| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* SRT - Secure, Reliable, Transport |
| 3 |
* Copyright (c) 2018 Haivision Systems Inc. |
| 4 |
* |
| 5 |
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| 6 |
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| 7 |
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
*/ |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
/***************************************************************************** |
| 12 |
written by |
| 13 |
Haivision Systems Inc. |
| 14 |
*****************************************************************************/ |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
#include "platform_sys.h" |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
#include <cstring> |
| 19 |
#include <string> |
| 20 |
#include <sstream> |
| 21 |
#include <iterator> |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
#include "udt.h" |
| 24 |
#include "utilities.h" |
| 25 |
#include <haicrypt.h> |
| 26 |
#include "crypto.h" |
| 27 |
#include "logging.h" |
| 28 |
#include "core.h" |
| 29 |
#include "api.h" |
| 30 |
|
| 31 |
using namespace srt_logging; |
| 32 |
|
| 33 |
#define SRT_MAX_KMRETRY 10 |
| 34 |
|
| 35 |
//#define SRT_CMD_KMREQ 3 /* HaiCryptTP SRT Keying Material */ |
| 36 |
//#define SRT_CMD_KMRSP 4 /* HaiCryptTP SRT Keying Material ACK */ |
| 37 |
#define SRT_CMD_KMREQ_SZ HCRYPT_MSG_KM_MAX_SZ /* */ |
| 38 |
#if SRT_CMD_KMREQ_SZ > SRT_CMD_MAXSZ |
| 39 |
#error SRT_CMD_MAXSZ too small |
| 40 |
#endif |
| 41 |
/* Key Material Request (Network Order) |
| 42 |
See HaiCryptTP SRT (hcrypt_xpt_srt.c) |
| 43 |
*/ |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
// 10* HAICRYPT_DEF_KM_PRE_ANNOUNCE |
| 46 |
const int SRT_CRYPT_KM_PRE_ANNOUNCE SRT_ATR_UNUSED = 0x10000; |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
namespace srt_logging |
| 49 |
{ |
| 50 |
std::string KmStateStr(SRT_KM_STATE state) |
| 51 |
{ |
| 52 |
switch (state) |
| 53 |
{ |
| 54 |
#define TAKE(val) case SRT_KM_S_##val : return #val |
| 55 |
TAKE(UNSECURED); |
| 56 |
TAKE(SECURED); |
| 57 |
TAKE(SECURING); |
| 58 |
TAKE(NOSECRET); |
| 59 |
TAKE(BADSECRET); |
| 60 |
#ifdef ENABLE_AEAD_API_PREVIEW |
| 61 |
TAKE(BADCRYPTOMODE); |
| 62 |
#endif |
| 63 |
#undef TAKE |
| 64 |
default: |
| 65 |
{ |
| 66 |
char buf[256]; |
| 67 |
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900 |
| 68 |
_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, "??? (%d)", state); |
| 69 |
#else |
| 70 |
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "??? (%d)", state); |
| 71 |
#endif |
| 72 |
return buf; |
| 73 |
} |
| 74 |
} |
| 75 |
} |
| 76 |
} // namespace |
| 77 |
|
| 78 |
using srt_logging::KmStateStr; |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::globalInit() |
| 81 |
{ |
| 82 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 83 |
// We need to force the Cryspr to be initialized during startup to avoid the |
| 84 |
// possibility of multiple threads initializing the same static data later on. |
| 85 |
HaiCryptCryspr_Get_Instance(); |
| 86 |
#endif |
| 87 |
} |
| 88 |
|
| 89 |
bool srt::CCryptoControl::isAESGCMSupported() |
| 90 |
{ |
| 91 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 92 |
return HaiCrypt_IsAESGCM_Supported() != 0; |
| 93 |
#else |
| 94 |
return false; |
| 95 |
#endif |
| 96 |
} |
| 97 |
|
| 98 |
#if ENABLE_LOGGING |
| 99 |
std::string srt::CCryptoControl::FormatKmMessage(std::string hdr, int cmd, size_t srtlen) |
| 100 |
{ |
| 101 |
std::ostringstream os; |
| 102 |
os << hdr << ": cmd=" << cmd << "(" << (cmd == SRT_CMD_KMREQ ? "KMREQ":"KMRSP") <<") len=" |
| 103 |
<< size_t(srtlen*sizeof(int32_t)) << " KmState: SND=" |
| 104 |
<< KmStateStr(m_SndKmState) |
| 105 |
<< " RCV=" << KmStateStr(m_RcvKmState); |
| 106 |
return os.str(); |
| 107 |
} |
| 108 |
#endif |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::updateKmState(int cmd, size_t srtlen SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 111 |
{ |
| 112 |
if (cmd == SRT_CMD_KMREQ) |
| 113 |
{ |
| 114 |
if ( SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED == m_SndKmState) |
| 115 |
{ |
| 116 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURING; |
| 117 |
} |
| 118 |
LOGP(cnlog.Note, FormatKmMessage("sendSrtMsg", cmd, srtlen)); |
| 119 |
} |
| 120 |
else |
| 121 |
{ |
| 122 |
LOGP(cnlog.Note, FormatKmMessage("sendSrtMsg", cmd, srtlen)); |
| 123 |
} |
| 124 |
} |
| 125 |
|
| 126 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::createFakeSndContext() |
| 127 |
{ |
| 128 |
if (!m_iSndKmKeyLen) |
| 129 |
m_iSndKmKeyLen = 16; |
| 130 |
|
| 131 |
if (!createCryptoCtx((m_hSndCrypto), m_iSndKmKeyLen, HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX, false)) |
| 132 |
{ |
| 133 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "Error: Can't create fake crypto context for sending - sending will return ERROR!"); |
| 134 |
m_hSndCrypto = 0; |
| 135 |
} |
| 136 |
} |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
int srt::CCryptoControl::processSrtMsg_KMREQ( |
| 139 |
const uint32_t* srtdata SRT_ATR_UNUSED, |
| 140 |
size_t bytelen SRT_ATR_UNUSED, |
| 141 |
int hsv SRT_ATR_UNUSED, unsigned srtv SRT_ATR_UNUSED, |
| 142 |
uint32_t pw_srtdata_out[], size_t& w_srtlen) |
| 143 |
{ |
| 144 |
//Receiver |
| 145 |
/* All 32-bit msg fields swapped on reception |
| 146 |
* But HaiCrypt expect network order message |
| 147 |
* Re-swap to cancel it. |
| 148 |
*/ |
| 149 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 150 |
w_srtlen = bytelen/sizeof(srtdata[SRT_KMR_KMSTATE]); |
| 151 |
HtoNLA((pw_srtdata_out), srtdata, w_srtlen); |
| 152 |
