
.allow_null = -1, |
| 1343 |
}; |
| 1344 |
bool timestamp_fresh, any_scope_after_polkit = false; |
| 1345 |
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec output = {}; |
| 1346 |
Hashmap **polkit_registry = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
| 1347 |
CredentialFlags cflags = 0; |
| 1348 |
uid_t peer_uid; |
| 1349 |
int r; |
| 1350 |
|
| 1351 |
assert(link); |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
r = sd_varlink_dispatch(link, parameters, dispatch_table, &p); |
| 1354 |
if (r != 0) |
| 1355 |
return r; |
| 1356 |
|
| 1357 |
if (p.name && !credential_name_valid(p.name)) |
| 1358 |
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "name"); |
| 1359 |
if (p.timestamp == UINT64_MAX) { |
| 1360 |
p.timestamp = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); |
| 1361 |
timestamp_fresh = true; |
| 1362 |
} else |
| 1363 |
timestamp_fresh = timestamp_is_fresh(p.timestamp); |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
r = settle_scope(link, &p.scope, &p.uid, &cflags, &any_scope_after_polkit); |
| 1366 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1367 |
return r; |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
if (p.allow_null > 0) |
| 1370 |
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL; |
| 1371 |
else if (p.allow_null == 0) |
| 1372 |
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_REFUSE_NULL; |
| 1373 |
|
| 1374 |
r = sd_varlink_get_peer_uid(link, &peer_uid); |
| 1375 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1376 |
return r; |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
/* Relax security requirements if peer wants to encrypt credentials for themselves */ |
| 1379 |
bool own_scope = p.scope == CREDENTIAL_USER && p.uid == peer_uid; |
| 1380 |
bool ask_polkit = !own_scope || !timestamp_fresh; |
| 1381 |
for (;;) { |
| 1382 |
if (ask_polkit) { |
| 1383 |
r = varlink_verify_polkit_async( |
| 1384 |
link, |
| 1385 |
/* bus= */ NULL, |
| 1386 |
"io.systemd.credentials.decrypt", |
| 1387 |
/* details= */ NULL, |
| 1388 |
polkit_registry); |
| 1389 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 1390 |
return r; |
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
/* Now that we have authenticated, it's fine to allow unpriv clients access to system secrets */ |
| 1393 |
if (any_scope_after_polkit) |
| 1394 |
cflags |= CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE; |
| 1395 |
} |
| 1396 |
|
| 1397 |
r = decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| 1398 |
p.name, |
| 1399 |
p.timestamp, |
| 1400 |
arg_tpm2_device, |
| 1401 |
arg_tpm2_signature, |
| 1402 |
p.uid, |
| 1403 |
&p.blob, |
| 1404 |
cflags, |
| 1405 |
&output); |
| 1406 |
if (r != -EMEDIUMTYPE || ask_polkit || !any_scope_after_polkit) |
| 1407 |
break; |
| 1408 |
|
| 1409 |
/* So the secret was apparently intended for the system. Let's retry decrypting it after |
| 1410 |
* acquiring polkit's permission. */ |
| 1411 |
ask_polkit = true; |
| 1412 |
} |
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 |
if (IN_SET(r, -EREMCHG, -ENOANO, -EUCLEAN, -EPERM)) |
| 1415 |
return sd_varlink_error(link, "io.systemd.Credentials.UnexpectedPCRState", NULL); |
| 1416 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 1417 |
const CredentialsVarlinkError *e = credentials_varlink_error_by_errno(r); |
| 1418 |
if (e) |
| 1419 |
return sd_varlink_error(link, e->id, NULL); |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
return r; |
| 1422 |
} |
| 1423 |
|
| 1424 |
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
r = sd_json_buildo(&reply, JSON_BUILD_PAIR_IOVEC_BASE64("data", &output)); |
| 1427 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1428 |
return r; |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
sd_json_variant_sensitive(reply); |
| 1431 |
|
| 1432 |
return sd_varlink_reply(link, reply); |
| 1433 |
} |
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 |
static int vl_server(void) { |
| 1436 |
_cleanup_(sd_varlink_server_unrefp) sd_varlink_server *varlink_server = NULL; |
| 1437 |
_cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *polkit_registry = NULL; |
| 1438 |
int r; |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
/* Invocation as Varlink service */ |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
r = varlink_server_new( |
| 1443 |
&varlink_server, |
| 1444 |
SD_VARLINK_SERVER_ACCOUNT_UID|SD_VARLINK_SERVER_INHERIT_USERDATA|SD_VARLINK_SERVER_INPUT_SENSITIVE, |
| 1445 |
&polkit_registry); |
| 1446 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1447 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate Varlink server: %m"); |
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
r = sd_varlink_server_add_interface(varlink_server, &vl_interface_io_systemd_Credentials); |
| 1450 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1451 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add Varlink interface: %m"); |
| 1452 |
|
| 1453 |
r = sd_varlink_server_bind_method_many( |
| 1454 |
varlink_server, |
| 1455 |
"io.systemd.Credentials.Encrypt", vl_method_encrypt, |
| 1456 |
"io.systemd.Credentials.Decrypt", vl_method_decrypt); |
| 1457 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1458 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to bind Varlink methods: %m"); |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
r = sd_varlink_server_loop_auto(varlink_server); |
| 1461 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1462 |
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run Varlink event loop: %m"); |
| 1463 |
|
| 1464 |
return 0; |
| 1465 |
} |
| 1466 |
|
| 1467 |
static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| 1468 |
int r; |
| 1469 |
|
| 1470 |
log_setup(); |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
char **args = NULL; |
| 1473 |
r = parse_argv(argc, argv, &args); |
| 1474 |
if (r <= 0) |
| 1475 |
return r; |
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 |
if (arg_varlink) |
| 1478 |
return vl_server(); |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
return dispatch_verb(args, NULL); |
| 1481 |
} |
| 1482 |
|
| 1483 |
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_WITH_POSITIVE_FAILURE(run); |