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/* v3_purp.c */ |
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/* |
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson ([email protected]) for the OpenSSL project |
| 4 |
* 2001. |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 10 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 22 |
* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* [email protected]. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 |
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <stdio.h> |
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#include "cryptlib.h" |
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| 63 |
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
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|
| 65 |
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); |
| 66 |
|
| 67 |
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); |
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static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
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int ca); |
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static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
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static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); |
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|
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static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); |
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); |
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|
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static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { |
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, |
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check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
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check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
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check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, |
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"S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, |
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check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, |
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"CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", |
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NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, |
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"OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, |
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{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, |
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check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", |
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NULL}, |
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}; |
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|
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#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) |
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|
| 113 |
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) |
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|
| 115 |
static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; |
| 116 |
|
| 117 |
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) |
| 118 |
{ |
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return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I |
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* really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const |
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* things. |
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*/ |
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int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) |
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{ |
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int idx; |
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const X509_PURPOSE *pt; |
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if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
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x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
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} |
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if (id == -1) |
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return 1; |
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
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if (idx == -1) |
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return -1; |
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pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
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return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) |
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{ |
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if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { |
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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*p = purpose; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) |
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{ |
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if (!xptable) |
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return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
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} |
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|
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X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) |
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{ |
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if (idx < 0) |
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return NULL; |
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if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) |
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return xstandard + idx; |
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) |
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{ |
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int i; |
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X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; |
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for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { |
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xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); |
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if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) |
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return i; |
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} |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) |
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{ |
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X509_PURPOSE tmp; |
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int idx; |
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if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) |
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return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; |
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tmp.purpose = purpose; |
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if (!xptable) |
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return -1; |
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idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); |
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if (idx == -1) |
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return -1; |
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return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, |
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int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), |
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char *name, char *sname, void *arg) |
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{ |
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int idx; |
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X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
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/* |
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* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it |