unsigned char* kmdata = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(pw_srtdata_out); |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
// The side that has received KMREQ is always an HSD_RESPONDER, regardless of |
| 155 |
// what has called this function. The HSv5 handshake only enforces bidirectional |
| 156 |
// connection. |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
const bool bidirectional = hsv > CUDT::HS_VERSION_UDT4; |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
// Local macro to return rejection appropriately. |
| 161 |
// CHANGED. The first version made HSv5 reject the connection. |
| 162 |
// This isn't well handled by applications, so the connection is |
| 163 |
// still established, but unable to handle any transport. |
| 164 |
//#define KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION() if (bidirectional) { return SRT_CMD_NONE; } else { w_srtlen = 1; goto HSv4_ErrorReport; } |
| 165 |
#define KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION() { w_srtlen = 1; goto HSv4_ErrorReport; } |
| 166 |
|
| 167 |
int rc = HAICRYPT_OK; // needed before 'goto' run from KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION macro |
| 168 |
bool wasb4 SRT_ATR_UNUSED = false; |
| 169 |
size_t sek_len = 0; |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
const bool bUseGCM = |
| 172 |
(m_iCryptoMode == CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AUTO && kmdata[HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_CIPHER] == HCRYPT_CIPHER_AES_GCM) || |
| 173 |
(m_iCryptoMode == CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM); |
| 174 |
|
| 175 |
m_bUseGcm153 = srtv <= SrtVersion(1, 5, 3); |
| 176 |
|
| 177 |
// What we have to do: |
| 178 |
// If encryption is on (we know that by having m_KmSecret nonempty), create |
| 179 |
// the crypto context (if bidirectional, create for both sending and receiving). |
| 180 |
// Both crypto contexts should be set with the same length of the key. |
| 181 |
// The problem with interpretinting this should be reported as SRT_CMD_NONE, |
| 182 |
// should be appropriately handled by the caller, as it expects that this |
| 183 |
// function normally return SRT_CMD_KMRSP. |
| 184 |
if ( bytelen <= HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT ) //Sanity on message |
| 185 |
{ |
| 186 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: size of the KM (" << bytelen << ") is too small, must be >" << HCRYPT_MSG_KM_OFS_SALT); |
| 187 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 188 |
KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION(); |
| 189 |
} |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "KMREQ: getting SEK and creating receiver crypto"); |
| 192 |
sek_len = hcryptMsg_KM_GetSekLen(kmdata); |
| 193 |
if ( sek_len == 0 ) |
| 194 |
{ |
| 195 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Received SEK is empty - REJECTING!"); |
| 196 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 197 |
KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION(); |
| 198 |
} |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
// Write the key length |
| 201 |
m_iRcvKmKeyLen = sek_len; |
| 202 |
// Overwrite the key length anyway - it doesn't make sense to somehow |
| 203 |
// keep the original setting because it will only make KMX impossible. |
| 204 |
#if ENABLE_HEAVY_LOGGING |
| 205 |
if (m_iSndKmKeyLen != m_iRcvKmKeyLen) |
| 206 |
{ |
| 207 |
LOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Agent's PBKEYLEN=" << m_iSndKmKeyLen |
| 208 |
<< " overwritten by Peer's PBKEYLEN=" << m_iRcvKmKeyLen); |
| 209 |
} |
| 210 |
#endif |
| 211 |
m_iSndKmKeyLen = m_iRcvKmKeyLen; |
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
// This is checked only now so that the SRTO_PBKEYLEN return always the correct value, |
| 214 |
// even if encryption is not possible because Agent didn't set a password, or supplied |
| 215 |
// a wrong password. |
| 216 |
if (m_KmSecret.len == 0) //We have a shared secret <==> encryption is on |
| 217 |
{ |
| 218 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Agent does not declare encryption - won't decrypt incoming packets!"); |
| 219 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 220 |
KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION(); |
| 221 |
} |
| 222 |
wasb4 = m_hRcvCrypto; |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
if (!createCryptoCtx((m_hRcvCrypto), m_iRcvKmKeyLen, HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_RX, bUseGCM)) |
| 225 |
{ |
| 226 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Can't create RCV CRYPTO CTX - must reject..."); |
| 227 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 228 |
KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION(); |
| 229 |
} |
| 230 |
|
| 231 |
// Deduce resulting mode. |
| 232 |
m_iCryptoMode = bUseGCM ? CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM : CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR; |
| 233 |
|
| 234 |
if (!wasb4) |
| 235 |
{ |
| 236 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: created RX ENC with KeyLen=" << m_iRcvKmKeyLen); |
| 237 |
} |
| 238 |
// We have both sides set with password, so both are pending for security |
| 239 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURING; |
| 240 |
// m_SndKmState is set to SECURING or UNSECURED in init(), |
| 241 |
// or it might have been set to SECURED, NOSECRET or BADSECRET in the previous |
| 242 |
// handshake iteration (handshakes may be sent multiple times for the same connection). |
| 243 |
|
| 244 |
