| 1 |
""" |
| 2 |
Cross Site Request Forgery Middleware. |
| 3 |
|
| 4 |
This module provides a middleware that implements protection |
| 5 |
against request forgeries from other sites. |
| 6 |
""" |
| 7 |
|
| 8 |
import logging |
| 9 |
import string |
| 10 |
from collections import defaultdict |
| 11 |
from urllib.parse import urlsplit |
| 12 |
|
| 13 |
from django.conf import settings |
| 14 |
from django.core.exceptions import DisallowedHost, ImproperlyConfigured |
| 15 |
from django.http import HttpHeaders, UnreadablePostError |
| 16 |
from django.urls import get_callable |
| 17 |
from django.utils.cache import patch_vary_headers |
| 18 |
from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare, get_random_string |
| 19 |
from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin |
| 20 |
from django.utils.functional import cached_property |
| 21 |
from django.utils.http import is_same_domain |
| 22 |
from django.utils.log import log_response |
| 23 |
from django.utils.regex_helper import _lazy_re_compile |
| 24 |
|
| 25 |
logger = logging.getLogger("django.security.csrf") |
| 26 |
# This matches if any character is not in CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS. |
| 27 |
invalid_token_chars_re = _lazy_re_compile("[^a-zA-Z0-9]") |
| 28 |
|
| 29 |
REASON_BAD_ORIGIN = "Origin checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins." |
| 30 |
REASON_NO_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - no Referer." |
| 31 |
REASON_BAD_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins." |
| 32 |
REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE = "CSRF cookie not set." |
| 33 |
REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING = "CSRF token missing." |
| 34 |
REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - Referer is malformed." |
| 35 |
REASON_INSECURE_REFERER = ( |
| 36 |
"Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure." |
| 37 |
) |
| 38 |
# The reason strings below are for passing to InvalidTokenFormat. They are |
| 39 |
# phrases without a subject because they can be in reference to either the CSRF |
| 40 |
# cookie or non-cookie token. |
| 41 |
REASON_INCORRECT_LENGTH = "has incorrect length" |
| 42 |
REASON_INVALID_CHARACTERS = "has invalid characters" |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH = 32 |
| 45 |
CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH = 2 * CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH |
| 46 |
CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS = string.ascii_letters + string.digits |
| 47 |
CSRF_SESSION_KEY = "_csrftoken" |
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
def _get_failure_view(): |
| 51 |
"""Return the view to be used for CSRF rejections.""" |
| 52 |
return get_callable(settings.CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW) |
| 53 |
|
| 54 |
|
| 55 |
def _get_new_csrf_string(): |
| 56 |
return get_random_string(CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH, allowed_chars=CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS) |
| 57 |
|
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
def _mask_cipher_secret(secret): |
| 60 |
""" |
| 61 |
Given a secret (assumed to be a string of CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS), generate a |
| 62 |
token by adding a mask and applying it to the secret. |
| 63 |
""" |
| 64 |
mask = _get_new_csrf_string() |
| 65 |
chars = CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS |
| 66 |
pairs = zip((chars.index(x) for x in secret), (chars.index(x) for x in mask)) |
| 67 |
cipher = "".join(chars[(x + y) % len(chars)] for x, y in pairs) |
| 68 |
return mask + cipher |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
def _unmask_cipher_token(token): |
| 72 |
""" |
| 73 |
Given a token (assumed to be a string of CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS, of length |
| 74 |
CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, and that its first half is a mask), use it to decrypt |
| 75 |
the second half to produce the original secret. |
| 76 |
""" |
| 77 |
mask = token[:CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH] |
| 78 |
token = token[CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH:] |
| 79 |
chars = CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS |
| 80 |
pairs = zip((chars.index(x) for x in token), (chars.index(x) for x in mask)) |
| 81 |
return "".join(chars[x - y] for x, y in pairs) # Note negative values are ok |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
def _add_new_csrf_cookie(request): |
| 85 |
"""Generate a new random CSRF_COOKIE value, and add it to request.META.""" |
| 86 |
csrf_secret = _get_new_csrf_string() |
| 87 |
request.META.update( |
| 88 |
{ |
| 89 |
"CSRF_COOKIE": csrf_secret, |
| 90 |
"CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE": True, |
| 91 |
} |
| 92 |
) |
| 93 |
return csrf_secret |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
|
| 96 |
def get_token(request): |
| 97 |
""" |
| 98 |
Return the CSRF token required for a POST form. The token is an |
| 99 |
alphanumeric value. A new token is created if one is not already set. |
| 100 |
|
| 101 |
A side effect of calling this function is to make the csrf_protect |
| 102 |
decorator and the CsrfViewMiddleware add a CSRF cookie and a 'Vary: Cookie' |
| 103 |
header to the outgoing response. For this reason, you may need to use this |
| 104 |
function lazily, as is done by the csrf context processor. |
| 105 |
""" |
| 106 |
if "CSRF_COOKIE" in request.META: |
| 107 |
csrf_secret = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] |
| 108 |
# Since the cookie is being used, flag to send the cookie in |
| 109 |
# process_response() (even if the client already has it) in order to |
| 110 |
# renew the expiry timer. |
| 111 |
request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"] = True |
| 112 |
else: |
| 113 |
csrf_secret = _add_new_csrf_cookie(request) |
| 114 |
return _mask_cipher_secret(csrf_secret) |
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
|
| 117 |
def rotate_token(request): |
| 118 |
""" |
| 119 |
Change the CSRF token in use for a request - should be done on login |
| 120 |
for security purposes. |
| 121 |
""" |
| 122 |
_add_new_csrf_cookie(request) |
| 123 |
|
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
class InvalidTokenFormat(Exception): |
| 126 |
def __init__(self, reason): |
| 127 |
self.reason = reason |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
def _check_token_format(token): |
| 131 |
""" |
| 132 |
Raise an InvalidTokenFormat error if the token has an invalid length or |
| 133 |
characters that aren't allowed. The token argument can be a CSRF cookie |
| 134 |
secret or non-cookie CSRF token, and either masked or unmasked. |
| 135 |
""" |
| 136 |
if len(token) not in (CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH): |
| 137 |
raise InvalidTokenFormat(REASON_INCORRECT_LENGTH) |
| 138 |
# Make sure all characters are in CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS. |
| 139 |
if invalid_token_chars_re.search(token): |
| 140 |
raise InvalidTokenFormat(REASON_INVALID_CHARACTERS) |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
def _does_token_match(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret): |
| 144 |
""" |
| 145 |
Return whether the given CSRF token matches the given CSRF secret, after |
| 146 |
unmasking the token if necessary. |
| 147 |
|
| 148 |
This function assumes that the request_csrf_token argument has been |
| 149 |
validated to have the correct length (CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH or |
| 150 |
CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH characters) and allowed characters, and that if it has |
| 151 |
length CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, it is a masked secret. |
| 152 |
""" |
| 153 |
# Only unmask tokens that are exactly CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH characters long. |
| 154 |
if len(request_csrf_token) == CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH: |
| 155 |
request_csrf_token = _unmask_cipher_token(request_csrf_token) |
| 156 |
assert len(request_csrf_token) == CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH |
| 157 |
return constant_time_compare(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret) |
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
class RejectRequest(Exception): |
| 161 |
def __init__(self, reason): |
| 162 |
self.reason = reason |
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
|
| 165 |
class CsrfViewMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): |
| 166 |
""" |
| 167 |
Require a present and correct csrfmiddlewaretoken for POST requests that |
| 168 |
have a CSRF cookie, and set an outgoing CSRF cookie. |
| 169 |
|
| 170 |
This middleware should be used in conjunction with the {% csrf_token %} |
| 171 |
template tag. |
| 172 |
""" |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
@cached_property |
| 175 |
def csrf_trusted_origins_hosts(self): |
| 176 |
return [ |
| 177 |
urlsplit(origin).netloc.lstrip("*") |
| 178 |
for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS |
| 179 |
] |
| 180 |
|
| 181 |
@cached_property |
| 182 |
def allowed_origins_exact(self): |
| 183 |
return {origin for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS if "*" not in origin} |
| 184 |
|
| 185 |
@cached_property |
| 186 |
def allowed_origin_subdomains(self): |
| 187 |
""" |
| 188 |
A mapping of allowed schemes to list of allowed netlocs, where all |
| 189 |
subdomains of the netloc are allowed. |