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*/ |
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flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
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/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
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flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
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/* Get existing entry if any */ |
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
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/* Need a new entry */ |
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if (idx == -1) { |
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if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { |
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
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} else |
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ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
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|
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/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
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if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
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} |
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/* dup supplied name */ |
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ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); |
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ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); |
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if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { |
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
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ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
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/* Set all other flags */ |
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ptmp->flags |= flags; |
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|
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ptmp->purpose = id; |
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ptmp->trust = trust; |
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ptmp->check_purpose = ck; |
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ptmp->usr_data = arg; |
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|
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/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
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if (idx == -1) { |
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if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { |
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { |
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) |
| 259 |
{ |
| 260 |
if (!p) |
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return; |
| 262 |
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { |
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if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
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OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
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OPENSSL_free(p->sname); |
| 266 |
} |
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OPENSSL_free(p); |
| 268 |
} |
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} |
| 270 |
|
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void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) |
| 272 |
{ |
| 273 |
unsigned int i; |
| 274 |
sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); |
| 275 |
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) |
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xptable_free(xstandard + i); |
| 277 |
xptable = NULL; |
| 278 |
} |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 281 |
{ |
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return xp->purpose; |
| 283 |
} |
| 284 |
|
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| 286 |
{ |
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return xp->name; |
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} |
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|
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
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{ |
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return xp->sname; |
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} |
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|
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
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{ |
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return xp->trust; |
| 298 |
} |
| 299 |
|
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static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) |
| 301 |
{ |
| 302 |
return *a - *b; |
| 303 |
} |
| 304 |
|
| 305 |
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
| 306 |
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) |
| 309 |
{ |
| 310 |
/* |
| 311 |
* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is |
| 312 |
* those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is |
| 313 |
* critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will |
| 314 |
* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical |
| 315 |
* order because it will be searched using bsearch. |
| 316 |
*/ |
| 317 |
|
| 318 |
static const int supported_nids[] = { |
| 319 |
NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ |
| 320 |
NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ |
| 321 |
NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ |
| 322 |
NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ |
| 323 |
NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ |
| 324 |
NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ |
| 325 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
| 326 |
NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ |
| 327 |
NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ |
| 328 |
#endif |
| 329 |
NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ |
| 330 |
NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ |
| 331 |
NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ |
| 332 |
NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ |
| 333 |
NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ |
| 334 |
}; |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
| 337 |
|
| 338 |
if (ex_nid == NID_undef) |
| 339 |
return 0; |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, |
| 342 |
sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) |
| 343 |
return 1; |
| 344 |
return 0; |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) |
| 348 |
{ |
| 349 |
X509_NAME *iname = NULL; |
| 350 |
int i; |
| 351 |
if (dp->reasons) { |
| 352 |
if (dp->reasons->length > 0) |
| 353 |
dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; |
| 354 |
if (dp->reasons->length > 1) |
| 355 |
dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); |
| 356 |
dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| 357 |
} else |
| 358 |
dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| 359 |
if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) |
| 360 |
return; |
| 361 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| 362 |
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| 363 |
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| 364 |
iname = gen->d.directoryName; |
| 365 |
break; |
| 366 |
} |
| 367 |
} |
| 368 |
if (!iname) |
| 369 |
iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
} |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) |
| 376 |
{ |
| 377 |
int i; |
| 378 |
x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); |
| 379 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
| 380 |
setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); |
| 381 |
} |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) |
| 384 |
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 385 |
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
| 386 |
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 387 |
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) |
| 388 |
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \ |
| 389 |
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) |
| 392 |
{ |
| 393 |
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; |
| 394 |
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; |
| 395 |