rc = HaiCrypt_Rx_Process(m_hRcvCrypto, kmdata, bytelen, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| 245 |
switch(rc >= 0 ? HAICRYPT_OK : rc) |
| 246 |
{ |
| 247 |
case HAICRYPT_OK: |
| 248 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURED; |
| 249 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "KMREQ/rcv: (snd) Rx process successful - SECURED."); |
| 250 |
//Send back the whole message to confirm |
| 251 |
break; |
| 252 |
case HAICRYPT_ERROR_WRONG_SECRET: //Unmatched shared secret to decrypt wrapped key |
| 253 |
m_RcvKmState = m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 254 |
//Send status KMRSP message to tel error |
| 255 |
w_srtlen = 1; |
| 256 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "KMREQ/rcv: (snd) Rx process failure - BADSECRET"); |
| 257 |
break; |
| 258 |
case HAICRYPT_ERROR_CIPHER: |
| 259 |
#ifdef ENABLE_AEAD_API_PREVIEW |
| 260 |
m_RcvKmState = m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADCRYPTOMODE; |
| 261 |
#else |
| 262 |
m_RcvKmState = m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; // Use "bad secret" as a fallback. |
| 263 |
#endif |
| 264 |
w_srtlen = 1; |
| 265 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "KMREQ/rcv: (snd) Rx process failure - BADCRYPTOMODE"); |
| 266 |
break; |
| 267 |
case HAICRYPT_ERROR: //Other errors |
| 268 |
default: |
| 269 |
m_RcvKmState = m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 270 |
w_srtlen = 1; |
| 271 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "KMREQ/rcv: (snd) Rx process failure (IPE) - NOSECRET"); |
| 272 |
break; |
| 273 |
} |
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
LOGP(cnlog.Note, FormatKmMessage("processSrtMsg_KMREQ", SRT_CMD_KMREQ, bytelen)); |
| 276 |
|
| 277 |
// Since now, when CCryptoControl::decrypt() encounters an error, it will print it, ONCE, |
| 278 |
// until the next KMREQ is received as a key regeneration. |
| 279 |
m_bErrorReported = false; |
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
if (w_srtlen == 1) |
| 282 |
goto HSv4_ErrorReport; |
| 283 |
|
| 284 |
// Configure the sender context also, if it succeeded to configure the |
| 285 |
// receiver context and we are using bidirectional mode. |
| 286 |
if (bidirectional) |
| 287 |
{ |
| 288 |
// Note: 'bidirectional' means that we want a bidirectional key update, |
| 289 |
// which happens only and exclusively with HSv5 handshake - not when the |
| 290 |
// usual key update through UMSG_EXT+SRT_CMD_KMREQ was done (which is used |
| 291 |
// in HSv4 versions also to initialize the first key, unlike HSv5). |
| 292 |
if (m_RcvKmState == SRT_KM_S_SECURED) |
| 293 |
{ |
| 294 |
if (m_SndKmState == SRT_KM_S_SECURING && !m_hSndCrypto) |
| 295 |
{ |
| 296 |
m_iSndKmKeyLen = m_iRcvKmKeyLen; |
| 297 |
if (HaiCrypt_Clone(m_hRcvCrypto, HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX, &m_hSndCrypto) != HAICRYPT_OK) |
| 298 |
{ |
| 299 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Can't create SND CRYPTO CTX - WILL NOT SEND-ENCRYPT correctly!"); |
| 300 |
if (hasPassphrase()) |
| 301 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 302 |
else |
| 303 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 304 |
} |
| 305 |
else |
| 306 |
{ |
| 307 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURED; |
| 308 |
} |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
LOGC(cnlog.Note, log << FormatKmMessage("processSrtMsg_KMREQ", SRT_CMD_KMREQ, bytelen) |
| 311 |
<< " SndKeyLen=" << m_iSndKmKeyLen |
| 312 |
<< " TX CRYPTO CTX CLONED FROM RX" |
| 313 |
); |
| 314 |
|
| 315 |
// Write the KM message into the field from which it will be next sent. |
| 316 |
memcpy((m_SndKmMsg[0].Msg), kmdata, bytelen); |
| 317 |
m_SndKmMsg[0].MsgLen = bytelen; |
| 318 |
m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry = 0; // Don't start sending them upon connection :) |
| 319 |
} |
| 320 |
else |
| 321 |
{ |
| 322 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: NOT cloning RX to TX crypto: already in " |
| 323 |
<< KmStateStr(m_SndKmState) << " state"); |
| 324 |
} |
| 325 |
} |
| 326 |
else |
| 327 |
{ |
| 328 |
HLOGP(cnlog.Debug, "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: NOT SECURED - not replaying failed security association to TX CRYPTO CTX"); |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
} |
| 331 |
else |
| 332 |
{ |
| 333 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: NOT REPLAYING the key update to TX CRYPTO CTX."); |
| 334 |
} |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 337 |
if (m_hRcvCrypto != NULL) |
| 338 |
HaiCrypt_UpdateGcm153(m_hRcvCrypto, m_bUseGcm153); |
| 339 |
if (m_hSndCrypto != NULL) |
| 340 |
HaiCrypt_UpdateGcm153(m_hSndCrypto, m_bUseGcm153); |
| 341 |
#endif |
| 342 |
|
| 343 |
return SRT_CMD_KMRSP; |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
HSv4_ErrorReport: |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
if (bidirectional && hasPassphrase()) |
| 348 |
{ |
| 349 |
// If the Forward KMX process has failed, the reverse-KMX process was not done at all. |
| 350 |
// This will lead to incorrect object configuration and will fail to properly declare |
| 351 |
// the transmission state. |
| 352 |
// Create the "fake crypto" with the passphrsae you currently have. |
| 353 |
createFakeSndContext(); |
| 354 |
} |
| 355 |
#undef KMREQ_RESULT_REJECTION |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
#else |
| 358 |
// It's ok that this is reported as error because this happens in a scenario, |
| 359 |
// when non-encryption-enabled SRT application is contacted by encryption-enabled SRT |
| 360 |
