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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| 2 |
|
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#include <fcntl.h> |
| 4 |
#include <stdio.h> |
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#include <stdlib.h> |
| 6 |
#include <sys/file.h> |
| 7 |
#include <sys/stat.h> |
| 8 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 9 |
#include <utmpx.h> |
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|
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#include "sd-messages.h" |
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|
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#include "alloc-util.h" |
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#include "chase.h" |
| 15 |
#include "errno-util.h" |
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#include "extract-word.h" |
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#include "fd-util.h" |
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#include "fileio.h" |
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#include "format-util.h" |
| 20 |
#include "lock-util.h" |
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#include "log.h" |
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#include "mkdir.h" |
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#include "parse-util.h" |
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#include "path-util.h" |
| 25 |
#include "string-util.h" |
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#include "strv.h" |
| 27 |
#include "terminal-util.h" |
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#include "user-util.h" |
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#include "utf8.h" |
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|
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#define DEFINE_STRERROR_ACCOUNT(type) \ |
| 32 |
const char* strerror_##type( \ |
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int errnum, \ |
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char *buf, \ |
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size_t buflen) { \ |
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\ |
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errnum = ABS(errnum); \ |
| 38 |
switch (errnum) { \ |
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case ESRCH: \ |
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return "Unknown " STRINGIFY(type); \ |
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case ENOEXEC: \ |
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return "Not a system " STRINGIFY(type); \ |
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default: \ |
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return strerror_r(errnum, buf, buflen); \ |
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} \ |
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} |
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|
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DEFINE_STRERROR_ACCOUNT(user); |
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DEFINE_STRERROR_ACCOUNT(group); |
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|
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bool uid_is_valid(uid_t uid) { |
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|
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/* Also see POSIX IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, 3.436. */ |
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|
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/* Some libc APIs use UID_INVALID as special placeholder */ |
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if (uid == (uid_t) UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)) |
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return false; |
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|
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/* A long time ago UIDs where 16 bit, hence explicitly avoid the 16-bit -1 too */ |
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if (uid == (uid_t) UINT32_C(0xFFFF)) |
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return false; |
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|
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return true; |
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} |
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|
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int parse_uid(const char *s, uid_t *ret) { |
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uint32_t uid = 0; |
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int r; |
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|
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assert(s); |
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|
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assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(uint32_t)); |
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|
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/* We are very strict when parsing UIDs, and prohibit +/- as prefix, leading zero as prefix, and |
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* whitespace. We do this, since this call is often used in a context where we parse things as UID |
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* first, and if that doesn't work we fall back to NSS. Thus we really want to make sure that UIDs |
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* are parsed as UIDs only if they really really look like UIDs. */ |
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r = safe_atou32_full(s, 10 |
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| SAFE_ATO_REFUSE_PLUS_MINUS |
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| SAFE_ATO_REFUSE_LEADING_ZERO |
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| SAFE_ATO_REFUSE_LEADING_WHITESPACE, &uid); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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|
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if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
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return -ENXIO; /* we return ENXIO instead of EINVAL |
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* here, to make it easy to distinguish |
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* invalid numeric uids from invalid |
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* strings. */ |
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|
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if (ret) |
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*ret = uid; |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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int parse_uid_range(const char *s, uid_t *ret_lower, uid_t *ret_upper) { |
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_cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; |
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uid_t l, u; |
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int r; |
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|
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assert(s); |
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assert(ret_lower); |
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assert(ret_upper); |
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|
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r = extract_first_word(&s, &word, "-", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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if (r == 0) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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|