| 190 |
""" |
| 191 |
allowed_origin_subdomains = defaultdict(list) |
| 192 |
for parsed in ( |
| 193 |
urlsplit(origin) |
| 194 |
for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS |
| 195 |
if "*" in origin |
| 196 |
): |
| 197 |
allowed_origin_subdomains[parsed.scheme].append(parsed.netloc.lstrip("*")) |
| 198 |
return allowed_origin_subdomains |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
# The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the |
| 201 |
# requires_csrf_token decorator. |
| 202 |
def _accept(self, request): |
| 203 |
# Avoid checking the request twice by adding a custom attribute to |
| 204 |
# request. This will be relevant when both decorator and middleware |
| 205 |
# are used. |
| 206 |
request.csrf_processing_done = True |
| 207 |
return None |
| 208 |
|
| 209 |
def _reject(self, request, reason): |
| 210 |
response = _get_failure_view()(request, reason=reason) |
| 211 |
log_response( |
| 212 |
"Forbidden (%s): %s", |
| 213 |
reason, |
| 214 |
request.path, |
| 215 |
response=response, |
| 216 |
request=request, |
| 217 |
logger=logger, |
| 218 |
) |
| 219 |
return response |
| 220 |
|
| 221 |
def _get_secret(self, request): |
| 222 |
""" |
| 223 |
Return the CSRF secret originally associated with the request, or None |
| 224 |
if it didn't have one. |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
If the CSRF_USE_SESSIONS setting is false, raises InvalidTokenFormat if |
| 227 |
the request's secret has invalid characters or an invalid length. |
| 228 |
""" |
| 229 |
if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS: |
| 230 |
try: |
| 231 |
csrf_secret = request.session.get(CSRF_SESSION_KEY) |
| 232 |
except AttributeError: |
| 233 |
raise ImproperlyConfigured( |
| 234 |
"CSRF_USE_SESSIONS is enabled, but request.session is not " |
| 235 |
"set. SessionMiddleware must appear before CsrfViewMiddleware " |
| 236 |
"in MIDDLEWARE." |
| 237 |
) |
| 238 |
else: |
| 239 |
try: |
| 240 |
csrf_secret = request.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME] |
| 241 |
except KeyError: |
| 242 |
csrf_secret = None |
| 243 |
else: |
| 244 |
# This can raise InvalidTokenFormat. |
| 245 |
_check_token_format(csrf_secret) |
| 246 |
if csrf_secret is None: |
| 247 |
return None |
| 248 |
# Django versions before 4.0 masked the secret before storing. |
| 249 |
if len(csrf_secret) == CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH: |
| 250 |
csrf_secret = _unmask_cipher_token(csrf_secret) |
| 251 |
return csrf_secret |
| 252 |
|
| 253 |
def _set_csrf_cookie(self, request, response): |
| 254 |
if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS: |
| 255 |
if request.session.get(CSRF_SESSION_KEY) != request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"]: |
| 256 |
request.session[CSRF_SESSION_KEY] = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] |
| 257 |
else: |
| 258 |
response.set_cookie( |
| 259 |
settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, |
| 260 |
request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"], |
| 261 |
max_age=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_AGE, |
| 262 |
domain=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN, |
| 263 |
path=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_PATH, |
| 264 |
secure=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE, |
| 265 |
httponly=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY, |
| 266 |
samesite=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SAMESITE, |
| 267 |
) |
| 268 |
# Set the Vary header since content varies with the CSRF cookie. |
| 269 |
patch_vary_headers(response, ("Cookie",)) |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
def _origin_verified(self, request): |
| 272 |
request_origin = request.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] |
| 273 |
try: |
| 274 |
good_host = request.get_host() |
| 275 |
except DisallowedHost: |
| 276 |
pass |
| 277 |
else: |
| 278 |
good_origin = "%s://%s" % ( |
| 279 |
"https" if request.is_secure() else "http", |
| 280 |
good_host, |
| 281 |
) |
| 282 |
if request_origin == good_origin: |
| 283 |
return True |
| 284 |
if request_origin in self.allowed_origins_exact: |
| 285 |
return True |
| 286 |
try: |
| 287 |
parsed_origin = urlsplit(request_origin) |
| 288 |
except ValueError: |
| 289 |
return False |
| 290 |
request_scheme = parsed_origin.scheme |
| 291 |
request_netloc = parsed_origin.netloc |
| 292 |
return any( |
| 293 |
is_same_domain(request_netloc, host) |
| 294 |
for host in self.allowed_origin_subdomains.get(request_scheme, ()) |
| 295 |
) |
| 296 |
|
| 297 |
def _check_referer(self, request): |
| 298 |
referer = request.META.get("HTTP_REFERER") |
| 299 |
if referer is None: |