// application which tries to make a security association. |
| 361 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "processSrtMsg_KMREQ: Encryption not enabled at compile time - must reject..."); |
| 362 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 363 |
#endif |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
w_srtlen = 1; |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
pw_srtdata_out[SRT_KMR_KMSTATE] = m_RcvKmState; |
| 368 |
return SRT_CMD_KMRSP; |
| 369 |
} |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
int srt::CCryptoControl::processSrtMsg_KMRSP(const uint32_t* srtdata, size_t len, unsigned srtv) |
| 372 |
{ |
| 373 |
/* All 32-bit msg fields (if present) swapped on reception |
| 374 |
* But HaiCrypt expect network order message |
| 375 |
* Re-swap to cancel it. |
| 376 |
*/ |
| 377 |
uint32_t srtd[SRTDATA_MAXSIZE]; |
| 378 |
size_t srtlen = len/sizeof(uint32_t); |
| 379 |
HtoNLA(srtd, srtdata, srtlen); |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
int retstatus = -1; |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
// Since now, when CCryptoControl::decrypt() encounters an error, it will print it, ONCE, |
| 384 |
// until the next KMREQ is received as a key regeneration. |
| 385 |
m_bErrorReported = false; |
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
if (srtlen == 1) // Error report. Set accordingly. |
| 388 |
{ |
| 389 |
SRT_KM_STATE peerstate = SRT_KM_STATE(srtd[SRT_KMR_KMSTATE]); /* Bad or no passphrase */ |
| 390 |
m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry = 0; |
| 391 |
m_SndKmMsg[1].iPeerRetry = 0; |
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
switch (peerstate) |
| 394 |
{ |
| 395 |
case SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET: |
| 396 |
m_SndKmState = m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 397 |
retstatus = -1; |
| 398 |
break; |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
// Default embraces two cases: |
| 401 |
// NOSECRET: this KMRSP was sent by secured Peer, but Agent supplied no password. |
| 402 |
// UNSECURED: this KMRSP was sent by unsecure Peer because Agent sent KMREQ. |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
case SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET: |
| 405 |
// This means that the peer did not set the password, while Agent did. |
| 406 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED; |
| 407 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 408 |
retstatus = -1; |
| 409 |
break; |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
case SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED: |
| 412 |
// This means that KMRSP was sent without KMREQ, to inform the Agent, |
| 413 |
// that the Peer, unlike Agent, does use password. Agent can send then, |
| 414 |
// but can't decrypt what Peer would send. |
| 415 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 416 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED; |
| 417 |
retstatus = 0; |
| 418 |
break; |
| 419 |
#ifdef ENABLE_AEAD_API_PREVIEW |
| 420 |
case SRT_KM_S_BADCRYPTOMODE: |
| 421 |
// The peer expects to use a different cryptographic mode (e.g. AES-GCM, not AES-CTR). |
| 422 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADCRYPTOMODE; |
| 423 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADCRYPTOMODE; |
| 424 |
retstatus = -1; |
| 425 |
break; |
| 426 |
#endif |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
default: |
| 429 |
LOGC(cnlog.Fatal, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: IPE: unknown peer error state: " |
| 430 |
<< KmStateStr(peerstate) << " (" << int(peerstate) << ")"); |
| 431 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 432 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 433 |
retstatus = -1; //This is IPE |
| 434 |
break; |
| 435 |
} |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: received failure report. STATE: " << KmStateStr(m_RcvKmState)); |
| 438 |
} |
| 439 |
else |
| 440 |
{ |
| 441 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: received key response len=" << len); |
| 442 |
// XXX INSECURE << ": [" << FormatBinaryString((uint8_t*)srtd, len) << "]"; |
| 443 |
bool key1 = getKmMsg_acceptResponse(0, srtd, len); |
| 444 |
bool key2 = true; |
| 445 |
if ( !key1 ) |
| 446 |
key2 = getKmMsg_acceptResponse(1, srtd, len); // <--- NOTE SEQUENCING! |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
if (key1 || key2) |
| 449 |
{ |
| 450 |
m_SndKmState = m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURED; |
| 451 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: KM response matches " << (key1 ? "EVEN" : "ODD") << " key"); |
| 452 |
retstatus = 1; |
| 453 |
} |
| 454 |
else |
| 455 |
{ |
| 456 |
retstatus = -1; |
| 457 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: IPE??? KM response key matches no key"); |
| 458 |
/* XXX INSECURE |
| 459 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: KM response: [" << FormatBinaryString((uint8_t*)srtd, len) |
| 460 |
<< "] matches no key 0=[" << FormatBinaryString((uint8_t*)m_SndKmMsg[0].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[0].MsgLen) |
| 461 |
<< "] 1=[" << FormatBinaryString((uint8_t*)m_SndKmMsg[1].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[1].MsgLen) << "]"); |
| 462 |
*/ |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
m_SndKmState = m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET; |
| 465 |
} |
| 466 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "processSrtMsg_KMRSP: key[0]: len=" << m_SndKmMsg[0].MsgLen << " retry=" << m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry |