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r = parse_uid(word, &l); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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|
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/* Check for the upper bound and extract it if needed */ |
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if (!s) |
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/* Single number with no dash. */ |
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u = l; |
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else if (!*s) |
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/* Trailing dash is an error. */ |
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return -EINVAL; |
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else { |
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r = parse_uid(s, &u); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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|
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if (l > u) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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} |
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|
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*ret_lower = l; |
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*ret_upper = u; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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char* getlogname_malloc(void) { |
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uid_t uid; |
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struct stat st; |
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|
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if (isatty_safe(STDIN_FILENO) && fstat(STDIN_FILENO, &st) >= 0) |
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uid = st.st_uid; |
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else |
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uid = getuid(); |
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|
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return uid_to_name(uid); |
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} |
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|
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char* getusername_malloc(void) { |
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const char *e; |
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|
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e = secure_getenv("USER"); |
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if (e) |
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return strdup(e); |
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|
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return uid_to_name(getuid()); |
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} |
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|
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bool is_nologin_shell(const char *shell) { |
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return PATH_IN_SET(shell, |
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/* 'nologin' is the friendliest way to disable logins for a user account. It prints a nice |
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* message and exits. Different distributions place the binary at different places though, |
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* hence let's list them all. */ |
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"/bin/nologin", |
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"/sbin/nologin", |
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"/usr/bin/nologin", |
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"/usr/sbin/nologin", |
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/* 'true' and 'false' work too for the same purpose, but are less friendly as they don't do |
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* any message printing. Different distributions place the binary at various places but at |
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* least not in the 'sbin' directory. */ |
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"/bin/false", |
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"/usr/bin/false", |
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"/bin/true", |
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"/usr/bin/true"); |
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} |
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|
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bool shell_is_placeholder(const char *shell) { |
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return isempty(shell) || is_nologin_shell(shell); |
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} |
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|
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const char* default_root_shell_at(int rfd) { |
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/* We want to use the preferred shell, i.e. DEFAULT_USER_SHELL, which usually |
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* will be /bin/bash. Fall back to /bin/sh if DEFAULT_USER_SHELL is not found, |
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* or any access errors. */ |
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|
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assert(rfd >= 0 || rfd == AT_FDCWD); |
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|
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int r = chaseat(rfd, rfd, DEFAULT_USER_SHELL, /* flags= */ 0, NULL, NULL); |
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if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) |
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log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to look up shell '%s': %m", DEFAULT_USER_SHELL); |
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if (r > 0) |
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return DEFAULT_USER_SHELL; |
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|
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return "/bin/sh"; |
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} |
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|
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const char* default_root_shell(const char *root) { |
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_cleanup_close_ int rfd = -EBADF; |
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|
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rfd = open(empty_to_root(root), O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY | O_PATH); |
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if (rfd < 0) |
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return "/bin/sh"; |
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|
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return default_root_shell_at(rfd); |
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} |
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|
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static int return_user_creds( |
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const char *username, |
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uid_t uid, gid_t gid, |
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const char *home, |
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const char *shell, |
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char **ret_username, |
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uid_t *ret_uid, gid_t *ret_gid, |
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char **ret_home, |
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char **ret_shell) { |
