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/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ |
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* This package is an SSL implementation written |
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* by Eric Young ([email protected]). |
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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* |
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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* the code are not to be removed. |
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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* as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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* must display the following acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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* Eric Young ([email protected])" |
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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* copied and put under another distribution licence |
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
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*/ |
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/* ==================================================================== |
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
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* software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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* [email protected]. |
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* |
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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* |
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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* acknowledgment: |
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* ==================================================================== |
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* |
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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* ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim |
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* Hudson ([email protected]). |
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* |
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*/ |
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|
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#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP |
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|
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#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG |
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# ifndef NDEBUG |
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# define NDEBUG |
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# endif |
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#endif |
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|
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#include <assert.h> |
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#include <stdio.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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|
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#include "e_os.h" |
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|
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#include <openssl/crypto.h> |
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#include <openssl/rand.h> |
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#include "rand_lcl.h" |
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|
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#include <openssl/err.h> |
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|
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#ifdef BN_DEBUG |
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# define PREDICT |
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#endif |
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|
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/* #define PREDICT 1 */ |
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|
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#define STATE_SIZE 1023 |
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static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; |
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static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
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static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
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static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; |
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|
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static double entropy = 0; |
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static int initialized = 0; |
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|
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static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread |
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* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to |
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* prevent double locking) */ |
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/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ |
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/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ |
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static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; |
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|
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#ifdef PREDICT |
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int rand_predictable = 0; |
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#endif |
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|
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const char RAND_version[] = "RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
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|
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static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); |
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static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); |
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static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); |
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static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
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static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
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static int ssleay_rand_status(void); |
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|
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RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth = { |
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ssleay_rand_seed, |
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ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, |
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ssleay_rand_cleanup, |
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ssleay_rand_add, |
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ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, |
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ssleay_rand_status |
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}; |
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|
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RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) |
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{ |
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return (&rand_ssleay_meth); |
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} |
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|
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static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) |
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{ |
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OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); |
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state_num = 0; |
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state_index = 0; |
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OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
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md_count[0] = 0; |
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md_count[1] = 0; |
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entropy = 0; |
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initialized = 0; |
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} |
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|
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static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) |
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{ |
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int i, j, k, st_idx; |
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long md_c[2]; |
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
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EVP_MD_CTX m; |
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int do_not_lock; |
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|
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if (!num) |
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return; |
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|
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/* |
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage) |
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* |
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* The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for |
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* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash |
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* function as follows: The data passed to the hash function |
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* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' |
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* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as |
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* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' |
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* (which is incremented after each use). |
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* The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the |
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* 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the |
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* hash function. |
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*/ |
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|
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/* check if we already have the lock */ |
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if (crypto_lock_rand) { |
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CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
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CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
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do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
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} else |
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do_not_lock = 0; |
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|
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if (!do_not_lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
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st_idx = state_index; |
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|
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/* |
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* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread |
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* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's |
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* _some_ difference |
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*/ |
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md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
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md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
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|
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
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|
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
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state_index += num; |
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if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { |
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state_index %= STATE_SIZE; |
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state_num = STATE_SIZE; |
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} else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { |
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if (state_index > state_num) |
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state_num = state_index; |
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} |
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
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|
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/* |
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* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we |
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* will use now, but other threads may use them as well |
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*/ |
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|
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md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); |
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|
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if (!do_not_lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
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|
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); |
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for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { |
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j = (num - i); |
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j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; |
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|
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MD_Init(&m); |
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MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
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k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; |
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if (k > 0) { |
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MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k); |
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MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k); |
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} else |
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MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j); |
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|
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/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ |
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MD_Update(&m, buf, j); |
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/* |
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* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind |
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* to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, |