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; |
| 396 |
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; |
| 397 |
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; |
| 398 |
X509_EXTENSION *ex; |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
int i; |
| 401 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) |
| 402 |
return; |
| 403 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| 404 |
X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); |
| 405 |
#endif |
| 406 |
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ |
| 407 |
if (!X509_get_version(x)) |
| 408 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; |
| 409 |
/* Handle basic constraints */ |
| 410 |
if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 411 |
if (bs->ca) |
| 412 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; |
| 413 |
if (bs->pathlen) { |
| 414 |
if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) |
| 415 |
|| !bs->ca) { |
| 416 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 417 |
x->ex_pathlen = 0; |
| 418 |
} else |
| 419 |
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); |
| 420 |
} else |
| 421 |
x->ex_pathlen = -1; |
| 422 |
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); |
| 423 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
/* Handle proxy certificates */ |
| 426 |
if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 427 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA |
| 428 |
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 |
| 429 |
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { |
| 430 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 431 |
} |
| 432 |
if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { |
| 433 |
x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); |
| 434 |
} else |
| 435 |
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; |
| 436 |
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
| 437 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
| 438 |
} |
| 439 |
/* Handle key usage */ |
| 440 |
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 441 |
if (usage->length > 0) { |
| 442 |
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; |
| 443 |
if (usage->length > 1) |
| 444 |
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; |
| 445 |
} else |
| 446 |
x->ex_kusage = 0; |
| 447 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; |
| 448 |
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); |
| 449 |
} |
| 450 |
x->ex_xkusage = 0; |
| 451 |
if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 452 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; |
| 453 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { |
| 454 |
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { |
| 455 |
case NID_server_auth: |
| 456 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; |
| 457 |
break; |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
case NID_client_auth: |
| 460 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; |
| 461 |
break; |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
case NID_email_protect: |
| 464 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; |
| 465 |
break; |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
case NID_code_sign: |
| 468 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; |
| 469 |
break; |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
case NID_ms_sgc: |
| 472 |
case NID_ns_sgc: |
| 473 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; |
| 474 |
break; |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
case NID_OCSP_sign: |
| 477 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; |
| 478 |
break; |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
case NID_time_stamp: |
| 481 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; |
| 482 |
break; |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
case NID_dvcs: |
| 485 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; |
| 486 |
break; |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: |
| 489 |
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; |
| 490 |
break; |
| 491 |
} |
| 492 |
} |
| 493 |
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); |
| 494 |
} |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { |
| 497 |
if (ns->length > 0) |
| 498 |
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; |
| 499 |
else |
| 500 |
x->ex_nscert = 0; |
| 501 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; |
| 502 |
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); |
| 503 |
} |
| 504 |
x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| 505 |
x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); |
| 506 |
/* Does subject name match issuer ? */ |
| 507 |
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { |
| 508 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; |
| 509 |
/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ |
| 510 |
if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && |
| 511 |
!ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 512 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; |
| 513 |
} |
| 514 |
x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); |
| 515 |
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); |
| 516 |
if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) |
| 517 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| 518 |
setup_crldp(x); |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
| 521 |
x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); |
| 522 |
x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, |
| 523 |
NULL, NULL); |
| 524 |
#endif |
| 525 |
for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { |
| 526 |
ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); |
| 527 |
if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) |
| 528 |
== NID_freshest_crl) |
| 529 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; |
| 530 |
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) |
| 531 |
continue; |
| 532 |
if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { |
| 533 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| 534 |
break; |
| 535 |
} |
| 536 |
} |
| 537 |
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; |
| 538 |
} |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
/*- |
| 541 |
* CA checks common to all purposes |
| 542 |
* return codes: |
| 543 |
* 0 not a CA |
| 544 |
* 1 is a CA |
| 545 |
* 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA |
| 546 |
* 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. |
| 547 |
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. |
| 548 |
*/ |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
static int check_ca(const X509 *x) |
| 551 |
{ |
| 552 |
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ |
| 553 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 554 |
return 0; |
| 555 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { |
| 556 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) |
| 557 |
return 1; |
| 558 |
/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ |
| 559 |
else |
| 560 |
return 0; |
| 561 |
} else { |
| 562 |
/* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ |
| 563 |
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) |
| 564 |
return 3; |
| 565 |
/* |
| 566 |
* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it |
| 567 |
*/ |
| 568 |
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| 569 |
return 4; |
| 570 |
/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ |
| 571 |
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) |
| 572 |
return 5; |
| 573 |
/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ |
| 574 |
return 0; |
| 575 |
} |
| 576 |
} |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) |
| 579 |
{ |
| 580 |
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { |
| 581 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 582 |
x509v3_cache_extensions(x); |
| 583 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| 584 |
} |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
return check_ca(x); |
| 587 |
} |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ |
| 590 |
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) |
| 591 |
{ |
| 592 |
int ca_ret; |
| 593 |
ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| 594 |
if (!ca_ret) |
| 595 |
return 0; |
| 596 |
/* check nsCertType if present */ |
| 597 |
if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) |
| 598 |
return ca_ret; |
| 599 |
else |
| 600 |
return 0; |
| 601 |
} |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 604 |