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/* Helper function to help with the strdups and atomic setting of return params. */ |
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|
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_cleanup_free_ char *s1 = NULL, *s2 = NULL, *s3 = NULL; |
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int r; |
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|
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if (ret_username) { |
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r = strdup_to(&s1, username); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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} |
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|
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if (ret_home) { |
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r = strdup_to(&s2, home); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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} |
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|
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if (ret_shell) { |
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r = strdup_to(&s3, shell); |
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if (r < 0) |
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return r; |
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} |
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|
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if (ret_username) |
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*ret_username = TAKE_PTR(s1); |
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if (ret_uid) |
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*ret_uid = uid; |
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if (ret_gid) |
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*ret_gid = gid; |
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if (ret_home) |
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*ret_home = TAKE_PTR(s2); |
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if (ret_shell) |
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*ret_shell = TAKE_PTR(s3); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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static int synthesize_user_creds( |
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const char *username, |
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UserCredsFlags flags, |
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char **ret_username, |
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uid_t *ret_uid, gid_t *ret_gid, |
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char **ret_home, |
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char **ret_shell) { |
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assert(username); |
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|
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/* We enforce some special rules for uid=0 and uid=65534: in order to avoid nss lookups for root we |
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* hardcode their user record data. */ |
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if (STR_IN_SET(username, "root", "0")) |
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return return_user_creds("root", 0, 0, |
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"/root", |
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ret_shell ? default_root_shell(NULL) : NULL, |
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ret_username, |
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ret_uid, ret_gid, |
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ret_home, |
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ret_shell); |
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|
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if (STR_IN_SET(username, NOBODY_USER_NAME, "65534") && |
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synthesize_nobody()) |
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return return_user_creds(NOBODY_USER_NAME, UID_NOBODY, GID_NOBODY, |
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FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_SUPPRESS_PLACEHOLDER) ? NULL : "/", |
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FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_SUPPRESS_PLACEHOLDER) ? NULL : NOLOGIN, |
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ret_username, |
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ret_uid, ret_gid, |
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ret_home, |
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ret_shell); |
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|
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return -ENOMEDIUM; |
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} |
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|
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int get_user_creds( |
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const char *username, |
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UserCredsFlags flags, |
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char **ret_username, |
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uid_t *ret_uid, gid_t *ret_gid, |
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char **ret_home, |
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char **ret_shell) { |
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|
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uid_t u = UID_INVALID; |
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_cleanup_free_ struct passwd *pw = NULL; |
| 295 |
int r; |
| 296 |
|
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assert(username); |
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assert((ret_home || ret_shell) || !(flags & (USER_CREDS_SUPPRESS_PLACEHOLDER|USER_CREDS_CLEAN))); |
| 299 |
|
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if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS) || |
| 301 |
(!ret_home && !ret_shell)) { |
| 302 |
|
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/* So here's the deal: normally, we'll try to synthesize all records we can synthesize, and override |
| 304 |
* the user database with that. However, if the user specifies USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS then the |
| 305 |
* user database will override the synthetic records instead — except if the user is only interested in |
| 306 |
* the UID and/or GID (but not the home directory, or the shell), in which case we'll always override |
| 307 |
* the user database (i.e. the USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS flag has no effect in this case). Why? |
| 308 |
* Simply because there are valid usecase where the user might change the home directory or the shell |
| 309 |
* of the relevant users, but changing the UID/GID mappings for them is something we explicitly don't |
| 310 |
* support. */ |
| 311 |
|
| 312 |
r = synthesize_user_creds(username, flags, ret_username, ret_uid, ret_gid, ret_home, ret_shell); |
| 313 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 314 |
return 0; |
| 315 |
if (r != -ENOMEDIUM) /* not a username we can synthesize */ |
| 316 |
return r; |
| 317 |
} |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
if (parse_uid(username, &u) >= 0) { |
| 320 |
r = getpwuid_malloc(u, &pw); |
| 321 |
|
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/* If there are multiple users with the same id, make sure to leave $USER to the configured value |
| 323 |
* instead of the first occurrence in the database. However if the uid was configured by a numeric uid, |
| 324 |