| 467 |
<< "; key[1]: len=" << m_SndKmMsg[1].MsgLen << " retry=" << m_SndKmMsg[1].iPeerRetry); |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
m_bUseGcm153 = srtv <= SrtVersion(1, 5, 3); |
| 470 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 471 |
if (m_hRcvCrypto != NULL) |
| 472 |
HaiCrypt_UpdateGcm153(m_hRcvCrypto, m_bUseGcm153); |
| 473 |
if (m_hSndCrypto != NULL) |
| 474 |
HaiCrypt_UpdateGcm153(m_hSndCrypto, m_bUseGcm153); |
| 475 |
#endif |
| 476 |
} |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
LOGP(cnlog.Note, FormatKmMessage("processSrtMsg_KMRSP", SRT_CMD_KMRSP, len)); |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
return retstatus; |
| 481 |
} |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::sendKeysToPeer(CUDT* sock SRT_ATR_UNUSED, int iSRTT SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 484 |
{ |
| 485 |
sync::ScopedLock lck(m_mtxLock); |
| 486 |
if (!m_hSndCrypto || m_SndKmState == SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED) |
| 487 |
{ |
| 488 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "sendKeysToPeer: NOT sending/regenerating keys: " |
| 489 |
<< (m_hSndCrypto ? "CONNECTION UNSECURED" : "NO TX CRYPTO CTX created")); |
| 490 |
return; |
| 491 |
} |
| 492 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 493 |
srt::sync::steady_clock::time_point now = srt::sync::steady_clock::now(); |
| 494 |
/* |
| 495 |
* Crypto Key Distribution to peer: |
| 496 |
* If... |
| 497 |
* - we want encryption; and |
| 498 |
* - we have not tried more than CSRTCC_MAXRETRY times (peer may not be SRT); and |
| 499 |
* - and did not get answer back from peer; and |
| 500 |
* - last sent Keying Material req should have been replied (RTT*1.5 elapsed); |
| 501 |
* then (re-)send handshake request. |
| 502 |
*/ |
| 503 |
if (((m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry > 0) || (m_SndKmMsg[1].iPeerRetry > 0)) |
| 504 |
&& ((m_SndKmLastTime + srt::sync::microseconds_from((iSRTT * 3)/2)) <= now)) |
| 505 |
{ |
| 506 |
for (int ki = 0; ki < 2; ki++) |
| 507 |
{ |
| 508 |
if (m_SndKmMsg[ki].iPeerRetry > 0 && m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen > 0) |
| 509 |
{ |
| 510 |
m_SndKmMsg[ki].iPeerRetry--; |
| 511 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "sendKeysToPeer: SENDING ki=" << ki << " len=" << m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen |
| 512 |
<< " retry(updated)=" << m_SndKmMsg[ki].iPeerRetry); |
| 513 |
m_SndKmLastTime = now; |
| 514 |
sock->sendSrtMsg(SRT_CMD_KMREQ, (uint32_t *)m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen / sizeof(uint32_t)); |
| 515 |
} |
| 516 |
} |
| 517 |
} |
| 518 |
#endif |
| 519 |
} |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::regenCryptoKm(CUDT* sock SRT_ATR_UNUSED, bool bidirectional SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 522 |
{ |
| 523 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 524 |
sync::ScopedLock lck(m_mtxLock); |
| 525 |
if (!m_hSndCrypto) |
| 526 |
return; |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
void *out_p[2]; |
| 529 |
size_t out_len_p[2]; |
| 530 |
int nbo = HaiCrypt_Tx_ManageKeys(m_hSndCrypto, out_p, out_len_p, 2); |
| 531 |
int sent = 0; |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "regenCryptoKm: regenerating crypto keys nbo=" << nbo << |
| 534 |
" THEN=" << (sock ? "SEND" : "KEEP") << " DIR=" << (bidirectional ? "BOTH" : "SENDER")); |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
for (int i = 0; i < nbo && i < 2; i++) |
| 537 |
{ |
| 538 |
/* |
| 539 |
* New connection keying material |
| 540 |
* or regenerated after crypto_cfg.km_refresh_rate_pkt packets . |
| 541 |
* Send to peer |
| 542 |
*/ |
| 543 |
// XXX Need to make it clearer and less hardcoded values |
| 544 |
int kix = hcryptMsg_KM_GetKeyIndex((unsigned char *)(out_p[i])); |
| 545 |
int ki = kix & 0x1; |
| 546 |
if ((out_len_p[i] != m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen) |
| 547 |
|| (0 != memcmp(out_p[i], m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen))) |
| 548 |
{ |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
uint8_t* oldkey SRT_ATR_UNUSED = m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg; |
| 551 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "new key[" << ki << "] index=" << kix |
| 552 |
<< " OLD=[" << m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen << "]" |
| 553 |
<< FormatBinaryString(m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen) |
| 554 |
<< " NEW=[" << out_len_p[i] << "]" |
| 555 |
<< FormatBinaryString((const uint8_t*)out_p[i], out_len_p[i])); |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
/* New Keying material, send to peer */ |
| 558 |
memcpy((m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg), out_p[i], out_len_p[i]); |
| 559 |
m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen = out_len_p[i]; |
| 560 |
m_SndKmMsg[ki].iPeerRetry = SRT_MAX_KMRETRY; |
| 561 |
|
| 562 |
if (bidirectional && !sock) |
| 563 |
{ |
| 564 |
// "Send" this key also to myself, just to be applied to the receiver crypto, |
| 565 |
// exactly the same way how this key is interpreted on the peer side into its receiver crypto |
| 566 |
int rc = HaiCrypt_Rx_Process(m_hRcvCrypto, m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| 567 |
if ( rc < 0 ) |
| 568 |
{ |
| 569 |
LOGC(cnlog.Fatal, log << "regenCryptoKm: IPE: applying key generated in snd crypto into rcv crypto: failed code=" << rc); |
| 570 |
// The party won't be able to decrypt incoming data! |
| 571 |
// Not sure if anything has to be reported. |
| 572 |
} |
| 573 |