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* it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get |
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* really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very |
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* insecure keys. |
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*/ |
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|
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MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)); |
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MD_Final(&m, local_md); |
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md_c[1]++; |
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|
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buf = (const char *)buf + j; |
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|
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for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { |
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/* |
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* Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte |
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* of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and |
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* local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking |
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* could hurt performance more than necessary given that |
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* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the |
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* random state. |
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*/ |
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state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; |
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if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) |
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st_idx = 0; |
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} |
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} |
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
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|
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if (!do_not_lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
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/* |
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* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other |
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* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented |
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* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into |
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* md. |
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*/ |
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for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { |
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md[k] ^= local_md[k]; |
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} |
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if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ |
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entropy += add; |
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if (!do_not_lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
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|
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) |
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assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); |
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#endif |
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} |
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|
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static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
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{ |
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ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); |
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} |
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|
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int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock) |
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{ |
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static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; |
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int i, j, k; |
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size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; |
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int ok; |
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long md_c[2]; |
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
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EVP_MD_CTX m; |
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
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pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
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#endif |
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int do_stir_pool = 0; |
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|
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#ifdef PREDICT |
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if (rand_predictable) { |
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static unsigned char val = 0; |
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|
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for (i = 0; i < num; i++) |
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buf[i] = val++; |
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return (1); |
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} |
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#endif |
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|
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if (num <= 0) |
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return 1; |
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|
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); |
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/* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
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num_ceil = |
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(1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); |
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|
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/* |
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) |
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* |
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* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: |
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* |
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* Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from |
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* the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to |
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* be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' |
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* (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept |
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* in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the |
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* bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. |
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* |
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* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the |
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* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' |
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* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the |
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* global 'md'. |
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*/ |
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if (lock) |
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
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|
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/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ |
| 389 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 390 |
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); |
| 391 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 392 |
crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
if (!initialized) { |
| 395 |
RAND_poll(); |
| 396 |
initialized = 1; |
| 397 |
} |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
if (!stirred_pool) |
| 400 |
do_stir_pool = 1; |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
| 403 |
if (!ok) { |
| 404 |
/* |
| 405 |
* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG |
| 406 |
* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have |
| 407 |
* to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial |
| 408 |
* seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, |
| 409 |
* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* |
| 410 |
* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before |
| 411 |
* we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate |
| 412 |
* input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the |
| 413 |
* entropy limit has been reached. |
| 414 |
*/ |
| 415 |
entropy -= num; |
| 416 |
if (entropy < 0) |
| 417 |
entropy = 0; |
| 418 |
} |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
if (do_stir_pool) { |
| 421 |
/* |
| 422 |
* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we |
| 423 |
* better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly |
| 424 |
* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input |
| 425 |
* function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more |
| 426 |
* suitable for this purpose. |
| 427 |
*/ |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ |
| 430 |
while (n > 0) { |
| 431 |
#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 |
| 432 |
# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." |
| 433 |
#endif |
| 434 |
#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ |
| 435 |
/* |
| 436 |
* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that |
| 437 |
* ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. |
| 438 |
*/ |
| 439 |
ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); |
| 440 |
n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| 441 |
} |
| 442 |
if (ok) |
| 443 |
stirred_pool = 1; |
| 444 |
} |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
st_idx = state_index; |
| 447 |
st_num = state_num; |
| 448 |
md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
| 449 |
md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
| 450 |
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
state_index += num_ceil; |
| 453 |
if (state_index > state_num) |
| 454 |
state_index %= state_num; |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
/* |
| 457 |
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now |
| 458 |
* ours (but other threads may use them too) |
| 459 |
*/ |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
md_count[0] += 1; |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ |
| 464 |
crypto_lock_rand = 0; |
| 465 |
if (lock) |
| 466 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
while (num > 0) { |
| 469 |
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ |
| 470 |
j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; |
| 471 |
num -= j; |
| 472 |
MD_Init(&m); |
| 473 |
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
| 474 |
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ |
| 475 |
MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid); |
| 476 |
curr_pid = 0; |
| 477 |
} |
| 478 |
#endif |
| 479 |
MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 480 |
MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)); |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ |
| 483 |
/* |
| 484 |
* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small source of |
| 485 |
* entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised it may cause |
| 486 |
* programs such as purify or valgrind to complain. So for those |
| 487 |
* builds it is not used: the removal of such a small source of |
| 488 |
* entropy has negligible impact on security. |
| 489 |
*/ |
| 490 |
MD_Update(&m, buf, j); |
| 491 |
#endif |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; |
| 494 |
if (k > 0) { |
| 495 |
MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k); |
| 496 |
MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k); |
| 497 |
} else |
| 498 |
MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); |
| 499 |
MD_Final(&m, local_md); |
| 500 |
|
| 501 |
for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { |
| 502 |
/* may compete with other threads */ |
| 503 |
state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; |
| 504 |
if (st_idx >= st_num) |
| 505 |
st_idx = 0; |
| 506 |
if (i < j) |
| 507 |
*(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; |
| 508 |
} |
| 509 |
} |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
MD_Init(&m); |
| 512 |
MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)); |
| 513 |
MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 514 |
if (lock) |
| 515 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| 516 |
MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| 517 |
MD_Final(&m, md); |
| 518 |
if (lock) |
| 519 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); |
| 522 |
if (ok) |
| 523 |
return (1); |
| 524 |
else if (pseudo) |
| 525 |
return 0; |
| 526 |
else { |
| 527 |
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); |
| 528 |
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " |
| 529 |
"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); |
| 530 |
return (0); |
| 531 |
} |
| 532 |
} |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| 535 |
{ |
| 536 |
return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1); |
| 537 |
} |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
/* |
| 540 |
* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable |
| 541 |
*/ |
| 542 |
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| 543 |
{ |
| 544 |
return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1, 1); |
| 545 |
} |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
static int ssleay_rand_status(void) |
| 548 |
{ |
| 549 |
CRYPTO_THREADID cur; |
| 550 |
int ret; |
| 551 |
int do_not_lock; |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); |
| 554 |
/* |
| 555 |
* check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() |
| 556 |
* implementation calls RAND_status()) |
| 557 |
*/ |
| 558 |
if (crypto_lock_rand) { |
| 559 |
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 560 |
do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
| 561 |
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 562 |
} else |
| 563 |
do_not_lock = 0; |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
if (!do_not_lock) { |
| 566 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
/* |
| 569 |
* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again |
| 570 |
*/ |
| 571 |
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 572 |
CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); |
| 573 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); |
| 574 |
crypto_lock_rand = 1; |
| 575 |
} |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
if (!initialized) { |
| 578 |
RAND_poll(); |
| 579 |
initialized = 1; |
| 580 |
} |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
if (!do_not_lock) { |
| 585 |
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ |
| 586 |
crypto_lock_rand = 0; |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| 589 |
} |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
return ret; |
| 592 |
} |