* then let's pick the real username from /etc/passwd. */ |
| 325 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 326 |
username = pw->pw_name; |
| 327 |
|
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else if (FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING) && !ret_gid && !ret_home && !ret_shell) { |
| 329 |
/* If the specified user is a numeric UID and it isn't in the user database, and the caller |
| 330 |
* passed USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING and was only interested in the UID, then just return that |
| 331 |
* and don't complain. */ |
| 332 |
if (ret_username) |
| 333 |
*ret_username = NULL; |
| 334 |
if (ret_uid) |
| 335 |
*ret_uid = u; |
| 336 |
return 0; |
| 337 |
} |
| 338 |
} else |
| 339 |
r = getpwnam_malloc(username, &pw); |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 342 |
/* If the user requested that we only synthesize as fallback, do so now */ |
| 343 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS) && |
| 344 |
synthesize_user_creds(username, flags, ret_username, ret_uid, ret_gid, ret_home, ret_shell) >= 0) |
| 345 |
return 0; |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
return r; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
if (ret_uid && !uid_is_valid(pw->pw_uid)) |
| 351 |
return -EBADMSG; |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
if (ret_gid && !gid_is_valid(pw->pw_gid)) |
| 354 |
return -EBADMSG; |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
/* Note: we don't insist on normalized paths, since there are setups that have /./ in the path */ |
| 357 |
const char *h = |
| 358 |
(FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_SUPPRESS_PLACEHOLDER) && empty_or_root(pw->pw_dir)) || |
| 359 |
(FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_CLEAN) && (!path_is_valid(pw->pw_dir) || !path_is_absolute(pw->pw_dir))) |
| 360 |
? NULL : pw->pw_dir; |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
const char *s = |
| 363 |
(FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_SUPPRESS_PLACEHOLDER) && shell_is_placeholder(pw->pw_shell)) || |
| 364 |
(FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_CLEAN) && (!path_is_valid(pw->pw_shell) || !path_is_absolute(pw->pw_shell))) |
| 365 |
? NULL : pw->pw_shell; |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
return return_user_creds(username, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, h, s, |
| 368 |
ret_username, ret_uid, ret_gid, ret_home, ret_shell); |
| 369 |
} |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
static int synthesize_group_creds(const char *groupname, char **ret_name, gid_t *ret_gid) { |
| 372 |
assert(groupname); |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
gid_t id; |
| 375 |
const char *n; |
| 376 |
int r; |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
if (STR_IN_SET(groupname, "root", "0")) { |
| 379 |
id = 0; |
| 380 |
n = "root"; |
| 381 |
} else if (STR_IN_SET(groupname, NOBODY_GROUP_NAME, "65534") && |
| 382 |
synthesize_nobody()) { |
| 383 |
id = GID_NOBODY; |
| 384 |
n = NOBODY_GROUP_NAME; |
| 385 |
} else |
| 386 |
return -ENOMEDIUM; |
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
r = strdup_to_full(ret_name, n); |
| 389 |
if (r < 0) |
| 390 |
return r; |
| 391 |
if (ret_gid) |
| 392 |
*ret_gid = id; |
| 393 |
return 0; |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
int get_group_creds(const char *groupname, UserCredsFlags flags, char **ret_name, gid_t *ret_gid) { |
| 397 |
_cleanup_free_ struct group *gr = NULL; |
| 398 |
gid_t id; |
| 399 |
int r; |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
assert(groupname); |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS)) { |
| 404 |
r = synthesize_group_creds(groupname, ret_name, ret_gid); |
| 405 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 406 |
return 0; |
| 407 |
if (r != -ENOMEDIUM) /* not a groupname we can synthesize */ |
| 408 |
return r; |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
if (parse_gid(groupname, &id) >= 0) { |
| 412 |
r = getgrgid_malloc(id, &gr); |
| 413 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 414 |
groupname = gr->gr_name; |
| 415 |
else if (FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING)) { |
| 416 |
if (ret_gid) |
| 417 |
*ret_gid = id; |
| 418 |
if (ret_name) |
| 419 |
*ret_name = NULL; |
| 420 |
return 0; |
| 421 |
} |
| 422 |
} else |
| 423 |
r = getgrnam_malloc(groupname, &gr); |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
if (r < 0) { |
| 426 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS) && |
| 427 |
synthesize_group_creds(groupname, ret_name, ret_gid) >= 0) |
| 428 |
return 0; |
| 429 |
return r; |
| 430 |
} |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
if (ret_gid && !gid_is_valid(gr->gr_gid)) |
| 433 |
return -EBADMSG; |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
r = strdup_to_full(ret_name, groupname); |
| 436 |
if (r < 0) |
| 437 |
return r; |
| 438 |
if (ret_gid) |
| 439 |
*ret_gid = gr->gr_gid; |
| 440 |
return 0; |
| 441 |
} |
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
char* uid_to_name(uid_t uid) { |
| 444 |
char *ret; |
| 445 |
int r; |
| 446 |
|
| 447 |
/* Shortcut things to avoid NSS lookups */ |
| 448 |
if (uid == 0) |
| 449 |
return strdup("root"); |
| 450 |
if (uid == UID_NOBODY && synthesize_nobody()) |
| 451 |
return strdup(NOBODY_USER_NAME); |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
| 454 |
_cleanup_free_ struct passwd *pw = NULL; |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
r = getpwuid_malloc(uid, &pw); |
| 457 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 458 |
return strdup(pw->pw_name); |
| 459 |
} |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
if (asprintf(&ret, UID_FMT, uid) < 0) |
| 462 |
return NULL; |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
return ret; |
| 465 |
} |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
char* gid_to_name(gid_t gid) { |
| 468 |
char *ret; |
| 469 |
int r; |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
if (gid == 0) |
| 472 |
return strdup("root"); |
| 473 |
if (gid == GID_NOBODY && synthesize_nobody()) |
| 474 |
return strdup(NOBODY_GROUP_NAME); |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { |
| 477 |
_cleanup_free_ struct group *gr = NULL; |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
r = getgrgid_malloc(gid, &gr); |
| 480 |
if (r >= 0) |
| 481 |
return strdup(gr->gr_name); |
| 482 |
} |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
if (asprintf(&ret, GID_FMT, gid) < 0) |
| 485 |
return NULL; |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
return ret; |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
static bool gid_list_has(const gid_t *list, size_t size, gid_t val) { |
| 491 |
assert(list || size == 0); |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
FOREACH_ARRAY(i, list, size) |
| 494 |
if (*i == val) |
| 495 |
return true; |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
return false; |
| 498 |
} |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
int in_gid(gid_t gid) { |
| 501 |
_cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids = NULL; |
| 502 |
int ngroups; |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
if (getgid() == gid) |
| 505 |
return 1; |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
if (getegid() == gid) |
| 508 |
return 1; |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) |
| 511 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
ngroups = getgroups_alloc(&gids); |
| 514 |
if (ngroups < 0) |
| 515 |
return ngroups; |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
return gid_list_has(gids, ngroups, gid); |
| 518 |
} |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
int in_group(const char *name) { |