} |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
if (sock) |
| 576 |
{ |
| 577 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "regenCryptoKm: SENDING ki=" << ki << " len=" << m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen |
| 578 |
<< " retry(updated)=" << m_SndKmMsg[ki].iPeerRetry); |
| 579 |
sock->sendSrtMsg(SRT_CMD_KMREQ, (uint32_t *)m_SndKmMsg[ki].Msg, m_SndKmMsg[ki].MsgLen / sizeof(uint32_t)); |
| 580 |
sent++; |
| 581 |
} |
| 582 |
} |
| 583 |
else if (out_len_p[i] == 0) |
| 584 |
{ |
| 585 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "no key[" << ki << "] index=" << kix << ": not generated"); |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
else |
| 588 |
{ |
| 589 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "no key[" << ki << "] index=" << kix << ": key unchanged"); |
| 590 |
} |
| 591 |
} |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "regenCryptoKm: key[0]: len=" << m_SndKmMsg[0].MsgLen << " retry=" << m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry |
| 594 |
<< "; key[1]: len=" << m_SndKmMsg[1].MsgLen << " retry=" << m_SndKmMsg[1].iPeerRetry); |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
if (sent) |
| 597 |
m_SndKmLastTime = srt::sync::steady_clock::now(); |
| 598 |
#endif |
| 599 |
} |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
srt::CCryptoControl::CCryptoControl(SRTSOCKET id) |
| 602 |
: m_SocketID(id) |
| 603 |
, m_iSndKmKeyLen(0) |
| 604 |
, m_iRcvKmKeyLen(0) |
| 605 |
, m_SndKmState(SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED) |
| 606 |
, m_RcvKmState(SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED) |
| 607 |
, m_KmRefreshRatePkt(0) |
| 608 |
, m_KmPreAnnouncePkt(0) |
| 609 |
, m_iCryptoMode(CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AUTO) |
| 610 |
, m_bUseGcm153(false) |
| 611 |
, m_bErrorReported(false) |
| 612 |
{ |
| 613 |
m_KmSecret.len = 0; |
| 614 |
//send |
| 615 |
m_SndKmMsg[0].MsgLen = 0; |
| 616 |
m_SndKmMsg[0].iPeerRetry = 0; |
| 617 |
m_SndKmMsg[1].MsgLen = 0; |
| 618 |
m_SndKmMsg[1].iPeerRetry = 0; |
| 619 |
m_hSndCrypto = NULL; |
| 620 |
//recv |
| 621 |
m_hRcvCrypto = NULL; |
| 622 |
} |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
bool srt::CCryptoControl::init(HandshakeSide side, const CSrtConfig& cfg, bool bidirectional SRT_ATR_UNUSED, bool bUseGcm153 SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 625 |
{ |
| 626 |
// NOTE: initiator creates m_hSndCrypto. When bidirectional, |
| 627 |
// it creates also m_hRcvCrypto with the same key length. |
| 628 |
// Acceptor creates nothing - it will create appropriate |
| 629 |
// contexts when receiving KMREQ from the initiator. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: HS SIDE:" |
| 632 |
<< (side == HSD_INITIATOR ? "INITIATOR" : "RESPONDER") |
| 633 |
<< " DIRECTION:" << (bidirectional ? "BOTH" : (side == HSD_INITIATOR) ? "SENDER" : "RECEIVER")); |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
// Set UNSECURED state as default |
| 636 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED; |
| 637 |
m_iCryptoMode = cfg.iCryptoMode; |
| 638 |
m_bUseGcm153 = bUseGcm153; |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 641 |
if (!cfg.bTSBPD && m_iCryptoMode == CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AUTO) |
| 642 |
m_iCryptoMode = CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR; |
| 643 |
const bool bUseGCM = m_iCryptoMode == CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM; |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
if (bUseGCM && !isAESGCMSupported()) |
| 646 |
{ |
| 647 |
LOGC(cnlog.Warn, log << "CCryptoControl: AES GCM is not supported by the crypto service provider."); |
| 648 |
return false; |
| 649 |
} |
| 650 |
#endif |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
// Set security-pending state, if a password was set. |
| 653 |
m_SndKmState = hasPassphrase() ? SRT_KM_S_SECURING : SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED; |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
m_KmPreAnnouncePkt = cfg.uKmPreAnnouncePkt; |
| 656 |
m_KmRefreshRatePkt = cfg.uKmRefreshRatePkt; |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
if (side == HSD_INITIATOR) |
| 659 |
{ |
| 660 |
if (hasPassphrase()) |
| 661 |
{ |
| 662 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 663 |
if (m_iSndKmKeyLen == 0) |
| 664 |
{ |
| 665 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: PBKEYLEN still 0, setting default 16"); |
| 666 |
m_iSndKmKeyLen = 16; |
| 667 |
} |
| 668 |
|
| 669 |
bool ok = createCryptoCtx((m_hSndCrypto), m_iSndKmKeyLen, HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX, bUseGCM); |
| 670 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: creating SND crypto context: " << ok); |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
if (ok && bidirectional) |
| 673 |
{ |
| 674 |
m_iRcvKmKeyLen = m_iSndKmKeyLen; |
| 675 |
const int st = HaiCrypt_Clone(m_hSndCrypto, HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_RX, &m_hRcvCrypto); |
| 676 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: creating CLONED RCV crypto context: status=" << st); |
| 677 |
ok = st == 0; |
| 678 |
} |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
// Note: this is sanity check, it should never happen. |
| 681 |
if (!ok) |
| 682 |
{ |
| 683 |
m_SndKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; // wanted to secure, but error occurred. |
| 684 |
if (bidirectional) |
| 685 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
return false; |
| 688 |
} |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