int ca) |
| 605 |
{ |
| 606 |
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| 607 |
return 0; |
| 608 |
if (ca) |
| 609 |
return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| 610 |
/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ |
| 611 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) |
| 612 |
return 0; |
| 613 |
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ |
| 614 |
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| 615 |
return 0; |
| 616 |
return 1; |
| 617 |
} |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
/* |
| 620 |
* Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or |
| 621 |
* key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual |
| 622 |
* key types. |
| 623 |
*/ |
| 624 |
#define KU_TLS \ |
| 625 |
KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 628 |
int ca) |
| 629 |
{ |
| 630 |
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) |
| 631 |
return 0; |
| 632 |
if (ca) |
| 633 |
return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) |
| 636 |
return 0; |
| 637 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) |
| 638 |
return 0; |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
return 1; |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
} |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 645 |
int ca) |
| 646 |
{ |
| 647 |
int ret; |
| 648 |
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); |
| 649 |
if (!ret || ca) |
| 650 |
return ret; |
| 651 |
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ |
| 652 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| 653 |
return 0; |
| 654 |
return ret; |
| 655 |
} |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
/* common S/MIME checks */ |
| 658 |
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 659 |
{ |
| 660 |
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) |
| 661 |
return 0; |
| 662 |
if (ca) { |
| 663 |
int ca_ret; |
| 664 |
ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| 665 |
if (!ca_ret) |
| 666 |
return 0; |
| 667 |
/* check nsCertType if present */ |
| 668 |
if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) |
| 669 |
return ca_ret; |
| 670 |
else |
| 671 |
return 0; |
| 672 |
} |
| 673 |
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { |
| 674 |
if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) |
| 675 |
return 1; |
| 676 |
/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ |
| 677 |
if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) |
| 678 |
return 2; |
| 679 |
return 0; |
| 680 |
} |
| 681 |
return 1; |
| 682 |
} |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 685 |
int ca) |
| 686 |
{ |
| 687 |
int ret; |
| 688 |
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| 689 |
if (!ret || ca) |
| 690 |
return ret; |
| 691 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) |
| 692 |
return 0; |
| 693 |
return ret; |
| 694 |
} |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 697 |
int ca) |
| 698 |
{ |
| 699 |
int ret; |
| 700 |
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); |
| 701 |
if (!ret || ca) |
| 702 |
return ret; |
| 703 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| 704 |
return 0; |
| 705 |
return ret; |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 709 |
int ca) |
| 710 |
{ |
| 711 |
if (ca) { |
| 712 |
int ca_ret; |
| 713 |
if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) |
| 714 |
return ca_ret; |
| 715 |
else |
| 716 |
return 0; |
| 717 |
} |
| 718 |
if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) |
| 719 |
return 0; |
| 720 |
return 1; |
| 721 |
} |
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
/* |
| 724 |
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA |
| 725 |
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. |
| 726 |
*/ |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 729 |
{ |
| 730 |
/* |
| 731 |
* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value |
| 732 |
* (2)? |
| 733 |
*/ |
| 734 |
if (ca) |
| 735 |
return check_ca(x); |
| 736 |
/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ |
| 737 |
return 1; |
| 738 |
} |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| 741 |
int ca) |
| 742 |
{ |
| 743 |
int i_ext; |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ |
| 746 |
if (ca) |
| 747 |
return check_ca(x); |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
/* |
| 750 |
* Check the optional key usage field: |
| 751 |
* if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature |
| 752 |
* and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall |
| 753 |
* be rejected). |
| 754 |
*/ |
| 755 |
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| 756 |
&& ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || |
| 757 |
!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) |
| 758 |
return 0; |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ |
| 761 |
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) |
| 762 |
return 0; |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ |
| 765 |
i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); |
| 766 |
if (i_ext >= 0) { |
| 767 |
X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); |
| 768 |
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) |
| 769 |
return 0; |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
return 1; |
| 773 |
} |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) |
| 776 |
{ |
| 777 |
return 1; |
| 778 |
} |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
/*- |
| 781 |
* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. |
| 782 |
* This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates |
| 783 |
* which have been looked up using some simple method such as by |
| 784 |
* subject name. |
| 785 |
* These are: |
| 786 |
* 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) |
| 787 |
* 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer |
| 788 |
* 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing |
| 789 |
* returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match |
| 790 |
* codes for X509_verify_cert() |
| 791 |
*/ |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
| 794 |
{ |
| 795 |
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), |
| 796 |
X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) |
| 797 |
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; |
| 798 |
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); |
| 799 |
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); |
| 800 |
|
| 801 |
if (subject->akid) { |
| 802 |
int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); |
| 803 |
if (ret != X509_V_OK) |
| 804 |
return ret; |
| 805 |
} |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| 808 |
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
| 809 |
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; |
| 810 |
} else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| 811 |
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; |
| 812 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 813 |
} |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) |
| 816 |
{ |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
if (!akid) |
| 819 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
/* Check key ids (if present) */ |
| 822 |
if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && |
| 823 |
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) |
| 824 |
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; |
| 825 |
/* Check serial number */ |
| 826 |
if (akid->serial && |
| 827 |
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) |
| 828 |
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| 829 |
/* Check issuer name */ |
| 830 |
if (akid->issuer) { |
| 831 |
/* |
| 832 |
* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF |
| 833 |
* GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but |
| 834 |
* we only take any notice of the first. |
| 835 |
*/ |
| 836 |
GENERAL_NAMES *gens; |
| 837 |
GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
| 838 |
X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| 839 |
int i; |
| 840 |
gens = akid->issuer; |
| 841 |
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| 842 |
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| 843 |
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| 844 |
nm = gen->d.dirn; |
| 845 |
break; |
| 846 |
} |
| 847 |
} |
| 848 |
if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) |
| 849 |
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| 850 |
} |
| 851 |
return X509_V_OK; |
| 852 |
} |