| 300 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_NO_REFERER) |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
try: |
| 303 |
referer = urlsplit(referer) |
| 304 |
except ValueError: |
| 305 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER) |
| 306 |
|
| 307 |
# Make sure we have a valid URL for Referer. |
| 308 |
if "" in (referer.scheme, referer.netloc): |
| 309 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER) |
| 310 |
|
| 311 |
# Ensure that our Referer is also secure. |
| 312 |
if referer.scheme != "https": |
| 313 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_INSECURE_REFERER) |
| 314 |
|
| 315 |
if any( |
| 316 |
is_same_domain(referer.netloc, host) |
| 317 |
for host in self.csrf_trusted_origins_hosts |
| 318 |
): |
| 319 |
return |
| 320 |
# Allow matching the configured cookie domain. |
| 321 |
good_referer = ( |
| 322 |
settings.SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN |
| 323 |
if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS |
| 324 |
else settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN |
| 325 |
) |
| 326 |
if good_referer is None: |
| 327 |
# If no cookie domain is configured, allow matching the current |
| 328 |
# host:port exactly if it's permitted by ALLOWED_HOSTS. |
| 329 |
try: |
| 330 |
# request.get_host() includes the port. |
| 331 |
good_referer = request.get_host() |
| 332 |
except DisallowedHost: |
| 333 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_BAD_REFERER % referer.geturl()) |
| 334 |
else: |
| 335 |
server_port = request.get_port() |
| 336 |
if server_port not in ("443", "80"): |
| 337 |
good_referer = "%s:%s" % (good_referer, server_port) |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
if not is_same_domain(referer.netloc, good_referer): |
| 340 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_BAD_REFERER % referer.geturl()) |
| 341 |
|
| 342 |
def _bad_token_message(self, reason, token_source): |
| 343 |
if token_source != "POST": |
| 344 |
# Assume it is a settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME value. |
| 345 |
header_name = HttpHeaders.parse_header_name(token_source) |
| 346 |
token_source = f"the {header_name!r} HTTP header" |
| 347 |
return f"CSRF token from {token_source} {reason}." |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
def _check_token(self, request): |
| 350 |
# Access csrf_secret via self._get_secret() as rotate_token() may have |
| 351 |
# been called by an authentication middleware during the |
| 352 |
# process_request() phase. |
| 353 |
try: |
| 354 |
csrf_secret = self._get_secret(request) |
| 355 |
except InvalidTokenFormat as exc: |
| 356 |
raise RejectRequest(f"CSRF cookie {exc.reason}.") |
| 357 |
|
| 358 |
if csrf_secret is None: |
| 359 |
# No CSRF cookie. For POST requests, we insist on a CSRF cookie, |
| 360 |
# and in this way we can avoid all CSRF attacks, including login |
| 361 |
# CSRF. |
| 362 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE) |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
# Check non-cookie token for match. |
| 365 |
request_csrf_token = "" |
| 366 |
if request.method == "POST": |
| 367 |
try: |
| 368 |
request_csrf_token = request.POST.get("csrfmiddlewaretoken", "") |
| 369 |
except UnreadablePostError: |
| 370 |
# Handle a broken connection before we've completed reading the |
| 371 |
# POST data. process_view shouldn't raise any exceptions, so |
| 372 |
# we'll ignore and serve the user a 403 (assuming they're still |
| 373 |
# listening, which they probably aren't because of the error). |
| 374 |
pass |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
if request_csrf_token == "": |
| 377 |
# Fall back to X-CSRFToken, to make things easier for AJAX, and |
| 378 |
# possible for PUT/DELETE. |
| 379 |
try: |
| 380 |
# This can have length CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH or CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, |
| 381 |
# depending on whether the client obtained the token from |
| 382 |
# the DOM or the cookie (and if the cookie, whether the cookie |
| 383 |
# was masked or unmasked). |
| 384 |
request_csrf_token = request.META[settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME] |
| 385 |
except KeyError: |
| 386 |
raise RejectRequest(REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING) |
| 387 |
token_source = settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME |
| 388 |
else: |
| 389 |
token_source = "POST" |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
try: |
| 392 |
_check_token_format(request_csrf_token) |
| 393 |
except InvalidTokenFormat as exc: |
| 394 |
reason = self._bad_token_message(exc.reason, token_source) |
| 395 |
raise RejectRequest(reason) |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
if not _does_token_match(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret): |