| 521 |
int r; |
| 522 |
gid_t gid; |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
r = get_group_creds(name, /* flags= */ 0, /* ret_name= */ NULL, &gid); |
| 525 |
if (r < 0) |
| 526 |
return r; |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
return in_gid(gid); |
| 529 |
} |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
int merge_gid_lists(const gid_t *list1, size_t size1, const gid_t *list2, size_t size2, gid_t **ret) { |
| 532 |
size_t nresult = 0; |
| 533 |
assert(ret); |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
if (size2 > INT_MAX - size1) |
| 536 |
return -ENOBUFS; |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
gid_t *buf = new(gid_t, size1 + size2); |
| 539 |
if (!buf) |
| 540 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
/* Duplicates need to be skipped on merging, otherwise they'll be passed on and stored in the kernel. */ |
| 543 |
for (size_t i = 0; i < size1; i++) |
| 544 |
if (!gid_list_has(buf, nresult, list1[i])) |
| 545 |
buf[nresult++] = list1[i]; |
| 546 |
for (size_t i = 0; i < size2; i++) |
| 547 |
if (!gid_list_has(buf, nresult, list2[i])) |
| 548 |
buf[nresult++] = list2[i]; |
| 549 |
*ret = buf; |
| 550 |
return (int)nresult; |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
int getgroups_alloc(gid_t **ret) { |
| 554 |
int ngroups = 8; |
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
assert(ret); |
| 557 |
|
| 558 |
for (unsigned attempt = 0;;) { |
| 559 |
_cleanup_free_ gid_t *p = NULL; |
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
p = new(gid_t, ngroups); |
| 562 |
if (!p) |
| 563 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
ngroups = getgroups(ngroups, p); |
| 566 |
if (ngroups > 0) { |
| 567 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(p); |
| 568 |
return ngroups; |
| 569 |
} |
| 570 |
if (ngroups == 0) |
| 571 |
break; |
| 572 |
if (errno != EINVAL) |
| 573 |
return -errno; |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
/* Give up eventually */ |
| 576 |
if (attempt++ > 10) |
| 577 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
/* Get actual size needed, and size the array explicitly. Note that this is potentially racy |
| 580 |
* to use (in multi-threaded programs), hence let's call this in a loop. */ |
| 581 |
ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL); |
| 582 |
if (ngroups < 0) |
| 583 |
return -errno; |
| 584 |
if (ngroups == 0) |
| 585 |
break; |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
*ret = NULL; |
| 589 |
return 0; |
| 590 |
} |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
int get_home_dir(char **ret) { |
| 593 |
_cleanup_free_ struct passwd *p = NULL; |
| 594 |
const char *e; |
| 595 |
uid_t u; |
| 596 |
int r; |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
assert(ret); |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
/* Take the user specified one */ |
| 601 |
e = secure_getenv("HOME"); |
| 602 |
if (e && path_is_valid(e) && path_is_absolute(e)) |
| 603 |
goto found; |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
/* Hardcode home directory for root and nobody to avoid NSS */ |
| 606 |
u = getuid(); |
| 607 |
if (u == 0) { |
| 608 |
e = "/root"; |
| 609 |
goto found; |
| 610 |
} |
| 611 |
if (u == UID_NOBODY && synthesize_nobody()) { |
| 612 |
e = "/"; |
| 613 |
goto found; |
| 614 |
} |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
/* Check the database... */ |
| 617 |
r = getpwuid_malloc(u, &p); |
| 618 |
if (r < 0) |
| 619 |
return r; |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
e = p->pw_dir; |
| 622 |
if (!path_is_valid(e) || !path_is_absolute(e)) |
| 623 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
found: |
| 626 |
return path_simplify_alloc(e, ret); |
| 627 |
} |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
int get_shell(char **ret) { |
| 630 |
_cleanup_free_ struct passwd *p = NULL; |
| 631 |
const char *e; |
| 632 |
uid_t u; |
| 633 |
int r; |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
assert(ret); |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
/* Take the user specified one */ |
| 638 |
e = secure_getenv("SHELL"); |
| 639 |
if (e && path_is_valid(e) && path_is_absolute(e)) |
| 640 |
goto found; |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
/* Hardcode shell for root and nobody to avoid NSS */ |
| 643 |
u = getuid(); |
| 644 |
if (u == 0) { |
| 645 |
e = default_root_shell(NULL); |
| 646 |
goto found; |
| 647 |
} |
| 648 |
if (u == UID_NOBODY && synthesize_nobody()) { |
| 649 |
e = NOLOGIN; |
| 650 |
goto found; |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
/* Check the database... */ |
| 654 |
r = getpwuid_malloc(u, &p); |
| 655 |
if (r < 0) |
| 656 |
return r; |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
e = p->pw_shell; |
| 659 |
if (!path_is_valid(e) || !path_is_absolute(e)) |
| 660 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
found: |
| 663 |
return path_simplify_alloc(e, ret); |
| 664 |
} |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
int fully_set_uid_gid(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const gid_t supplementary_gids[], size_t n_supplementary_gids) { |
| 667 |
int r; |
| 668 |
|
| 669 |
assert(supplementary_gids || n_supplementary_gids == 0); |
| 670 |
|
| 671 |
/* Sets all UIDs and all GIDs to the specified ones. Drops all auxiliary GIDs */ |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
r = maybe_setgroups(n_supplementary_gids, supplementary_gids); |
| 674 |
if (r < 0) |
| 675 |
return r; |
| 676 |
|
| 677 |
if (gid_is_valid(gid)) |
| 678 |
if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) |
| 679 |
return -errno; |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
if (uid_is_valid(uid)) |
| 682 |
if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) |
| 683 |
return -errno; |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
return 0; |
| 686 |
} |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root) { |
| 689 |
int r; |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
/* This is roughly the same as lckpwdf(), but not as awful. We don't want to use alarm() and signals, |
| 692 |
* hence we implement our own trivial version of this. |
| 693 |
* |
| 694 |
* Note that shadow-utils also takes per-database locks in addition to lckpwdf(). However, we don't, |
| 695 |
* given that they are redundant: they invoke lckpwdf() first and keep it during everything they do. |
| 696 |
* The per-database locks are awfully racy, and thus we just won't do them. */ |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
_cleanup_free_ char *path = path_join(root, ETC_PASSWD_LOCK_PATH); |
| 699 |
if (!path) |
| 700 |
return log_oom_debug(); |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
(void) mkdir_parents(path, 0755); |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
_cleanup_close_ int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600); |
| 705 |
if (fd < 0) |
| 706 |
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Cannot open %s: %m", path); |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
r = unposix_lock(fd, LOCK_EX); |
| 709 |
if (r < 0) |
| 710 |
return log_debug_errno(r, "Locking %s failed: %m", path); |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
return TAKE_FD(fd); |
| 713 |
} |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
bool valid_user_group_name(const char *u, ValidUserFlags flags) { |
| 716 |
const char *i; |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
/* Checks if the specified name is a valid user/group name. There are two flavours of this call: |
| 719 |
* strict mode is the default which is POSIX plus some extra rules; and relaxed mode where we accept |
| 720 |
* pretty much everything except the really worst offending names. |