regenCryptoKm( |
| 691 |
NULL, // Do not send the key (the KM msg will be attached to the HSv5 handshake) |
| 692 |
bidirectional // replicate the key to the receiver context, if bidirectional |
| 693 |
); |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
m_iCryptoMode = bUseGCM ? CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM : CSrtConfig::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR; |
| 696 |
#else |
| 697 |
// This error would be a consequence of setting the passphrase, while encryption |
| 698 |
// is turned off at compile time. Setting the password itself should be not allowed |
| 699 |
// so this could only happen as a consequence of an IPE. |
| 700 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "CCryptoControl::init: IPE: encryption not supported"); |
| 701 |
return false; |
| 702 |
#endif |
| 703 |
} |
| 704 |
else |
| 705 |
{ |
| 706 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: CAN'T CREATE crypto: key length for SND = " << m_iSndKmKeyLen); |
| 707 |
} |
| 708 |
} |
| 709 |
else |
| 710 |
{ |
| 711 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CCryptoControl::init: NOT creating crypto contexts - will be created upon reception of KMREQ"); |
| 712 |
} |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
return true; |
| 715 |
} |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
void srt::CCryptoControl::close() |
| 718 |
{ |
| 719 |
/* Wipeout secrets */ |
| 720 |
sync::ScopedLock lck(m_mtxLock); |
| 721 |
memset(&m_KmSecret, 0, sizeof(m_KmSecret)); |
| 722 |
} |
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
std::string srt::CCryptoControl::CONID() const |
| 725 |
{ |
| 726 |
if (m_SocketID == 0) |
| 727 |
return ""; |
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
std::ostringstream os; |
| 730 |
os << "@" << m_SocketID << ":"; |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
return os.str(); |
| 733 |
} |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
#if ENABLE_HEAVY_LOGGING |
| 738 |
namespace srt { |
| 739 |
static std::string CryptoFlags(int flg) |
| 740 |
{ |
| 741 |
using namespace std; |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
vector<string> f; |
| 744 |
if (flg & HAICRYPT_CFG_F_CRYPTO) |
| 745 |
f.push_back("crypto"); |
| 746 |
if (flg & HAICRYPT_CFG_F_TX) |
| 747 |
f.push_back("TX"); |
| 748 |
if (flg & HAICRYPT_CFG_F_FEC) |
| 749 |
f.push_back("fec"); |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
ostringstream os; |
| 752 |
copy(f.begin(), f.end(), ostream_iterator<string>(os, "|")); |
| 753 |
return os.str(); |
| 754 |
} |
| 755 |
} // namespace srt |
| 756 |
#endif // ENABLE_HEAVY_LOGGING |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
bool srt::CCryptoControl::createCryptoCtx(HaiCrypt_Handle& w_hCrypto, size_t keylen, HaiCrypt_CryptoDir cdir, bool bAESGCM) |
| 759 |
{ |
| 760 |
if (w_hCrypto) |
| 761 |
{ |
| 762 |
// XXX You can check here if the existing handle represents |
| 763 |
// a correctly defined crypto. But this doesn't seem to be |
| 764 |
// necessary - the whole CCryptoControl facility seems to be valid only |
| 765 |
// within the frames of one connection. |
| 766 |
return true; |
| 767 |
} |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
if ((m_KmSecret.len <= 0) || (keylen <= 0)) |
| 770 |
{ |
| 771 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << CONID() << "cryptoCtx: IPE missing secret (" << m_KmSecret.len << ") or key length (" << keylen << ")"); |
| 772 |
return false; |
| 773 |
} |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
HaiCrypt_Cfg crypto_cfg; |
| 776 |
memset(&crypto_cfg, 0, sizeof(crypto_cfg)); |
| 777 |
#if 0//test key refresh (fast rate) |
| 778 |
m_KmRefreshRatePkt = 2000; |
| 779 |
m_KmPreAnnouncePkt = 500; |
| 780 |
#endif |
| 781 |
crypto_cfg.flags = HAICRYPT_CFG_F_CRYPTO | (cdir == HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX ? HAICRYPT_CFG_F_TX : 0) | (bAESGCM ? HAICRYPT_CFG_F_GCM : 0); |
| 782 |
crypto_cfg.xport = HAICRYPT_XPT_SRT; |
| 783 |
crypto_cfg.cryspr = HaiCryptCryspr_Get_Instance(); |
| 784 |
crypto_cfg.key_len = (size_t)keylen; |
| 785 |
crypto_cfg.data_max_len = HAICRYPT_DEF_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; //MTU |
| 786 |
crypto_cfg.km_tx_period_ms = 0;//No HaiCrypt KM inject period, handled in SRT; |
| 787 |
crypto_cfg.km_refresh_rate_pkt = m_KmRefreshRatePkt == 0 ? HAICRYPT_DEF_KM_REFRESH_RATE : m_KmRefreshRatePkt; |
| 788 |
crypto_cfg.km_pre_announce_pkt = m_KmPreAnnouncePkt == 0 ? SRT_CRYPT_KM_PRE_ANNOUNCE : m_KmPreAnnouncePkt; |
| 789 |
crypto_cfg.secret = m_KmSecret; |
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CRYPTO CFG: flags=" << CryptoFlags(crypto_cfg.flags) << " xport=" << crypto_cfg.xport << " cryspr=" << crypto_cfg.cryspr |
| 792 |
<< " keylen=" << crypto_cfg.key_len << " passphrase_length=" << crypto_cfg.secret.len); |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
if (HaiCrypt_Create(&crypto_cfg, (&w_hCrypto)) != HAICRYPT_OK) |
| 795 |
{ |
| 796 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << CONID() << "cryptoCtx: could not create " << (cdir == HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX ? "tx" : "rx") << " crypto ctx"); |
| 797 |
return false; |
| 798 |
} |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << CONID() << "cryptoCtx: CREATED crypto for dir=" << (cdir == HAICRYPT_CRYPTO_DIR_TX ? "tx" : "rx") << " keylen=" << keylen); |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
return true; |
| 803 |
} |
| 804 |
#else |
| 805 |
bool srt::CCryptoControl::createCryptoCtx(HaiCrypt_Handle&, size_t, HaiCrypt_CryptoDir, bool) |