| 398 |
reason = self._bad_token_message("incorrect", token_source) |
| 399 |
raise RejectRequest(reason) |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
def process_request(self, request): |
| 402 |
try: |
| 403 |
csrf_secret = self._get_secret(request) |
| 404 |
except InvalidTokenFormat: |
| 405 |
_add_new_csrf_cookie(request) |
| 406 |
else: |
| 407 |
if csrf_secret is not None: |
| 408 |
# Use the same secret next time. If the secret was originally |
| 409 |
# masked, this also causes it to be replaced with the unmasked |
| 410 |
# form, but only in cases where the secret is already getting |
| 411 |
# saved anyways. |
| 412 |
request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = csrf_secret |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
def process_view(self, request, callback, callback_args, callback_kwargs): |
| 415 |
if getattr(request, "csrf_processing_done", False): |
| 416 |
return None |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
# Wait until request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] has been manipulated before |
| 419 |
# bailing out, so that get_token still works |
| 420 |
if getattr(callback, "csrf_exempt", False): |
| 421 |
return None |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
# Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC 9110 needs protection |
| 424 |
if request.method in ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"): |
| 425 |
return self._accept(request) |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
if getattr(request, "_dont_enforce_csrf_checks", False): |
| 428 |
# Mechanism to turn off CSRF checks for test suite. It comes after |
| 429 |
# the creation of CSRF cookies, so that everything else continues |
| 430 |
# to work exactly the same (e.g. cookies are sent, etc.), but |
| 431 |
# before any branches that call the _reject method. |
| 432 |
return self._accept(request) |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
# Reject the request if the Origin header doesn't match an allowed |
| 435 |
# value. |
| 436 |
if "HTTP_ORIGIN" in request.META: |
| 437 |
if not self._origin_verified(request): |
| 438 |
return self._reject( |
| 439 |
request, REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % request.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] |
| 440 |
) |
| 441 |
elif request.is_secure(): |
| 442 |
# If the Origin header wasn't provided, reject HTTPS requests if |
| 443 |
# the Referer header doesn't match an allowed value. |
| 444 |
# |
| 445 |
# Suppose user visits http://example.com/ |
| 446 |
# An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a |
| 447 |
# POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and |
| 448 |
# submits it via JavaScript. |
| 449 |
# |
| 450 |
# The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but |
| 451 |
# that's no problem for a MITM and the session-independent secret |
| 452 |
# we're using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF protection. This |
| 453 |
# is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone using HTTPS expects |
| 454 |
# better! For this reason, for https://example.com/ we need |
| 455 |
# additional protection that treats http://example.com/ as |
| 456 |
# completely untrusted. Under HTTPS, Barth et al. found that the |
| 457 |
# Referer header is missing for same-domain requests in only about |
| 458 |
# 0.2% of cases or less, so we can use strict Referer checking. |
| 459 |
try: |
| 460 |
self._check_referer(request) |
| 461 |
except RejectRequest as exc: |
| 462 |
return self._reject(request, exc.reason) |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
try: |
| 465 |
self._check_token(request) |
| 466 |
except RejectRequest as exc: |
| 467 |
return self._reject(request, exc.reason) |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
return self._accept(request) |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
def process_response(self, request, response): |
| 472 |
if request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"): |
| 473 |
self._set_csrf_cookie(request, response) |
| 474 |
# Unset the flag to prevent _set_csrf_cookie() from being |
| 475 |
# unnecessarily called again in process_response() by other |
| 476 |
# instances of CsrfViewMiddleware. This can happen e.g. when both a |
| 477 |
# decorator and middleware are used. However, |
| 478 |
# CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE is still respected in subsequent calls |
| 479 |
# e.g. in case rotate_token() is called in process_response() later |
| 480 |
# by custom middleware but before those subsequent calls. |
| 481 |
request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"] = False |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
return response |