| 721 |
* |
| 722 |
* Whenever we synthesize users ourselves we should use the strict mode. But when we process users |
| 723 |
* created by other stuff, let's be more liberal. */ |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
if (isempty(u)) /* An empty user name is never valid */ |
| 726 |
return false; |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
if (parse_uid(u, NULL) >= 0) /* Something that parses as numeric UID string is valid exactly when the |
| 729 |
* flag for it is set */ |
| 730 |
return FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_ALLOW_NUMERIC); |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_RELAX)) { |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
/* In relaxed mode we just check very superficially. Apparently SSSD and other stuff is |
| 735 |
* extremely liberal (way too liberal if you ask me, even inserting "@" in user names, which |
| 736 |
* is bound to cause problems for example when used with an MTA), hence only filter the most |
| 737 |
* obvious cases, or where things would result in an invalid entry if such a user name would |
| 738 |
* show up in /etc/passwd (or equivalent getent output). |
| 739 |
* |
| 740 |
* Note that we stepped far out of POSIX territory here. It's not our fault though, but |
| 741 |
* SSSD's, Samba's and everybody else who ignored POSIX on this. (I mean, I am happy to step |
| 742 |
* outside of POSIX' bounds any day, but I must say in this case I probably wouldn't |
| 743 |
* have...) */ |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
if (startswith(u, " ") || endswith(u, " ")) /* At least expect whitespace padding is removed |
| 746 |
* at front and back (accept in the middle, since |
| 747 |
* that's apparently a thing on Windows). Note |
| 748 |
* that this also blocks usernames consisting of |
| 749 |
* whitespace only. */ |
| 750 |
return false; |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
if (!utf8_is_valid(u)) /* We want to synthesize JSON from this, hence insist on UTF-8 */ |
| 753 |
return false; |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
if (string_has_cc(u, NULL)) /* CC characters are just dangerous (and \n in particular is the |
| 756 |
* record separator in /etc/passwd), so we can't allow that. */ |
| 757 |
return false; |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
if (strpbrk(u, ":/")) /* Colons are the field separator in /etc/passwd, we can't allow |
| 760 |
* that. Slashes are special to file systems paths and user names |
| 761 |
* typically show up in the file system as home directories, hence |
| 762 |
* don't allow slashes. */ |
| 763 |
return false; |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
if (in_charset(u, DIGITS)) /* Don't allow fully numeric strings, they might be confused with |
| 766 |
* UIDs (note that this test is more broad than the parse_uid() |
| 767 |
* test above, as it will cover more than the 32-bit range, and it |
| 768 |
* will detect 65535 (which is in invalid UID, even though in the |
| 769 |
* unsigned 32 bit range) */ |
| 770 |
return false; |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
if (u[0] == '-' && in_charset(u + 1, DIGITS)) /* Don't allow negative fully numeric strings |
| 773 |
* either. After all some people write 65535 as |
| 774 |
* -1 (even though that's not even true on |
| 775 |
* 32-bit uid_t anyway) */ |
| 776 |
return false; |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
if (dot_or_dot_dot(u)) /* User names typically become home directory names, and these two are |
| 779 |
* special in that context, don't allow that. */ |
| 780 |
return false; |
| 781 |
|
| 782 |
/* Compare with strict result and warn if result doesn't match */ |
| 783 |
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, VALID_USER_WARN) && !valid_user_group_name(u, 0)) |
| 784 |
log_struct(LOG_NOTICE, |
| 785 |
LOG_MESSAGE("Accepting user/group name '%s', which does not match strict user/group name rules.", u), |
| 786 |
LOG_ITEM("USER_GROUP_NAME=%s", u), |
| 787 |
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_UNSAFE_USER_NAME_STR)); |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
/* Note that we make no restrictions on the length in relaxed mode! */ |
| 790 |
} else { |
| 791 |
long sz; |
| 792 |
size_t l; |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
/* Also see POSIX IEEE Std 1003.1-2008, 2016 Edition, 3.437. We are a bit stricter here |
| 795 |
* however. Specifically we deviate from POSIX rules: |
| 796 |
* |
| 797 |
* - We don't allow empty user names (see above) |
| 798 |
* - We require that names fit into the appropriate utmp field |
| 799 |
* - We don't allow any dots (this conflicts with chown syntax which permits dots as user/group name separator) |
| 800 |
* - We don't allow dashes or digit as the first character |
| 801 |
* |
| 802 |
* Note that other systems are even more restrictive, and don't permit underscores or uppercase characters. |
| 803 |
*/ |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
if (!ascii_isalpha(u[0]) && |
| 806 |
u[0] != '_') |
| 807 |
return false; |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
for (i = u+1; *i; i++) |
| 810 |
if (!ascii_isalpha(*i) && |
| 811 |
!ascii_isdigit(*i) && |
| 812 |
!IN_SET(*i, '_', '-')) |
| 813 |
return false; |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
l = i - u; |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
sz = sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX); |
| 818 |
assert_se(sz > 0); |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
if (l > (size_t) sz) /* glibc: 256 */ |
| 821 |
return false; |
| 822 |
if (l > NAME_MAX) /* must fit in a filename: 255 */ |
| 823 |
return false; |
| 824 |
if (l > sizeof_field(struct utmpx, ut_user) - 1) /* must fit in utmp: 31 */ |
| 825 |
return false; |
| 826 |
} |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
return true; |
| 829 |
} |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
bool valid_gecos(const char *d) { |
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
if (!d) |
| 834 |
return false; |
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
if (!utf8_is_valid(d)) |
| 837 |
return false; |
| 838 |
|
| 839 |
if (string_has_cc(d, NULL)) |
| 840 |
return false; |
| 841 |
|
| 842 |
/* Colons are used as field separators, and hence not OK */ |
| 843 |
if (strchr(d, ':')) |
| 844 |
return false; |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
return true; |
| 847 |
} |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
char* mangle_gecos(const char *d) { |
| 850 |
char *mangled; |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
/* Makes sure the provided string becomes valid as a GEGOS field, by dropping bad chars. glibc's |
| 853 |
* putpwent() only changes \n and : to spaces. We do more: replace all CC too, and remove invalid |
| 854 |
* UTF-8 */ |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
mangled = strdup(d); |
| 857 |
if (!mangled) |
| 858 |
return NULL; |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
for (char *i = mangled; *i; i++) { |
| 861 |
int len; |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
if ((uint8_t) *i < (uint8_t) ' ' || *i == ':') { |
| 864 |
*i = ' '; |
| 865 |
continue; |
| 866 |
} |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
len = utf8_encoded_valid_unichar(i, SIZE_MAX); |
| 869 |
if (len < 0) { |
| 870 |
*i = ' '; |
| 871 |
continue; |
| 872 |
} |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
i += len - 1; |
| 875 |
} |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
return mangled; |
| 878 |
} |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
bool valid_home(const char *p) { |
| 881 |
/* Note that this function is also called by valid_shell(), any |
| 882 |