| 806 |
{ |
| 807 |
return false; |
| 808 |
} |
| 809 |
#endif // SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
srt::EncryptionStatus srt::CCryptoControl::encrypt(CPacket& w_packet SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 813 |
{ |
| 814 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 815 |
// Encryption not enabled - do nothing. |
| 816 |
if ( getSndCryptoFlags() == EK_NOENC ) |
| 817 |
return ENCS_CLEAR; |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
// Note that in case of GCM the header has to zero Retransmitted Packet Flag (R). |
| 820 |
// If TSBPD is disabled, timestamp also has to be zeroed. |
| 821 |
int rc = HaiCrypt_Tx_Data(m_hSndCrypto, ((uint8_t*)w_packet.getHeader()), ((uint8_t*)w_packet.m_pcData), w_packet.getLength()); |
| 822 |
if (rc < 0) |
| 823 |
{ |
| 824 |
return ENCS_FAILED; |
| 825 |
} |
| 826 |
else if (rc > 0) |
| 827 |
{ |
| 828 |
// XXX what happens if the encryption is said to be "succeeded", |
| 829 |
// but the length is 0? Shouldn't this be treated as unwanted? |
| 830 |
w_packet.setLength(rc); |
| 831 |
} |
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
return ENCS_CLEAR; |
| 834 |
#else |
| 835 |
return ENCS_NOTSUP; |
| 836 |
#endif |
| 837 |
} |
| 838 |
|
| 839 |
srt::EncryptionStatus srt::CCryptoControl::decrypt(CPacket& w_packet SRT_ATR_UNUSED) |
| 840 |
{ |
| 841 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 842 |
if (w_packet.getMsgCryptoFlags() == EK_NOENC) |
| 843 |
{ |
| 844 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "CPacket::decrypt: packet not encrypted"); |
| 845 |
return ENCS_CLEAR; // not encrypted, no need do decrypt, no flags to be modified |
| 846 |
} |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
if (m_RcvKmState == SRT_KM_S_UNSECURED) |
| 849 |
{ |
| 850 |
if (m_KmSecret.len != 0) |
| 851 |
{ |
| 852 |
// We were unaware that the peer has set password, |
| 853 |
// but now here we are. |
| 854 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_SECURING; |
| 855 |
LOGC(cnlog.Note, log << "SECURITY UPDATE: Peer has surprised Agent with encryption, but KMX is pending - current packet size=" |
| 856 |
<< w_packet.getLength() << " dropped"); |
| 857 |
return ENCS_FAILED; |
| 858 |
} |
| 859 |
else |
| 860 |
{ |
| 861 |
// Peer has set a password, but Agent did not, |
| 862 |
// which means that it will be unable to decrypt |
| 863 |
// sent payloads anyway. |
| 864 |
m_RcvKmState = SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET; |
| 865 |
LOGP(cnlog.Warn, "SECURITY FAILURE: Agent has no PW, but Peer sender has declared one, can't decrypt"); |
| 866 |
// This only informs about the state change; it will be also caught by the condition below |
| 867 |
} |
| 868 |
} |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
if (m_RcvKmState != SRT_KM_S_SECURED) |
| 871 |
{ |
| 872 |
// If not "secured", it means that it won't be able to decrypt packets, |
| 873 |
// so there's no point to even try to send them to HaiCrypt_Rx_Data. |
| 874 |
// Actually the current conditions concerning m_hRcvCrypto are such that this object |
| 875 |
// is created in case of SRT_KM_S_BADSECRET, so it will simply fail to decrypt, |
| 876 |
// but with SRT_KM_S_NOSECRET m_hRcvCrypto is not even created (is NULL), which |
| 877 |
// will then cause an error to be reported, misleadingly. Simply don't try to |
| 878 |
// decrypt anything as long as you are not sure that the connection is secured. |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
// This problem will occur every time a packet comes in, it's worth reporting, |
| 881 |
// but not with every single packet arriving. Print it once and turn off the flag; |
| 882 |
// it will be restored at the next attempt of KMX. |
| 883 |
if (!m_bErrorReported) |
| 884 |
{ |
| 885 |
m_bErrorReported = true; |
| 886 |
LOGC(cnlog.Error, log << "SECURITY STATUS: " << KmStateStr(m_RcvKmState) << " - can't decrypt w_packet."); |
| 887 |
} |
| 888 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "Packet still not decrypted, status=" << KmStateStr(m_RcvKmState) |
| 889 |
<< " - dropping size=" << w_packet.getLength()); |
| 890 |
return ENCS_FAILED; |
| 891 |
} |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
const int rc = HaiCrypt_Rx_Data(m_hRcvCrypto, ((uint8_t *)w_packet.getHeader()), ((uint8_t *)w_packet.m_pcData), w_packet.getLength()); |
| 894 |
if (rc <= 0) |
| 895 |
{ |
| 896 |
LOGC(cnlog.Note, log << "decrypt ERROR: HaiCrypt_Rx_Data failure=" << rc << " - returning failed decryption"); |
| 897 |
// -1: decryption failure |
| 898 |
// 0: key not received yet |
| 899 |
return ENCS_FAILED; |
| 900 |
} |
| 901 |
// Otherwise: rc == decrypted text length. |
| 902 |
w_packet.setLength(rc); /* In case clr txt size is different from cipher txt */ |
| 903 |
|
| 904 |
// Decryption succeeded. Update flags. |
| 905 |
w_packet.setMsgCryptoFlags(EK_NOENC); |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
HLOGC(cnlog.Debug, log << "decrypt: successfully decrypted, resulting length=" << rc); |
| 908 |
return ENCS_CLEAR; |
| 909 |
#else |
| 910 |
return ENCS_NOTSUP; |
| 911 |
#endif |
| 912 |
} |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
srt::CCryptoControl::~CCryptoControl() |
| 916 |
{ |
| 917 |
#ifdef SRT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION |
| 918 |
close(); |
| 919 |
if (m_hSndCrypto) |
| 920 |
{ |
| 921 |
HaiCrypt_Close(m_hSndCrypto); |
| 922 |
} |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
if (m_hRcvCrypto) |
| 925 |
{ |
| 926 |
HaiCrypt_Close(m_hRcvCrypto); |
| 927 |
} |
| 928 |
#endif |
| 929 |
} |