* changes must account for that. */ |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
if (isempty(p)) |
| 885 |
return false; |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
if (!utf8_is_valid(p)) |
| 888 |
return false; |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
if (string_has_cc(p, NULL)) |
| 891 |
return false; |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
if (!path_is_absolute(p)) |
| 894 |
return false; |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
if (!path_is_normalized(p)) |
| 897 |
return false; |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
/* Colons are used as field separators, and hence not OK */ |
| 900 |
if (strchr(p, ':')) |
| 901 |
return false; |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
return true; |
| 904 |
} |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
bool valid_shell(const char *p) { |
| 907 |
/* We have the same requirements, so just piggy-back on the home check. |
| 908 |
* |
| 909 |
* Let's ignore /etc/shells because this is only applicable to real and not system users. It is also |
| 910 |
* incompatible with the idea of empty /etc/. */ |
| 911 |
if (!valid_home(p)) |
| 912 |
return false; |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
return !endswith(p, "/"); /* one additional restriction: shells may not be dirs */ |
| 915 |
} |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
int maybe_setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list) { |
| 918 |
int r; |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
/* Check if setgroups is allowed before we try to drop all the auxiliary groups */ |
| 921 |
if (size == 0) { /* Dropping all aux groups? */ |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
/* The kernel refuses setgroups() if there are no GID mappings in the current |
| 924 |
* user namespace, so check that beforehand and don't try to setgroups() if |
| 925 |
* there are no GID mappings. */ |
| 926 |
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = fopen("/proc/self/gid_map", "re"); |
| 927 |
if (!f && errno != ENOENT) |
| 928 |
return -errno; |
| 929 |
if (f) { |
| 930 |
r = safe_fgetc(f, /* ret= */ NULL); |
| 931 |
if (r < 0) |
| 932 |
return r; |
| 933 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 934 |
log_debug("Skipping setgroups(), /proc/self/gid_map is empty"); |
| 935 |
return 0; |
| 936 |
} |
| 937 |
} |
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
_cleanup_free_ char *setgroups_content = NULL; |
| 940 |
r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/setgroups", &setgroups_content); |
| 941 |
if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) |
| 942 |
return r; |
| 943 |
if (r > 0 && streq(setgroups_content, "deny")) { |
| 944 |
log_debug("Skipping setgroups(), /proc/self/setgroups is set to 'deny'"); |
| 945 |
return 0; |
| 946 |
} |
| 947 |
} |
| 948 |
|
| 949 |
return RET_NERRNO(setgroups(size, list)); |
| 950 |
} |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
bool synthesize_nobody(void) { |
| 953 |
/* Returns true when we shall synthesize the "nobody" user (which we do by default). This can be turned off by |
| 954 |
* touching /etc/systemd/dont-synthesize-nobody in order to provide upgrade compatibility with legacy systems |
| 955 |
* that used the "nobody" user name and group name for other UIDs/GIDs than 65534. |
| 956 |
* |
| 957 |
* Note that we do not employ any kind of synchronization on the following caching variable. If the variable is |
| 958 |
* accessed in multi-threaded programs in the worst case it might happen that we initialize twice, but that |
| 959 |
* shouldn't matter as each initialization should come to the same result. */ |
| 960 |
static int cache = -1; |
| 961 |
|
| 962 |
if (cache < 0) |
| 963 |
cache = access("/etc/systemd/dont-synthesize-nobody", F_OK) < 0; |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
return cache; |
| 966 |
} |
| 967 |
|
| 968 |
int putpwent_sane(const struct passwd *pw, FILE *stream) { |
| 969 |
assert(pw); |
| 970 |
assert(stream); |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
errno = 0; |
| 973 |
if (putpwent(pw, stream) != 0) |
| 974 |
return errno_or_else(EIO); |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
return 0; |
| 977 |
} |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
int putspent_sane(const struct spwd *sp, FILE *stream) { |
| 980 |
assert(sp); |
| 981 |
assert(stream); |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
errno = 0; |
| 984 |
if (putspent(sp, stream) != 0) |
| 985 |
return errno_or_else(EIO); |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
return 0; |
| 988 |
} |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
int putgrent_sane(const struct group *gr, FILE *stream) { |
| 991 |
assert(gr); |
| 992 |
assert(stream); |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
errno = 0; |
| 995 |
if (putgrent(gr, stream) != 0) |
| 996 |
return errno_or_else(EIO); |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
return 0; |
| 999 |
} |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
#if ENABLE_GSHADOW |
| 1002 |
int putsgent_sane(const struct sgrp *sg, FILE *stream) { |
| 1003 |
assert(sg); |
| 1004 |
assert(stream); |
| 1005 |
|
| 1006 |
errno = 0; |
| 1007 |
if (putsgent(sg, stream) != 0) |
| 1008 |
return errno_or_else(EIO); |
| 1009 |
|
| 1010 |
return 0; |
| 1011 |
} |
| 1012 |
#endif |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
int fgetpwent_sane(FILE *stream, struct passwd **pw) { |
| 1015 |
assert(stream); |
| 1016 |
assert(pw); |
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 |
errno = 0; |
| 1019 |
struct passwd *p = fgetpwent(stream); |
| 1020 |
if (!p && !IN_SET(errno, 0, ENOENT)) |
| 1021 |
return -errno; |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
*pw = p; |
| 1024 |
return !!p; |
| 1025 |
} |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
int fgetspent_sane(FILE *stream, struct spwd **sp) { |
| 1028 |
assert(stream); |
| 1029 |
assert(sp); |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
errno = 0; |
| 1032 |
struct spwd *s = fgetspent(stream); |
| 1033 |
if (!s && !IN_SET(errno, 0, ENOENT)) |
| 1034 |
return -errno; |
| 1035 |
|
| 1036 |
*sp = s; |
| 1037 |
return !!s; |
| 1038 |
} |
| 1039 |
|
| 1040 |
int fgetgrent_sane(FILE *stream, struct group **gr) { |
| 1041 |
assert(stream); |
| 1042 |
assert(gr); |
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 |
errno = 0; |
| 1045 |
struct group *g = fgetgrent(stream); |
| 1046 |
if (!g && !IN_SET(errno, 0, ENOENT)) |
| 1047 |
return -errno; |
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
*gr = g; |
| 1050 |
return !!g; |
| 1051 |
} |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
#if ENABLE_GSHADOW |
| 1054 |
int fgetsgent_sane(FILE *stream, struct sgrp **sg) { |
| 1055 |
assert(stream); |
| 1056 |
assert(sg); |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
errno = 0; |
| 1059 |
struct sgrp *s = fgetsgent(stream); |
| 1060 |
if (!s && !IN_SET(errno, 0, ENOENT)) |
| 1061 |
return -errno; |
| 1062 |
|
| 1063 |
*sg = s; |
| 1064 |
return !!s; |
| 1065 |
} |
| 1066 |
#endif |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
int is_this_me(const char *username) { |
| 1069 |
uid_t uid; |
| 1070 |
int r; |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
/* Checks if the specified username is our current one. Passed string might be a UID or a user name. */ |
| 1073 |
|
| 1074 |
r = get_user_creds(username, /* flags= */ USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING, NULL, &uid, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| 1075 |
if (r < 0) |
| 1076 |
return r; |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
return uid == getuid(); |
| 1079 |
} |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
const char* get_home_root(void) { |
| 1082 |
/* For debug purposes allow overriding where we look for home dirs */ |
| 1083 |
const char *e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_HOME_ROOT"); |
| 1084 |
if (e && path_is_absolute(e) && path_is_normalized(e)) |
| 1085 |
return e; |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
return "/home"; |
| 1088 |
} |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
static size_t getpw_buffer_size(void) { |
| 1091 |
long bufsize = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1092 |
return bufsize <= 0 ? 4096U : (size_t) bufsize; |
| 1093 |
} |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
static bool errno_is_user_doesnt_exist(int error) { |
| 1096 |
/* See getpwnam(3) and getgrnam(3): those codes and others can be returned if the user or group are |
| 1097 |
* not found. */ |
| 1098 |
return IN_SET(abs(error), ENOENT, ESRCH, EBADF, EPERM); |
| 1099 |
} |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
int getpwnam_malloc(const char *name, struct passwd **ret) { |
| 1102 |
size_t bufsize = getpw_buffer_size(); |
| 1103 |
int r; |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
/* A wrapper around getpwnam_r() that allocates the necessary buffer on the heap. The caller must |
| 1106 |
* free() the returned structures! */ |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
if (isempty(name)) |
| 1109 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
for (;;) { |
| 1112 |
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL; |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
/* Silence static analyzers */ |
| 1115 |
assert(bufsize <= SIZE_MAX - ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd))); |
| 1116 |
buf = malloc0(ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd)) + bufsize); |
| 1117 |
if (!buf) |
| 1118 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
struct passwd *pw = NULL; |
| 1121 |
r = getpwnam_r(name, buf, (char*) buf + ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd)), bufsize, &pw); |
| 1122 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1123 |
if (pw) { |
| 1124 |
if (ret) |
| 1125 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(buf); |
| 1126 |
return 0; |
| 1127 |
} |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1130 |
} |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
assert(r > 0); |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
/* getpwnam() may fail with ENOENT if /etc/passwd is missing. For us that is equivalent to |
| 1135 |
* the name not being defined. */ |
| 1136 |
if (errno_is_user_doesnt_exist(r)) |
| 1137 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1138 |
if (r != ERANGE) |
| 1139 |
return -r; |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
if (bufsize > SIZE_MAX/2 - ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd))) |
| 1142 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1143 |
bufsize *= 2; |
| 1144 |
} |
| 1145 |
} |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
int getpwuid_malloc(uid_t uid, struct passwd **ret) { |
| 1148 |
size_t bufsize = getpw_buffer_size(); |
| 1149 |
int r; |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
| 1152 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
for (;;) { |
| 1155 |
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL; |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
/* Silence static analyzers */ |
| 1158 |
assert(bufsize <= SIZE_MAX - ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd))); |
| 1159 |
buf = malloc0(ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd)) + bufsize); |
| 1160 |
if (!buf) |
| 1161 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
struct passwd *pw = NULL; |
| 1164 |
r = getpwuid_r(uid, buf, (char*) buf + ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd)), bufsize, &pw); |
| 1165 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1166 |
if (pw) { |
| 1167 |
if (ret) |
| 1168 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(buf); |
| 1169 |
return 0; |
| 1170 |
} |
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1173 |
} |
| 1174 |
|
| 1175 |
assert(r > 0); |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
if (errno_is_user_doesnt_exist(r)) |
| 1178 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1179 |
if (r != ERANGE) |
| 1180 |
return -r; |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
if (bufsize > SIZE_MAX/2 - ALIGN(sizeof(struct passwd))) |
| 1183 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1184 |
bufsize *= 2; |
| 1185 |
} |
| 1186 |
} |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
static size_t getgr_buffer_size(void) { |
| 1189 |
long bufsize = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX); |
| 1190 |
return bufsize <= 0 ? 4096U : (size_t) bufsize; |
| 1191 |
} |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
int getgrnam_malloc(const char *name, struct group **ret) { |
| 1194 |
size_t bufsize = getgr_buffer_size(); |
| 1195 |
int r; |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
if (isempty(name)) |
| 1198 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
for (;;) { |
| 1201 |
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL; |
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
/* Silence static analyzers */ |
| 1204 |
assert(bufsize <= SIZE_MAX - ALIGN(sizeof(struct group))); |
| 1205 |
buf = malloc0(ALIGN(sizeof(struct group)) + bufsize); |
| 1206 |
if (!buf) |
| 1207 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
struct group *gr = NULL; |
| 1210 |
r = getgrnam_r(name, buf, (char*) buf + ALIGN(sizeof(struct group)), bufsize, &gr); |
| 1211 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1212 |
if (gr) { |
| 1213 |
if (ret) |
| 1214 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(buf); |
| 1215 |
return 0; |
| 1216 |
} |
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1219 |
} |
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 |
assert(r > 0); |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
if (errno_is_user_doesnt_exist(r)) |
| 1224 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1225 |
if (r != ERANGE) |
| 1226 |
return -r; |
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
if (bufsize > SIZE_MAX/2 - ALIGN(sizeof(struct group))) |
| 1229 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1230 |
bufsize *= 2; |
| 1231 |
} |
| 1232 |
} |
| 1233 |
|
| 1234 |
int getgrgid_malloc(gid_t gid, struct group **ret) { |
| 1235 |
size_t bufsize = getgr_buffer_size(); |
| 1236 |
int r; |
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) |
| 1239 |
return -EINVAL; |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
for (;;) { |
| 1242 |
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL; |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
/* Silence static analyzers */ |
| 1245 |
assert(bufsize <= SIZE_MAX - ALIGN(sizeof(struct group))); |
| 1246 |
buf = malloc0(ALIGN(sizeof(struct group)) + bufsize); |
| 1247 |
if (!buf) |
| 1248 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
struct group *gr = NULL; |
| 1251 |
r = getgrgid_r(gid, buf, (char*) buf + ALIGN(sizeof(struct group)), bufsize, &gr); |
| 1252 |
if (r == 0) { |
| 1253 |
if (gr) { |
| 1254 |
if (ret) |
| 1255 |
*ret = TAKE_PTR(buf); |
| 1256 |
return 0; |
| 1257 |
} |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1260 |
} |
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
assert(r > 0); |
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
if (errno_is_user_doesnt_exist(r)) |
| 1265 |
return -ESRCH; |
| 1266 |
if (r != ERANGE) |
| 1267 |
return -r; |
| 1268 |
|
| 1269 |
if (bufsize > SIZE_MAX/2 - ALIGN(sizeof(struct group))) |
| 1270 |
return -ENOMEM; |
| 1271 |
bufsize *= 2; |
| 1272 |
} |
| 1273 |
} |